At the end of the first dayas talks, Kennedy returned to the subject of Poland and argued that democratic elections there might well replace the current Soviet-friendly government with one that was closer to the West. Khrushchev feigned shock. It was not respectful, he said, for Kennedy ato speak that way about a government the U.S. recognizes and with which it has diplomatic relations.a He argued that Polandas aelection system is more democratic than that in the United States.a Kennedyas subsequent effort to differentiate between Americaas multi-party system and single-party Poland was lost on Khrushchev. The two men could not agree on the definition of democracy, let alone on whether Poland had one.

Kennedy and Khrushchev circ.u.mnavigated the globe geographically and philosophically with Khrushchev thrusts and Kennedy parries on issues ranging from Angola to Laos. Khrushchevas biggest concession of the day would be agreement to accept a neutral, independent Laosa"a deal that their underlings would negotiate on the Viennese sidelines. Uncharacteristically, he demanded little from Kennedy in exchange.

Khrushchev was clearing out the underbrush for what he wanted to be the next dayas all-consuming focus: Berlin.

Kennedy declared an evening break at 6:45, after six hours of nearly uninterrupted discussion. Weary and drawn, Kennedy noted the lateness of the hour and suggested that the next agenda item, the question of a nuclear test ban, could be discussed that night over dinner with the Austrian president, so that most of the following day could be given over to Berlin. Kennedy also gave Khrushchev the option of discussing both issues the following day.

Kennedy wanted to ensure that Khrushchev didnat stray from his pre-summit commitment to discuss a test ban, something he knew was of little interest to Moscow, before they took on Berlin.

With Kennedy glancing at his watch, Khrushchev pounced on the mention of Berlin. He said he would agree to discuss nuclear testing only in the context of general disarmament issues. That was an approach Kennedy opposed for the simple reason that a test ban could be agreed upon quickly, while concluding far-reaching arms reduction agreements could consume years of negotiation.

Regarding Berlin, Khrushchev said his demands would have to be satisfied the following day or he would move unilaterally. aThe Soviet Union hopes that the U.S. will understand this question so that both countries can sign a peace treaty together,a he said. aThis would improve relations. But if the United States refuses to sign a peace treaty, the Soviet Union will do so and nothing will stop it.a After a Soviet limo drove Khrushchev away, a dazed Kennedy turned to Amba.s.sador Thompson on the U.S. residence steps and asked, aIs it always like this?a aPar for the course,a said Thompson.

Thompson restrained himself from telling the president how much better matters might have gone had he taken the advice he had been given to avoid ideological debate. Thompson knew the next dayas Berlin discussion was likely to be even more difficult.

It was only the halftime break at the Vienna Summit, but it was already clear that Team USA was losing.

Kennedy had reinforced Khrushchevas impression of his weakness. aThis man is very inexperienced, even immature,a Khrushchev told his interpreter Oleg Troyanovsky. aCompared to him, Eisenhower is a man of intelligence and vision.a In the years that followed, then Vienna-based U.S. diplomat William Lloyd Stearman would teach students about the summitas lessons in a lecture he called aLittle Boy Blue Meets Al Capone.a He thought that t.i.tle captured the naive, almost apologetic approach Kennedy had followed in the face of Khrushchevas brutal a.s.saults. He believed the Bay of Pigs had cut into the presidentas confidence at the summit and had made Khrushchev feel that aKennedy was now his pigeon.a Stearmanas insights were better informed than most observersa because he was regularly briefed in Vienna by his friend Martin Hillenbrand, who was the note-taker at the Kennedya"Khrushchev meeting. Stearmanas view was that the talks had gone astray partly because Kennedy had been so ill served by his key advisers.

Stearman dismissed Secretary of State Rusk as an Asia expert who lacked sufficient judgment on Soviet issues. National Security Advisor Bundy was more cerebral than decisive, Stearman believed. Missing at the heart of the administration were advisers who could bring Kennedy the sense of historic moment and accompanying strategic direction that Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles had supplied Truman and Eisenhower.

By Stearmanas account, Kennedy had also hurt his chances of success during the pre-summit planning by going around his national security staff and doing much of the planning secretly between Bolshakov and his brother Bobby. When the talks began to head in the wrong direction, Kennedy lacked backup staff with adequate knowledge of the preparations to help him change direction.

Mercifully, the U.S. emba.s.sy residence where Kennedy was staying also had a bathtub, though it was more modest than the gilded basin of Paris. As Kennedy soaked, OaDonnell asked the president about the awkward moment at the beginning of the day when he was sizing up the Soviet leader on the residence steps.

aAfter all the studying and talking Iave done on him in the last few weeks, you canat blame me for being interested in getting a look at him,a he said.

Was he different than forecast? asked OaDonnell.

aNot really,a said Kennedy, but then he corrected himself. aMaybe [he was] a little more unreasonable [than expected]a. From what I read and from what people told me, I expected him to be smart and tough. He would have to be smart and tough to work his way to the top in a government like that one.a Dave Powers told the president that he and OaDonnell had watched from the second-floor window as the Soviet leader went after him during their walk in the garden. aYou seemed pretty calm while he was giving you a hard time out there.a Kennedy shrugged. aWhat did you expect me to do?a he asked. aTake off one of my shoes and hit him over the head with it?a He said Khrushchev had been battering him on Berlin in an effort to wear him down over the issue. Khrushchev had questioned how the U.S. could support the notion of German unification. The Soviet leader had said he lacked all sympathy for Germans, who had killed his son in the war.

Kennedy had reminded Khrushchev that he had lost his brother as well, but the U.S. would not turn its back on West Germany nor pull out of Berlin. aAnd thatas that,a Kennedy had told Khrushchev.

Kennedy told his friends about Khrushchevas tough response to his concerns about the possibility of miscalculation on either side leading to war. aKhrushchev went berserk,a he said. He told OaDonnell that he would make a mental note to stay away from the word during the rest of their talks.

Austrian President Adolf Schrf had a protocol problem to solve before his grand gala dinner that evening at Schnbrunn Palace. Which of the two leadersa wives should sit at his right? he wondered.

On the one hand, Khrushchev had freed Vienna from the possible fate of a divided Berlin by allowing it to embrace independence and neutrality through the Austrian state treaty of May 15, 1955. Because of that, Khrushchevas wife, Nina, had earned pride of place. Yet the Viennese loved the Kennedys, and Austrians, despite their neutrality, felt that where they belonged was the West.

In a diplomatic compromise, Schrf would seat Madame Khrushchev to his right at the dinner, and Mrs. Kennedy would have the honored position for the second half of the evening, during performances in the music room.

It was Austriaas coming-out party. More than six thousand Viennese crowded around the floodlit gates of the 265-year-old palace to watch Kennedy and Khrushchev arrive. The palace staff had waxed the parquet floor to a perfect sheen and scrubbed the windows until they sparkled. The most valuable of the antiques were removed from the museumas display rooms and positioned for use. Staff collected flowers from the palace gardens and arranged them so generously on the tables that they perfumed the entire hall. The tables were set with the aGold Eagle Service,a a priceless porcelain collection with the Austrian double-headed eagle embossed on a white background that had been used by Emperor Franz Joseph.

Aside from the fact that the meals were served cold, the Austrians patted themselves on the back on an evening well done. The eveningas guests noticed how Jackie and Nina had hit it off. Jackie wore a floor-length pink sheath dress. Designed by Oleg Ca.s.sini, the gown was sleeveless and low-waisted. Nina dressed in a dark silk dress laced with a faint golden threada"a more proletariat choice.

Their husbands struck the same contrast. Kennedy was in black tie and Khrushchev in a plain dark suit and checkered gray tie. Waiters in white gloves, knee breeches, and gold braid moved through the corridors and across the s.p.a.cious rooms bearing silver trays laden with drinks.

aMr. Khrushchev,a a photographer asked, awonat you shake hands with Mr. Kennedy for us?a aIad like to shake her hand first.a Khrushchev grinned and nodded to the presidentas wife.

a.s.sociated Press reporter Eddy Gilmore scribbled that beside Jackie athe tough and often belligerent Communist leader looked like a smitten schoolboy when the ice thaws along the Volga in springtime.a Khrushchev went out of his way to sit beside Jackie while the chamber ensemble of the Vienna Philharmonic played Mozart and then the Vienna State Operaas dance company performed the aBlue Danubea waltz.

Kennedyas performance was not nearly as graceful. Just before the music began, he lowered himself onto a chair, only to find that it already held Khrushchevas wife. He stopped just short of landing in her lap.

He smiled an apology. The Vienna Summit wasnat going well at all.

11.

VIENNA: THE THREAT OF WAR.

The U.S. is unwilling to normalize the situation in the most dangerous spot in the world. The USSR wants to perform an operation on this sore spota"to eliminate this thorn, this ulcera.

Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy, Vienna, June 4, 1961.

I never met a man like this. I talked about how a nuclear exchange would kill seventy million people in ten minutes and he just looked at me as if to say, aSo what?a My impression was he just didnat give a d.a.m.n if it came to that.

President Kennedy to reporter Hugh Sidey, Time, June 1961.

SOVIET EMBa.s.sY, VIENNA.

10:15 A.M., SUNDAY, JUNE 4, 1961.

Standing before the Soviet emba.s.sy, Nikita Khrushchev shifted from side to side like a boxer eager to come back out of his corner after having won the opening rounds. A wide grin revealed the gap in his front teeth as he thrust out his small, plump hand to greet Kennedy.

For all the Soviet stateas working-cla.s.s pretensions, Moscowas emba.s.sy was unashamedly imperial. Acquired by Tsarist Russia in the late nineteenth century, its neo-Renaissance facade opened up to a grand entry hall of natural granite and marble. aI greet you on a small piece of Soviet territory,a said Khrushchev to Kennedy. He then threw out a Russian proverb whose meaning escaped Kennedy: aSometimes we drink out of a small gla.s.s but we speak with great feelings.a After some nine minutes of small talk, none of it memorable, Khrushchev took his American guests through a pillared corridor to a wide staircase that led to the second floor. There they sat on sofas in a twenty-foot-square conference room with red damask walls.

The manner in which the two men had spent the morning ahead of their second dayas meeting spoke to their differences. The Catholic Kennedys had listened to the Vienna Boysa Choir and had taken Ma.s.s from Cardinal Franz Knig in the Gothic magnificence of St. Stephenas Cathedral. The First Ladyas eyes had welled up as she fell to her knees to pray. When the Kennedys emerged from worship, a throng cheered on the cobblestoned square outside. At about the same time, a far smaller and less enthusiastic crowd watched with curiosity as the leader of the atheist Soviet Union laid a wreath at the Soviet war memorial at the Schwarzenbergplatz. Locals knew it bitterly as the amonument to the unknown rapist.a In the conference room where the two delegations gathered, the matching red curtains were pulled shut. They concealed the emba.s.syas tall and broad windows and created an atmosphere of gloom, keeping out the dayas bright sun. Kennedy began with the same sort of small talk he had employed the first day, asking the Soviet premier about his childhood. Khrushchev had no interest in discussing his peasant origins with this child of privilege. So he was curt, saying only that he was born in a Russian village near Kursk, less than ten kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

Shifting quickly to the present, he said the Soviet Union had recently found very large deposits of iron ore near Kursk, estimated at 30 billion tons. He said total reserves were likely to be ten times greater than that. By comparison, he reminded Kennedy, total iron ore deposits of the U.S. were only a fraction of that, at 5 billion tons. aSoviet deposits will be sufficient to cover the needs of the entire world for a long time to come,a he said.

In the first minutes of Day Two in Vienna, Khrushchev had turned what might have been a personal exchange about family matters into a boast about his countryas superior resource base. He did not ask about the presidentas upbringing, about which he knew quite enough. Impatiently, he suggested they move on to the dayas purpose: discussing Berlin and its future.

In its edition of that morning, the London Times had quoted a British diplomat on his concerns about the Vienna Summit. aWe hope the lad will be able to get out of the bear cage without being too badly mauled,a he had said. And Khrushchev had come out at the beginning of the second day with his claws bared. Despite progress their delegations had made overnight on Laos, he was unwilling to seize upon the issue as an example of how the two sides could reduce tensions.

U.S. and Soviet foreign secretaries and their staffs had reached agreement that they would accept a neutral Laos. It was a concession that could be politically costly to Khrushchev, as it would be opposed by the Chinese, the North Vietnamese, and the Pathet Lao, the Laotian communist movement. Instead of embracing Kennedy over the accord, however, Khrushchev accused him of amegalomania and delusions of grandeura for insisting that the U.S. would continue to safeguard its commitments in Asia.

Beyond that, Khrushchev resisted all of Kennedyas efforts to steer talks toward nuclear test ban issues. He rejected the presidentas logic that only an overall improvement of relations could open the way to an eventual Berlin settlement. For Khrushchev, Berlin had to come first.

Pushing for the test ban, Kennedy drew upon a Chinese proverb: aA journey of a thousand miles begins with one step.a aYou seem to know the Chinese very well,a Khrushchev said.

aWe may both get to know them better,a responded Kennedy.

Khrushchev smiled. aI know them well enough now,a he said. It was an unusual slip for the Soviet, a brief glimpse into his frustration with Mao.

However, the Soviets would doctor the final transcript, which would be provided to Beijing, adding another sentence that Khrushchev actually had never said to Kennedy: aChina is our neighbor, our friend, and our ally.a The most important exchange of the summit began with a Khrushchev warning. The Soviet leader prefaced his statement by saying Moscow had waited as long as it could for a Berlin solution. He said the position he was about to outline regarding Berlin would aaffect the relations between our two countries to a great extent and even more so if the U.S. were to misunderstand the Soviet position.a At that point, both menas advisers sat forward, knowing that everything else had been foreplay for this moment. aSixteen years have pa.s.sed since World War II,a said Khrushchev. aThe USSR lost twenty million people in that war and much of its territory was devastated. Now Germany, the country which unleashed World War II, has again acquired military power and has a.s.sumed a predominant position in NATO. Its generals hold high offices in that organization. This const.i.tutes a threat of World War III, which would be even more devastating than World War II.a For that reason, he told Kennedy, Moscow refused to tolerate any further delay regarding Berlin, because only West German militarists would gain from it. He said German unification was not a practical possibility and that even Germans didnat want it. So the Soviets would begin to act from the aactual state of affairs, namely, that two German States exist.a Khrushchev told Kennedy that it was his preference to reach agreement personally with him on a war-ending treaty that would alter Berlinas status. If that wasnat possible, however, he would act alone and end all postwar commitments made by the Soviets. He said thereafter West Berlin would be a afree citya where U.S. troops could remain, but only coexisting with Soviet troops. The Soviets would then join the U.S. in ensuring awhat the West calls West Berlinas freedom.a Moscow would also be aagreeablea to the presence of neutral troops or UN guarantees.

Kennedy began his response by thanking Khrushchev for asetting forth his views in such a frank manner.a Shot up with painkillers and amphetamines and snug in his corset, Kennedy realized Khrushchev had just delivered what amounted to a new ultimatum on Berlin. That required a clear and sharp response. It was a moment Kennedy had prepared for, and he measured each word carefully.

He stressed that the two men were talking no longer about lesser issues such as Laos but rather about the far more crucial topic of Berlin. This place was aof greatest interest to the U.S. We are in Berlin not because of someoneas sufferance. We fought our way there.a And though the U.S. casualties in World War II had not been as high as those of the Soviet Union, Kennedy said, awe are in Berlin not by agreement of East Germans but by contractual rightsa.

aThis is an area,a said Kennedy, awhere every President of the U.S. since World War II has been committed by treaty and other contractual rights and where every President has reaffirmed his faithfulness to those obligations. If we were expelled from that area, and if we accepted the loss of our rights, no one would have any confidence in U.S. commitments and pledges. U.S. national security is involved in this matter, because if we were to accept the Soviet proposal, U.S. commitments would be regarded as a mere sc.r.a.p of paper.a At the Vienna Summit until that point, words had tumbled over each other without consequence. Yet now note-takers sat forward, precisely scribbling their leadersa verbatim comments. The worldas two most powerful men were facing off over their most intractable and explosive issue.

It was the stuff of history.

aWest Europe is vital to our national security and we have supported it in two wars,a Kennedy said. aIf we were to leave West Berlin, Europe would be abandoned as well. So when we are talking about West Berlin, we are also talking about West Europe.a What was new for the Soviets was Kennedyas repeated emphasis on the qualifying word of aWesta in front of Berlin. No U.S. president had previously differentiated so clearly between his commitment to all of Berlin and to West Berlin. In perhaps the most important manhood moment of his presidency, Kennedy had made a unilateral concession. He reminded Khrushchev that the Soviet leader in their first dayas talks had agreed that athe ratios of [military] power today are equal.a So he thought it adifficult to understanda why a country like the Soviet Union, with such considerable achievements in s.p.a.ce and economy, should suggest that the U.S. leave a place of such vital interest where it was already established. He said the U.S. would never be willing to agree to give up rights it had awon by war.a Khrushchevas face reddened, as if it were a thermometer measuring a rise in his internal temperature. He interrupted to say that he understood Kennedyas words to mean the president did not want a peace treaty. He spat derisively that Kennedyas statement on U.S. national security sounded like athe U.S. might wish to go to Moscow [with its troops] because that too would, of course, improve its position.a aThe U.S. is not asking to go anywhere,a Kennedy responded. aWe are not talking about the U.S. going to Moscow or of the USSR going to New York. What we are talking about is that we are in Berlin and have been there for fifteen years. We suggest that we stay there.a Returning to a course he had tried a day earlier without success, Kennedy explored a more conciliatory path. He said that he knew the situation in Berlin ais not a satisfactory one.a That said, added Kennedy, aconditions in many parts of the world are not satisfactory,a and it was not the right time to change the balance in Berlin or in the world more generally. aIf this balance should change, the situation in West Europe as a whole would change, and this would be a most serious blow to the U.S.,a he said. aMr. Khrushchev would not accept similar loss and we cannot accept it either.a Until that point, Khrushchev had largely held his usual bombast in check. Yet now his arms were waving, his face turned crimson, and his voice rose to a truculent pitch as his words tumbled out in staccato spurts like angry machine-gun fire. aThe U.S. is unwilling to normalize the situation in the most dangerous spot in the world,a he said. aThe USSR wants to perform an operation on this sore spota"to eliminate this thorn, this ulcera"without prejudicing the interests of any side, but rather to the satisfaction of all peoples of the world.a The Soviet Union was not going to change Berlin by aintrigue or threata but by asolemnly signing a peace treaty. Now the President says that this action is directed against the interests of the U.S. Such a statement is difficult to understand indeed.a The Soviets did not want to change existing boundaries, he argued, but were only trying to formalize them so as to aimpede those people who want a new war.a Khrushchev spoke derisively of Adenaueras desire to revise Germanyas borders and regain territory it had lost after World War II. aHitler spoke of Germanyas need for Lebensraum to the Urals,a he said. aHitleras generals, who had helped him in his designs to execute his plans, are [now] high commanders in NATO.a He said the logic of the U.S. needing to protect its interests in Berlin acannot be understood and the USSR cannot accept it.a He told the president he was sorry, but that ano force in the worlda would stop Moscow from moving forward on its peace treaty.

He repeated again that sixteen years had pa.s.sed since the war. How much longer did Kennedy want Moscow to wait? Another sixteen years? Perhaps thirty years?

Khrushchev looked around the room at his colleagues and then said with a wave of his arm that he had lost a son in the last war, that Gromyko had lost two brothers, and that Mikoyan had also lost a son. aThere is not a single family in the USSR or the leadership of the USSR that did not lose at least one of its members in the war.a He conceded that American mothers mourn their sons just as deeply as do Soviet mothers, but that while the U.S. had lost thousands, the USSR had lost millions.

He then declared: aThe USSR will sign a peace treaty and the sovereignty of the GDR will be observed. Any violation of that sovereignty will be regarded by the USSR as an act of open aggressiona with all its attendant consequences.

Khrushchev was threatening war, just as de Gaulle had predicted. The American delegation sat in stunned silence as they awaited Kennedyas response.

The president calmly asked whether access routes to Berlin would remain open after the Soviets had agreed to such a peace treaty. Kennedy had already decided he could accept an outcome under which the Soviets concluded a treaty with the East Germans but did nothing to impede Western rights in West Berlin or Allied access to the city.

Khrushchev, however, said the new treaty would alter freedom of access.

That crossed Kennedyas red line.

aThis presents us with a most serious challenge and no one can foresee how serious the consequences might be,a said Kennedy. He said it was not his wish to come to Vienna only to abe denied our position in West Berlin and our access to that city.a He said he had hoped relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union could be improved through the Vienna Summit, but instead they were worsening. Kennedy said it was Moscowas business if it wanted to transfer its rights in Berlin to the East Germans, but the president could not allow Moscow to give away American rights.

Khrushchev began to probe the U.S. position. He wanted to know if an interim arrangement still might be possible along the lines that Eisenhower had discussed with hima"something that protected the prestige of both countries. All sides could set a time limit of six months for the two Germanys to negotiate a unification arrangement. If they failed during that timea"and Khrushchev was convinced they woulda"aanyone would be free to conclude a peace treaty.a Khrushchev said that even if the U.S. disagreed with the Soviet proposal, it should understand athe USSR can no longer delaya and would take action by yearas end that would make all access to West Berlin subject to East German control. He based his right to act on a statistical a.n.a.lysis of the difference in the price the two sides had paid to defeat the Germansa"the 20 milliona"plus people the Soviets had lost in World War II, compared to only 143,000 U.S. military dead.

Kennedy said it was those losses that motivated him to avoid a new war.

Repeating the word that he so hated, the Soviet leader reminded Kennedy of his worry that the Soviets might amiscalculate.a It seemed to Khrushchev it was the Americans who were in danger of miscalculation. aIf the U.S. should start a war over Berlin, let it be so,a he said. aThat is what the Pentagon has been wanting. However, Adenauer and Macmillan know very well what war means. If there is any madman who wants war, he should be put in a straitjacket!a Kennedyas team was stunned again. Now Khrushchev had used the word awar,a and he had done so three times. That was unheard-of in diplomatic discussions at every level.

As if to close the matter, Khrushchev flatly stated that the USSR would sign a peace treaty by the end of the year, altering Western rights in Berlin for all time, but that he was confident common sense and peace would prevail.

The Soviet leader had not yet responded to what amounted to a Kennedy proposal, so the president probed again. Kennedy stressed that he would not regard a peace treaty in itself as a belligerent act if Khrushchev left West Berlin untouched. aHowever, a peace treaty denying us our contractual rights is a belligerent act,a he said. aWhat is belligerent is transfer of our rights to East Germany.a It was increasingly clear what Kennedy was saying: Do what you want to with what is yours, but do not touch what is ours. If the U.S. ceded anything on West Berlin, the world awould not regard [the U.S.] as a serious country.a But as East Berlin was Soviet territory, he was suggesting that the USSR would be free to do as it pleased there.

Khrushchev did not acknowledge at the time what would later look like the makings of a deal that had been offered by Kennedy. Instead, the Soviet leader replied that the USSR awould never, under any conditions, accept U.S. rights in West Berlin after a peace treaty had been signed.a He then lashed out at what he considered U.S. mistreatment of the Soviet Union after the war. Khrushchev said the U.S. had deprived the USSR of reparations, rights, and interests in West Germany. Beyond that, he said the U.S. practiced a double standard by refusing to negotiate a war-ending peace treaty with East Germany although it had signed just such an agreement with the j.a.panese in 1951a"without consulting with Moscow in preparing the doc.u.ment. Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had led the Soviet delegation at the conference, where it had tried to stall the treaty and then refused to sign while complaining that the U.S. had not invited the Chinese and was creating an anti-Soviet, militaristic j.a.pan.

Kennedy countered that Khrushchev had publicly declared he would have signed the j.a.pan treaty if he had been in power at the time.

For Khrushchev, however, the point wasnat what he might have done but rather that the U.S. had not even sought Soviet agreement. Khrushchev called Kennedyas approach regarding Berlin a similar one of aI do what I want.a Khrushchev said he had seen enough of that sort of U.S. behavior. Moscow would sign its treaty with East Germany, he said, and the price would be great if the U.S. thereafter violated East German sovereignty over access to Berlin.

What he wanted, Kennedy countered, was not a conflict over Berlin but an overall mending of Easta"West German relations and of U.S.a"Soviet relations, so as to permit over time a solution to the whole German problem. He said he did not wish ato act in a way that would deprive the Soviet Union of its ties in Eastern Europe,a again rea.s.suring Khrushchev, as he had done the first day, that he would do nothing to upset the balance of power in Europe.

Kennedy noted that the Soviet leader had called him a young man, and the president suggested that Khrushchev was trying to take advantage of his relative inexperience. However, Kennedy said, he had anot a.s.sumed office to accept arrangements totally inimical to U.S. interests.a Khrushchev repeated that the only alternative to unilateral action would be an interim agreement under which the two Germanys could negotiate and after which all Allied rights would disappear. That would agive the semblance of responsibility for the problem having been turned over to the Germans themselves.a But as they would not agree to unification, Khrushchev was certain the outcome would be the same.

With an actoras sense of dramatic timing, Khrushchev then presented Kennedy a doc.u.ment, an aide-mmoire on the Berlin question, whose purpose was to give his ultimatum official force. No one on Kennedyas team had prepared the president for such a written Kremlin initiative. Bolshakov had not even hinted at such a move. Khrushchev said the Soviet side had prepared it so that the U.S. could study the Soviet position and aperhaps return to this question at a later date, if it wished to do so.a With that bold move, Khrushchev had put himself on a collision course with Kennedy over Berlin. He had acted in part because Kennedy, in clinging to the status quo, had not shown even Eisenhoweras willingness to negotiate the issue. That was difficult enough for Khrushchev to accept under Eisenhower, and before the U-2 incident. But now it was impossible.

The morning had pa.s.sed quickly.

While Khrushchev and Kennedy retreated to a tense lunch, their wives were out doing the town. In front of the Pallavicini Palace on the sun-bathed Josefsplatz, a crowd of a thousand had gathered to get a glimpse of the two women heading for lunch. A slight murmur greeted the Soviet, followed by an outburst of cheers for Jackie. Two American reporters felt sorry for the crowdas inattention to Nina, so as the Viennese shouted, aJa-kee! Ja-kee!a they countered with their own chant of aNina!a But it gained no following.

Reuters correspondent Adam Kellett-Long, who had been sent from Berlin to cover the summit, was horrified as he heard photographers shout at Jackie to stick out her b.r.e.a.s.t.s for more alluring shots. aAnd she did!a he recalled later. aShe behaved like Marilyn Monroe or a film star. She was lapping it up.a From the upstairs window of the restaurant, the two women looked down on the crowd. Jackie appeared very much like a fashion magazine ill.u.s.tration in her navy blue suit, black pillbox hat, and four strands of pearls and white gloves. Soviet press spokesmen didnat release what Nina was wearing, but the New York Times described her as looking like the housewife for whom Jackieas fashion magazines were produced. None of that disturbed Nina Petrovna, who found Jackieas conversation intelligent and who thought she alooked like a work of art.a She held Jackieas gloved hand aloft standing before the crowd in the window frame of their restauranta"a warmth that was absent from their husbandsa last supper.

The two men conversed about weapons manufacturing and arms policies. Khrushchev said he had scrutinized the presidentas May message to Congress in which he had dramatically increased defense spending. He said that he understood the U.S. could not disarm, controlled as it was by monopolists. However, he said, the U.S. buildup would force him also to increase the size of Soviet armed forces.

In that context, Khrushchev returned to their chat over lunch a day earlier at which he said he would consider a joint moon project. He regretted that such cooperation would be impossible as long as there was no disarmament. Khrushchev would not leave even this thin strand of new cooperation on the table.

Kennedy said perhaps they could at least coordinate the timing of their s.p.a.ce projects.

Lacking conviction, Khrushchev shrugged that such a course might be possible. He then lifted a gla.s.s of sweet Soviet champagne to Kennedy.

He joked that anatural love is better than love through intermediaries,a and that it was good the two men had now talked directly to each other.

He wanted the president to understand that the new Soviet ultimatum on Berlin awould not be directed against the U.S. or its allies.a He compared what Moscow was doing to a surgical operation, which was painful to the patient but necessary for survival. Mixing his metaphors, he said Moscow awants to cross that bridge and it will cross it.a Khrushchev conceded that U.S.a"Soviet relations would sustain agreat tensionsa but that he was certain athe sun will come out again and will shine brightly. The U.S. does not want Berlin, neither does the Soviet Uniona. The only party really interested in Berlin as such is Adenauer. He is an intelligent man but old. The Soviet Union cannot agree to having the old and moribund hold back the young and vigorous.a As he toasted Kennedy, Khrushchev conceded that he had put the president in a difficult position, as allies would question his decisions on Berlin. He then dismissed the influence and interests of allies, noting that Luxembourg should cause Kennedy no problem, just as the Soviet Unionas own unnamed allies awould not frighten anyone.a Khrushchev then raised his gla.s.s and noted that Kennedy as a religious man would say, aG.o.d should help us in this endeavor.a Khrushchev said he would rather raise his own drink to common sense rather than to G.o.d.

Kennedyas return toast focused on the two menas obligations in a nuclear age when the effects of a conflict awould go from generation to generation.a He stressed that each side ashould recognize the interests and the responsibilities of the other side.a The gift Kennedy had brought the Soviet leader rested before them on the table, a model of the USS Const.i.tution, whose guns, the president said, had a range of only a half-mile. In the nuclear age, where guns were intercontinental and the devastation would be far more horrible, Kennedy said leaders could not allow war to happen.

Kennedy referred to their setting in neutral Vienna, and he said that he hoped they would not leave a place that so symbolized the possibility of finding equitable solutions after having increased dangers to both sidesa security and prestige. aThis goal can be achieved only if each is wise and stays in his own area,a he said.

There it was again: Kennedyas solution to the Berlin Crisis. He was once more suggesting the Soviet could do whatever he wished on his own ground. It was a negotiating point he had repeated several times during the day in different formsa"and now he had employed it within his closing toast.

To take some of the sting out of that as a final word, Kennedy recalled that he had asked Khrushchev what job he had had when he was forty-four, the presidentas current age. The Kremlin boss had said he was head of the Moscow Planning Commission. Kennedy joked that he would like to head the Boston Planning Commission at age sixty-seven.

aPerhaps the President would like to become head of the planning commission of the whole world,a Khrushchev sneered.

No, said the president. Just Boston.

With their two days of talks ending so badly, Kennedy took a last stab at a more positive outcome. He asked Khrushchev for one more post-lunch meeting alone with their interpreters.

aI canat leave here without giving it one more try,a Kennedy told Kenny OaDonnell.

When the presidentas staff told him that that would throw them off their scheduled departure, Kennedy barked that nothing in the world could be more important at the moment than getting matters right with Khrushchev. aNo, weare not going on time! Iam not going to leave until I know more.a Throughout his life, Kennedy had depended on his charm and personality to overcome obstacles. Yet none of that had broken through Khrushchevas force field.

Kennedy opened their last, short exchange by acknowledging the importance of Berlin. However, he hoped that Khrushchev, in the interest of relations between their two countries, awould not present him with a situation so deeply involving our national interest.a He underscored yet again athe difference between a peace treaty and the rights of access to Berlin.a He hoped relations would unfold in a way that would avoid direct confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Yet with Kennedy already in his chokehold, Khrushchev squeezed harder. If the U.S. insisted on its rights, thus violating East German borders after the signing of a peace treaty, aforce would be met by force,a he declared. aThe U.S. should prepare for that, and the Soviet Union will do the same.a Before leaving Vienna, Kennedy wanted to understand clearly the options the Soviet was leaving him. Under the interim arrangement that Khrushchev had suggested, would U.S. military forces in Berlin remain, along with free access to the city? Kennedy asked.

Yes, for six monthsa time, responded Khrushchev.

And then the forces would have to be withdrawn? Kennedy asked.

Khrushchev said that was so.