"The Garibaldians were numerous about Monte-Rotondo. But the terrain like all that around Italian villages was covered with trees, hedges, etc. Under these conditions, I believe that the fire of sharpshooters would have been more effective than volleys, where the men estimate distances badly and do not aim."

NOTES

[Footnote 1: General Daumas (Manners and Customs of Algeria). Nocturnal Surprise and Extermination of a Camp.]

[Footnote 2: Among the Romans, mechanics and morale are so admirably united, that the one always comes to the aid of the other and never injures it.]

[Footnote 3: The Romans did not make light of the influence of a poet like Tyrtaeus. They did not despise any effective means. But they knew the value of each.]

[Footnote 4: Also their common sense led them to recognize immediately and appropriate arms better than their own.]

[Footnote 5: This is an excuse. The maniple was of perfect n.o.bility and, without the least difficulty, could face in any direction.]

[Footnote 6: This was an enveloping attack of an army and not of men or groups.

The Roman army formed a wedge and was attacked at the point and sides of the wedge; there was not a separate flank attack. That very day the maniple presented more depth than front.]

[Footnote 7: They had been sent to attack Hannibal's camp; they were repulsed and taken prisoner in their own camp after the battle.]

[Footnote 8: This extract is taken from the translation of Dom Thuillier. Livy does not state the precise number of Roman combatants. He says nothing had been neglected in order to render the Roman army the strongest possible, and from what he was told by some it numbered eighty-seven thousand two hundred men. That is the figure of Polybius. His account has killed, forty-five thousand; taken or escaped after the action, nineteen thousand. Total sixty-four thousand. What can have become of the twenty-three thousand remaining?]

[Footnote 9: The Numidian hors.e.m.e.n were a light irregular cavalry, excellent for skirmishing, hara.s.sing, terrifying, by their extraordinary shouts and their unbridled gallop. They were not able to hold out against a regular disciplined cavalry provided with bits and substantial arms. They were but a swarm of flies that always hara.s.ses and kills at the least mistake; elusive and perfect for a long pursuit and the ma.s.sacre of the vanquished to whom the Numidians gave neither rest nor truce. They were like Arab cavalry, badly armed for the combat, but sufficiently armed for butchering, as results show. The Arabian knife, the Kabyle knife, the Indian knife of our days, which is the favorite of the barbarian or savage, must play its part.]

[Footnote 10: They formed the third Roman line according to the order of battle of the Legion. The contraction of the first line into a point would naturally hem them in.]

[Footnote 11: Brought back by Hannibal who had reserved to himself the command of the center.]

[Footnote 12: The triarians, the third Roman line.]

[Footnote 13: What effect this might have, was shown in the battle of Alisia, where Caesar's men, forewarned by him, were nevertheless troubled by war-whoops behind them. The din of battle in rear has always demoralized troops.]

[Footnote 14: His cavalry consisted of seven thousand horse, of which five hundred were Gauls or Germans, the best hors.e.m.e.n of that time, nine hundred Galicians, five hundred Thracians, and Thessalians, Macedonians and Italians in various numbers.]

[Footnote 15: Caesar's legions in battle order were in three lines: four cohorts in the first line, two in the second, and three in the third. In this way the cohorts of a legion were, in battle, always supported by cohorts of the same legion.]

[Footnote 16: Caesar stated that in order to make up the numerical inferiority of his cavalry, he had chosen four hundred of the most alert young men, from among those marching ahead of the standards, and by daily exercise had them accustomed to fighting between his hors.e.m.e.n. He had in this way obtained such results that his thousand riders dared, in open field, to cope with Pompey's seven thousand cavalry without becoming frightened at their number.]

[Footnote 17: Any one who wishes to read in extenso is referred to the fight of the ten thousand against Pharnabazus in Bithynia, Xenophon, par. 34, page 569, Lisken & Sauvan edition.--In Polybius, the battle of the Tecinus, Chapt. XIII, of Book III.--In Caesar or those who followed him the battles against Scipio, Labienus, and Afranius, the Getae and the Numidians, par. 61, page 282, and par. 69, 70, 71 and 72, pp. 283, 285, and 286, in the African war, Lisken & Sauvan edition.]

[Footnote 18: In ancient combat, there was almost only, dead or lightly wounded.

In action, a severe wound or one that incapacitated a man was immediately followed by the finishing stroke.]

[Footnote 19: Hand-to-hand, sword-to-sword, serious fighting at short distances, was rare then. Likewise in the duels of our day blades are rarely crossed in actual practice.]

[Footnote 20: To-day, it is the riflemen who do nearly all the work of destruction.]

[Footnote 21: Considering Caesar's narrative what becomes of the mathematical theory of ma.s.ses, which is still discussed? If that theory had the least use, how could Marius ever have held out against the tide of the armies of the Cimbri and Teutons? In the battle of Pharsalus, the advice given by Triarius to Pompey's army, a counsel which was followed and which was from a man of experience, who had seen things close at hand, shows that the shock, the physical impulse of the ma.s.s was a by-word.

They knew what to think of it.]

[Footnote 22: The individual advance, in modern battle, in the midst of blind projectiles that do not choose, is much less dangerous than in ancient times, because it seldom goes up to the enemy.

At Pharsalus, the volunteer Crastinius, an old centurion, moved ahead with about a hundred men, saying to Caesar: "I am going to act, general, in such a way that, living or dead, to-day you may have cause to be proud of me."

Caesar, to whom these examples of blind devotion to his person were not displeasing, and whose troops had shown him that they were too mature, too experienced, to fear the contagion of this example, let Crastinius and his companions go out to be killed.

Such blind courage influences the action of the ma.s.s that follows.

Probably for that reason, Caesar permitted it. But against reliable troops, as the example of Crastinius proves, to move ahead in this way, against the enemy, is to go to certain death.]

[Footnote 23: The men of the maniple, of the Roman company, mutually gave their word never to leave ranks, except to pick up an arrow, to save a comrade (a Roman citizen), or to kill an enemy. (Livy).]

[Footnote 24: A small body of troops falling into a trap might present a sort of melee, for a second, the time necessary for its slaughter. In a rout it might be possible at some moment of the butchery to have conflict, a struggle of some men with courage, who want to sell their lives dearly. But this is not a real melee. Men are hemmed in, overwhelmed, but not thrown into confusion.]

[Footnote 25: The Greek phalanx.]

[Footnote 26: The Romans lost no one as their companies entered the openings in the phalanx.]

[Footnote 27: The Roman velites, light-armed soldiers, of the primitive legion before Marius, were required to stand for an instant in the intervals of the maniples, while awaiting the onset. They maintained, but only for an instant, the continuity of support.]

[Footnote 28: A result forced by the improvement of war appliances.]