He was an admirable historical investigator and narrator.

He carefully investigated the facts. He told the story of the heroic days of the Revolution and of the heroic days of the War for the Union with a graphic power which will give his addresses on such subjects a permanent place in our best historical literature.

But it is as a soldier that his countrymen will remember him, and it is as a soldier that he would wish to be remembered.

Whatever may be said by the philosopher, the moralist, or the preacher, the instincts of the greater portion of mankind will lead them to award the highest meed of admiration to the military character. Even when the most selfish of human pa.s.sions, the love of power or the love of fame, is the stimulant of the soldier's career, he must at least be ready for the supreme sacrifice--the willingness to give his life, if need be, for the object he is pursuing. But when his end is purely unselfish, when the love of country or the desire to save her life by giving his own has entire mastery of the soul, all mankind are agreed to award the good soldier a glory which it bestows nowhere else.

There was nothing lacking in General Devens to the complete soldierly character. He had a pa.s.sionate love of his country; he was absolutely fearless; he never flinched before danger, sickness, suffering or death. He was prompt, resolute and cool in the face of danger. He had a warm and affectionate heart. He loved his comrades, especially the youth who were under his command. He had that gentle and placable nature which so often accompanies great courage. He was incapable of a permanent anger. He was still less capable of revenge or of willingness to inflict injury or pain.

As Clarendon says of Falkland: "He had a full appet.i.te of fame by just and generous actions, so he had an equal contempt for it by base and servile expedients." He never for an instant tolerated that most pernicious and pestilent heresy, that so long as each side believed itself to be in the right there was no difference between the just and the unjust cause. He knew that he was contending for the life of his country, for the fate of human liberty on this continent. No other cause would have led him to draw his sword; and he cared for no other earthly reward for his service.

Oh just and faithful knight of G.o.d, Ride on, the prize is near.

CHAPTER IV ATTEMPT TO REOPEN THE QUESTION OF THE t.i.tLE TO THE PRESIDENCY

In general the determination of the t.i.tle to the Presidency was acquiesced in in a manner highly creditable to the people.

The Democratic party submitted to their disappointment in a manner which was on the whole exceedingly praiseworthy.

This was due very largely to the influence of Mr. Lamar, of Mississippi, and I suppose to that of Mr. Bayard, of Delaware.

But there were not wanting persons who were willing to revive the question for political advantage, whatever the effect upon the public tranquillity. On May 13, 1878, when the President had been for more than a year in the quiet possession of his office, Mr. Clarkson N. Potter, of New York, introduced in the House of Representatives a resolution for the appointment of a Committee to investigate alleged frauds in the States of Louisiana and Florida, in the recent Presidential election.

This resolution was adopted by the House, in which every possible parliamentary method for its defeat was resorted to by the Republican minority. The Republicans were exceedingly alarmed, and the proceeding seemed likely to create a financial panic which would disturb and injure the business of the country.

Shortly after Mr. Potter's committee was appointed, it was expected that a report would be made denying the validity of President Hayes's t.i.tle, and that the Democratic House of Representatives would be advised to refuse to acknowledge him as President. This would have thrown the Government into great confusion and would have made a square issue. A caucus of Republican Senators was held, and the following gentlemen were appointed a Committee, with directions to report what action, if any, ought to be taken in the Senate in the matter: Mr. Edmunds, Mr. Howe, Mr. Conkling, Mr. Allison, Mr. Sargent, Mr. Ingalls, Mr. Oglesby, Mr. Jones (of Nevada), Mr. Christiancy, Mr. Blaine, Mr. h.o.a.r.

I was requested by my a.s.sociates to prepare an address to the people, to be signed by the Republican Senators, arraigning the Democratic leaders for their unjustifiable and revolutionary course, and pointing out the public danger. The Committee had a second meeting, when I read to them the following address, which I had prepared and which I still have in my possession:

"Our sense of the presence of a great public danger makes it our duty to address you. We are satisfied that the leaders of the Democratic Party meditate an attack on the President's possession of his office, the results of which must be the destruction of the reviving industries of the country, civil confusion and war. There has been difference of opinion whether the count of the electoral vote, which under the Const.i.tution determines the President's t.i.tle, must be made by the two Houses of Congress, or by the President of the Senate in their presence. In the count of electoral votes, which resulted in the declaration of the election of President Hayes, both methods concurred, the action of the two Houses being in accordance with a law regulating their proceedings, enacted in the last Congress to meet the case by large majorities of both branches.

The t.i.tle of President Hayes, therefore, not only rests upon the strongest possible Const.i.tutional sanction, but the honor of both the great parties in the country is solemnly pledged to maintain it.

"Yet the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives has set on foot a proceeding, which they call an investigation, intended, if they can get control of the next Congress, to pave the way for the expulsion of President Hayes, and the seating of Mr. Tilden in his place. It will be the President's duty to maintain himself in office, and the duty of all good citizens to stand by him. The result is Civil War.

"We know that many Democratic Senators and Representatives disclaim in private the purpose we attribute to their leaders, and denounce the wickedness and folly of an attempt to set aside the accepted result of the last election of President.

You doubtless know that many of your Democratic neighbors give you the same a.s.surance. Be not lulled by these a.s.surances into a false security. He is little familiar with the history of that party who does not know how its members follow in compact columns where its leaders point the way. Like a.s.surances preceded the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. Like a.s.surances on the part of many Democrats at the South preceded the late rebellion. Such convictions on the part of the Democrats, however honest or earnest, of the danger and dishonor of the proceedings just inaugurated found expression in but a single dissenting vote in the House of Representatives.

"They say that they believe that the result in two of the States was accomplished by fraud. We believe, on the other hand, that those States, and others whose votes were counted for Tilden, were strongly Republican, and would have been counted for Hayes without a question, but for violence and crime. The Const.i.tution provides the time, place and manner in which these contentions must be settled. They have been so settled as between Hayes and Tilden, and it is only by usurpation and revolution that a subsequent Congress can undertake to reopen them. You know how easily party majorities persuade themselves, or affect to persuade themselves, of the existence of facts, which it is for their party interest to establish.

"At the end of his four years the President lays down his office, and his successor is chosen. The people have in their hands this frequent, easy and peaceful remedy for all evils of administration. The usurpation by Congress of the power to displace a President whenever they choose to determine that the original declaration of the result of an election was wrong, on whatever pretence it is defended, is a total overthrow of the Const.i.tution.

"If you would ward off this blow at the national life, you have one perfect means of defence, the election of a Republican majority in the next House of Representatives."

When they had all agreed to it, Mr. Conkling, a member of the Committee who had not attended the previous meeting, came in late. The doc.u.ment was read to him. He opposed the whole plan with great earnestness and indignation, spoke with great severity of President Hayes, and said that he hoped it would be the last time that any man in the United States would attempt to steal the Presidency. Mr. Conkling's influence in the Senate and in the country was then quite powerful.

It was thought best not to issue the appeal unless it were to have the unanimous support of the Republicans. But the discovery of some cipher dispatches, implicating some well- known persons, including one member of Mr. Tilden's household, in an attempt to bribe the canva.s.sing boards in the South and to purchase some Republican electors in the South and one in Oregon, tended to make the leading members of that party sick of the whole matter. President Hayes served out his term peacefully and handed over the executive power, not only to a Republican successor, but to a member of the majority of the Electoral Commission. So it seems clear that the bulk of the American people had little sympathy with the complaints.

CHAPTER V THE SENATE IN 1877

When I came to the Senate that body was at the very height of its Const.i.tutional power. It was, I think, a more powerful body than ever before or since. There were no men in it, I suppose, who were equal in reputation or personal authority to either of the great triumvirate--Webster, Clay and Calhoun.

If we may trust the traditions that have come down from the time of the Administrations of Washington and Adams, when the Senate sat with closed doors, none of them ever acquired the authority wielded by the profound sagacity of Ellsworth.

But the National authority itself, of which the Senate was a part, was restricted by the narrow construction which prevailed before the Civil War. During the Civil War everything was bowed and bent before the military power. After the war ended the Senate was engaged in a controversy with Andrew Johnson, during which there could be no healthy action either of the executive or the legislative branch of the Government. It was like a pair of shears, from which the rivet was gone.

With the coming in of Grant harmonious relations were established between the two departments. But the Senators were unwilling to part with the prerogatives, which they had helped each other to a.s.sert, and which had been wrenched from the feeble hand of Johnson. What was called Senatorial Courtesy required every Senator belonging to the party in the majority to support every other in demanding the right to dictate and control the executive and judicial appointments from their respective States. So every Senator had established a following, like that of the Highland chieftain--"Vich Ian Vohr with his tail on"--devoted, of course, to the party, but devoted more completely and immediately to his political fortunes.

President Grant in the beginning undertook to break down this arrogant claim. He recommended the repeal of the Civil Tenure Act, the establishment of a system of compet.i.tive examinations for appointments in the civil service and, under the advice of Attorney-General h.o.a.r, made the nominations to the new Circuit Court without regard to Senatorial dictation. But he very soon abandoned this purpose, and formed a close friendship and alliance with the most earnest opponents of the reform.

While, in my opinion, this claim of the Senators was untenable and of injurious public consequences, it tended to maintain and increase the authority of the Senate. The most eminent Senators--Sumner, Conkling, Sherman, Edmunds, Carpenter, Frelinghuysen, Simon Cameron, Anthony, Logan--would have received as a personal affront a private message from the White House expressing a desire that they should adopt any course in the discharge of their legislative duties that they did not approve. If they visited the White House, it was to give, not to receive advice. Any little company or coterie who had undertaken to arrange public policies with the President and to report to their a.s.sociates what the President thought would have rapidly come to grief. These leaders were men, almost all of them, of great faults. They were not free from ambition.

Some of them were quite capable of revenge, and of using the powers of the Government to further their ambition or revenge. But they maintained the dignity and the authority of the Senatorial office. Each of these stars kept his own orbit and shone in his sphere, within which he tolerated no intrusion from the President, or from anybody else.

The reform of the civil service has doubtless shorn the office of Senator of a good deal of its power. I think President McKinley, doubtless with the best and purest intentions, did still more to curtail the dignity and authority of the office. I dare say the increase in the number of Senators has had also much to do with it. President McKinley, with his great wisdom and tact and his delightful individual quality, succeeded in establishing an influence over the members of the Senate not, I think, equalled from the beginning of the Government, except possibly by Andrew Jackson. And while the strong will of Jackson subjugated Senators, in many cases, as it did other men, yet it roused an antagonism not only in his political opponents, but in many important men of his own party, which would have overthrown him but for his very great popularity with the common people. President McKinley also made one serious mistake, of which indeed he did not set the example. Yet he made what was before but an individual and extraordinary instance, a practice. If that practice continue, it will go far, in my judgment, to destroy the independence and dignity of the Senate. That is, the appointment of members of the Senate to distinguished and lucrative places in the public service, in which they are to receive and obey the command of the Executive, and then come back to their seats to carry out as Senators a policy which they have adopted at the command of another power, without any opportunity of consultation with their a.s.sociates, or of learning their a.s.sociates' opinions.

The Const.i.tution provides, Article I., Sec. 6,

"No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office."

It is, I suppose, beyond dispute that the intention of that provision was to protect the members of the Legislative branch of the Government from Executive influence. The legislator was not to be induced to create a civil office, or to increase its emoluments, at the request of the Executive, in the hope that he might be appointed. He was to preserve his independence of Executive influence, and to approach all questions in which he might have to deal with matters which concerned the Executive power, or Executive action, absolutely free from any bias.

This provision comes, with some modification, from the English Const.i.tution. The fear of Executive influence was in that day constantly before the framers of the Const.i.tution and the people who adopted it. Roger Sherman, in his correspondence with John Adams, says that he "esteems the provision made for appointment to office to be a matter of very great importance, on which the liberties and safety of the people depend nearly as much as on legislation."

"It was," he says, "a saying of one of the Kings of England that while the King could appoint the Bishops and Judges he might have what religion and laws he pleased."

I think that sooner or later some emphatic action will be taken, probably in the form of a declaratory resolution, which will put an end to this abuse. But there will always be found men in either branch who desire such honorable employment.

They will be men of great influence. There are also frequently men of personal worth who always support whatever the President of the United States thinks fit to do, and trot or amble along in the procession which follows the Executive chariot. So, if any President shall hereafter repeat this attempt it will require a good deal of firmness to defeat it.

Senator Morgan of Alabama made a very bright comparison of the relation to the White House of some very worthy Senators to that of the bird in a cuckoo clock. He said that whenever the clock at the White House strikes the bird issues out of the door in the Senate Chamber, and says: "Cuckoo, Cuckoo,"

and that when the striking is over, he goes in again and shuts the door after him. He was speaking of Democratic Senators.

But I am afraid my excellent Republican brethren can furnish quite as many instances of this servility as their opponents.

The President has repeatedly, within the last six years, appointed members of the Senate and the House to be Commissioners to negotiate and conclude, as far as can be done by diplomatic agencies, treaties and other arrangements with foreign Governments, of the gravest importance. These include the arrangement of a standard of value by International agreement; making a Treaty of Peace, at the end of the War with Spain; arranging a Treaty of Commerce between the United States and Great Britain; making a Treaty to settle the Behring Sea controversy; and now more lately to establish the boundary line between Canada and Alaska.

President McKinley also appointed a Commission, including Senators and Representatives, to visit Hawaii, and to report upon the needs of legislation there. This last was as clearly the proper duty and function of a committee, to be appointed by one or the other branch of Congress, as anything that could be conceived.

The question has been raised whether these functions were offices, within the Const.i.tutional sense. It was stoutly contended, and I believe held by nearly all the Republican Senators at the time when President Cleveland appointed Mr.

Blount to visit Hawaii, and required that the diplomatic action of our Minister there should be subject to his approval, that he was appointing a diplomatic officer, and that he had no right so to commission Mr. Blount, without the advice and consent of the Senate. President McKinley seemed to accept this view when he sent in for confirmation the names of two Senators, who were appointed on the Commission to visit Hawaii.

The Senate declined to take action upon these nominations.

The very pertinent question was put by an eminent member of the Senate: If these gentlemen are to be officers, how can the President appoint them under the Const.i.tution, the office being created during their term? Or, how can they hold office and still keep their seats in this body? If, on the other hand, they are not officers, under what Const.i.tutional provision does the President ask the advice and consent of the Senate to their appointment?

But the suggestion that these gentlemen are not officers, seems to me the merest cavil. They exercise an authority, and are clothed with a dignity equal to that of the highest and most important diplomatic officer, and far superior to that of most of the civil officers of the country. To say that the President cannot appoint a Senator or Representative postmaster in a country village, where the perquisites do not amount to a hundred dollars a year, where perhaps no other person can be found to do the duties, because that would put an improper temptation in the way of the legislator to induce him to become the tool of the Executive will, and then permit the President to send him abroad; to enable him to maintain the distinction and enjoy the pleasure of a season at a foreign capital as the representative of the United States, with all his expenses paid, and a large compensation added, determined solely by the Executive will; and to hold that the framers of the Const.i.tution would for a moment have tolerated that, seems to me utterly preposterous.

Beside, it places the Senator so selected in a position where he cannot properly perform his duties as a Senator. He is bound to meet his a.s.sociates at the great National Council Board as an equal, to hear their reasons as well as to impart his own. How can he discharge that duty, if he had already not only formed an opinion, but acted upon the matter under the control and direction of another department of the Government?

The Senate was exceedingly sensitive about this question when it first arose. But the gentlemen selected by the Executive for these services were, in general, specially competent for the duty. Their a.s.sociates were naturally quite unwilling to take any action that should seem to involve a reproof to them. The matter did not, however, pa.s.s without remonstrance.

It was hoped that it would not be repeated. At the time of the appointment of the Silver Commission, I myself called attention to the matter in the Senate. Later, as I have said, the Senate declined to take action on the Commission appointed to visit Hawaii. But there was considerable discussion. Several bills and resolutions were introduced, which were intended to prohibit such appointments in the future. The matter was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. It turned out that three members of that Committee had been appointed by President McKinley on the Canadian Committee. One of them, however, said he had accepted the appointment without due reflection, and he was quite satisfied that the practice was wrong. The Committee disliked exceedingly to make a report which might be construed as a censure of their a.s.sociates.

So I was instructed to call upon President McKinley and say to him in behalf of the Committee, that they hoped the practice would not be continued. That task I discharged. President McKinley said he was aware of the objections; that he had come to feel the evil very strongly; and while he did not say in terms that he would not make another appointment of the kind, he conveyed to me, as I am very sure he intended to do, the a.s.surance that it would not occur again. He said, however, that it was not in general understood how few people there were in this country, out of the Senate and House of Representatives, qualified for important diplomatic service of that kind, especially when we had to contend with the trained diplomatists of Europe, who had studied such subjects all their lives. He told me some of the difficulties he had encountered in making selections of Ministers abroad, where important matters were to be dealt with, our diplomatic representatives having, as a rule, to be taken from entirely different pursuits and employments.

That Congress in the past has thought it best to extend rather than restrict this prohibition is shown by the statute which forbids, under a severe penalty, members of either House of Congress from representing the Government as counsel.

CHAPTER VI LEADERS OF THE SENATE IN 1877

As I just said, there was no man in the Senate when I entered it who equalled in renown either Webster, Clay or Calhoun, or wielded in the Senate an influence like that of Oliver Ellsworth. With at most but two or three exceptions, no one of them would be counted among the great men of the century in which he lived, or will be remembered long after his death.