* Khalid Sheikh Mohammed told us later that Bin Ladin's highest priority is to spur a revolution in Saudi Arabia and overthrow the government and that al-Qa'ida operatives in the kingdom had blanket autonomy to conduct attacks on their own.

"Your Royal Highness," I said, "your family and the end of its rule is the objective now. Al-Qa'ida operatives are prepared to a.s.sa.s.sinate members of the royal family and to attack key economic targets."

I told the Crown Prince that a Saudi-based contact of Saad al-Faqih, a London-based dissident, responded to Faqih's call for the overthrow of the Saudi royal family in February by saying, "The a.s.sa.s.sination phase has already begun."

I said, "We know that senior al-Qa'ida operatives inside the kingdom are planning attacks against American interests, both in the United States and in Europe. Your Royal Highness, we are exactly where we were before September 11, but with some important differences. We have great specificity with regard to the planning. It's directed against your family and religious leadership. It is directed from within the kingdom against the United States with the same apocalyptic language I saw before the attacks on September 11. Our relationship cannot sustain another attack. So what do we do about this? We either declare war, and act like we mean it, or we accept the catastrophic consequences."

It was a long meeting and an emotional one. Prince Bandar, the longtime Saudi amba.s.sador to the United States, who had ridden with me to the palace, had encouraged me to lay everything on the line, and I did, chapter and verse.

I have rarely been more direct in my life. By the time I was through with my presentation, the room was energized-by my words and by the attacks of a few days earlier-and virtually that very day, the Crown Prince began to implement a plan we'd helped create.

The world is still not a safe place, but it is a safer place now because of the aggressive steps that the Saudis began to take. They arrested, captured, or killed many (if not all) of the senior al-Qa'ida operatives involved in the plotting. One major capture involved Abu Bakr al-Azdi, who confirmed that indeed plotting against the United States was occurring from within the kingdom. They began to clamp down on al-Qa'ida's finances, and engaged with their clerical establishment to overturn fatwas urging ma.s.s violence as a tactic. Al-Qa'ida made an important strategic miscalculation, never counting on the Crown Prince's reaction. The anger of this honest man at what had happened to his country was palpable that day. As frustrating as the U.S.-Saudi relationship had been over the years, our patience had paid off.

Particularly important at that time, and from then on, were the efforts of Prince Mohammad bin Naif, interior minister Prince Naif's son, who worked for his father as deputy interior minister for security affairs. MBN, as we called him, became my most important interlocutor. A relatively young man, he is someone in whom we developed a great deal of trust and respect. Many of the successes in rolling up al-Qa'ida in the kingdom are a result of his courageous efforts.

Let's be clear: the Saudis acted out of self-interest. At stake were not only plots against the United States but the stability of Saudi Arabia as well. While sustained Saudi action had been a long time coming, the Crown Prince's sense of urgency was matched by our determination to deny al-Qa'ida the key elements of their political strategy. Al-Qai'da wanted the destruction of the House of Saud and the creation of a Bin Ladininspired caliphate, with the economic muscle that oil would confer. The accommodation that the House of Saud had made with the Wahabi branch of Islam had turned the kingdom into a ready source of finance, recruitment, and inspiration for al-Qa'ida. We now had the beginning of a sustained counterterrorism partnership that has carried on since. It has been vital to eliminating an al-Qa'ida safe haven that had operated within Saudi Arabia.

As important as our relationship with the Saudis was, we depended on foreign partners all over the world. Of all the terrorist takedowns, none was more important or memorable than the capture in Pakistan of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, whom everyone in our business referred to simply as KSM. No person, other than perhaps Usama bin Ladin, was more responsible for the attacks of 9/11 than KSM, and none, other than UBL, more deserved to be brought to justice.

Although KSM grew up in Kuwait, his family comes from the Baluchistan region, which straddles the Iran-Pakistan border. During the mid-1980s, he attended college in North Carolina.

The future Most Wanted list all-star first came to the attention of U.S. intelligence about the time it was learned that his nephew, Ramzi Yousef, had been involved in planning the 1993 World Trade Center attack. Yousef was arrested in Islamabad, Pakistan, in 1995 and later tried and convicted in U.S. courts for his part in planning "Operation Bojinka," which envisioned simultaneously blowing up twelve airliners over the Pacific. Yousef had also been involved in plots to a.s.sa.s.sinate Pope John Paul II during an official visit to the Philippines and in a plan to have a suicide pilot fly a small plane loaded with explosives into CIA headquarters. Clearly, he and KSM came from the same gene pool.

During the mid-1990s, CIA chased KSM around three continents. We attempted to bring him to justice in Qatar, the Philippines, and even Brazil. He eluded us and ended up in Afghanistan, where he first met Usama bin Ladin. Through the late 1990s, we knew that KSM was taking on an increasingly important role with al-Qa'ida. It was only after the capture of Abu Zubaydah that we learned how significant that role had become. From our interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and later KSM himself, we would learn that it was KSM who first proposed the idea of flying aircraft into the World Trade Center. Initially he suggested stealing small private aircraft and filling them with explosives. Usama bin Ladin reportedly asked, "Why do you use an axe when you can use a bulldozer?" and altered the plan to use commercial airliners full of pa.s.sengers.

By early 2002, we believed that KSM, like much of the al-Qa'ida leadership, was in hiding in the teeming cities of Pakistan. To find him, CIA ran elaborate human intelligence operations.

I vividly remember Marty M., the then chief of the Sunni Extremist Group of CTC, asking me at the end of one of our Friday five o'clock meetings, "Boss, where are you going to be this weekend? Stay in touch. I just might get some good news."

Later that evening, Pakistani security officials surrounded a house in Rawalpindi where they suspected KSM was hiding. The Pakistanis stormed the residence and were wrestling KSM to the ground when he grabbed for a rifle. In the melee, the weapon went off, shooting one of the Pakistanis in the foot, before KSM was subdued for good.

Marty woke me with the good news. "Boss," he said. "We got KSM." You don't take down a major terrorist in the middle of a large city and have it go unnoticed. Before sunrise, Pakistani media were reporting that KSM had been taken into custody.

By the next morning, Sunday, March 2, U.S. media outlets were carrying news of the capture as well. Some of the stories described the worldly KSM as an al-Qa'ida James Bond. To ill.u.s.trate the point, they showed photos of him with a full dark beard wearing what were supposedly his traditional robes. It didn't take long for Marty to phone me and relay his disgust at some of the coverage. A native of Louisiana, Marty speaks with a Cajun patois that is sometimes hard to decipher. We used to joke that he speaks "level 5" (fluent) Arabic but only "level 2" English.

"Boss," he said, "this ain't right. The media are making this b.u.m look like a hero. That ain't right. You should see the way this bird looked when we took him down. I want to show the world what terrorists look like!"

Turns out, our officers on the scene in Rawalpindi had snapped and sent back some digital photos of KSM just after his capture, so I suggested that Marty call the Agency spokesman, Bill Harlow, and work something out. Within an hour, Harlow was in CTC looking over a selection of photos that made KSM look nothing like James Bond. Together they picked out the most evocative photo. Then Harlow, armed with a digital copy, called up a reporter at the a.s.sociated Press and told him, "I'm about to make your day." Asking only that the AP not reveal where they got the picture, he released the image of a stunned, disheveled, scroungy KSM wearing a ratty T-shirt. The photo became one of the iconic images of the war on terrorism. If we could have copyrighted it, we might have funded CTC for a year on the profits. Foreign intelligence services later told us that the single best thing we ever did was release that picture. It sent a message more eloquently than ten thousand words ever could that the life of a terrorist on the run is anything but glamorous.

Just after KSM's capture, I left on a trip to a half-dozen Middle Eastern countries. Among my stops was Islamabad. I wanted to personally thank the courageous Pakistani security officials who had captured KSM, and indeed I gave several of them CIA medals. I particularly remember the man who had been shot in the foot during the takedown painfully limping forward to receive his medal. From their side, the Pakistanis presented me with the rifle they had seized from KSM.

There have been published reports that CIA paid millions of dollars in "prize money" for capturing al-Qa'ida figures. That is absolutely right. It seemed to us entirely appropriate to tell countries around the world that there is both a price to pay if they cooperate with terrorists, and an appropriate reward to be earned for bringing them to justice. While we could, and sometimes did, simply present a check to the intelligence service responsible for helping us capture a major terrorist, we would occasionally opt for a more dramatic approach. We would show up in someone's office, offer our thanks, and we would leave behind a briefcase full of crisp one-hundred-dollar bills, sometimes totaling more than a million in a single transaction. PostSeptember 11, the influx of cash in our hands made a huge difference. We were able to fund training, support technology upgrades of our key partners, and generally reward good performance.

I also had the opportunity at one of our stops to meet the foreign agent who had led us to KSM. The man bought his first suit to wear to our meeting. I thanked him for his courage and expressed our grat.i.tude for what he had done. He embraced me, looked me in the eye, and asked just one question: "Do you think President Bush knows of my role in this capture?" I smiled. "Yes, he does," I said, "because I told him." The fellow beamed with pride. "Does he know my name?" he asked. "No. Because that is a secret that he doesn't need to know," I replied. I asked the man why he had agreed to help us and to place his life at risk. His answer goes to the heart of the struggle we're involved in against terrorists worldwide: "I want my children free of these madmen who distort our religion and kill innocent people," he told me.

The benefits of capturing someone like KSM went far beyond simply taking a killer off the street. Through hard work, each success cascaded into others. It was amazing to watch. For example, the same day that KSM was captured, a senior al-Qa'ida financial operator by the name of Majid Khan was also taken into custody.

In interrogation, KSM told us that Majid Khan had recently provided fifty thousand dollars to operatives working for a major al-Qa'ida figure in Southeast Asia known as "Hambali." When confronted with this allegation, Khan confirmed it and said he gave the money to someone named Zubair, and he provided the man's phone number. Before long, Zubair was in custody and provided fragmentary information that led us to capture another senior Hambali a.s.sociate named Bashir bin Lap, aka "Lilie." That person provided information that led to the capture of Hambali, in Thailand.

The importance of Hambali's capture cannot be overestimated. He was the leader of the Jemaah Islamiya, a Sunni extremist organization that has established an operational infrastructure in Southeast Asia. Hambali swore allegiance to Bin Ladin in the late 1990s, offering him a critical operational advantage: a non-Arab face to attack the United States and our allies. While moderate Islam thrives in Southeast Asia, its geographic expanse offers the opportunity to create dispersed sanctuaries throughout the continent.

What Hambali's arrest demonstrated is that our campaign was targeted not just against al-Qa'ida but also against Sunni extremism around the world. What we are fighting today is bigger than the al-Qa'ida central management structure and more diverse than Arab males between the ages of eighteen and forty. What we have to contend with has an Arab, Asian, European, African, and perhaps even a homegrown American face.

After Hambali was arrested, we went back to KSM and asked him to speculate on who might fill Hambali's shoes. KSM suggested that the likely candidate would be Hambali's brother, Rusman "Gun Gun" Gunawan. So we went back to Hambali, and while being debriefed, he inadvertently provided information that led to the detention of his brother, in Karachi, in September 2003.

In custody, "Gun Gun" identified a cell of Jemaah Islamiya members hidden in Karachi that his brother planned to use for future al-Qa'ida operations. Hambali confirmed that the non-Arab men were being groomed for future attacks in the United States, at the behest of KSM, and were probably intended to conduct a future airborne attack on America's West Coast.

I believe none of these successes would have happened if we had had to treat KSM like a white-collar criminal-read him his Miranda rights and get him a lawyer who surely would have insisted that his client simply shut up. In his initial interrogation by CIA officers, KSM was defiant. "I'll talk to you guys," he said, "after I get to New York and see my lawyer." Apparently he thought he would be immediately shipped to the United States and indicted in the Southern District of New York. Had that happened, I am confident that we would have obtained none of the information he had in his head about imminent threats against the American people.

From our interrogation of KSM and other senior al-Qa'ida members, and our examination of doc.u.ments found on them, we learned many things-not just tactical information leading to the next capture. For example, more than twenty plots had been put in motion by al-Qa'ida against U.S. infrastructure targets, including communications nodes, nuclear power plants, dams, bridges, and tunnels. All these plots were in various stages of planning when we captured or killed the pre-9/11 al-Qa'ida leaders behind them.

In my view, it wasn't one single thing that hindered a major follow-on attack, but rather a combination of three things. We were successful with information gained from NSA's terrorist surveillance program, CIA's interrogation of a handful of high-value detainees, and leads provided by another highly cla.s.sified program that tracked terrorist financial transactions. Each of these programs informed and enabled the others. And each was carefully monitored to ensure that it was appropriately conducted.

As much as some things change, many things remain the same. Al-Qa'ida's fixation on the use of airplanes as weapons did not end on 9/11. In the ensuing years, plots to use airliners as weapons were broken in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. What started in 1995 as the Manila air conspiracy was taken forward to London in April 2006, when British intelligence broke the back of a plot to use liquid explosives on aircraft transiting the Atlantic in the same way that was attempted in 1995. In the years in between, airline plots were directed against Heathrow airport, and there were four separate operations to target both coasts of the United States.

During the Millennium threat, actions in Amman by the Jordanians uncovered the intent to use hydrogen cyanide in a movie theater. Today al-Qa'ida disseminates instructions on how to acquire simple materials that can be purchased in hardware stores to disperse lethal ga.s.ses in enclosed facilities, using a simple but effective device they called the "mobtaker." What this tells you about al-Qa'ida is that history matters. They will return to plots previously attempted whether they succeeded or failed.

What the detainees gave us was insight into people, strategy, thinking, individuals, and how they would all be used against us. What they gave us was worth more than CIA, NSA, the FBI, and our military operations had achieved collectively. We were able to corroborate what they told us with other data we had collected. What we now have is an exhaustive menu and knowledge about how al-Qa'ida thinks, operates, and trains its members to conduct operations against us. What we have in our possession is a road map to put in place a systematic program of protection, to deny al-Qa'ida the operational lat.i.tude it once enjoyed. The questions are: How effective will we be in relentlessly closing the seams of our vulnerability? How urgently will we pursue the sacrifices required to avert the next attack?

One thing is certain: the United States remains the crown jewel in al-Qa'ida's planning. Its desire to pull off multiple spectacular attacks in the United States that inflict economic and psychological damage is undiminished.

We have learned that al-Qa'ida is a very adaptive organization. Prior to 9/11 they understood the security weaknesses of the United States. They understood our laws, our banking regulations, and the large gaps in our domestic security preparations. They also recognize that we are p.r.o.ne to "fighting the last war." So after the 9/11 attacks, while the United States and our allies have focused on a threat posed by certain young Arab males, al-Qa'ida has shifted its recruitment to bring in jihadists with different backgrounds. I am convinced the next major attack against the United States may well be conducted by people with Asian or African faces, not the ones that many Americans are alert to.

It would be easy for al-Qa'ida or another terrorist group to send suicide bombers to cause chaos in a half-dozen American shopping malls on any given day. Why haven't they? The real answer is that we do not know. (It would be easy to do and would spread the kind of fear and economic damage they desire.) I believe it is because they have set for themselves a bigger goal. They want to hurt us in a measure commensurate with our status as a superpower. To date, the techniques the terrorists gladly employ in places like Iraq and Israel have not been used in the United States.

Our successes against al-Qa'ida have not come without a price. As time pa.s.ses since 9/11, I fear that Americans will once again begin to think of terrorism as something that happens "over there." That is exactly the mind-set our enemy wants us to have. The lessons of the past and the attacks in England, Spain, Morocco, Bali, Turkey, and elsewhere tell us how they are going to attack, the targets they are interested in attacking, and, most important, that they are intent on coming here again. We will rarely know the "when," but there is no longer any excuse for not understanding the "how" and not doing our best to protect against it. History matters.

CHAPTER 14

They Want to Change History

Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank G.o.d for enabling me to do so.- Usama bin Ladin quoted in Usama bin Ladin quoted in Time Time magazine, December 24, 1998, when asked if al-Qa'ida had nuclear and chemical weapons magazine, December 24, 1998, when asked if al-Qa'ida had nuclear and chemical weapons

There was not a shred of doubt that Bin Ladin meant what he said, nor any doubt that he would go to any length to fulfill his "religious duty." Long before 9/11, in public testimony and in secret counsel to two administrations, I raised the alarm about al-Qa'ida. Now, in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, I asked my staff, "What's next?"

Although we had his own statements to give us great concern, the consensus inside and outside our own government could be boiled down to this: "Guys in caves can't get WMD." But this was an issue about which we could not afford to be wrong. So soon after 9/11, I directed CIA's CTC to establish a new capability to focus exclusively on terrorist WMD. Even the people I put in charge of that effort were skeptical, hopeful that they would simply be proving a negative. We began to review the historical record. We combed our files and sent teams around the world to share our leads and ask foreign intelligence services about information in their possession. We interrogated al-Qa'ida prisoners and pored over doc.u.ments found in safe houses and on computers captured in Afghanistan. What we discovered stunned us all.

The threats were real. Our intelligence confirmed that the most senior leaders of al-Qa'ida are still singularly focused on acquiring WMD. Bin Ladin may have provided the spiritual guidance to develop WMD, but the program was personally managed at the top by his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Moreover, we established beyond any reasonable doubt that al-Qa'ida had clear intent to acquire chemical, biological, and radiological/nuclear (CBRN) weapons, to possess not as a deterrent but to cause ma.s.s casualties in the United States. The a.s.sessment prior to 9/11 that terrorists were not working to develop strategic weapons of ma.s.s destruction was simply wrong. They were determined to have, and to use, these weapons.

Over time, we were able to link the top echelon of al-Qa'ida's leadership to the group's highly compartmentalized chemical, biological, and nuclear networks. This group included al-Qa'ida's operational chief, Sayf al-Adl; the group's logistics chief, Abu Hafs; Jemaah Islamiya chief Ruidin Isomuddin (Hambali); 9/11 planners Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh; Egyptian CBRN expert Abu Khabab al-Masri; self-described "CEO of anthrax," Yazid Sufaat; and explosives expert and "nuclear CEO," Abdel al-Aziz al-Masri.

As we researched the information we were slowly gathering from myriad sources, we unlocked a disturbing secret: the group's interest in WMD was not new. They had been searching for these weapons long before we had been looking for them them. As far as we know, al-Qa'ida's fascination with chemical weapons goes back to the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system in March 1995 by a group of religious fanatics called the Aum Shinrikyo. Twelve people died in that attack, but had the dispersal devices worked as planned, the death toll would have been higher. Al-Qa'ida leaders were impressed and saw the attack as a model for achieving their own ambitions. (In retrospect, the Tokyo attack also foreshadowed al-Qa'ida's interest in subway and railway systems, which later manifested itself in attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004; in London on July 7, 2005; and a planned attack against the New York City subway in fall 2003 that was called off by Ayman al-Zawahiri in the last stages of preparation-"for something better.") In February 2001, in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, Usama bin Ladin was tried in absentia and others were tried in person for their involvement in the 1998 bombing of the U.S. emba.s.sies in Kenya and Tanzania. It was here that al-Qa'ida's pursuit of WMD became clear: one of the key witnesses in that trial, Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, described how, as far back as 1993, he helped Bin Ladin try to obtain uranium in Sudan, to be used in some type of a nuclear device. Al-Qa'ida, al-Fadl testified, was willing to pay $1.5 million to acquire an unknown quant.i.ty of uranium. His testimony ended without resolution. Perhaps this was the first of many experiences for al-Qa'ida in which the group was scammed by opportunists, or perhaps the offer was real. We may never know. The important point is that the group was actively attempting to acquire nuclear material in the early 1990s. They were willing to do what needed to be done, and pay whatever it would cost, to get their hands on fissile material. In the face of such steely resolve, the only responsible course of action would be to do whatever was necessary to rule out any possibility that terrorists could get their hands on fissile material.

Bin Ladin's statements in 1998 regarding his religious obligation to obtain WMD were not made in a vacuum, either. That was the same year that Pakistan first tested a nuclear weapon. The expertise and material for fulfilling UBL's dream lay across the border from his Afghan sanctuary. We received fragmentary information from an intelligence service that, also in 1998, UBL had sent emissaries to establish contact with the nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan's network. Over decades, A.Q. had built an international network of suppliers of nuclear capability for sale to rogue states. According to the intel, A. Q. Khan had rebuffed several of UBL's entreaties, although it was not clear why. However, this new reality of the potential collaboration between a well-organized proliferation network and a terrorist group would ultimately reshape our understanding of the WMD threat, and the nature of our response to it.

Shortly before 9/11, a friendly intelligence service chanced across information that a Pakistani nongovernmental organization (NGO) called Umma Tameer-e-Nau (UTN) had been formed to establish social-welfare projects in Afghanistan. However, the information suggested that UTN had another purpose: they hoped to lend their expertise and access to the scientific establishment in order to help build chemical, biological, and nuclear programs for al-Qa'ida. (NGOs can be a convenient vehicle for providing cover for terrorist organizations, as they have legitimate reasons to traffic in expertise, material, and money.) The leadership of UTN was made up of retired Pakistani nuclear scientists, military officers, engineers, and technicians. Its founder and chairman, Sultan Bashirrudan Mahmood, was the former director for nuclear power at Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission. Mahmood was thought of as something of a madman by many of his former colleagues in the Pakistan nuclear establishment. In 1987 he published a book called Doomsday and Life After Death: The Ultimate Faith of the Universe as Seen by the Holy Quran. Doomsday and Life After Death: The Ultimate Faith of the Universe as Seen by the Holy Quran. It was a disturbing tribute to his skewed view of the role of science in jihad. The book's basic message-from the leader of a group that had offered WMD capabilities to al-Qa'ida-was that the world would end one day soon in the fire of nuclear holocaust that would usher in judgment day and thus fulfill the prophecies of the Quran. It was a disturbing tribute to his skewed view of the role of science in jihad. The book's basic message-from the leader of a group that had offered WMD capabilities to al-Qa'ida-was that the world would end one day soon in the fire of nuclear holocaust that would usher in judgment day and thus fulfill the prophecies of the Quran.

Mahmood's a.s.sociates in UTN may not have embraced his apocalyptic vision, but they shared his extremist tendencies. Chaudiri Andul Majeed, a prominent nuclear engineer who retired from the Pakistani Inst.i.tute of Nuclear Science and Technology in 2000, agreed to play a key role in a.s.sisting Mahmood in his plans to share WMD with the Taliban and UBL. We also knew that UTN enjoyed some measure of support from Pakistani military officers opposed to President Musharraf, notably the former director of the Pakistani intelligence service, Gen. Hamid Gul. It appeared that UTN's contacts with the Taliban and al-Qa'ida may have been supported, if not facilitated, by elements within the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment.

I instructed the Directorate of Operations to press all of our contacts worldwide to find out anything we could about the people and organizations with WMD that might be willing to share expertise with al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. We did not limit our inquiries to friends. We also spoke to the Libyans, who confirmed that they had rejected overtures from UTN peddling nuclear expertise. Ben Bonk, the deputy chief of CTC, held a clandestine meeting with Musa Kusa, the head of the Libyan intelligence service, to try to elicit what he could about Tripoli's familiarity with al-Qa'ida. During their conversation, Bonk asked if Kusa had ever heard of UTN. "Yes," the Libyan replied, "they tried to sell us a nuclear weapon. Of course, we turned them down." This information confirmed separate reporting from another intelligence service that UTN had approached the Libyans with an offer to provide chemical, biological, and nuclear expertise. Kusa's words rang true because, unbeknownst to him, we knew Libya did not need UTN since they had already secured the services of an upscale supplier of WMD services-the A. Q. Khan proliferation network.

CIA pa.s.sed our information on UTN to our Pakistani colleagues, who quickly hauled in seven board members for questioning. The investigation was ill-fated from the get-go. The UTN officials all denied wrongdoing and were not properly isolated and questioned. In fact, they were allowed to return home after questioning each day. Pakistani intelligence interrogators treated the UTN officials deferentially, with respect befitting their status in Pakistani society. They were seen as men of science, men who had made significant contributions to Pakistan. Our officers read the question etched in the faces of their Pakistani liaison contacts: Surely, such men cannot be terrorists? It was a problem we would encounter time and time again as we began tracing WMD networks and leads that emerged in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Australia, and in North and South America. There was no question al-Qa'ida sought scientific expertise on a global scale. The question I needed an answer to urgently was whether they had already succeeded.

A Western intelligence service came to us in the fall of 2001 with a remarkable piece of information that helped break the case open. A source had told them that in August 2001, just weeks before the 9/11 attacks, UTN officials Mahmood and Majeed met with Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan. There, around a campfire, they discussed how al-Qa'ida should go about building a nuclear device. CIA pressed the Pakistanis to confront Mahmood and Majeed with this new information. We put the Libyan information on the table. We also pa.s.sed new information that had been collected by other intelligence services. To no avail.

Then 9/11 struck, and there was no slowing down in this pursuit. The stakes were too high to accept the lack of progress that the Pakistanis were making. In late November 2001, I briefed the president, vice president, and national security advisor on the latest intelligence, our concerns, and the likelihood we would be unable to resolve this issue satisfactorily without intervention by the president. I brought along with me my WMD chief, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, and Kevin K., our most senior WMD terrorism a.n.a.lyst. During the ensuing conversation, the vice president asked if we thought al-Qa'ida had a nuclear weapon. Kevin replied, "Sir, if I were to give you a traditional a.n.a.lytical a.s.sessment of the al-Qa'ida nuclear program, I would say they probably do not. But I can't a.s.sure you they don't." The vice president then made a comment that in my view has since been misinterpreted: "If there's a one percent chance that they do, you have to pursue it as if it were true."

I am convinced the vice president did not mean to suggest, as some have a.s.serted, that we should ignore contrary evidence and that such a policy should be applied to all threats to our national security. On the contrary, the vice president understood instinctively that WMD must be managed differently because the implications were unique-such an attack would change history. We all felt that the vice president understood this issue. There was no question in my mind that he was absolutely right to insist that when it came to discussing weapons of ma.s.s destruction in the hands of terrorists, conventional risk a.s.sessments no longer applied; we must rule out any possibility of terrorists succeeding in their quest to obtain such weapons. We could not afford to be surprised.

Photographic Insert

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Being sworn in as Director of Central Intelligence by FBI Director Louis Freeh, July 11, 1997. Wife Stephanie Glakas-Tenet and son John Michael holding the bible. (Official FBI Photo) (Official FBI Photo)

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At a White House meeting with President Bill Clinton. Seated are Chief of Staff John Podesta and Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen. (Official White House Photo) (Official White House Photo)

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With one of the great historical figures in modern Middle East history, His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan. (Author's personal collection) (Author's personal collection)

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With former president George H. W. Bush and Mrs. Bush at a ceremony renaming CIA headquarters in honor of President Bush, April 26, 1999. (Official CIA Photo) (Official CIA Photo)

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A new generation of leader in the Middle East, His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan. (Author's personal collection) (Author's personal collection)

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With President George W. Bush addressing CIA workforce in Agency headquarters lobby, March 20, 2001. (Official CIA Photo) (Official CIA Photo)

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In the White House bunker on September 11, 2001, watching as the president addresses the nation on television. Behind me is Richard Clarke, and to the right is the vice president's wife, Mrs. Lynne Cheney. (Official White House Photo) (Official White House Photo)

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At Camp David, Maryland, briefing the president, Condoleezza Rice, and Andrew Card on CIA operations against al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan, September 30, 2001. (Official White House Photo) (Official White House Photo)

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In a meeting with Attorney General John Ashcroft (right) (right) and FBI Director Robert Mueller and FBI Director Robert Mueller (left) (left), October 29, 2001. (Official White House Photo) (Official White House Photo)