[Footnote 1: _Ibid._, art. 7 ad. 3.]

[Footnote 2: I. ii. 96,4.]

There can be no doubt that the practice of the scholastic teaching of community of user, in its proper sense, made for social stability. The following pa.s.sage from Trithemius, written at the end of the fifteenth century, is interesting as showing how consistently the doctrine of St. Thomas was adhered to two hundred years after his death, and also that the failure of the rich to put into practice the moderate communism of St. Thomas was the cause of the rise of the heretical communists, who attacked the very foundations of property itself: 'Let the rich remember that their possessions have not been entrusted to them in order that they may have the sole enjoyment of them, but that they may use and manage them as property belonging to mankind at large. Let them remember that when they give to the needy they only give them what belongs to them. If the duty of right use and management of property, whether worldly or spiritual, is neglected, if the rich think that they are the sole lords and masters of that which they possess, and do not treat the needy as their brethren, there must of necessity arise an inner shattering of the commonwealth. False teachers and deceivers of the people will then gain influence, as has happened in Bohemia, by preaching to the people that earthly property should be equally distributed among all, and that the rich must be forcibly condemned to the division of their wealth. Then follow lamentable conditions and civil wars; no property is spared; no right of ownership is any longer recognised; and the wealthy may then with justice complain of the loss of possessions which have been unrighteously taken from them; but they should also seriously ask themselves the question whether in the days of peace and order they recognised in the administration of these goods the right of their superior lord and owner, namely, the G.o.d of all the earth.'[1]

[Footnote 1: Quoted in Janssen, _op. cit._, vol. ii. p. 91.]

It must not, however, be imagined for a moment that the community of user advocated by the scholastics had anything in common with the communism recommended by modern Socialists. As we have seen above, the scholastic communism did not at all apply to the procuring and dispensing of material things, but only to the mode of using them.

It is not even correct to say that the property of an individual was _limited_ by the duty of using it for the common good. As Rambaud puts it: 'Les devoirs de charite, d'equite naturelle, et de simple convenance sociale peuvent affecter, ou mieux encore, commander un certain usage de la richesse; mais ce n'est pas le meme chose que limiter la propriete.'[1] The community of user of the scholastics was distinguished from that of modern Socialists not less strongly by the motives which inspired it than by the effect it produced. The former was dictated by high spiritual aims, and the contempt of material goods; the latter is the fruit of over-attachment to material goods, and the envy of their possessors.[2]

[Footnote 1: _Op. cit._, p. 43. The same writer shows that there is no authority in Christian teaching for the proposition, advanced by many Christian Socialists, that property is a 'social function' (_ibid._, p. 774). The right of property even carried with it the _jus abutendi_, which, however, did not mean the right to _abuse_, but the right to destroy by consumption (see Antoine, _Cours d'Economie sociale_, p. 526).]

[Footnote 2: Roscher, _op. cit._, p. 5: 'Vom neuern Socialismus freilich unterscheidet sich diese Auffa.s.sung nicht blosz durch ihre religiose Grundlage, sondern auch durch ihre, jedem Mammonsdienst entgegengesetze, Verachtung der materiellen Guter.']

The large estates which the Church itself owned have frequently been pointed to as evidence of hypocrisy in its att.i.tude towards the common user of property. This is not the place to inquire into the condition of ecclesiastical estates in the Middle Ages, but it is sufficient to say that they were usually the centres of charity, and that in the opinion of so impartial a writer as Roscher, they rather tended to make the rules of using goods for the common use practicable than the contrary.[1]

[Footnote 1: Roscher, _op. cit._, p. 6.]

SECTION 3.--PROPERTY IN HUMAN BEINGS

Before we pa.s.s from the subject of property, we must deal with a particular kind of property right, namely, that of one human being over another. At the present day the idea of one man being owned by another is repugnant to all enlightened public opinion, but this general repugnance is of very recent growth, and did not exist in mediaeval Europe. In dealing with the scholastic att.i.tude towards slavery, we shall indicate, as we did with regard to its att.i.tude towards property in general, the fundamental harmony between the teaching of the primitive and the mediaeval Church on the subject. No apology is needed for this apparent digression, as a comparison of the teaching of the Church at the two periods of its development helps us to understand precisely what the later doctrine was; and, moreover, the close a.n.a.logy which, as we shall see, existed between the Church's view of property and slavery, throws much light on the true nature of both inst.i.tutions.

Although in practice Christianity had done a very great deal to mitigate the hardships of the slavery of ancient times, and had in a large degree abolished slavery by its encouragement of emanc.i.p.ation,[1] it did not, in theory, object to the inst.i.tution itself. There is no necessity to labour a point so universally admitted by all students of the Gospels as that Christ and His Apostles did not set out to abolish the slavery which they found everywhere around them, but rather aimed, by preaching charity to the master and patience to the slave, at the same time to lighten the burden of servitude, and to render its acceptance a merit rather than a disgrace. 'What, in fact,' says Janet, 'is the teaching of St. Peter, St. Paul, and the Apostles in general? It is, in the first place, that in Christ there are no slaves, and that all men are free and equal; and, in the second place, that the slave must obey his master, and the master must be gentle to his slave.[2] Thus, although there are no slaves in Christ, St. Paul and the Apostles do not deny that there may be on earth. I am far from reproaching the Apostles for not having proclaimed the immediate necessity of the emanc.i.p.ation of slaves. But I say that the question was discussed in precisely the same terms by the ancient philosophers of the same period. Seneca, it is true, proclaimed not the civil, but the moral equality of men; but St. Paul does not speak of anything more than their equality in Christ. Seneca instructs the master to treat the slave as he would like to be treated himself.[3] Is not this what St. Peter and St.

Paul say when they recommended the master to be gentle and good? The superiority of Christianity over Stoicism in this question arises altogether from the very superiority of the Christian spirit....'[4]

The article on 'Slavery' in the _Catholic Encyclopaedia_ expresses the same opinion: 'Christian teachers, following the example of St. Paul, implicitly accept slavery as not in itself incompatible with the Christian law. The Apostle counsels slaves to obey their masters, and to bear with their condition patiently. This estimate of slavery continued to prevail until it became fixed in the systematised ethical teaching of the schools; and so it remained without any conspicuous modification until the end of the eighteenth century.' The same interpretation of early Christian teaching is accepted by the Protestant scholar, Dr. Bartlett: 'The practical att.i.tude of Seneca and the early Christians to slavery was much the same. They bade the individual rise to a sense of spiritual freedom in spite of outward bondage, rather than denounce the inst.i.tution as an altogether illegitimate form of property.'[5]

[Footnote 1: See Roscher, _Political Economy_, s. 73.]

[Footnote 2: _Eph._, vi. 5, 6, 9.]

[Footnote 3: _Ep. ad Luc._, 73.]

[Footnote 4: Janet, _op. cit._, p. 317.]

[Footnote 5: 'Biblical and Early Christian Idea of Property,'

_Property, Its Duties and Rights_ (London, 1915), p. 110; Franck, _Reformateurs et Publicistes de l'Europe: Moyen age_--Renaissance, p.

87. On the whole question by far the best authority is volume iii. of Wallon's _Histoire de l'Esclavage dans l'Antiquite_.]

Several texts might be collected from the writings of the Fathers which would seem to show that according to patristic teaching the inst.i.tution of slavery was unjustifiable. We do not propose to cite or to explain these texts one by one, in view of the quite clear and unambiguous exposition of the subject given by St. Thomas Aquinas, whose teaching is the more immediate subject of this essay; we shall content ourselves by reminding the reader of the precisely similar texts relating to the inst.i.tution of property which we have examined above, and by stating that the corresponding texts on the subject of slavery are capable of an exactly similar interpretation. 'The teaching of the Apostle,' says Janet, 'and of the Fathers on slavery is the same as their teaching on property.'[1] The author from whom we are quoting, and on whose judgment too much reliance cannot be placed, then proceeds to cite many of the patristic texts on property, which we quoted in the section dealing with that subject, and asks: 'What conclusion should one draw from these different pa.s.sages? It is that in Christ there are no rich and no poor, no mine and no thine; that in Christian perfection all things are common to all men, but that nevertheless property is legitimate and derived from human law. Is it not in the same sense that the Fathers condemned slavery as contrary to divine law, while respecting it as comformable to human law? The Fathers abound in texts contrary to slavery, but have we not seen a great number of texts contrary to property?'[2] The closeness of the a.n.a.logy between the patristic treatment of slavery and of property appears forcibly in the following pa.s.sage of Lactantius: 'G.o.d who created man willed that all should be equal. He has imposed on all the same condition of living; He has produced all in wisdom; He has promised immortality to all; no one is cut off from His heavenly benefits. In His sight no one is a slave, no one a master; for if we have all the same Father, by an equal right we are all His children; no one is poor in the sight of G.o.d but he who is without justice, no one rich but he who is full of virtue.... Some one will say, Are there not among you some poor and others rich; some servants and others masters? Is there not some difference between individuals? There is none, nor is there any other cause why we mutually bestow on each other the name of brethren except that we believe ourselves to be equal. For since we measure all human things not by the body but by the spirit, although the condition of bodies is different, yet we have no servants, but we both regard them, and speak of them as brothers in spirit, in religion as fellow-servants.'[3] Slavery was declared to be a blessing, because, like poverty, it afforded the opportunity of practising the virtues of humility and patience.[4] The treatment of the inst.i.tution of slavery underwent a striking and important development in the hands of St. Augustine, who justified it as one of the penalties incurred by man as a result of the sin of Adam and Eve.

'The first holy men,' writes the Saint, 'were rather shepherds than kings, G.o.d showing herein what both the order of the creation desired, and what the deserts of sin exacted. For justly was the burden of servitude laid upon the back of transgression. And therefore in all the Scriptures we never read the word _servus_ until Noah laid it as a curse upon his offending son. So that it was guilt, and not nature, that gave origin to that name.... Sin is the mother of servitude and the first cause of man's subjection to man.'[5] St. Augustine also justifies the enslavement of those conquered in war--'It is G.o.d's decree to humble the conquered, either reforming their sins herein or punishing them.'[6]

[Footnote 1: _Op. cit._, p. 318.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._, p. 321.]

[Footnote 3: _Div. Inst_., v. 15-16.]

[Footnote 4: Chryst., _Genes._, serm. v. i.; _Ep. ad Cor._, hom. xix.

4.]

[Footnote 5: _De Civ. Dei_, xix. 14-15.]

[Footnote 6: _Ibid._]

Janet ably a.n.a.lyses and expounds the advance which St. Augustine made in the treatment of slavery: 'In this theory we must note the following points: (1) Slavery is unjust according to the law of nature. This is what is contrary to the teaching of Aristotle, but conformable to that of the Stoics. (2) Slavery is just as a consequence of sin. This is the new principle peculiar to St.

Augustine. He has found a principle of slavery, which is neither natural inequality, nor war, nor agreement, but sin. Slavery is no more a transitory fact which we accept provisionally, so as not to precipitate a social revolution: it is an inst.i.tution which has become natural as a result of the corruption of our nature. (3) It must not be said that slavery, resulting from sin, is destroyed by Christ who destroyed sin.... Slavery, according to St. Augustine, must last as long as society.'[1]

[Footnote 1: Janet, _op. cit._, p. 302.]

Nowhere does St. Thomas Aquinas appear as clearly as the medium of contact and reconciliation between the Fathers of the Church and the ancient philosophers as in his treatment of the question of slavery.

His utterances upon this subject are scattered through many portions of his work, but, taken together, they show that he was quite prepared to admit the legitimacy of the inst.i.tution, not alone on the grounds put forward by St. Augustine, but also on those suggested by Aristotle and the Roman jurists.

He fully adopts the Augustinian argument in the _Summa_, where, in answer to the query, whether in the state of innocence all men were equal, he states that even in that state there would still have been inequalities of s.e.x, knowledge, justice, etc. The only inequalities which would not have been present were those arising from sin; but the only inequality arising from sin was slavery.[1] 'By the words "So long as we are without sin we are equal," Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty.'[2] In the following article St. Thomas distinguishes between political and despotic subordination, and shows that the former might have existed in a state of innocence. 'Mastership has a twofold meaning; first as opposed to servitude, in which case a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is commonly referred to any kind of subject; and in that sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free men can be called a master. In the first meaning of mastership man would not have been ruled by man in the state of innocence; but in the latter sense man would be ruled over by man in that state.'[3] In _De Regimine Principum_ Aquinas also accepts what we may call the Augustinian view of slavery. 'But whether the dominion of man over man is according to the law of nature, or is permitted or provided by G.o.d may be certainly resolved. If we speak of dominion by means of servile subjection, this was introduced because of sin. But if we speak of dominion in so far as it relates to the function of advising and directing, it may in this sense be said to be natural.'[4]

[Footnote 1: i. 96, 3.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._, ad. 1.]

[Footnote 3: i. 96, 4.]

[Footnote 4: _De Reg. Prin._, iii. 9. This is one of the chapters the authorship of which is disputed.]

St. Thomas was therefore willing to endorse the argument of St.

Augustine that slavery was a result of sin; but he also admits the justice of Aristotle's reasoning on the subject. In the section of the _Summa_ where the question is discussed, whether the law of nations is the same as the natural law, one of the objections to be met is that 'Slavery among men is natural, for some are naturally slaves according to the philosopher. Now "slavery belongs to the law of nations," as Isidore states. Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.'[1]

In answer to this objection St. Thomas draws the distinction between what is natural absolutely, and what is natural _secundum quid_, the pa.s.sage which we have quoted in treating of property rights.[2]

He then goes on to apply this distinction to the case of slavery.

'Considered absolutely, the fact that this particular man should be a slave rather than another man, is based, not on natural reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful to this man to be ruled by a wise man, and to the latter to be helped by the former, as the philosopher states. Wherefore slavery which belongs to the law of nations is natural in the second way, but not in the first.'[3] It will be noted from this pa.s.sage that St. Thomas partly admits, though not entirely, the opinion of Aristotle. In the _De Regimine Principum_ he goes much further in the direction of adopting the full Aristotelian theory: 'Nature decrees that there should be grades in men as in other things. We see this in the elements, a superior and an inferior; we see in every mixture that some one element predominates.... For we see this also in the relation of the body and the mind, and in the powers of the mind compared with one another; because some are ordained towards ordering and moving, such as the understanding and the will; others to serving. So should it be among men; and thus it is proved that some are slaves according to nature.

Some lack reason through some defect of nature; and such ought to be subjected to servile works because they cannot use their reason, and this is called the natural law.'[4] In the same chapter the right of conquerors to enslave their conquered is referred to without comment, and therefore implicitly approved by the author.

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 57, 3.]

[Footnote 2: _Supra_, p. 64.]

[Footnote 3: II. ii 57, ad. 2.]

[Footnote 4: _De Reg. Prin._, ii. 10.]

'Thus,' according to Janet, 'St. Thomas admits slavery as far as one can admit it, and for all the reasons for which one can admit it.

He admits with Aristotle that there is a natural slavery; with St.

Augustine that slavery is the result of sin; with the jurisconsult that slavery is the result of war and convention.'[1] 'The author justifies slavery,' says Franck, 'in the name of St. Augustine, and in that of Aristotle; in the name of the latter by showing that there are two races of men, one born to command, and the other to obey; in the name of the former in affirming that slavery had its origin in original sin; that by sin man has forfeited his right to liberty.

Further, we must admit slavery as an inst.i.tution not only of nature and one of the consequences of the fall, we must admit a third principle of slavery which appears to St. Thomas as legitimate as the other two. War is necessary; therefore it is just; and if it is just we must accept its consequences. One of these consequences is the absolute right of the conqueror over the life, person, and goods of the conquered.'[2]

[Footnote 1: _Op. cit._, vol. i. p. 431.]

[Footnote 2: Franck, _op cit_., p. 69.]