Of all the colonies the Australian ones were the most directly interested in the South African controversy. In view of the vast and increasing trade between Australia and the mother-country, the safety of the Cape route must always be a question of the very highest importance in the eyes of Australian statesmen. And apart from such considerations of contingent self-interest, Australians had strong personal feelings over the issue between Kruger and the Uitlanders. Australian miners formed no small section of the population of the Rand. Australians were under no illusions as to the idyllic character of the peasant-owners of the Transvaal. As soon as the crisis became acute, public meetings were held all over the Australian colonies to express sympathy with the Uitlanders and to support the att.i.tude of the Imperial Government. The question of sending Australian contingents to join the Imperial forces in the event of a war was discussed at an early stage. The idea of active partic.i.p.ation in the wars of the Empire was not altogether a new one. As far back as 1867 Tasmania had sent a contingent to a.s.sist the Imperial forces in the Maori war. More recently a body of New South Wales troops took part in the Sudan campaign of 1885. A little active service and much tedious waiting at Suakim was all they saw, and one might have imagined that in Australia the result had been to damp any inclination to repeat the performance. But the partial disappointment of 1885 made the Australians all the more eager to try again.

Between October 28 and November 5 the first Australian contingents sailed amidst the most enthusiastic popular demonstrations. They were officered and manned almost entirely by members of the various colonial volunteer forces, and thus possessed the advantage of a certain amount of initial training which was destined to stand them in good stead in the field. It should never be forgotten that their success was mainly due to the persistent effort of those officers, whether Imperial or colonial, who during the past twenty years had given their services to the development and organization of the colonial forces. It was the existence of these forces that kept up the military spirit in the colonies.

Small as was the force contributed by the Empire (nearly 80,000 men) it was none the less a material a.s.sistance, whose value can hardly be overrated. It practically doubled the mounted force, and thus made possible those sweeping movements by which Lord Roberts reached Pretoria. Above all, it gave the Imperial Government a moral support which enabled it to face with equanimity the almost universal hostility of the European powers or the fanatical outcries of a few anti-Imperialist partisans at home. Never, probably, in modern times has there been a greater consensus of honest opinion in support of a great national movement than that which backed up Britain's effort to maintain her position in South Africa. It was simply that the free citizens of free countries asked to be allowed to venture their lives for the sake of a political ideal which was personally and intimately dear to each one of them, and that, in spite of the paralysing absence of either precedent or preparation, many thousands actually achieved their desire.

The war has not shown what the Empire can do, but it has revealed to those who perhaps doubted before, what an Empire we can make if we but choose.

ELANDS RIVER

Amongst varying fortunes and many indecisive actions, the defence of the position at Elands River stands out as an achievement only made possible by courage and grim determination.

For several weeks Colonel h.o.r.e, with a small garrison at Brakfontein on the Elands River, had been keeping up the connection between Mafeking and Zeerust, policing the district and forwarding on convoys to Rustenburg. At the beginning of August the force which he had for this purpose, as well as to guard a large store of supplies, consisted of 500 men, nearly all Imperial bushmen or Rhodesians, an old muzzle-loading seven-pounder, and two maxims. By this time Lord Roberts had determined that several isolated posts in the Western Transvaal, such as this one, which were in constant danger of attack, must be evacuated, and on August 1 ordered General Carrington to march to Elands River to cover h.o.r.e's retirement. But De la Rey, with three detachments of his troops under himself, Lemmer, and Steenekemp, each numbering about 300 men, and each with a gun and a pom-pom, and a maxim, had arrived there before him, and on the morning of August 4 had aroused h.o.r.e's camp by sh.e.l.l and rifle fire from the north-west, east, and south-east. The camp was on a small boulder-strewn kopje, in the centre of an amphitheatre about five acres in extent, and half a mile east of the river. Most of the men were on this central kopje, but two small hills on the bank of the river were held by detachments under Captain b.u.t.ters and Lieutenant Zouch. Luckily, an attack had been expected, and stone sangars and shelters of ox-wagons had been made and further protected by biscuit boxes and bags of flour and sugar from the stores the men were guarding. Nevertheless the Boer attack seemed to have every chance in its favour; their guns were in safe positions 2,400 yards from the camp, and along the river banks they could creep close up to the defenders. h.o.r.e's old seven-pounder, though it succeeded in silencing a Boer gun, and killed a German gunner, was very capricious in its working, and was obviously no match for the Boer guns. The thousands of horses and oxen which were in the camp under no sort of cover were nearly all killed on the first day by the Boer sh.e.l.ls; and the stench arising from these dead animals in the narrow camp makes it almost marvellous that the men who escaped the Boer sh.e.l.ls were not killed by pestilence. Moreover, the only chance of getting water was to take the water carts down to the river at night, and then the drivers and escort were not always safe. To make matters worse, on the second day of the siege Carrington's advance scouts, after appearing on the rise to the west, were soon seen retiring again, so that rescue from this side seemed now out of the question. When starting, Carrington did not know that h.o.r.e was invested, so he carried very few rations. He no doubt had a small force with him and was badly off for supplies; but he had gained a ridge from which he commanded the way to Elands River, and under the circ.u.mstances of h.o.r.e's pressing danger he was too quickly discouraged from a more determined effort to bring out the garrison.

From the east another attempt was made to relieve h.o.r.e which proved equally abortive.

On August 5 firing had been heard in the direction of Elands River, so next day Baden-Powell marched with his own and Mahon's mounted troops about half-way to Brakfontein. Here he heard guns firing in a westerly direction, but as the sound seemed to grow fainter and fainter, he a.s.sumed, without, however, waiting for the reports of his scouts, that Carrington had succeeded in withdrawing h.o.r.e towards Mafeking.

After Carrington's retreat to Zeerust on August 5 and Baden-Powell's to Rustenburg on the 6th, Lord Roberts had given up all hope of saving this garrison. But on the 13th a runner from Colonel h.o.r.e had arrived at Crocodile Pools, announcing that he had not surrendered. On hearing this the Field Marshal ordered Kitchener to take part of his force to relieve him. Kitchener started on the 16th. from Quaggafontein with Little's, Broadwood's, and Smith-Dorrien's brigades. After Carrington had come up and gone away again on August 5, the garrison, though apparently left to their fate, would hear nothing of surrender, but made up their minds to fight as long as they had ammunition and strength to use it. Luckily they were well provided with food, and the Boers, as usual in their sieges, were content to sit round and fire at them without seriously attempting to rush the place as they should have done. The garrison also kept up their spirits by sudden raids at night on adventurous Boers or guns that came too near. Thus, as at Wepener, it became a game of patience for the garrison, dissimilar only in this, that at Elands River there was no promise of support to buoy up the garrison with hope.

However, on August 16, after eleven days' siege, De la Rey moved away on the news of the approaching relief columns, and Lord Kitchener rode in to set free the garrison.

This siege, like that of Wepener, was especially a Colonial triumph; there the garrison had been chiefly Cape Colonials, here the majority were Australians of Carrington's first Brigade, the rest being Rhodesians, and it would be difficult to praise overmuch the determination and fine spirit shown by these Colonials in their first opportunity of distinguishing themselves as a corps. Every soldier who saw the place afterwards expressed surprise that they could have held out so long, and it is therefore the more creditable to them to have done so when every hope of relief seemed entirely cut off; while, at a time when surrenders and retreats were not sufficiently rare, the example shown by these splendid men was even more important than the position they held.

THE GREAT WAR

+Source.+--The Times History of the War and Encyclopaedia, Vol. I, p.

161; Vol. II, p. 31; Vol. III, p. 126

The aggressive policy of Germany led to the outbreak in 1914 of the greatest war in history; for nearly every country in the world ultimately became involved in the struggle.

Germany advised Austria to demand most humiliating concessions from Servia, and the resistance of Servia supported by Russia resulted in war between Germany and Austria on one side, and Servia, Russia, and her ally France on the other.

For strategical reasons Germany determined to attack France through Belgium, declaring that the international treaty which bound her to respect Belgian neutrality was but a "Sc.r.a.p of Paper." Great Britain, as one of the signatories to the treaty, protested against such a violation of good faith, but finding protestation vain declared war upon Germany on 4 August 1914.

The whole Empire solidly supported the Mother Country and shared valiantly in all her achievements.

THE RALLY OF THE EMPIRE

Important as were the offers of help, both of men and provisions, which the self-governing Dominions and the Indian Empire made to the Mother Country almost immediately after the outbreak of the war, the knowledge that these great daughter-nations were morally convinced of the justice of the British cause, was a factor of even more far-reaching importance.

Great as was the necessity of organizing and expanding the Imperial forces, and thus creating an extra army or armies to reinforce the British Expeditionary Force in France, urgent as was the need of taking advantage of the prompt offers of help which came from all parts of the Empire, the necessity of convincing the self-governing Dominions and the Empire at large of the righteousness of the cause for which Great Britain was fighting was more imperative still. For in the long run the consciousness of the justice of the principles for which a people is fighting, alone can ensure the ma.s.sing of material force sufficient to secure material victory.

Evidence that the case for Great Britain was fully understood and thoroughly approved, not only by our own peoples, but by the bulk of the neutral States of the world, was not long in presenting itself. The Dominions as a whole had satisfied themselves that the British cause was just, before Sir Edward Grey had made it plain by his speech of August 3rd that the British Government had done everything short of sacrificing the honour of the country to avoid war. In the words of Sir Richard McBride, the Premier of British Columbia, "Should it unfortunately develop that Great Britain is compelled to engage in hostilities, Canada will automatically be at war also"; while in Australia, Mr. Fisher, the ex-Prime Minister, declared, "Should honour demand the Mother Country to take part in hostilities, Australians will stand beside her to the last man and the last shilling." These sentiments found expression in the offers of help of men and material, which have been described in the preceding chapter. To those offers the King replied by a message to the Overseas Dominions:

"I desire to express to my people of the Overseas Dominions with what appreciation and pride I have received the messages from their respective Governments during the last few days.

"These spontaneous a.s.surances of their fullest support recall to me the generous, self-sacrificing help given by them in the past to the Mother Country.

"I shall be strengthened in the discharge of the great responsibility which rests upon me by the confident belief that in this time of trial my Empire will stand united, calm, resolute, trusting in G.o.d.

"GEORGE R.I."

THE SINKING OF THE _EMDEN_ (German cruiser)

Against us there were known to be some eight or nine German cruisers abroad, all efficient for commerce-destroying purposes, and several with very high speed, which it was recognized would require a great deal of catching....

The _Emden_ was a small vessel of some 3,500 tons, with a speed of about 25 knots--quite fast enough to overhaul any British steamer she was likely to encounter, and fast enough also to run away, if necessary. The _Emden_ was generally heard of where she was least expected, and after reaping her harvest of merchantmen, as unaccountably disappeared. In something under six weeks she had captured nearly twenty steamers, always contriving to pick up a collier among them, so that she was able to keep her bunkers replenished....

As a variety of adventure, the _Emden_ steamed one evening into Madras Roads, and threw sh.e.l.l into the outskirts of the town for the s.p.a.ce of half an hour or so--some oil tanks were set ablaze, and two or three natives killed; Fort George returned the fire--probably without effect--and the _Emden_ retired.

It may be a.s.sumed that the German captain received information by wireless of the probable approach of colliers or other vessels, as he was so very much on the spot; in any case, he was a courageous and enterprising man, and a good sportsman; but we wanted very badly to catch him. There are so many holes and corners in that part of the world, where a vessel may lie for a time with little chance of detection, and the _Emden's_ speed would have enabled her to reach some such refuge very quickly.

The last act in the drama of the _Emden_ took place off the Cocos-Keeling Islands in the Indian Ocean....

It was to this desolate spot in the Indian Ocean that Captain Von Muller brought his ship, in the early days of November; with him was one of his captures, the _Buresk_, which was full of coal. The object of this visit of the _Emden_ was the destruction of the important wireless station that is established on the islands, and on the morning of November 9th, the officials were unpleasantly surprised by the landing of an armed boat's crew from a cruiser, which had come to an anchor, and which they first imagined to be H.M.S. _Minotaur_. They were quickly undeceived by the German officer in charge of the party, who informed them that their operations from the wireless station had greatly hampered the movements of the cruiser. One detachment of the Germans then rounded up all the officials and their servants, placing them under a strict guard, while a second party prepared to blow up the wireless installation and to smash the instrument rooms of the cable office. This they did most thoroughly, but the officials seem to have kept their heads in the most praiseworthy manner, as, just as soon as they discovered that the enemy was upon them, they sent out distress signals by wireless, and warned adjacent stations by cable that they were about to be smashed up.

The landing party now blew up the wireless mast and the store in which spare cable and cable gear was kept; a third explosion wrecked the wireless hut, and completed the destruction of the installation. The dynamo rooms and workshops were destroyed with flogging hammers and axes, everything breakable, including clocks, being smashed to atoms.

Their next proceeding was to cut the sh.o.r.e ends of the submarine cables, and this was done in full view of the prisoners. There are three cables from the Cocos--to Perth, to Batavia, and to Rodriguez--and the pleasure of the prisoners can be imagined when they saw the Germans spend much hard labour in destroying a dummy cable. Eventually the Perth cable and the dummy were cut, the others being left, presumably because the Germans did not know that they existed.

The party from the _Emden_ had landed at 7.30 a.m., and by 9.20 their mission of destruction was accomplished. At this time a signal was blown on the siren from the ship; the officer in command collected his men, marched them down to the beach, and re-embarked. The telegraphists report that they were fairly and courteously treated. On arrival the _Emden_ was still using her now famous fourth funnel, a dummy, and this it was that caused the telegraphists to mistake her in the first instance for the _Minotaur_, which is a four-funnelled armoured cruiser.

As she steamed away in the bright light of the tropic morning for what was so shortly to prove her last cruise, the _Emden_ hauled down, and stowed away, her dummy.

The action that ensued between the _Sydney_ and the _Emden_ is here given in the official despatch of Captain Glossop, dated from Colombo on November 15th:

I have the honour to report that whilst on escort duty with the convoy under the charge of Captain Silver, H.M.A.S. _Melbourne_, at 6.30 a.m.

on Monday, Nov. 9th, a wireless message from Cocos was heard reporting that a foreign warship was off the entrance. I was ordered to raise steam for full speed at 7.0 a.m. and proceeded thither. I worked up to twenty knots, and at 9.15 a.m. sighted land ahead and almost immediately the smoke of a ship, which proved to be the H.I.G.M.S. _Emden_ coming out towards me at a great rate. At 9.40 a.m. fire was opened, she firing the first shot. I kept my distance as much as possible to obtain the advantage of my guns. Her fire was very accurate and rapid to begin with, but seemed to slacken very quickly, all casualties occurring in this ship almost immediately. First, the foremost funnel of her went, secondly the foremast, and she was badly on fire aft, then the second funnel went, and lastly the third funnel, and I saw she was making for the beach on North Keeling Island, where she grounded at 11.20 a.m. I gave her two more broadsides and left her, to pursue a merchant ship which had come up during the action.

2. Although I had guns on this merchant ship at odd times during the action, I had not fired, and as she was making off fast, I pursued and overtook her at 12.10, firing a gun across her bows and hoisting International Code Signal to stop, which she did. I sent an armed boat, and found her to be the ss. _Buresk_, a captured British collier, with 18 Chinese crew, 1 English steward, 1 Norwegian cook, and a German prize crew of 3 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 12 men. The ship unfortunately was sinking, so I took all on board, fired four sh.e.l.ls into her, and returned to _Emden_, pa.s.sing men swimming in the water, for whom I left two boats I was towing from _Buresk_.

3. On arriving again off _Emden_, she still had her colours up at mainmast head. I inquired by signal, International Code, "Will you surrender?" and received a reply in Morse, "What signal? No signal books." I then made in Morse, "Do you surrender?" and subsequently, "Have you received my signal?" to neither of which did I get an answer.

The German officers on board gave me to understand that the captain would never surrender, and therefore, though very reluctantly, I again fired at her at 4.30 p.m., ceasing at 4.35, as she showed white flags and hauled down her ensign by sending a man aloft.

4. I then left Emden and returned and picked up the _Buresk's_ two boats, rescuing two sailors (5.0 p.m.) who had been in the water all day. I returned and sent in one boat to _Emden_, manned by her own prize crew from _Buresk_ and one officer, and stating I would return to their a.s.sistance next morning.

5. I lay on and off all night, and communicated with Direction Island at 8.0 a.m., November 10th, to find that the _Emden's_ party, consisting of three officers and forty men, one launch and two cutters, had seized and provisioned a 70-ton schooner (the _Ayesha_), having four Maxims with two belts to each. They left the previous night at six o'clock. The wireless station was entirely destroyed, one cable cut, one damaged, and one intact. I borrowed a doctor and two a.s.sistants, and proceeded as fast as possible to _Emden's_ a.s.sistance.

6. I sent an officer on board to see the captain, and in view of the large number of prisoners and wounded, and lack of accommodation, etc., in this ship, and the absolute impossibility of leaving them there, he agreed that if I received his officers and men and all wounded, "then as for such time as they remained in _Sydney_ they would cause no interference with ship or fittings, and would be amenable to the ship's discipline." I therefore set to work at once to tranship them--a most difficult operation, the ship being on weather side of island, and the send alongside very heavy. The conditions in the _Emden_ were indescribable. I received the last from her at 5.0 p.m., then had to go round to the lee side to pick up 20 more men who had managed to get ash.o.r.e from the ship.

7. Darkness came on before this could be accomplished, and the ship again stood off and on all night, resuming operations at 5.0 a.m., on November 11th, a cutter's crew having to land with stretchers to bring wounded round to embarking point. A German officer, a doctor, died ash.o.r.e the previous day. The ship in the meantime ran over to Direction Island to return their doctor and a.s.sistants, send cables, and was back again at 10 a.m., embarked the remainder of wounded, and proceeded for Colombo by 10.35 a.m., Wednesday, November 11th.

8. Total casualties in _Sydney_: killed, 3; severely wounded (since dead), 1; severely wounded, 4; wounded, 4; slightly wounded, 4. In the _Emden_ I can only approximately state the killed at 7 officers and 108 men from captain's statement. I had on board 11 officers, 9 warrant officers and 191 men, of whom 3 officers and 53 men were wounded, and of this number 1 officer and 3 men have since died of wounds.

9. The damage to Sydney's hull and fittings was surprisingly small; in all about ten hits seem to have been made. The engine and boiler rooms and funnels escaped entirely.

10. I have great pleasure in stating that the behaviour of the ship's company was excellent in every way, and with such a large number of young hands and people under training it is all the more gratifying.