Under a barrage formed by the French and English artillery the 11th Ess.e.x Regiment attacked with great determination, and by the end of the day had achieved the whole of its share of the task. The two battalions of the Cha.s.seurs were, unfortunately, not so successful, with the result that the right of the 11th Ess.e.x Regiment was exposed, and it was unable to hold on to a small part of the ground recovered on its extreme right. For this action the Division received a letter of thanks for its "spontaneous" co-operation from General de Mitry, commanding the French Detachement de l'Armee du Nord.

The Division remained in the line as next-door neighbours to the French till the 7th June, when relieved by 33rd Division. Many will retain pleasant memories of our a.s.sociation with our Allies during the three to four weeks that we were alongside them, and of the admirable liaison that existed between us.

During the period of just under three weeks' rest that it enjoyed on this occasion the Division had one brigade always at Dirty Bucket Camp working on rear lines of defence, one training in the St. Jan ter Biezen area, and one at musketry at Cormette, near Tilques. During this period, too, the 71st Trench-mortar Battery and the 18th Trench-mortar Battery were able to be of service to the French, the former being lent to the 46th Division to a.s.sist them in an operation on 8th June, the latter co-operating with the 7th (French) Division in a successful raid on the 19th June.

On the 27th June the Division pa.s.sed to the XIX Corps (Lt.-Gen.

Sir H. E. Watts) and relieved the 46th French Division (Cha.s.seurs) in the d.i.c.kebusch sector. This was in a very unpleasant front, where the dominating position of the enemy on Kemmel Hill made movement, even in the rear lines, impossible by day, and practically all work, of which there was plenty, had to be done by night.

The chief incidents of the tour of the Division in this sector were the successful attack on Ridgewood, the 1st The Buffs daylight raid on the Bra.s.serie, the sixteen-prisoner night-raid of the 2nd D.L.I. on the Zillebeke front, and the co-operation of the 18th Infantry Brigade with the operations of the 41st Division on our right.

The situation created by the enemy's attack on Ridgewood on the 28th May had never been satisfactorily restored, in spite of repeated attempts on the part of the 46th (French) Division. The 6th Division took over with the determination to put this right on the first opportunity, profiting by the lessons learnt in the successive attacks made by the French Cha.s.seurs, which their Division had placed most unreservedly at our disposal. After careful reconnaissance the 18th Infantry Brigade, a.s.sisted by two companies of the 1st Middles.e.x Regiment of the 33rd Division, attacked the enemy at 6 a.m. on the 14th July. The attack delivered by the 1st West Yorkshire Regiment and the 2nd D.L.I. and the two above-mentioned companies was a complete success. The enemy, taken entirely by surprise, only offered any resistance in one or two isolated cases, and the dash and prompt initiative of the attacking troops soon dealt with these. All objectives were gained, Ridgewood and Elzenwalle retaken, and 7 officers, 341 other ranks, 25 machine-guns, and 3 trench-mortars captured at small cost to the attackers. Large quant.i.ties of trench-mortar ammunition, found dumped close up to the front line, demonstrated the correctness of the view that the enemy had in contemplation a resumption of his offensive on this front. For this the Division received congratulations from the Commander-in-Chief, the G.O.C., Second Army (General Sir Herbert Plumer), and G.O.C., XIX Corps.

The raid of the 1st The Buffs was carried out on the 2nd August. The objective was the Bra.s.serie and neighbouring farms. The raid, which was by day and on a fairly extensive scale, was very successful.

On the 8th August the 41st Division carried out a small operation, in co-operation with which the 18th Infantry Brigade undertook two minor operations. That by a company of the 1st West Yorkshire Regiment on the Vierstraat Road was unsuccessful, through no fault of the attacking infantry, who were held up by machine-guns sited so far forward that they had escaped our barrage. On the right a company of the 2nd D.L.I., operating in direct touch with the left of the 41st Division, was completely successful in carrying out its task. In connection with operations on this front the Division sustained a severe loss in Major R. W. Barnett, K.R.R., G.S.O.2, who was killed by a sniper while reconnoitring on 12th August.

During July and August the Divisional Artillery was exceptionally busy. An immense amount of effort was put into the preparation of forward positions for a large number of batteries to be employed in a contemplated later offensive. Vast quant.i.ties of gun ammunition were carted nightly, and dumped therein in readiness.

During the month of August the Division had the pleasure of close a.s.sociation with our American Allies, part of the 27th American, a New York Division, doing their attachment and apprenticeship to trench warfare with us. On the 21st to the 24th August the Americans relieved the Division in the line, and it was withdrawn for rest and training to the Wizernes area.

On leaving the XIX Corps the Corps Commander sent the Division his "warmest thanks for and appreciation of the excellent service rendered" while under his command.

CHAPTER XI

THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH

1918

Originally destined to take part in a projected attack for the recapture of Kemmel Hill and Village, the Division suddenly received orders at the end of August, to the delight of all, to move southwards at very short notice. During the 1st, 2nd and 3rd September the move southwards was carried out by rail, the Division, less artillery, detraining at Corbie, Heilly and Mericourt. On the 4th the Divisional Artillery followed, and the whole Division was concentrated in the area Heilly-Ribemont-Franvillers on the River Ancre, in G.H.Q.

Reserve. The next few days were devoted to a continuation of the training in open warfare commenced in the Wizernes area.

The Germans, forced back in July and August from the high-water mark of their advance in March and April, had stood on the line of the Somme and the Peronne--Arras road. In the southern sector of the British front the Somme defences had been turned by the brilliant capture of Mont St. Quentin (to the north of and guarding Peronne) by the Australian Corps. The retreating enemy had been pursued across the Somme by the 32nd Division, which had been attached temporarily to the Australians. This Division now became part of the newly-const.i.tuted IX Corps (Lt.-Gen. Sir W. Braithwaite), which was to bear such a glorious part in the concluding chapter of the War, and which consisted of 1st, 6th, 32nd and 46th Divisions.

The 32nd Division had followed the enemy without much incident up to the large Holnon Wood, three and a half miles west of St. Quentin, and it was there that the Division relieved it on night 13/14th September, with the 1st Division on the left and the 34th (French) Division on the right.

It was expected that the enemy would stand on the heights which command St. Quentin to the west and south, but it was not known whether their resistance would be strong or not, as they were much disorganized.

The 1st and 6th Divisions, hand in hand with the French, were ordered to capture this tactical line on 18th September, as a starting-point for the attack on the Hindenburg Line, which ran just outside St.

Quentin to the ca.n.a.l at Bellenglise.

To the 18th Infantry Brigade was entrusted the task of securing a line well clear of Holnon Wood for the forming-up line on the 18th, and in doing so it first had to clear the wood and establish posts at the edge, then push forward. The selected forming-up line included to us Holnon Village on the right and next to the French.

On the morning of the 16th September the 11th Ess.e.x, after an unsuccessful attempt to push forward during the night, attacked under a barrage and advanced from the line of posts taken over a little way inside the wood to a line of trenches just clear of the wood, capturing in this small operation forty-six prisoners. It was now arranged for the 1st, 6th and 34th (French) Divisions to advance simultaneously to secure the above-mentioned starting line. On the left the 1st Division was successful, and so were the 11th Ess.e.x, who, held up at first by heavy sh.e.l.ling and machine-gun fire, persevered throughout the day and were rewarded by finishing up in possession of the whole of their objectives, a very creditable performance.

On the right the West Yorks had to secure Holnon Village, which lay in a hollow commanded by Round and Manchester Hills in the area allotted to the French, and which was itself strongly held. The French failed in their attack, and though the West Yorks obtained part of the village they could not clear it and establish the starting line beyond it. The situation at the end of the 17th was therefore unsatisfactory on the right, but it was impossible to put off the general attack, and arrangements had to be improvised. Another unsatisfactory feature was that Holnon Wood covered practically the whole 2,500 yards frontage of the Division, and was so drenched with gas sh.e.l.ls and the tracks so bad, that both 16th and 71st Infantry Brigades had to make a detour north and south of the wood respectively to reach their a.s.sembly positions, and this naturally fatigued the troops and hindered communication and supply.

Standing on the east edge of the wood, a bare glacis-like slope devoid of cover, except for two or three sh.e.l.l-trap copses, stretched away for 3,000 yards to the high ground overlooking St. Quentin. There was no sign of life and very few trenches could be seen, though it was known that they were there as the Fifth Army had held the position in March 1918. It was found afterwards that the Germans had camouflaged their trenches with thistles, which here covered the ground to a height in many places of eighteen inches.

At the highest point about the centre of the Divisional area of attack was a network of trenches known later as the Quadrilateral--a name of bad omen to the 6th Division--and which, like its namesake on the Somme, could be reinforced under cover from the back slopes of the hill. An examination of the battlefield after the 24th September also revealed several narrow sunken roads filled with wire. The position was one of great natural strength, and in addition the whole of the right was dominated by heights in the area to be attacked by the French. Lastly, adequate time could not be given to Brigades for reconnaissance owing to the imperative necessity of pushing on to guard the flank of Corps farther north. Troops had not seen the ground they had to attack over, and rain and smoke obscured the few landmarks existing on 18th September.

On that morning the Division attacked at 5.20 a.m. with the 71st Infantry Brigade on the right, its left directed on the Quadrilateral and its right on Holnon and Selency.

The 16th Infantry Brigade was on the left, with its right just clear of the Quadrilateral and its left on Fresnoy le Pet.i.t. Six tanks were allotted to the Division, but met with various mishaps or were knocked out, and were not of much use. The attack met with most determined opposition at once, especially on the right, where the difficulties of the 71st Infantry Brigade were increased by the failure of the French to take Round and Manchester Hills.

The 2nd D.L.I., attached to this brigade to complete the clearing of Holnon Village, accomplished this, but were driven out by sh.e.l.ling and by machine gun fire from Round and Manchester Hills, losing very heavily.

The 16th Infantry Brigade was more successful, and at one time the York and Lancasters had nearly completed the capture of Fresnoy le Pet.i.t, but were unable to hold it. The brigade advanced, however, 3,000 yards. Fighting was continuous throughout the day, but without further success. The Sherwood Foresters advancing very gallantly against the Quadrilateral were reported as being just outside it and entrenched. It was machine gun fire from this stronghold which prevented the right of the 16th Infantry Brigade advancing, and an attack was therefore ordered for dawn of the 19th September, but it was evidently antic.i.p.ated by the enemy, who put down a very heavy artillery and machine-gun barrage before the attackers left their jumping-off positions. Fighting again continued throughout the day, but without success, and it was evident that the enemy meant standing his ground and that this was not a rearguard action as it had at one time been thought. The enemy's artillery was very strong, and, with the thick Hindenburg wire in front of it, was placed close to their front line, and was enabled thus to do considerable execution on our back areas.

The successes of other Divisions in the south of the British zone had been constant and fairly easy for some time, so that the partial success which the Division had obtained was very disappointing to all ranks. They were much cheered, therefore, to get the following wire from the Army Commander (General Sir H. Rawlinson):--"Please convey to the 6th Division my congratulations and warm thanks for their success of yesterday. Though all objectives were not attained they carried through a difficult operation with great gallantry and determination.

I offer to all ranks my warm thanks and congratulations."

All units had heavy fighting, in which some had incurred considerable losses, and all were tired and in want of reorganization. It was therefore decided not to renew the attack for a few days, and to devote the interval to a proper artillery preparation (the heavy artillery put 1,000 sh.e.l.ls on the Quadrilateral in one day), the reorganization of battalions, and the construction of a jumping-off position, in the execution of which the R.E. (Lt.-Col. H. A. L. Hall) and the Pioneers rendered invaluable a.s.sistance. The fighting up to this date had yielded 6 officers and 264 other ranks prisoners, and 65 machine-guns.

On the morning of the 24th September a fresh attack was launched; the 18th Infantry Brigade, to which was attached the 1st Leicestershire Regiment, attacking on the right; the 16th Infantry Brigade on the left. The French 36th Corps attacked with a fresh division simultaneously to our right; the 1st Division, which had taken over the task of the capture of Fresnoy and Gricourt, on our left. The four tanks detailed to attack the Quadrilateral again had bad luck, one being turned absolutely turtle by a mine field. The three battalions of the 18th Infantry Brigade met at first with little success, the 11th Ess.e.x on the left establishing a rather precarious footing in one face of the Quadrilateral, and the 1st West Yorkshire Regiment getting in at one point in Douai Trench, running south from the Strong Point. The D.L.I., attacking south of them through Holnon Village, could make no headway. The French had during the morning captured Round Hill and part of Manchester Hill, and came up in line with us.

The 16th Infantry Brigade fared much better, and working down from the north was able in the course of the day to secure the northern face of the Quadrilateral. Their four tanks were of great a.s.sistance to them this day. Throughout the day the 18th Infantry Brigade maintained the fight with characteristic determination, but without improving its position very much. At 11 p.m., however, it launched the 1st Leicestershire Regiment by moonlight in a further attack on Douai Trench. The attack, delivered with great gallantry, was successful, and many enemy were killed in the trench which was found to be strongly held. In spite of the very rough handling which it had received on the 24th the 18th Infantry Brigade stuck grimly to its task during the 25th. Douai Trench was cleared from end to end by hand-to-hand fighting, and patrols, admirably handled, gradually made good the whole of the objectives allotted for the previous day's attack. On the morning of 25th September 3 officers and 104 other ranks surrendered near Fayet to patrols of the 2nd Y. and L. Regiment.

By midnight on the night of the 25/26th September the 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades in co-operation had completed the capture of the Quadrilateral, a position of such unusual natural strength that captured German officers admitted that they had fully expected to be able to hold it indefinitely. For this very fine performance, a remarkable instance of grit and determination and of intelligent initiative by regimental officers of all ranks, to whom the successful results were entirely due, the Division received the congratulations of the Army and Corps Commanders and G.O.C., 1st Division. The message telephoned on behalf of the Army Commander contained the following pa.s.sage:--"He fully realises the difficulties they have had to contend with, and admires the tenacity with which they have stuck to it and completed their task."

The enemy's resistance now broke down, and during the 26th, 27th and 28th September patrols were able gradually to gain further ground, so that by the time the Division was relieved by the 4th French Division on the 29/30th, posts had been established round three sides of the village of Fayet. Manchester Hill was finally captured by the French on 26th September.

The captures during the period were 10 officers, 372 other ranks, 4 guns, 15 trench-mortars, and 53 machine-guns.

During the relief by the French a noteworthy incident occurred. The 2nd Brigade, R.F.A., were asked to fire a barrage to cover an advance of French infantry at a certain hour, and did so. Just after completion a message arrived saying that the attack had been postponed, and would the brigade repeat the operation very shortly at another hour which was fixed. This the brigade did, clearing to absolutely the last sh.e.l.l the ammunition available on the ground and completing the barrage at the same moment.

During the fighting in September the Division had "B" and "C"

Companies, 2nd Life Guards Machine-gun Battalion, at its disposal, and these fine troops helped much in the machine-gun barrage, and added confidence that any counter-attack on the right would meet with a hot reception.

While the 6th Division had been fighting on the right of the British Army, the 46th Division, with the Americans on their left and the 1st Division forming a defensive flank on their right, had broken the Hindenburg Line on 29th September by a magnificent attack. Followed across the ca.n.a.l by the 32nd Division, these two divisions had very severe fighting at Ramicourt and Sequehart and were exhausted.

The 6th Division, after four days to rest and absorb reinforcements, was ordered to relieve them and attack on the 8th October in the direction of the small town of Bohain. The 30th American Division was on the right and about 2,000 yards ahead, connected to the 6th Division by a series of posts along the railway. This curious position entailed a very complicated creeping barrage, which, however, was successfully put into operation on the day of the attack. On the right was the French 42nd Division slightly in rear, having followed the Germans through St. Quentin and met with strong resistance beyond it.

The position to be attacked consisted of high rolling downs with deep traverse valleys, giving good cover for supports and forward guns, and on the right a broad longitudinal valley closed by a ridge on which stood the village of Mericourt. The French had a stiff task in front of them, and did not propose to advance as far as the British--6,000 yards--with the result that even if they were successful our frontage, thrown back from left to right, would be 7,500 yards, and if unsuccessful over 10,000. Added to this their zero hour was nearly an hour after ours, and there would be a very real danger of counter-attack from the right. The Divisional Commander, therefore, decided to leave the valley severely alone to start with, merely smoking by guns and bombs from aeroplanes the Mericourt Ridge and attacking all along the high ground on the north. As our attack and the French attack progressed the valley was to be cleared by three whippet tanks supported by the 1st Battalion West Yorks, lent to the 16th Infantry Brigade, while finally an attack from the high ground against the Mericourt Ridge would be delivered with a view to cutting off posts in the valley between the two attacks. The 139th Infantry Brigade of the 46th Division remained in position at Sequehart, together with two companies Life Guards Machine-gun Battalion, to secure the right flank against counter-attack. The machine-gun nests on the Sequehart-Mericourt road enfiladed the start line of the 6th Division, and the G.O.C., 139th Infantry Brigade (Brig-Gen. J.

Harington), was asked to capture these just before the general attack.

The 46th Divisional Pioneer Battalion (1/1st Monmouthshire Regiment) undertook this task, and twice attacked the position but without success, in spite of the greatest gallantry. The Commanding Officer (Col. Jenkins) and his Adjutant were both unfortunately killed. Their bravery, however, was well rewarded, as their action enabled the 6th Divisional troops to work round and cut the position off, and the enemy eventually surrendered.

The weight of artillery for the operations of the 8th October was immense. In addition to the Divisional artillery there were the 5th and 16th Brigades, R.H.A., 161st, 168th, 230th, 231st, 232nd Brigades, R.F.A., and the 14th and 23rd Army Brigades, R.F.A. Only a part of these fired the creeping barrage, the 6th Divisional Artillery, the 5th Brigade, R.H.A., and the 232nd Brigade, R.F.A., moving forward as the infantry attack progressed to new positions, so as to support exploitation and give protection against counter-attack. The attack was launched at 5.30 a.m. The 16th Infantry Brigade on the right next to the valley, and the 71st Infantry Brigade on the left next to the Americans, both made excellent way, the former capturing the very strong Mannikin Hill position, and the latter the formidable Doon Mill and Doon Copse position, and making a good haul of machine-guns.

As had been antic.i.p.ated the French had been held up by Bellicourt Farm on their left, and the 16th Infantry Brigade suffered a good deal from machine-gun fire from Cerise Wood on the farther side of the valley and from Mannikin Wood in the valley. The three whippet tanks allotted to the 16th Infantry Brigade were all knocked out, but the West Yorks, to whom had been entrusted the clearing of the valley, stuck to their work most gallantly, and in the afternoon, after three attempts, had the satisfaction of securing Mannikin Wood, with 10 officers, 240 other ranks, and 20 machine-guns, by a final attack under an artillery smoke barrage. To this success "B" Company, 6th Machine-gun Battalion, contributed largely by enfilade fire.

By 3 p.m. the French announced that they had captured Bellicourt Farm, and were advancing. The situation on the right was now completely changed, and the 1st West Yorks, advancing up the valley, gained touch with the French east of Fairy Wood, more than half-way to the final objective in that area.

By nightfall Mericourt, which blocked the head of and commanded the whole of the valley, was in our hands.

The Americans gained their final objective and continued the advance without much opposition. In attempting to support their flank the 71st Infantry Brigade came under the fire of field guns firing over open sights near Joncourt Farm, and could not advance. A squadron of the Royal Scots Greys (5th Cavalry Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Neil Haig), attached to the Division, worked round and made a gallant attempt to gallop the guns, but were stopped by close range gun fire. Pitch darkness now came on, and left the Division tired but triumphant on their final objectives. The bag of the 6th Division amounted to over 30 officers and 1,100 other ranks.

Congratulatory messages were received from the Army and Corps Commanders as follows:--

From the Army Commander--"Will you please convey to the 6th Division my warm thanks and hearty congratulations on their success to-day.