On consideration thought it would be better to have a secret letter on the press, authorising the Government to allow their servants to be connected with the press. To this letter I thought it advisable to add an exhortation to redoubled zeal on the part of the Company's servants on account of the unsettled state in which the minds of men must be until it was decided under what form the future Government of India should be administered, and I directed the Government to make all thoroughly understand that no possible change could effect the public debt, or the rights of the natives or the just expectations of the European servants. My reason for thinking the officers of Government should be permitted to be concerned in the press is this, that if none but those who are unconnected with the Government, and who, according to the existing system, cannot be connected with it, manage the press, the probability is that everything will be said against the Government and nothing for it.

I showed the proposed letter to the Duke. He thought it would be better to pay people for writing than to employ the Company's servants, and that the concluding paragraphs would lead the Government to suppose it was quite decided that the Company should be put an end to. It is wonderful the sort of prejudice he has in favour of the Company. He thinks that unless Directors selected writers and cadets we should have an inferior sort of people in India. I have no objection to the patronage being in a corporate body, but I am satisfied the present system leads to a degree of delay which is more mischievous than misdirection. He acknowledges, however, that the service is much changed. The exhibition made by Courtenay Smith has produced a strong impression upon his mind. He has done more injury to the Company in his mind than all the evidence. He still seems unwilling to make his opinion up against the continuance of the monopoly. It must fall, however.

The King wishes to have Sir E. Barnes appointed provisional successor to Lord Dalhousie. The Duke thinks him a better man than Sir R. O'Callaghan, who was suggested by Lord F. Somerset. I suggested that it would be expedient to unite the influence of Governor-General with that of Commander-in-Chief, and make Lord William Bentinck provisional successor.

The Duke seemed to think Lord William could not execute both duties, and that it was better to adhere to the general usage of separating the two offices. It seems that after Lord Hastings' return the Court intimated a disposition to separate the offices in future. I can do nothing against the King, the Duke, and the Horse Guards; but I am satisfied it would have been better to send Sir E. Barnes as second in command to the Governor-General.

The King (Lord F. Somerset told me) was desirous of doing away with the Company's European regiments. He could not do a better thing. He has likewise some notion of bringing the army under himself. The Duke thinks it must be a _local army,_ and certainly it must. [Footnote: In accordance with this view Lord Ellenborough opposed the eventual amalgamation of the Queen's and the Indian army.] I believe it is better to make it an army of three Presidencies, not one army. My doubt is whether it would not be advisable to allow exchanges from the King's army to the Company's.

Everything would be beneficial that raised the tone of the Indian army.

The Duke showed me a draft letter he had written for Aberdeen to Lord Stuart, informing the French Government that the King of the Netherlands had required the a.s.sistance of his allies to re-establish his authority in Belgium. That it was as much the interest of France as of other Powers to put down a revolution not carried on by the higher or the middle, but by the lowest cla.s.ses of the people. That we were desirous of concerting with France, as one of the contracting parties to the Treaty of Vienna, what course should be now adopted. It could not be supposed the Allies would forego the advantage of the union of Belgium and Holland for which they had sacrificed so much.

This was the substance of the letter. It will not be sent without the concurrence of the Cabinet, which will be summoned the moment Peel comes to town, and he is hourly expected.

I think this letter prudent, inasmuch as whatever may happen it will place us in the right; but I do not expect that France will do anything against the rebels, or sanction the doing of anything.

The Duke considers, as indeed is clear enough, that it is idle to expect the future submission of Belgium to the King of the Netherlands. It may be possible to place it under a Prince of the House of Na.s.sau. I do not think the Duke sees his way; but he expects war.

_October 2._

Cabinet. Aberdeen's letter to Lord Stuart. It is founded upon the Duke's memorandum, but much extended _a l'Indienne_. I think none approved of it but Lord Bathurst. I objected to the statement that the treaty of 1815 imposed upon us _obligations_. It may give us _rights_, but it imposes no obligation. Then the principle of non-interference is advanced as just and wise, but there are peculiar circ.u.mstances attending the position of the Netherlands which make a difference.

There is an a.s.sertion that the troubles in Belgium have been fomented by French agency, although not a.s.sisted by the Government, and a direct reference is made to the Barrier Treaties. France is requested to concert with us and the Allies to _suppress_ the anarchy which exists in the Low Countries. She is at the same time reminded that in no case can the Allies consent to renounce the security given to them by the Treaty of Paris in consequence of an insurrection amongst the lower orders at Brussels. Of this a great deal will be left out. Peel seemed to be rather averse to the whole tenor of the letter, which looks like an invitation to put down the insurrection by force. He sketched in a few words a letter which would be innocuous.

The Duke's object is to make an effort to induce France to act with us to settle the Belgian affairs amicably. They cannot be settled _without_ France, without a war. But is there any hope that the French Government will venture to give us her _appui_? If they be self-denying enough to renounce the hopes of annexing Belgium to France, their fears of the Jacobins will not allow them to do so. My expectation is that they will say they neither have interfered nor will interfere to dissolve the union between Holland and Belgium. That they will not interfere in the internal concerns of other States.

Some think they will go farther and declare they will not allow other _Powers_ to do so. I do not expect this.

Every word of this letter must be well weighed, for every discontented man in England and in France will criticise its words and its spirit. There is no writer more unsafe than Aberdeen.

Rosslyn did not seem to like the letter at all, but he said little. I whispered to Peel that I wished he would bring a letter to-morrow. _Short_.

It was at last agreed alterations should be made, and we are to meet at one to-morrow.

Peel takes the letter home, and will, I trust, cut it down.

The King Charles X. is in danger of being arrested, of which he naturally has a great horror, and he desires to be allowed to go to Holyrood House, where he would be safe. At Lulworth they are afraid of the Due de Bordeaux being kidnapped. The pretence is the getting masters from Edinburgh for the children.

It may be feared that the placing him in a royal residence may look or be represented as looking like recognition. On the other hand his removal from the southern coast to Scotland is a renunciation of intrigues with France.

It would be inconvenient if the King should wish to go to Edinburgh next year. Charles X. is to be told he cannot stay there after the spring.

However, he will probably live there all his life.

It would be a revolting sight to see a King imprisoned for debt, and all gentlemen, all men of feeling, would have cried out _shame_!

We are right in feeling, but in policy I am not sure.

Nieuport has fallen as well as Ostend. The Bruxellois are drilling, and threaten to attack Prince Frederick. Probably Van Holen drills them to keep them quiet.

Many people have applied to Falck [Footnote: Dutch Minister.] for pa.s.sports for Brussels, going in reality to join the rebels. Today two Irish labourers asked for pa.s.sports! Brussels will become the sink of Europe, and every unquiet spirit will go there.

The Duke thinks our attempt to make France act in concert with us the only chance of preserving peace.

I fear its preservation is almost desperate. One thing is in favour of it, that all the European States desire it yet more than we do.

I cautioned them to-day not to take any advanced position from which it would be difficult and discreditable to retreat. The people would not go in with us in a war to avert a distant danger, nor indeed for any object not commercially interesting.

It came out accidentally in the course of conversation respecting the loan to the Netherlands that we had lent 20,000 to the Greeks; the sum to be repaid by bills to be drawn by our Commissioner whenever the loan we are to guarantee may be made--that is, we are to be paid out of our own money.

Of this loan I knew nothing, and my impression is that when it was earnestly pressed by Aberdeen such objections were stated on the ground of illegality that the decision was against it. Certainly nothing was decided in favour of it. I recollect having said I would rather advance a portion of the money myself than be a party to the transaction.

_October 3._

Cabinet. The Consul at Ostend announces that nothing remains to the King of the Netherlands but Antwerp. The troops have everywhere laid down their arms. On the 1st the Brussels papers announce that orders had been issued by the provisional Government for arresting all the Dutch officers.

Peel read first the dispatch written by Aberdeen with the omissions agreed upon, and then his own subst.i.tutions. His is much the best. It speaks of 'composing troubles' instead of 'suppressing anarchy,' avoids all mention of interference, and altogether is a more prudent paper, touching the Barrier very slightly. It was understood that Peel's was adopted.

It is determined to allow the King, Charles X., to go to Holyrood House, but he will be told there is no furniture, or very little, and that he can only stay six months, and that no expense can be incurred on his account.

He has admitted no one to an audience, but many have been to Lulworth to ask for places.

Talleyrand says they have found an _ebauche_ of Polignac's, telling Bourmont that his proposal that the money taken at Algiers should be given to the Legion of Honour could not be complied with, as the King intended to distribute it amongst his most faithful friends. They pretend they do not intend to make use of this because there is no proof of its having been sent; in fact they do not use it because it reflects credit on Bourmont.

Lord Rosslyn, with whom I walked as far as Pimlico Palace, showed me the Treasury list of the House of Commons. 311 decided friends and 189 enemies- that is 500; the remainder, consisting of moderate Tories, violent Tories, good and bad doubtfuls, as well as Huskissonians (the latter 13), are more likely to be against us than for us.

Rosslyn still hankers after a coalition, but reform has made it impossible.

We might have had this time last year Sir J. Graham. We might even now have Palmerston, [Footnote: It appears from Lord Palmerston's published papers that this was an error. He had already determined to act with the Whigs, and not to take office without Lord Grey and Lord Lansdowne. See Ashley's _Life of Lord Palmerston_, vol. i. p. 211.] but the Duke seems determined to go on as he is, Peel and all, even Bathurst, seem to have a correct view of the danger; but I see no flinching.

_October 4._

Saw the Duke. Suggested that we must soon consider what should be done with respect to the China trade. If we were to give up the monopoly we had better do so at once, on the first day of the Session, with a good grace, and not make ourselves appear to do it with reluctance. The Duke said we must certainly consider it. Had I talked with the Chairs about it? I said no. I had thought it best to wait till the Cabinet had come to a decision as to what should be done. I had privately advised them to turn over in their minds the plan of the Company going on with the Government slightly varied, but without monopoly.

The Duke said he could not make up his mind without hearing first what the Chairs had to say. I observed that if they, that is Astell, thought the Government hesitated, they would certainly say they could not go on without monopoly. However, the Duke seemed to think it was impossible for the question to come before the Cabinet before we had talked with the Chairs.

So I have asked him and Loch to meet at the Treasury at twelve on Monday.

I should like to see Tucker and Stuart, but I must do it privately, as I have no principle to go upon in consulting with individual Directors.

The Duke seems very reluctant to give up the monopoly, and to have very exaggerated ideas of the value of the Company's intervention.

He showed me a letter he had received from Mole, in which he takes a very moderate view of the Belgian question. Expresses the most earnest desire for peace, as war would place everywhere the two extreme principles in conflict. France will not interfere, neither can she suffer others to interfere, in the internal affairs of the Netherlands. He hopes to be able to arrange everything amicably.

A letter the Duke showed me from Rothschild's brother is still more satisfactory if the view taken in it be correct. He says France will, _with England and the Allies_, amicably settle the question; but she will not have to be excluded.

He mentions Leopold as a probable King of Belgium.

The Court of Turin [Footnote: The first French Republic had made a similar non-recognition a plea for seizing Savoy.] seems to be in a great fright because the French Government took huff at their not recognizing at once.

They were afraid to do so till they heard what the great Powers did.