_August 10._

The Russians appear to have pa.s.sed the defiles on the northern side of the Balkans, and almost without loss. There is, I conclude, a force near Bourgas, but all that is to be hoped is that the Turks will be wise enough not to fight. It was an unlucky appointment, that of the Grand Vizier. Old Hussein never would have committed his fault.

R. Gordon has been magnificently received at Constantinople.

Polignac has been made Prime Minister of France. De Rigny is made Minister of Marine. The Government is Tory, and I should think very favourable to English alliance, not Greek, and certainly not Russian. If it should be able to stand, it must be good for us. Received letters from Colonel Macdonald from Tabriz. He says the Russians at Tiflis talk as if they were going to war with us.

_August 11._

Received Persian despatches. The Persians will pay no more. They wanted to go to war. No one would go as Envoy to Petersburg but an _attache_. They all thought they should be beheaded. Macdonald seems to have kept them quiet.

Cabinet room. Met Lord Melville. Read Gordon's letters from Constantinople.

The Turks have not above 20,000 men there. They are not disposed to yield at all. Gordon thinks if we declared we would fix in any manner the limits of Greece, and maintain them, the Porte would not quarrel with us, and would rather do anything than yield the point of honour by acknowledging the independence of the Greeks.

The Russians mean to pa.s.s the Balkans with 60,000 men and march on Adrianople. They send a large force by sea to Sizeboli to turn Bourgas.

Lord Francis Leveson holds out the apprehension of a long religious contest in Ireland. [Footnote: Unhappily, like other pessimists, he seems to have judged Ireland correctly.] I believe he looks only at the surface and judges from first appearances.

_August 12._

A victory gained by Paskewitz over the Seraskier, whom he has taken prisoner, with thirty-one pieces of cannon, &c., near Erzeroum--that is, three days after the battle, Paskewitz, still in pursuit, was within forty miles of Erzeroum.

Wrote two letters to the Duke--one on the subject of Sir J. P. Grant, who has closed the Courts at Bombay because the Government would not execute an unlawful process, and the other respecting Persian affairs, giving the substance of the despatches which I enclosed.

We have a Cabinet to-morrow at 12 on Turkish affairs. I would not allow the Russians to advance any further. I would send one from our own body, _incognito,_ to Paris to talk to Polignac and endeavour to get him to join us in an act of vigorous intervention which would give character to his Government and save Constantinople. I would pa.s.s the English and French fleets through the Dardanelles, and give Russia a leaf out of the Greek Treaty. But I do not expect that this will be Aberdeen's course.

Drummond, whom I saw, said the Duke was delighted with the account of the Jaghirdars of the Kistna. Granville is gone to Ireland.

The Duke was gone to Windsor. It is the King's birthday.

_August 13._

When the Cabinet was a.s.sembled the Duke said we were not to consider the state of things at Constantinople, and what we should do. He thought the Russians would get to Constantinople, and into it. If they did he thought there was an end of the Ottoman Empire. He was doubtful whether, after the innovations introduced, the Turks would cordially support Mahmoud, [Footnote: Sultan Mahmoud, as is well known, remodelled the whole internal organisation of the Turkish Empire. He was denounced as the Giaour Sultan by old-fashioned Turks.] and already there were insurrections of the Greeks. It was just what he predicted in his letter to La Ferronays, and what Lord Dudley afterwards said in a letter to Lieven; the success of the Russians was the dissolution of an Empire which could not be reconst.i.tuted.

It was too late to interfere by force, even if we had been disposed to do so alone.

He thought France, if we did nothing, would be quiet--if we did anything, she would take the other line. Polignac was a more able man than people supposed, and he would adhere to the course he adopted. We might endeavour, at any rate, to ascertain his feelings and intentions.

As to the Greek question we must have a conference, and consider the suggestions of the Amba.s.sadors, namely, that whatever we chose to make Greece, should be declared independent, and guaranteed. Both the Duke and Aberdeen thought France and Russia would both take the proposition into consideration. The former as to _limits_, the latter for delay. France had already told us that, provided we could agree upon the limits, she was inclined to adopt the suggestion of the Amba.s.sadors.

We asked whether the permanent occupation of Constantinople by Russia was to be submitted to? The answer was, _No_, to be opposed by war. It seemed to me and to Fitzgerald we had better endeavour to prevent, at a small expense, even if alone, a measure we could only retrieve if it took place at an enormous expense, if at all, and which would in all probability effect the ruin of the Turkish Empire. I did not think affairs quite so desperate. I thought the Russians might get to Adrianople, but not to Constantinople, and that they could not maintain themselves at Adrianople without the command of the sea. We had six ships at the mouth of the Dardanelles, and these with the Turkish Fleet would open the Black Sea.

I was for pa.s.sing our ships up to Constantinople and placing them at the disposal of the Amba.s.sador, for from hence we cannot give orders adapted to circ.u.mstances. It was replied _that_ would be war. If war were to be declared we should do as much mischief as possible, and go to Cronstadt, not to the Black Sea. We should have our ships beyond the Bosphorus when Russia occupied the Dardanelles, and shut us in. This would make us ridiculous.

As the object is not to do mischief to Russia, but to save the Turkish Empire, I should say that measure was to be effected at the Bosphorus, for Constantinople, once taken, and the Ottoman Power annihilated, it would be of no use to distress Russia.

Fitzgerald seemed to be of my opinion that, however desperate the chance, we should do all we could to save Constantinople, and at any risk.

It was determined that our fleet in the Mediterranean should be reinforced by three or four line-of-battle ships, on the principle that wherever any Power had a large force, we should have one--not a very wise principle, it seems to me, if we are never to use force. I interceded for a few powerful steamers, with 68 pound carronades, and I think Lord Melville seemed inclined to acquiesce.

Questions are to be put to Polignac to ascertain what he would do in certain events. I said he never would open himself to Lord Stuart. It was then suggested by the Duke that Aberdeen could write a private letter. This will, I believe, be done. I said to Fitzgerald, who was next to me, 'Neither letter nor Stuart will get anything out of Polignac. One of ourselves should go to Paris as an individual, see Polignac, and return before the Conference.'

I suggested Rosslyn, as he had nothing to do. Fitzgerald said he could go and return in a week, and seemed to wish to do so. However, nothing was said openly; and with all the means of success in our hands, for, I think, Polignac _might_ be brought into our views, we shall lose all by not using proper instruments; just as we have lost the Greek question by persisting in keeping Stratford Canning.

We had a good deal of conversation as to the limits of Greece. The Duke was for adhering to the Morea. It was _really_ the best line. It was what we had guaranteed. We had told the Turks we did not mean to go beyond it.

Aberdeen has always had a little private hankering after Athens, though he ridicules it. He had no scruple about annexing Athens, although not yet taken. I said I thought Polignac would be disposed to hold our language to Russia, if we would make some concession on the subject of Greece, and enable him to settle that question with _eclat_. He would then be supported by France in any strong language he might hold, and would establish himself by the experiment of his first fortnight of office.

However, the Cabinet seems disposed to look at accessories, not at principles, at the minor objects rather than at _the one great object_, which is inducing France to act with us to prevent the occupation of Constantinople or to force its evacuation. Instead of yielding upon points of minor importance, in order to carry the question, we are to insist now on the minor points-the evacuation of the Morea by the French, and then, I fear we shall weaken Polignac's Government, and lose our object.

Our foreign policy has certainly been, most unsuccessful. We have succeeded in nothing.

The communication to be made to Polignac is to be made to him confidentially, and he is to know it is not to be made to Austria. It is considered that in any case Austria would support France and England if they acted together, and any indication Austria might give of moving alone would bring down Prussia upon her. This line, I think, well considered and prudent.

It seemed to be thought that, if the Turkish Empire should be _dissolved_, Austria might be inclined to share the spoils and be quiet; but if it were only _weakened_, she would feel she suffered.

It seemed to be admitted by all that we ought to have taken a decided step long ago. That we were too late, and that we were inexcusable.

I said a year ago Aberdeen would ruin us--he would gradually let us down, not by any flagrant error, but by being always under the mark. The Duke, occupied as he is as Prime Minister, wanted an efficient secretary for Foreign Affairs, and he could not have had a worse.

Peel seems to think Ireland stands much better since the proclamation respecting the attack made by the Ribbonmen upon the Orangemen in Fermanagh. He seems to think the Irish Government ready enough when things are brought to their notice, but that they do not read or attend to the reports made to them.

_August 19._

I am inclined to think from what Colonel Hodgson says that leather might be made in India as well as here. They have the hide of the buffalo. They want the _tanning_, and some one must be sent from this country to teach them.

He told me of a Mr. Cotton who was long at Tanjore, where the iron is, and I have written to him.

_August 22._

The Russians have taken Erzeroum, and have quite dispersed the Turkish army in Asia. Every success of theirs in that quarter makes my heart bleed. I consider it a victory gained over me, as Asia is _mine_.

_August 28._

The 'Courier' of last night throws doubts on the reported victory of Kirkhilissa. The Sultan is said to be now ready to treat. The plague is in the Russian army, and in the country before them. Had a long conversation with Hardinge on Indian affairs.

_August 29._

Read a letter from Mr. Cartwright, the Consul at Constantinople, dated the 9th. The loss of Erzeroum is to be attributed to the Janizaries. In all Asia they seem to be rising. The Russians are not expected to advance till they are joined by 15,000 men, coming by sea. Thus our fleet would have saved Constantinople.

Cabinet at half-past three. Before the Cabinet read Lord Heytesbury's and Mr. Gordon's despatches. Lord Heytesbury seems to be a mere Russian.

_August 31._