Let us consider what non-sectarianism means. We cannot, for example, isolate a single domain of science in a particular country and at a particular time--say, mechanics in England in the eighteenth century--and hope to make of it a thoroughly complete object of study.

In natural science, for example, we make conventional divisions simply with the object of saving labor when dealing with the huge ma.s.s of material that experience offers. But the narrowest specialist knows that all workers in science, religion, and philosophy seek the Truth; and that the Truth is bounded neither by s.p.a.ce nor by time nor by man-made divisions. A man may rightly conclude that he stands little chance of finding out very much of the Truth, and so he may voluntarily limit his view to a certain roughly defined domain of facts and thoughts, and become, for example, what is called a "biologist," a "physicist," a "higher critic," or, if he thinks that he may discover rather more of the Truth, a "philosopher."

And let us carry a clear understanding of a lofty aim into religion as well. It is our duty, as rational beings, to be non-sectarian. It is not a merit to allow ignorance to blind us to the glimpses of Truth that we sometimes get from prophets, poets, and priests of other religions and other philosophies than our own. If we think that there is more truth or sacredness in our own, let us use every means to make this sacredness or this truth appear evident to others. But, in justice, let us also fearlessly discuss other religions and philosophies, and discover their greater merits, if any, as compared with our own. If, after careful investigation, we arrive at the belief in the truth or falsehood of anything in these religions or philosophies, let us state our grounds for believing so in the fullest possible way. Only by so doing can we fulfil the duties of being true to ourselves and helpful to others.

Sometimes the work of a critic is said to be "merely destructive." This idea rests on a most harmful misunderstanding. Criticism consists not only in the pointing out of error, but in the pointing out of truth as well. Error is simply a psychological condition of blindness to the truth; and the discovery of errors committed by other people or ourselves is not--as many superficial people like to say--the pulling down of a structure already raised, unless an error can be called a structure which is built out of the fictions of our imagination which have no objective existence. Criticism often enables us to discover more of the Truth, and n.o.body can do more than _discover_ Truth: n.o.body _creates_ Truth, any more than Columbus created America.

Nowadays all intelligent men and women agree that all knowledge must be subjected to criticism, and the best men and women act on these beliefs.

The books and magazines published by the Open Court Company are intended to help these men and women.

We will dwell a little longer on the subject of religion, because it is in religion that the majority of us have the one region of ideals above our bodily needs. It is rare, though of course not unknown, that Science or Philosophy satisfies the spiritual needs--the purest of human cravings. Nowadays, most of us realize that an anti-scientific att.i.tude of religion is impossible. If there were an opposition between "science"

and "religion," there would be no question as to which side would be victorious. More particularly during the last seventy years, "religion,"

conscious of the opposition which a rather crude doctrine which was called "science" had towards it, has been gradually, and often somewhat ludicrously, trying to bring itself more into conformity with that "science." The result is painful to the student of human nature; though it has its amusing sides, just as had the militant denial, on the part of those who were "on the side of the angels" about fifty years ago, of certain deductions from facts. What is called a "conflict between religion and science" always has ended in a victory for "science" and an agnosticism which ousted religion. And thus many see that it is desirable that the matured results of science should enter into the fabric of our religious convictions. For the realization of this purpose, the Open Court Company publishes two periodicals, _The Monist_, a quarterly magazine devoted to the philosophy of science, and _The Open Court_, an ill.u.s.trated monthly devoted to the science of religion and the religion of science. In addition, the Open Court Company publishes books that directly or indirectly advance its aim--books on Philosophy, which, in contrast with the old metaphysicism, lay the foundations of a philosophy of science; books on the history of philosophies; books on mathematics and other lines of thought which are indispensable for a rational and scientific conception of the world; books that have a bearing on the doctrine of Evolution; books on the history of Religions, especially on the development of Christianity and on Higher Criticism; and books on Comparative Religion, on Psychology, on Education, and on Ethics. Above all, in all the works careful, sympathetic, and scholarly criticism is aimed at. Criticism is the joint result of love of Truth and independence of thought; rightly understood, it is not only a preliminary to a work of synthesis, but it is part of synthesis itself.

No synthesis, in fact, is more than a discovery of Truth: from past history we know that syntheses have often blinded men to the Truth, though that was naturally not their intention.

On the subject of independence of thought it may be proper shortly to refer to the work of Dr. Paul Carus, who has been, since the end of 1887, closely a.s.sociated with the Open Court Company and its publications. Only two things need be said here. In the first place, it was owing to the need he felt for keeping his independence of thought that he resigned a post in Germany and came, first to England and then to America. In the second place, his views, which are also, broadly speaking, the views for which the Open Court Company works, may be characterized both as monism and positivism, though his philosophy differs considerably from Haeckel's monism, which is practically materialism, and even more so from the French positivism of Comte and from agnosticism, its English equivalent. In his philosophy, _form_ plays the most important part. Form is the significant feature of both objective existence and subjective thought. Matter and energy only denote reality, but form characterizes quality. Science traces form, and the nature of all things, the human character included, is const.i.tuted by form. In the formal sciences again, that which is the core of their usefulness as general propositions is the character of _anyness_, the use of which justifies the method of generalization. Here lies the root of the kinship of Dr. Carus's philosophy with modern logic, and allows him to reconstruct the old artistic and religious ideas upon a new and modern ground. In this sense, he himself has characterized his philosophy as a _philosophy of form_.