The negotiations between Rome and Macedonia, from the year 214, give the first striking examples of the ability and address of the Romans in foreign policy; and they are the more remarkable, as the treaty with the aetolians and others, 211 (see above, p. 283), was the remote cause of the transactions which afterwards took place in the east. The peculiar system adopted by the Romans, of taking the lesser states under their protection as allies, must always have given them an opportunity of making war on the more powerful whenever they chose. This in fact happened in the present case, notwithstanding the peace concluded with Philip, 204. The chief object of the Romans in this war, both by sea and land, was to drive Philip completely out of Greece. The allies on both sides, and the conditions of peace, were similar to those concluded with Carthage (see above, p. 284). The destruction of the naval power of her conquered enemies became now a maxim of Roman policy in making peace; and she thus maintained the dominion of the seas without any great fleet, and without losing the essential character of a dominant power by land.

9. The expulsion of Philip from Greece brought that country into a state of dependence upon Rome; an event which could not have been better secured than by the present of liberty which T. Quintius conferred upon its inhabitants at the Isthmian games. The system of surveillance, which the Romans had already established in the west over Carthage and Numidia, was now adopted in the east over Greece and Macedonia. Roman commissioners, under the name of amba.s.sadors, were sent into the country of the nations in alliance, and were the princ.i.p.al means by which this system of espionage was carried on. These however did not fail to give umbrage to the Greeks, particularly to the turbulent aetolians; more especially as the Romans seemed in no hurry to withdraw their troops from a country which they had declared to be free.

Liberty was expressly granted to the state which had taken the part of Philip, namely, to the Achaeans; to the others it was naturally understood to belong. It was nevertheless three years, 194, before the Roman army evacuated Greece and withdrew from the fortified places. The conduct of T. Quintius during this period fully shows what he was. The Greeks indeed had much want of such a guardian if they wished to remain quiet: his conduct, however, in the war against Nabis, 195, shows that he had not really at heart the tranquillity of Greece.

10. The treaty of peace with Philip contained the seeds of a new and greater war with Syria; but though this seemed inevitable at that time, it did not break out till six years afterwards; and in but few periods of the history of the world is so great a political crisis to be found, as in this short interval. The fall of Carthage and Macedonia had shown the rest of the world what it had to expect from Rome; and there was no lack of great men sufficiently endowed with courage and talents to resist her. The danger of a formidable league between Carthage, Syria, and perhaps Macedonia, was never so much to be feared, as when Hannibal, now at the head of affairs, laboured to effect it with all the zeal which his hatred of Rome could inspire; and they might calculate with certainty beforehand on the accession of many smaller states. Rome, however, by her equally decided and artful policy procured Hannibal's banishment from Carthage, amused Philip by granting him some trifling advantages, and gained over the smaller states by her amba.s.sadors. By these means, and by taking advantage of the intrigues in the court of Syria, she prevented this coalition from being formed. Antiochus was therefore left without a.s.sistance in Greece, except from the aetolians, and a few other unimportant allies; while Rome drew from hers, especially the Rhodians and Eumenes, advantages of the greatest consequence.

The first cause of contention between Rome and Antiochus was the liberty of Greece, which the former wished to extend to the Grecian cities of Asia, and to those in particular which had belonged to Philip, and afterwards to Antiochus; while the latter contended, that Rome had no right to intermeddle with the affairs of Asia. The second cause of dispute was the occupation of the Thracian Chersonesus by Antiochus, 196, in right of some ancient pretensions; and Rome, on her part, would not tolerate him in Europe. This quarrel therefore commenced as early as 196, but did not become serious till the year 105, when in consequence of Hannibal's flight to Antiochus, together with the turbulence and excitement of the aetolians, whose object it was to embroil the rival powers, the political horizon was completely overcast. What a fortunate thing it was for Rome that such men as Hannibal and Antiochus could not understand each other!

HEYNE, _de foederum ad Romanorum opes imminuendas initorum eventis eorumque causis; in Opusc._ vol. iii.

11. This war was much sooner brought to a termination than the Macedonian, owing to the half-measures adopted by Antiochus. After having been driven from Greece by Glabrio, and after two naval victories had opened to the Romans the way to Asia, he felt inclined to act on the defensive; but in the battle near Magnesia at the foot of Mount Sipylus, L. Scipio gathered the laurels which more properly belonged to Glabrio.

The total expulsion of Antiochus from Asia Minor, even before this victory, had been the chief object of the war. The conditions of peace (see above, p. 284.) were such, as not only weakened Antiochus, but reduced him to a state of dependence.

During this contest in the east, a sanguinary war was going on in the west; from the year 201 in Spain, where the elder Cato commanded; and from 193 in Italy itself, against the Ligurians.

Whatever may be said upon the means made use of by Rome to increase the number of her citizens, it will always be difficult to comprehend, not only how she could support all these wars without being thereby weakened, but how at the same time she could found so many colonies!

12. Even after the termination of this war, Rome refrained with astonishing moderation from appearing in the light of a conqueror: it was only for the liberty of Greece, and for her allies, that she had contended! Without keeping a foot of land for herself, she divided, with the exception of the free Grecian cities, the conquered Asia Minor between Eumenes and the Rhodians; the manner, however, in which she dealt with the aetolians, who after a long supplication for peace were obliged to buy it dearly, shows that she also knew how to treat unfaithful allies. The war against the Gauls in Asia Minor was not less necessary for the preservation of tranquillity in that country, than it was injurious to the morals and military discipline of the Roman army.

They here learned to levy contributions.

13. Thus, within the short s.p.a.ce of ten years, was laid the foundation of the Roman authority in the east, and the general state of affairs entirely changed. If Rome was not yet the ruler, she was at least the arbitress of the world from the Atlantic to the Euphrates. The power of the three princ.i.p.al states was so completely humbled, that they durst not, without the permission of Rome, begin any new war; the fourth, Egypt, had already, in the year 201, placed herself under the guardianship of Rome; and the lesser powers followed of themselves: esteeming it an honour to be called the _allies of Rome_. With this name the nations were lulled into security, and brought under the Roman yoke; the new political system of Rome was founded and strengthened, partly by exciting and supporting the weaker states against the stronger, however unjust the cause of the former might be, and partly by factions which she found means to raise in every state, even the smallest.

Although the policy of Rome extended itself everywhere by means of her commissioners, or amba.s.sadors, yet she kept a more particular guard against Carthage by favouring Masinissa at her expense, against the Achaean league by favouring the Spartans, and against Philip of Macedon by favouring every one who brought any complaint against him (see above, p. 285).

14. Although these new connections and this intercourse with foreign nations greatly aided the diffusion of knowledge and science, and was followed by a gradual improvement in her civilization, yet was it nevertheless, in many respects, detrimental to the internal state of Rome. The introduction of the scandalous Baccha.n.a.lia, which were immediately discovered and forbidden, shows how easily great vices may creep in among a people who are only indebted for their morality to their ignorance. Among the higher cla.s.ses also the spirit of intrigue manifested itself to an astonishing degree; particularly by the attacks directed against the Scipios by the elder Cato, whose restless activity became the instrument of his malignant pa.s.sions. The severity of his censorship did not repair the evils caused by his immorality and pernicious politics.

Voluntary exile of Scipio Africa.n.u.s to Linternum, 187. He dies there, 183, the same year in which Hannibal falls under the continued persecution of Rome. His brother Scipio Asiaticus is also unable to escape a trial and condemnation, 185. One would have expected a sensible effect from the exile of these two great men; but, in a state where the ruling power is in the hands of a body like what the Roman senate was, the change of individuals is but of little consequence.

15. Fresh disputes arose, as early as 185, with Philip of Macedon, who soon found that they had spared him no longer than it suited their own convenience. Although the intervention of Philip's youngest son, upon whom the Romans had formed some design, prevented the powers from coming to an immediate rupture, and war was still further delayed by Philip's death, yet the national hatred descended to his successor, and continued to increase, notwithstanding an alliance concluded with him, until the war openly broke out (see above, p. 287).

The first circ.u.mstance which gave umbrage to Philip was the small portion they permitted him to conquer in Athamania and Thessaly during the war against Antiochus. But what sharpened his animosity, much more than the object in dispute, was the conduct of the Roman commissioners, before whom he, the king, was called upon to defend himself as an accused party, 184. The exclamation of Philip, that "the sun of every day had not yet set," showed his indignation, and at the same time betrayed his intention. The interval previous to the breaking out of the war was anything rather than a time of peace for Rome; for besides that the Spanish and Ligurian wars continued almost without intermission, the revolts which broke out in Istria, 178, and in Sardinia and Corsica, 176, produced much bloodshed.

16. In the second Macedonian war, which ended with the destruction of Perseus and his kingdom (see above, p. 288), it required the active efforts of Roman policy to prevent a powerful confederacy from being formed against her; as Perseus used all his endeavours to stimulate, not only the Grecian states, and Thrace and Illyria, but also Carthage and Asia, to enter into alliance with him. Where was it that Rome did not at this crisis send her amba.s.sadors? She did not, indeed, succeed so far as to leave her enemy quite alone, but prepared new triumphs for herself over the few allies she left him. The devastated Epirus, and Gentius king of Illyria, suffered dearly for the a.s.sistance they had lent him; the states also which had remained neuter, the Rhodians and Eumenes, were made to feel severely that they were the mere creatures of Rome.

Beginning of the Macedonian war, 171, before Rome was prepared; a deceitful truce, which raised the indignation even of the elder senators, was the means resorted to for gaining time.

Notwithstanding this, the war at first, 170 and 169, was favourable to Perseus; but he wanted resolution and judgment to enable him to turn his advantages to account. In 168, Paulus aemilius, an old general, against the usual custom of the Romans, took the command. b.l.o.o.d.y and decisive battle near Pydna, June 22, 168. So completely may one day overturn a kingdom which has only an army for its support! Contemporary with this war, and highly fortunate for Rome, was the war of Antiochus Epiphanes with Egypt.

No wonder that Rome did not, till 168, through Popilius, command peace between them! (See above, p. 261.)

17. The destruction of the Macedonian monarchy was attended with consequences equally disastrous to the conquerors and the conquered. To the first it soon gave the notion of becoming the masters of the world, instead of its arbiters; and it exposed the latter, for the next twenty years, to all the evils inseparable from such a catastrophe. The system of politics. .h.i.therto pursued by Rome could not last much longer; for if nations suffered themselves to be brought under the yoke by force, it was not to be expected that they would long be held in dependence under the specious name of liberty. But the state of things after this war was such as contributed to hasten a change in the form of the relations which existed between Rome and her allies.

The republican const.i.tution given to the already ruined and devastated Macedonians (see above, p. 288.) and Illyrians, and which, according to the decree of the senate, "showed to all people that Rome was ready to bestow liberty upon them," was granted upon such hard conditions, that the enfranchised nation soon used every endeavour to procure themselves a king. Greece however suffered still more than Macedonia. Here, during the war, the spirit of faction had risen to the highest pitch; and the arrogant insolence of the Roman party, composed for the most part of venal wretches, was so great, that they persecuted not only those who had espoused an opposite faction, but even those who had joined no faction at all. Rome nevertheless could not believe herself secure, until she had destroyed, by a cruel artifice, all her adversaries (see above, p. 288).

18. Entirely in the same spirit did Rome proceed against the other states from whom she had anything to fear. These must be rendered defenceless; and every means of effecting that purpose was considered justifiable by the senate. The quarrels between the successors to the throne of Egypt were taken advantage of to cause dissensions in that kingdom (see above, p. 260); while Syria was retained in a state of tutelage, by keeping the rightful heir to the throne at Rome; and its military power neutralized by means of their amba.s.sadors (see above, p.

243).

19. From these facts we may also conclude, that the injuries now meditated against Carthage were not separate projects, but rather formed part of the general system of Roman policy at this period, although particular events at one time r.e.t.a.r.ded their execution, and at another hastened it. History, in recounting the incredibly bad treatment which Carthage had to endure before her fall, seems to have given a warning to those nations who can take it, of what they may expect from the domination of a powerful republic.

Cato was chief of the party which sought the destruction of Carthage, both from a spirit of envy against Scipio Nasica, whom he hated for his great influence in the senate; and because, when amba.s.sador to Carthage, he thought they did not treat him with sufficient respect. But Masinissa's victory, 152 (see above, p.

88), and the defection of Utica, brought this project into immediate play. Beginning of the war, 150, the Carthaginians having been previously inveigled out of their arms. The city, however, was not captured and destroyed till 146, by P. Scipio aemilia.n.u.s. The Carthaginian territory, under the name of Africa, was then made a Roman province.

20. During this third war with Carthage, hostilities again broke out in Macedonia, which brought on a new war with Greece, and entirely changed the state of both these countries. In Macedonia, an impostor named Andriscus, who pretended to be the son of Philip, placed himself at the head of that highly disaffected people, a.s.sumed the name of Philip, and became, particularly by an alliance with the Thracians, very formidable to the Romans, until overcome by Metellus. Rome wishing to take advantage of this crisis to dissolve the Achaean league, the Achaean war broke out (see above, p. 289). This war was begun by Metellus, and terminated by Mummius with the destruction of Corinth. By reducing both Macedonia and Greece to the form of provinces, Rome now gave evident proof that no existing relations, nor any form of government, can prevent nations from being subjugated by a warlike republic, whenever circ.u.mstances render it possible.

It might have been expected, that the destruction of the two first commercial cities in the world, in the same year, would have been followed by important consequences to the course of trade; but the trade of Carthage and Corinth had already been drawn to Alexandria and Rhodes, otherwise Utica might, in some respects, have supplied the place of Carthage.

21. While Rome was thus destroying thrones and republics, she met in Spain with an antagonist--a simple Spanish countryman named Viriathus--whom, after six years' war, she could only rid herself of by a.s.sa.s.sination. The war, nevertheless, continued after his death against the Numantines, who would not be subjected, but were at last destroyed by Scipio aemilia.n.u.s.

The war against the Spaniards, who of all the nations subdued by the Romans defended their liberty with the greatest obstinacy, began in the year 200, six years after the total expulsion of the Carthaginians from their country, 206. It was exceedingly obstinate, partly from the natural state of the country, which was thickly populated, and where every place became a fortress; partly from the courage of the inhabitants; but above all, owing to the peculiar policy of the Romans, who were wont to employ their allies to subdue other nations. This war continued, almost without interruption, from the year 200 to 133, and was for the most part carried on at the same time in Hispania Citerior, where the Celtiberi were the most formidable adversaries, and in Hispania Ulterior, where the Lusitani were equally powerful. Hostilities were at the highest pitch in 195, under Cato, who reduced Hispania Citerior to a state of tranquillity 185-179, when the Celtiberi were attacked in their native territory; and 155-150, when the Romans in both provinces were so often beaten, that nothing was more dreaded by the soldiers at home than to be sent there. The extortions and perfidy of Servius Galba placed Viriathus, in the year 146, at the head of his nation, the Lusitani: the war, however, soon extended itself to Hispania Citerior, where many nations, particularly the Numantines, took up arms against Rome, 143. Viriathus, sometimes victorious and sometimes defeated, was never more formidable than in the moment of defeat; because he knew how to take advantage of his knowledge of the country, and of the dispositions of his countrymen. After his murder, caused by the treachery of Caepio, 140, Lusitania was subdued; but the Numantine war became still more violent, and the Numantines compelled the consul Mancinus to a disadvantageous treaty, 137. When Scipio, in the year 133, put an end to this war, Spain was certainly tranquil; the northern parts, however, were still unsubdued, though the Romans penetrated as far as Galatia.

22. Towards the end of this period, the Romans obtained at a much cheaper rate the possession of one of their most important provinces; for the profligate Attalus III. king of Pergamus, bequeathing them the whole of his kingdom (on what account is uncertain, see above, p. 292.), they immediately took possession of it, and kept in spite of the resistance of the legitimate heir Aristonicus, merely ceding, as a recompense, Phrygia to Mithridates V. king of Pontus. Thus, by a stroke of the pen, the largest and finest part of Asia Minor became the property of Rome. If this extraordinary legacy was the work of Roman policy, she paid dearly enough, in the long run, for this accession to her power and riches, by the destruction of her morals, and the dreadful wars to which this legacy gave rise under Mithridates.

23. The foreign possessions of Rome, besides Italy, comprised at this time under the name of provinces, a name of much higher signification in the Latin language than in any other, Hispania Citerior and Ulterior, Africa (the territory of Carthage), Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, Liguria, and Cisalpine Gaul, in the west; and in the east, Macedonia, Achaia, and Asia (territory of Pergamus). The inhabitants of these countries were entirely subject to Rome. The administration of them was carried on by those who had enjoyed the office of consul, and by praetors, subordinate to whom were the quaestors, or collectors of the revenue. The highest military and civil powers were united in these governors; a princ.i.p.al cause of that horrible oppression which was soon felt. Troops were always kept up in the provinces; and the Latin language everywhere introduced (except only where Greek was spoken), that the inhabitants might be made as much like Romans as possible.

Till nearly the end of this period, praetors were expressly appointed to each province. It was not till after the origin of the _quaestiones perpetuae_, that it became the custom for the praetors who had vacated office, to succeed to the provinces (_propraetores_), a princ.i.p.al cause of the degeneracy of the Roman const.i.tution.

C. SIGONIUS, _de Antiquo jure provinciarum in Graevii Thes. Antiq.

Rom._ vol. ii.

24. The acquisition of these rich countries naturally had great influence in augmenting the revenue of the Romans. Though Rome was not indeed a state, like Carthage, altogether dependent upon finances, yet she kept these adjusted in a wonderful manner; a spirit of nice order being observed in this as well as in every other department of her administration. If in extraordinary emergencies recourse were had to native loans, to a change in the value of money, or a monopoly of salt, order was soon restored; while the booty obtained from conquered countries was also a great source of the public income so long indeed as it was reserved for the state, and did not become the prey of the generals.

Sources of the Roman revenue (_vectigalia_) were: 1. Tribute _a._ from the Roman citizens; that is to say, a property-tax imposed by the senate according to the urgency of the case (which, however, was remitted, for a long time, after the war with Perseus, 168, being no longer necessary). _b._ Tribute of the allies (_socii_) in Italy: which seems also to have been a property-tax; differing in different places. _c._ Tribute of the provinces: in some a heavy poll-tax, in others taxes on property; in all, however, they were paid in natural productions, mostly ordinary, though sometimes extraordinary, as well for the salary of the governor as for the supply of the capital. 2. The revenue from the national domains (_ager publicus_), both in Italy (especially Campania) and in the provinces; the tythes (_dec.u.mae_) of which were paid by means of leases for four years, granted by the censors. 3. The revenue from the customs (_portoria_), collected in the seaports and frontier towns. 4. The revenue arising from the mines (_metalla_), particularly the Spanish silver mines; the proprietors of which were obliged to pay a duty to the state. 5.

The duty upon enfranchised slaves (_aurum vicesimarium_). All receipts flowed into the national treasury, the _aerarium_; all outgoings were exclusively ordered by the senate; and the people were consulted as little with regard to them as they were respecting the imposts. The officers employed were the _quaestores_, under whom were the _scribae_, divided into _decurias_, who, though certainly subordinate, had nevertheless great influence. Their services, as they were not yearly changed, must have been indispensable to the _quaestores_ for the time being; and the whole management of affairs, at least in detail, must have fallen into their hands.

Upon the finances of Rome, the best work at present is:--

P. BURMANNI, _Vectigalia Populi Romani_. Leyden, 1734, 4to.

Two excellent treatises have since appeared in German upon this subject:--

# D. H. HEGEWISCH, _Essay upon Roman Finances_. Antona, 1804, and

# R. BOSSE, _Sketch of the System of Finance in the Roman State_.

Brunswick, 1803, 2 parts. Both include the periods of the republic and the monarchy.

THIRD PERIOD.

_From the beginning of the civil broils under the Gracchi, to the fall of the republic. B. C. 134-30. Year of Rome, 620-724._

SOURCES. Concerning the first half of this important period of the republic, down to the time of Cicero, we are sadly in want of precise information. Not one of the contemporary writers has been preserved to us, nor indeed any one of the later historians who have compiled a history of the whole period. APPIAN, _de Bellis Civilibus_; PLUTARCH, in his _Lives of the Gracchi_; and the spirited _Compendium_ of VEL.

PATERCULUS, are, for this portion, our princ.i.p.al authorities; and even the imperfect summaries of the lost books of Livy, so masterly supplied by Freinshemius here become of importance. For the times which follow, the _Jugurtha_ and _Cataline_ of Sall.u.s.t, are two excellent historical cabinet pieces, and become the more valuable for the insight they at the same time give us of the internal condition of Rome. His great work, however, _The Histories_, is, with the exception of a few precious fragments, unfortunately lost. For the times of CaeSAR and CICERO, we have the _Commentaries_ of the first, and the _Orations_ and _Letters_ of the latter; both fertile sources of information. What is left us of DIO Ca.s.sIUS'S _History_, begins with the year 69 before Christ. Of PLUTARCH'S _Lives_, besides those of the Gracchi, the following are connected with this period: C. MARIUS, SYLLA, LUCULLUS, CRa.s.sUS, SERTORIUS, CATO OF UTICA, CICERO, BRUTUS, and ANTONIUS. Upon the sources for these lives, see my treatises cited above, p. 321.

Among the moderns, the greater part of this period is particularly treated of by:--

DE BROSSES, _Histoire de la Republique Romaine dans le cours du VIIe Siecle par Sall.u.s.te_, a Dijou, 1777, 3 vols. 4to.