In the light of all the different allegations about the dossier, it is just worth nailing down a few of the myths. The dossier itself was the work of the JIC. They zealously and rightly protected its authorship. What it said, as the four concluded inquiries have now found, was an accurate summary of the material. Neither myself nor Alastair wrote any of it. I wrote the foreword only.

It is said, rightly, that the March 2002 JIC report on Iraq warned that the intelligence on Iraq was 'sporadic' and 'patchy'. What is then omitted is what it went on to say, which was: 'But it is clear that Iraq continues to pursue a policy of acquiring WMD and their delivery means.' By September 2002, of course, further intelligence had been received. The final report reflected this and was firmer. But then the evidence was greater. Shortly before the dossier, fresh intelligence was received about a mobile production facility that had just been created. This led to the description of Saddam's programme as 'growing'.

It may be worth dealing with a further issue at this point. There was evidence given to the Chilcot Inquiry that shortly before the outbreak of war, intelligence was received that Saddam might not be able to a.s.semble WMD quickly. This was reported in the media coverage of the inquiry as meaning that, in effect, I was being warned that the threat was less than supposed. Actually, the intelligence was that Saddam had taken measures to conceal his programme, including dismantling and storing certain equipment. The overall impact of the intelligence was not that he had given up on his programme but that he was hiding it from the inspectors. I was specifically told this intelligence confirmed his WMD programme. So, far from being a warning to desist, it confirmed the need to persist.

Anyway, no doubt after a fifth inquiry there will still be calls for more. The truth is we believed, without any doubt at all, that Saddam had an active WMD programme. Given his history, we did so for pretty good reasons. There was no intent to deceive. Indeed, such an intention would have been in any event absurd, since once Saddam was out, the truth would be out also. The ISG Report, as I indicated earlier, explains both why we were in error and also what remained accurate.

On 7 September, prior to the publication of the dossier, we had gone back to Camp David. At this meeting we had one objective: to get George to go down the UN route, i.e. to agree that before any action we would pa.s.s a UN resolution and give Saddam a final chance.

This was not an easy sell. The US context, politically, was completely opposite to ours; and the UN did not play well there. The meeting was a little tense, though by then George and I had a really good personal chemistry. In the end, one to one, I got his acceptance, not as a favour but because I think ultimately he bought the idea that this was going to be a whole lot easier if we had a coalition behind us. I said that I really feared the consequences of US unilateral action; or US/UK joint action. I had written him a note prior to the meeting setting out my concerns and saying the very unpredictability of the outcome meant that a coalition was wise. We had to try for peace, even if eventually we did go to war. This was not Kosovo or even Afghanistan. It was going to be far tougher.

It's true to say, however, that at that point the downside risk of military action revolved around how easy or hard it would be to remove Saddam, and any humanitarian fallout. There was, of course, also the Sunni/Shia issue, but never at that stage or indeed until after Saddam's removal was the true threat perceived: outside interference by al-Qaeda and by Iran. The view of our military and intelligence was that though Saddam did sponsor terrorist groups, there was only hazy evidence of any al-Qaeda link; and after the IraqIran War, with its one million casualties, it was a.s.sumed that Iran would be relatively compliant. The issue of the Sunni minority suddenly turned from rulers to ruled was extensively canva.s.sed. But the main question was about Saddam's capability of withstanding a military campaign and about the degree of support he might have. This is highly relevant to debates about the planning for the aftermath.

Once George declared he was in favour of going the UN route, the visit relaxed. d.i.c.k Cheney had been there for part of the time, and made it clear he was not for going down the UN route. He was unremittingly hard line.

d.i.c.k is the object of so much conspiracy theory that it's virtually impossible to have a rational discussion about him. To those on the left, he is, of course, an uncomplicated figure of loathing. Even for the middle ground, they tend to reach for the garlic and crucifixes. You have to go pretty far right to find d.i.c.k's natural const.i.tuency.

My take on him was different from that of most people. I thought he had one central insight which was at least worth taking seriously. He believed, in essence, that the US was genuinely at war; that the war was one with terrorists and rogue states that supported them; that it stemmed from a guiding ideology that was a direct threat to America; and that therefore the only way of defeating it was head-on, with maximum American strength, with the object of destroying the ideology and allowing democracy to flourish in its stead. He would have worked through the whole lot, Iraq, Syria, Iran, dealing with all their surrogates in the course of it Hezbollah, Hamas, etc. In other words, he thought the world had to be made anew, and that after September 11, it had to be done by force and with urgency. So he was for hard, hard power. No ifs, no buts, no maybes. We're coming after you, so change or be changed.

Of course, this att.i.tude terrified and repelled people. But, as will be obvious from what I have written, I did not think it was as fantastical as conventional wisdom opined. It is one struggle. Our enemy has an ideology. It does threaten us. The ultimate answer is in the spread of democracy and freedom. It is even possible to conceive of this, in different language, as being a progressive position, certainly where removing someone like Saddam was concerned.

My problem with the way he put it and wanted to do it was that the manner of doing it was incomplete. Precisely because the war was based loosely around an ideology, the fight had to be waged and won at the level of ideas and in a way that would appeal not to us, but to those who had fallen or might fall prey to that ideology. In other words, it couldn't be a hard-power strategy alone. It had to encompa.s.s more than military might. It had to engage the people out in the Middle East, in the Muslim world, and had to build alliances within that world. This wasn't some namby-pamby peacenikery; it was a critical part of winning. That was why, for example, progress to a Palestinian state was of such huge importance. It wasn't a sideshow; it was central to the main stage on which the struggle was being played out.

Therefore, also, when it came to human rights and prisoner issues, we had to be showing by our actions the strength of our alternative ideas and, however constraining it might be, the truth was that in the reality of modern communications, in an age of information that was transforming the arena of public debate, this was not a weak-minded concession, it was an absolute imperative.

So there was much to be said for his insight, but the methods and messaging a.s.sumed the world of the 1980s, not the early twenty-first century.

By the end of September, we had a clear commitment for a fresh UN resolution. This also greatly helped with the concerns of our Attorney General, Peter Goldsmith, about the legality of action without one.

My speech at party conference that year came together with surprising ease. Though I dealt with Iraq and foreign policy, I reserved most of it for a huge push on reform. We were now well into our health, education and crime plans and I felt, at long last, both more confident about the case for them and more comfortable with the ministers fronting them.

A staunch friend as always, Bill Clinton turned up to the conference to spread a bit of stardust and remind them I was progressive and knew well at least one American other than George. He even went out to a Blackpool McDonald's for a burger and fries, much to the amus.e.m.e.nt, astonishment and bemus.e.m.e.nt of the sprinkling of late-night diners. He had an endless ability for rapport with ordinary people, liked it, got something from it, felt reinvigorated from it. I could do it but was always a little shamefaced, never sure whether I was intruding or foisting myself on strangers. He would just love it, 'shooting the breeze', as if having a McDonald's in Blackpool was what he did every Tuesday night as a matter of course. Kevin s.p.a.cey was there too, a really fun guy, who turned up with Bill for Northern night and did a brilliant impersonation of him. Also performing was Paul Rodgers, the lead singer of Free and Bad Company, and so a set of completely bizarre pictures of all of us were taken, with the party activists in awe at the spectacle.

I always reckoned that even the ones who didn't like me (quite a few) or didn't agree with me (a large proportion) still admired the fact I counted, was a big player, was a world and not just a national leader. It's not a reason for doing anything, by the way, but the British, whatever they say, prefer their prime ministers to stand tall internationally. Most foreign leaders wouldn't have turned a head if they wandered down Guildford High Street. The US president, yes. Others, not really, maybe Sarkozy in later times, but probably not Chirac even at the time. However, Brits would want to know that in Toulouse people would recognise me. Our leaders should stand out, and if not cut a dash, at least make an impact. The problem is as time has gone on and the world has changed, and Britain's relative size and weight have shifted, it becomes harder to do. Not less desirable; just harder.

Again I stress: it's not the reason for acting in Afghanistan and Iraq or anything else, but our alliance with the US gave Britain a huge position. Those who thought our closeness to America was a problem in the rest of the world could not have been further from the mark. On the contrary, it gave us immediate purchase. There was no greater nonsense than that our alliance with the US lost us standing in the world. The opposite is the case. This was true even in the Middle East. It was true in spades in China and India. I remember once debating the pure politics of Iraq with Robin Cook. He said to me: It will be a disaster electorally; remember Wilson and Vietnam he didn't side with the US. I know, I replied, and just remind me of the result of the 1970 election again? I'm not, by the way, commenting on the decision; only the pure politics of it.

In October 2002, we had evidence of the continuing terrorist threat when a nightclub in Bali was bombed, leaving just over two hundred dead, including many tourists, mainly Australian. It was an ugly jolt to any complacency. It was followed by the Moscow theatre hostage attack in which over a hundred died. A little later in February 2003 we had our own scare when we were told of a potential attack on Heathrow. We had the usual emergency meeting. The options included shutting the airport, but I feared that the consequence would be devastating for British industry and the airlines. Instead, I decided to put up a big presence around the airport as a deterrent, including armoured vehicles and heavily armed patrols. It worked, but the press accused us of inventing the whole thing as a pretext for stepping up the 'war on terror'.

The UN resolution was duly debated and pa.s.sed in November 2002, and shortly after, the weapons inspectors, led by Hans Blix, were allowed back into Iraq. Hans was a curious fellow. He was smart and capable, and I liked him, but his problem was that he felt the weight of the politics of the inspection. This was quite natural, but in truth he just needed to do his job. If Saddam was in compliance, fine. If not, fine. That was his judgement. But it was ours as to the consequences. Instead, he first said Saddam wasn't complying; but then, as he could see the result of such non-compliance, shifted more to the position that Saddam might comply. And it wasn't clear whether the facts had changed, or his appreciation of the political implications. He kept saying, 'I have to decide for war or peace', and I kept saying, 'You don't. Just tell us your honest a.s.sessment.' However, to be fair, he was in a pretty impossible position and, as I shall relate, was actually very helpful in a last-ditch attempt to resolve the issue peacefully.

By this time in late 2002, our military were well alongside the US. The options were still being canva.s.sed. There were essentially three 'packages' for our potential involvement. One was purely logistics support. The second was air and sea, with special forces. The third was for full-on 'boots on the ground', i.e. the partic.i.p.ation of UK ground forces inside Iraq. Mike Boyce, who had grown in stature and confidence as time went on, was clear that the optimum from the British perspective was package three. He said he would have a real problem with the army if they were not fully involved, and such involvement alone gave us far greater influence in shaping US thinking. This was also my own instinct.

The new year turned and with it a sense we were in the final phase. The inspectors were in. The first Blix Report in mid-January was clear: Saddam was not complying. A further report would come in a month. The UN resolution pa.s.sed in November had been silent on the need for a further resolution prior to any military action. There were legal debates as to whether it was necessary, and Peter Goldsmith was again anxious about it. The Russians had become negative, and it was perfectly possible a second resolution would be vetoed.

I was still thinking it might be possible to get a second resolution George was adamant he didn't need one. Jack Straw and others warned me that, without one, I might be unable to survive the expected House of Commons vote.

I was about as isolated as it is possible to be in politics. On the one hand, the US were chafing at the bit and essentially I agreed with their basic thrust: Saddam was a threat, he would never cooperate fully with the international community, and the world, not to say Iraq, would be better off with him out of power. My instinct was with them. Our alliance was with them. I had made a commitment after September 11 to be 'shoulder to shoulder'. I was determined to fulfil it.

On the other hand, my isolation within Cabinet, let alone the PLP and large parts of media and public opinion, was colossal. And worrying, not because I might go down in a sense, so what? but because so much was at stake. War and peace. The struggle against terrorism. The future of our treasured alliance. The reputation of the country and its armed forces. Above all, people's lives. Either way, people's lives, since 'peace' would not be peace for those in Iraq under the boot of Saddam.

As I pondered in December 2002 and took a short winter break in January 2003, I tried to work out what was the right thing to do. I was past expediency, past political calculation, past personal introspection. I knew this could be the end politically. I just wanted to know: what is the right thing?

I could see by now, and following the first Blix Report, that barring something unantic.i.p.ated, the likelihood was war. We could opt out, of that I was sure. Package one was designed with that in mind. George had regularly given me the chance to take it and stay out of the conflict, coming in only for the aftermath. We had many allies by then. Thirteen out of twenty-five EU countries were onside. The coalition would eventually number over thirty different nations. But many were taking the route of avoiding the initial fighting.

I remember that Christmas at Chequers. As ever, there was the ma.s.sive tree in the Great Hall, the decorations, the festivity done with a ritual and solemnity that time had long made hallowed. My family came, as did Cherie's. The house was busy, bustling and brimful of Christmas spirit. Leaving everyone to take pre-Christmas drinks, I went up to the Long Gallery, my place of quiet reflection, with its ancient books, some dating from the time of Caxton. I sat and thought. What did I truly believe? That Saddam was about to attack Britain or the US? No. That he was a bigger WMD threat than Iran or North Korea or Libya? Not really, though he was the only leader to have used them. That left alone now, with these inspections ending the same way as the last, he would threaten the stability of the region? Very possibly. That he would leach WMD material or provide help to terrorists? Yes, I could see him doing that. Was it better for his people to be rid of him? For sure. Could it be done without a long and b.l.o.o.d.y war? You can never be sure of that. Did I want more time? Yes, but to allow me to probe every other way of doing it, rather than because I believed the nature of his regime would ever change. Would a new Iraq help build a new Middle East? I thought that possible.

Did I think that if we drew back now, we would have to deal with him later? That I thought was clear: yes, there was no way this man, with his past, was going to be anything other than a source of instability. At some point, especially if strengthened now, he would be back to his old tricks.

So, in or out? In, I concluded. And if in, better in fully and not partly. I still thought it possible to avoid war. I still thought it possible that other alternatives, diplomatic or through a coup of some sort (there was much private Arab talk of such a thing), could be available to avert conflict. I was determined, at the least, to try to persuade the Americans to get more time. But I had said I would be with them, and if conflict could not be avoided, I would be in with the whole and not half a heart.

If you had told me then that we would not find WMD after we toppled Saddam, and that following his removal there would be six years of conflict as we grappled with the terrorism so cruelly inflicted upon the Iraqi people, would my decision have been different? I ask that question every day. So much bloodshed. So many lives so brutally affected or destroyed. Yes, a new Iraq is now emerging and at last there are signs of hope. But at what cost?

And then I think of leaving him there in power. I remember the stories some of the Iraqis have told me since of what life was really like under Saddam. The killings, the torture, most of all the fear. 'You trusted no one except the closest family,' I remember one man saying. 'No one.' In the worst days of 2006 when Basra seemed overrun with militia, I recall asking someone from there if it would not be better if it had never happened. 'Are you serious?' he said. 'It will take time. Iraq was a broken country. For some, now it's worse. It's true. But no, you have no idea what it was like. And at least our future is in our hands.'

But back then, I could not foresee the future; I could only try to navigate my way through the present. In February 2003, a million people marched in London against the war. There had never been a larger demonstration, reminding me of my isolation and the responsibility of the decision I was about to take.

FOURTEEN.

RESOLUTION.

The weeks in the build-up to military action on 19 March were probably the most difficult in all the ten years of being prime minister. The inspectors were back in Iraq and producing reports, but they were inconclusive. The Blix Report of 27 January 2003 was the first formal report of the inspectors. In his oral briefing of the United Nations Security Council on 9 January, he had said that many outstanding issues were unresolved by the Iraqi declaration in December 2002; and that the information sought by the inspectors had not been forthcoming.

In the 27 January submission, the inspectors made it clear that, in terms of process at least, Iraq had somewhat opened up, but the November 2002 UN resolution had called for cooperation by Saddam to be 'immediate, unconditional and active'. The submission is important since it provides essential context to understanding the decisions being taken by me and others. Blix said as follows: Resolution 687 (1991), like the subsequent resolutions I shall refer to, required cooperation by Iraq but such was often withheld or given grudgingly. Unlike South Africa, which decided on its own to eliminate its nuclear weapons and welcomed inspection as a means of creating confidence in its disarmament, Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance not even today of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace.

He then went on to describe, in detail, what his current understanding was of the various programmes. This is worth reading since it gives an insight into the difficulty of trying to deal with a regime like that of Saddam.

Chemical weaponsThe nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed. Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and that the quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequently, it was said that the agent was never weaponised. Iraq said that the small quant.i.ty of agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and that the quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequently, it was said that the agent was never weaponised. Iraq said that the small quant.i.ty of agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilisation and that more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the doc.u.ments provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared. UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilisation and that more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the doc.u.ments provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared. There are also indications that the agent was weaponised. In addition, there are questions to be answered concerning the fate of the VX precursor chemicals, which Iraq states were lost during bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq. There are also indications that the agent was weaponised. In addition, there are questions to be answered concerning the fate of the VX precursor chemicals, which Iraq states were lost during bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq. I would now like to turn to the so-called 'Air Force doc.u.ment' that I have discussed with the Council before. This doc.u.ment was originally found by an UNSCOM inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by Iraqi minders. It gives an account of the expenditure of bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the IraqIran War. I am encouraged by the fact that Iraq has now provided this doc.u.ment to UNMOVIC. I would now like to turn to the so-called 'Air Force doc.u.ment' that I have discussed with the Council before. This doc.u.ment was originally found by an UNSCOM inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by Iraqi minders. It gives an account of the expenditure of bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the IraqIran War. I am encouraged by the fact that Iraq has now provided this doc.u.ment to UNMOVIC. The doc.u.ment indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tonnes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must a.s.sume that these quant.i.ties are now unaccounted for. The doc.u.ment indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tonnes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must a.s.sume that these quant.i.ties are now unaccounted for. The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot 170 km south-west of Baghdad was much publicised. This was a relatively new bunker and therefore the rockets must have been moved there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions. The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot 170 km south-west of Baghdad was much publicised. This was a relatively new bunker and therefore the rockets must have been moved there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions. The investigation of these rockets is still proceeding. Iraq states that they were overlooked from 1991 from a batch of some 2,000 that were stored there during the Gulf War. This could be the case. They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for. The investigation of these rockets is still proceeding. Iraq states that they were overlooked from 1991 from a batch of some 2,000 that were stored there during the Gulf War. This could be the case. They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for. The finding of the rockets shows that Iraq needs to make more effort to ensure that its declaration is currently accurate. During my recent discussions in Baghdad, Iraq declared that it would make new efforts in this regard and had set up a committee of investigation. Since then it has reported that it has found a further four chemical rockets at a storage depot in Al Taji. The finding of the rockets shows that Iraq needs to make more effort to ensure that its declaration is currently accurate. During my recent discussions in Baghdad, Iraq declared that it would make new efforts in this regard and had set up a committee of investigation. Since then it has reported that it has found a further four chemical rockets at a storage depot in Al Taji. I might further mention that inspectors have found at another site a laboratory quant.i.ty of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor. I might further mention that inspectors have found at another site a laboratory quant.i.ty of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor.Biological weapons I have mentioned the issue of anthrax to the Council on previous occasions and I come back to it as it is an important one. I have mentioned the issue of anthrax to the Council on previous occasions and I come back to it as it is an important one. Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 litres of this biological warfare agent, which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little evidence for this production and no convincing evidence for its destruction. Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 litres of this biological warfare agent, which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little evidence for this production and no convincing evidence for its destruction. There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared, and that at least some of this was retained after the declared destruction date. It might still exist. Either it should be found and be destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision or else convincing evidence should be produced to show that it was, indeed, destroyed in 1991. There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared, and that at least some of this was retained after the declared destruction date. It might still exist. Either it should be found and be destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision or else convincing evidence should be produced to show that it was, indeed, destroyed in 1991. As I reported to the Council on 19 December last year, Iraq did not declare a significant quant.i.ty, some 650 kg, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged as imported in Iraq's submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999. As part of its 7 December 2002 declaration, Iraq resubmitted the Amorim panel doc.u.ment, but the table showing this particular import of media was not included. The absence of this table would appear to be deliberate as the pages of the resubmitted doc.u.ment were renumbered. As I reported to the Council on 19 December last year, Iraq did not declare a significant quant.i.ty, some 650 kg, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged as imported in Iraq's submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999. As part of its 7 December 2002 declaration, Iraq resubmitted the Amorim panel doc.u.ment, but the table showing this particular import of media was not included. The absence of this table would appear to be deliberate as the pages of the resubmitted doc.u.ment were renumbered. In the letter of 24 January to the president of the Council, Iraq's Foreign Minister stated that 'all imported quant.i.ties of growth media were declared'. This is not evidence. I note that the quant.i.ty of media involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax. In the letter of 24 January to the president of the Council, Iraq's Foreign Minister stated that 'all imported quant.i.ties of growth media were declared'. This is not evidence. I note that the quant.i.ty of media involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax.

Missiles I turn now to the missile sector. There remain significant questions as to whether Iraq retained SCUD-type missiles after the Gulf War. Iraq declared the consumption of a number of SCUD missiles as targets in the development of an anti-ballistic missile defence system during the 1980s. Yet no technical information has been produced about that programme or data on the consumption of the missiles. I turn now to the missile sector. There remain significant questions as to whether Iraq retained SCUD-type missiles after the Gulf War. Iraq declared the consumption of a number of SCUD missiles as targets in the development of an anti-ballistic missile defence system during the 1980s. Yet no technical information has been produced about that programme or data on the consumption of the missiles. There has been a range of developments in the missile field during the past four years presented by Iraq as non-proscribed activities. We are trying to gather a clear understanding of them through inspections and on-site discussions. There has been a range of developments in the missile field during the past four years presented by Iraq as non-proscribed activities. We are trying to gather a clear understanding of them through inspections and on-site discussions. Two projects in particular stand out. They are the development of a liquid-fuelled missile named the Al Samoud 2, and a solid propellant missile, called the Al Fatah. Both missiles have been tested to a range in excess of the permitted range of 150 km, with the Al Samoud 2 being tested to a maximum of 183 km and the Al Fatah to 161 km. Some of both types of missiles have already been provided to the Iraqi armed forces even though it is stated that they are still undergoing development. Two projects in particular stand out. They are the development of a liquid-fuelled missile named the Al Samoud 2, and a solid propellant missile, called the Al Fatah. Both missiles have been tested to a range in excess of the permitted range of 150 km, with the Al Samoud 2 being tested to a maximum of 183 km and the Al Fatah to 161 km. Some of both types of missiles have already been provided to the Iraqi armed forces even though it is stated that they are still undergoing development. The Al Samoud's diameter was increased from an earlier version to the present 760 mm. This modification was made despite a 1994 letter from the executive chairman of UNSCOM directing Iraq to limit its missile diameters to less than 600 mm. Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the executive chairman of UNSCOM to Iraq prohibited the use of engines from certain surface-to-air missiles for the use in ballistic missiles. The Al Samoud's diameter was increased from an earlier version to the present 760 mm. This modification was made despite a 1994 letter from the executive chairman of UNSCOM directing Iraq to limit its missile diameters to less than 600 mm. Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the executive chairman of UNSCOM to Iraq prohibited the use of engines from certain surface-to-air missiles for the use in ballistic missiles. During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on these two programmes. We were told that the final range for both systems would be less than the permitted maximum range of 150 km. During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on these two programmes. We were told that the final range for both systems would be less than the permitted maximum range of 150 km. These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems. The test ranges in excess of 150 km are significant, but some further technical considerations need to be made, before we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the meantime, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both missiles. These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems. The test ranges in excess of 150 km are significant, but some further technical considerations need to be made, before we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the meantime, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both missiles. In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile production infrastructure. In particular, Iraq reconst.i.tuted a number of casting chambers, which had previously been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. They had been used in the production of solid-fuel missiles. Whatever missile system these chambers are intended for, they could produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 km. In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile production infrastructure. In particular, Iraq reconst.i.tuted a number of casting chambers, which had previously been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. They had been used in the production of solid-fuel missiles. Whatever missile system these chambers are intended for, they could produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 km. Also a.s.sociated with these missiles and related developments is the import, which has been taking place during the last few years, of a number of items despite the sanctions, including as late as December 2002. Foremost amongst these is the import of 380 rocket engines which may be used for the Al Samoud 2. Also a.s.sociated with these missiles and related developments is the import, which has been taking place during the last few years, of a number of items despite the sanctions, including as late as December 2002. Foremost amongst these is the import of 380 rocket engines which may be used for the Al Samoud 2. Iraq also declared the recent import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation and guidance and control systems. These items may well be for proscribed purposes. That is yet to be determined. What is clear is that they were illegally brought into Iraq, that is, Iraq or some company in Iraq circ.u.mvented the restrictions imposed by various resolutions. Iraq also declared the recent import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation and guidance and control systems. These items may well be for proscribed purposes. That is yet to be determined. What is clear is that they were illegally brought into Iraq, that is, Iraq or some company in Iraq circ.u.mvented the restrictions imposed by various resolutions.The recent inspection find in the private home of a scientist of a box of some 3,000 pages of doc.u.ments, much of it relating to the laser enrichment of uranium, support a concern that has long existed that doc.u.ments might be distributed to the homes of private individuals. This interpretation is refuted by the Iraqi side, which claims that research staff sometimes may bring home papers from their workplaces. On our side, we cannot help but think that the case might not be isolated and that such placement of doc.u.ments is deliberate to make discovery difficult and to seek to shield doc.u.ments by placing them in private homes. Any further sign of the concealment of doc.u.ments would be serious. The Iraqi side committed itself at our recent talks to encourage persons to accept access also to private sites. There can be no sanctuaries for proscribed items, activities or doc.u.ments. A denial of prompt access to any site would be a very serious matter. Any further sign of the concealment of doc.u.ments would be serious. The Iraqi side committed itself at our recent talks to encourage persons to accept access also to private sites. There can be no sanctuaries for proscribed items, activities or doc.u.ments. A denial of prompt access to any site would be a very serious matter. Find persons to give credible information: a list of personnel Find persons to give credible information: a list of personnelWhen Iraq claims that tangible evidence in the form of doc.u.ments is not available, it ought at least to find individuals, engineers, scientists and managers to testify about their experience. Large weapons programmes are moved and managed by people. Interviews with individuals who may have worked in programmes in the past may fill blank spots in our knowledge and understanding. It could also be useful to learn that they are now employed in peaceful sectors. These were the reasons why UNMOVIC asked for a list of such persons, in accordance with resolution 1441. Some 400 names for all biological and chemical weapons programmes as well as their missile programmes were provided by the Iraqi side. This can be compared to over 3,500 names of people a.s.sociated with those past weapons programmes that UNSCOM either interviewed in the 1990s or knew from doc.u.ments and other sources. At my recent meeting in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to supplementing the list and some eighty additional names have been provided. Some 400 names for all biological and chemical weapons programmes as well as their missile programmes were provided by the Iraqi side. This can be compared to over 3,500 names of people a.s.sociated with those past weapons programmes that UNSCOM either interviewed in the 1990s or knew from doc.u.ments and other sources. At my recent meeting in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to supplementing the list and some eighty additional names have been provided. Allow information through credible interviews Allow information through credible interviewsIn the past, much valuable information came from interviews. There were also cases in which the interviewee was clearly intimidated by the presence of and interruption by Iraqi officials. This was the background of Resolution 1441's provision for a right for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to hold private interviews 'in the mode or location' of our choice, in Baghdad or even abroad. To date, eleven individuals were asked for interviews in Baghdad by us. The replies have invariably been that the individual will only speak at Iraq's monitoring directorate or, at any rate, in the presence of an Iraqi official. This could be due to a wish on the part of the invited to have evidence that they have not said anything that the authorities did not wish them to say. At our recent talks in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to encourage persons to accept interviews 'in private', that is to say alone with us. Despite this, the pattern has not changed. However, we hope that with further encouragement from the authorities, knowledgeable individuals will accept private interviews, in Baghdad or abroad. To date, eleven individuals were asked for interviews in Baghdad by us. The replies have invariably been that the individual will only speak at Iraq's monitoring directorate or, at any rate, in the presence of an Iraqi official. This could be due to a wish on the part of the invited to have evidence that they have not said anything that the authorities did not wish them to say. At our recent talks in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to encourage persons to accept interviews 'in private', that is to say alone with us. Despite this, the pattern has not changed. However, we hope that with further encouragement from the authorities, knowledgeable individuals will accept private interviews, in Baghdad or abroad.

I am sorry to quote at such length, but it is critical to understand the context in which WMD were being debated in the run-up to the outbreak of conflict. We the key allies had no doubt that Saddam had an active WMD programme. We had worked really hard to get Resolution 1441 through. There could be no doubt that the only reason for the inspectors being allowed back into Iraq was a threat of military action. The build-up of American forces was likewise the only conceivable reason for what cooperation there was. But that cooperation fell short of what Resolution 1441 demanded. And the history of dealing with Saddam did not exactly lead to belief in his fidelity to the UN.

By this time, UK troops were also being prepared for the possibility of war. Several statements were made to Parliament in January. I still pinned some considerable hope on getting a diplomatic breakthrough. For me too, the prospect of a second UN resolution was central. We had left unresolved the issue of whether a breach of Resolution 1441 was in and of itself a justification for action. There was a legal dispute about it; but it was swiftly apparent that the law and the politics were inextricably intertwined. If people disagreed with war, they tended to think a second UN resolution specifically and expressly authorising military action was legally necessary; if they agreed with removing Saddam, they didn't. And whether there was such a resolution depended on President Chirac and President Putin agreeing, or at least not vetoing, the new resolution.

At this point, it is perhaps sensible to deal with the issue of the advice of the Attorney General, Peter Goldsmith. Again this has been extensively, indeed exhaustively, canva.s.sed before the Chilcot Inquiry, but again it has become the object of ingrained myth designed to show that the war was plainly illegal, that Peter really thought so and that he was pressured into changing his mind, not for good legal cause but for base political reasons.

It is therefore worth just restating some of the legal ideas and concepts behind the judgement that Peter eventually came to. The previous UN resolution in the early 1990s specifically authorised the use of force to make Saddam comply with the UN inspection regime. In particular, Resolution 678 stated that it: authorised Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its Resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area. authorised Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its Resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area.

So the UNSCOM inspections mechanism was established at that time to disarm Saddam, backed by the explicit authorisation of force if he failed to comply. This resolution was still extant. Therefore there was an argument right from the outset that the authority to use force remained in being.

Its revival was the basis for the 1993 and 1998 military action against Saddam, when at that time he was in breach of the UN resolution and effectively threw inspectors out of Iraq. By 2002, Resolution 678 was still in place. But it was felt and set out in a note to me in March 2002 that because of the pa.s.sage of time, we should have a fresh UN resolution specifying that Saddam was in breach of the UN resolutions in order for 678 to be the basis of further action. Hence we went down the UN route i.e. a first UN resolution was a legal necessity.

Resolution 1441 in November 2002 was the fresh UN resolution. It specified Saddam was in breach; it gave him 'a final opportunity' to comply; it called for him to give 'immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access' to the inspectors and, unusually, it said that failure to do so would in itself be a 'further material breach'.

Now it is true that it didn't explicitly state that military action was to follow. But it expressly reaffirmed Resolution 678, and a French/Russian attempt to insert language to the effect that any military action required yet another resolution was rejected. It did call, though, for an a.s.sessment to be made by the Council in the event of breach.

So of course a case could be made that a further resolution expressly authorising force was necessary. But it was equally valid to argue that it wasn't; that 1441 was clear; and that if there was not in fact full compliance, Saddam was in material breach, 678 still applied and action was lawful.

Again, my purpose here is not to say it was beyond argument; simply to a.s.sert, rather, that there was at least as much, if not more, on the side of legality as not.

The truth is that the international community jointly agreed 1441 and then got buyer's remorse once it became clear Saddam was still not really playing ball. As I say, had Saddam taken Gaddafi's decision and really changed, 1441 would have meant no military action. This was accepted by George on several occasions. But Saddam didn't; yet the consequence of that failure was not accepted in the spirit, at any rate, of 1441.

There was, naturally, a spirited debate inside the legal fraternity of the Foreign Office and the Attorney General's department. At first, though Peter thought 1441 shifted the argument considerably, he was still of the view that, to be sure, we should have yet another resolution. It was all about what the UNSC had in mind when pa.s.sing 1441.

Eventually, when he spoke to Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who had been the amba.s.sador at the UN negotiating 1441, he moved closer; and then after a debate with the US lawyers he was finally persuaded. What persuaded him was the account of the negotiation, and in particular the fact that France and Russia had failed in their attempt to link any military action to a new resolution.

So, of course, there were pros and cons on the legal case, but in the end Peter came down in favour of military action being legal, provided it was clear that Saddam was still not giving full compliance. And Blix, for all his ambiguity, was clear on that point even up to the outbreak of hostilities.

However, politically, as well as to put the issue beyond any legal claim to the contrary, a second resolution was certainly desirable. Above all, it would reunite the international community.

Unfortunately, during the course of February, despite my best endeavours and my G.o.d I tried the division in the international community grew larger, not smaller. Europe was now split down the middle. As I say, thirteen out of the twenty-five members were in favour. The ten new accession countries came out strongly for the US position and were roundly abused by Jacques Chirac for it! But the 'old versus new' Europe paradigm was misleading Spain and Italy both supported action. Allies of the US outside Europe, such as j.a.pan and South Korea, also rallied. So did many of the applicant countries for NATO. Australia gave unflinching and determined support under John Howard.

But public opinion in many traditionally supportive countries, like Turkey, was strongly anti. Canada decided they couldn't support without a new UN resolution, as did Mexico.

Basically, there were nations for whom the American alliance was a fundamental part of their foreign policy. They tended to back the US. Then there were those for whom the alliance was important, but not fundamental. They backed off. As happens in these situations, the dynamic of disagreement then started to fashion new alliances, with France, Germany and Russia, in particular, moving to create an alternative pole of power and influence.

I thought this was highly damaging; but I also understood it was inevitable. They felt as strongly as I did; and they weren't prepared to indulge the US, as they saw it. They thought conflict would harm relations between the West and Islam, and of course the more they said this, the more they rather played into that a.n.a.lysis and strengthened it.

For me, the choice still remained the same. I agreed with the basic US a.n.a.lysis of Saddam as a threat; I thought he was a monster; and to break the US partnership in such circ.u.mstances, when America's key allies were all rallying round, would in my view then (and now) have done major long-term damage to that relationship.

I had one last throw of the dice, however. The problem which sensible opinion had with it all was the feeling that it was a rush to war. Now, the US position was that this was all very well, but they had close on 250,000 troops down in the region and they couldn't simply wait until a diplomatic dance, which they had fair evidence for thinking would be interminable, was played out. Their position was: Resolution 1441 was a final chance; he didn't take it; if we give him time, we just allow him to mess us around as he has before; he won't reform; we're kidding ourselves if we think he will; so let's go and get the job done.

The inspectors' reports were at best inconclusive; but they certainly weren't evidence of 'immediate, unconditional and active compliance'. The US was champing at the bit. President Bush was actually losing support by waiting. The international community was split. UK public opinion was split. The party was split. I was between numerous rocks and innumerable hard places.

The strain on everyone around me was almost unbearable. At home in Downing Street, I was a bit like a zombie; eating meals distractedly; not hearing questions the kids asked; trying to keep family life normal but with all of them acutely aware it was all very abnormal, not least because of how I was behaving. I forced myself on occasions to relax and stop working, but the issue was like an incessant throbbing ache that wouldn't go away, wouldn't let you forget it for an instant, and didn't stop reminding you of the necessity of dealing with it.

Gradually I did deal with it. I sat and reasoned it all through. I knew in the final a.n.a.lysis I would be with the US, because in my view it was right, morally and strategically. But we should still make a last-ditch attempt for a peaceful solution. I decided to do two things. First, to make the moral case for removing Saddam in response to the protesters' moral case against war. Second, to try one more time to reunite the international community behind a clear basis for action in the event of continuing breach.

On the day of the ma.s.sive demonstration in London 15 February I was due to make a speech to the Scottish Labour Party Spring Conference in Glasgow. I didn't sleep well, going over the arguments in my head, but I was determined to make the point that whatever their feelings about the ghastly reality of conflict, people should not be able to hide from the ghastly reality of Saddam continuing in power. In my hotel in Edinburgh (where we were staying for security reasons) I sat and worked from the early hours.

The Caledonian is a wonderful old hotel situated at the end of Princes Street. From the suite I could see Arthur's Seat rising up behind Edinburgh Castle, that magnificent fourteenth-century edifice within whose battlements the Tattoo takes place each summer, where the pipes and drums are the musical backdrop to a display of ancient Scottish military might. I used to go as a teenager while still at Fettes, even though it was during the school holidays. Somehow, looking out of the hotel window at the rock and the castle and all the familiar sights of Edinburgh, my mind settled as it needed to in order that I write this speech.

The conference centre in Glasgow was ringed with security. The protesters were out in force. My speech was heard respectfully by the party members. Actually, people were interested in the argument. When I came to the core of the speech, I described the case in these terms: The moral case against war has a moral answer: it is the moral case for removing Saddam. It is not the reason we act. That must be according to the United Nations mandate on weapons of ma.s.s destruction. But it is the reason, frankly, why if we do have to act, we should do so with a clear conscience.Yes, there are consequences of war. If we remove Saddam by force, people will die and some will be innocent. And we must live with the consequences of our actions, even the unintended ones. But there are also consequences of 'stop the war'.If I took that advice and did not insist on disarmament, yes there would be no war but there would still be Saddam. Many of the people marching will say they hate Saddam, but the consequences of taking their advice is that he stays in charge of Iraq, ruling the Iraqi people. A country that in 1978, the year before he seized power, was richer than Malaysia or Portugal. A country where, today, 130 out of every 1,000 Iraqi children die before the age of five 70 per cent of these deaths are from diarrhoea and respiratory infections that are easily preventable. Where almost a third of children born in the centre and south of Iraq have chronic malnutrition. Where 60 per cent of the people depend on food aid. Where half the population of rural areas have no safe water.Where every year and now, as we speak, tens of thousands of political prisoners languish in appalling conditions in Saddam's jails and are routinely executed. Where in the past fifteen years over 150,000 Shia Muslims in southern Iraq and Muslim Kurds in northern Iraq have been butchered; with up to four million Iraqis in exile round the world, including 350,000 now in Britain.This isn't a regime with weapons of ma.s.s destruction that is otherwise benign. This is a regime that contravenes every single principle or value anyone of our politics believes in. There will be no march for the victims of Saddam, no protests about the thousands of children who die needlessly every year under his rule, no righteous anger over the torture chambers which if he is left in power will be left in being.

The succeeding days were a whirl of diplomatic activity, speeches, press conferences and phone calls. I was now running on pure adrenalin, utterly focused, clear in my own mind and watching as other leaders came to their final decisions. Some broke in favour of the US; some against; some broke for cover. It was an agonising time for practically everyone. The stakes were high, as high as anyone could remember. George was clear: bar something extraordinary and unforeseen, America was going to remove Saddam. The whole might of the US armed forces was mustered around Iraq.

The irony, as I pointed out to George, was that as American intentions became more plain, so of course the att.i.tude of Saddam shifted to more cooperation. This was reflected in the Blix Report of 14 February. Just as that of January had pointed to a breach of Resolution 1441, so the report of February pointed towards greater compliance. But it pays to reread the report now. It was clear that compliance was stepped up significantly as the prospect of military action became more real, but it was also clear that the problem was unlikely to be resolved unless those running Iraq had a genuine and not transitory change of heart. The report described the finding of imported material for longer-range missiles in breach of UN resolutions; the difficulties of tracking down the anthrax and VX nerve agent, without greater Iraqi cooperation; and it concluded: 'If Iraq had provided the necessary cooperation in 1991, the phase of disarmament under Resolution 687 (1991) could have been short and a decade of sanctions could have been avoided. Today, three months after the adoption of Resolution 1441 (2002), the period of disarmament through inspection could still be short, if "immediate, active and unconditional cooperation" with UNMOVIC and the IAEA were to be forthcoming.' They were hopeful that Iraq could be disarmed; but the report still concluded compliance had yet to conform to the requirement of the UN resolution of three months before.

Even in his report to the UN on 7 March, here is what Hans Blix said about Iraq's cooperation. Having stated that it was increasing, which, as he put it in somewhat of an understatement, 'may well be due to outside pressure', he then addressed the matter of interviews and doc.u.ments: It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as 'active', or even 'proactive', these initiatives 34 months into the new resolution cannot be said to const.i.tute 'immediate' cooperation.

Most of all, on the crucial matter of interviews, Blix was never going to get cooperation. That only came after March 2003 with the ISG. So though both we and Blix wanted more time, it is highly doubtful that it would have yielded anything other than the (wrong) conclusion that because Saddam had no active WMD programme, therefore he was not a threat.

This issue of interviews was absolutely of the essence. In the end it was how the ISG got to the truth of the whole business. The reality was that he was never going to allow his top people to spill the beans. In December 2002, after Blix and UNMOVIC entered Iraq, we had intelligence (and this remains valid) of Saddam calling his key people working on weapons together and telling them anyone who cooperated with interviews outside of Iraq would be treated as an enemy agent. Later, in 2004, the ISG uncovered evidence of a meeting of over four hundred scientists chaired by Taha Ramadan, the vice president of Iraq, just before the inspectors returned, in which he warned them of dire consequences if the inspectors found anything that interfered with the lifting of sanctions. Of course the obligation under 1441 was just the opposite: to disclose anything relevant to the inspections. The ISG also found that once inspections resumed, foreign experts were hidden from the inspectors.

So in hindsight, my effort was probably futile in any event, although at the time I thought interviews might indeed yield something.

But as one ambiguous report succeeded another, opinion polarised further.

Public opinion in most of Europe was pretty fiercely against. In Spain, Jose Maria Aznar told me that there was only 4 per cent approval for military action. I told him that was roughly the number you would get in a poll of people who believed Elvis was still alive. But he was a tough guy and was going to stay firm with America. He believed, like me, that the prospect of a link between WMD proliferation and terrorist groups was too real to be countenanced; and now was the moment to take a stand with the one regime, Saddam's, that had used WMD.

But he also, like me, thought it critical, if at all possible, to get a fresh UN resolution authorising action. Jack, Hilary Armstrong, Sally, all those closest to me were advising that without a UN resolution specifically agreeing military action, the politics was going to be difficult and possibly terminal. I asked Alastair what he thought my chances were of having to resign. 'Around twenty per cent,' he said. 'More like thirty per cent,' I replied, 'and rising.'

Cabinet meetings were regular and on the whole supportive. Robin was clearly manoeuvring for the exit, but doing it, to be fair, with transparency and no ill intent (at that time) towards me personally.

Clare was being her usual self. One of the most bizarre things said about the build-up to war is that it was a kind of one-man mission, discussed with a few special advisers on the famous sofa in the den, with the Cabinet excluded. Actually, it was the the topic at virtually every Cabinet meeting for nigh on six months, with not just me but Jack and Geoff Hoon briefing extensively, and everyone not just having the right to have their say, but saying it. topic at virtually every Cabinet meeting for nigh on six months, with not just me but Jack and Geoff Hoon briefing extensively, and everyone not just having the right to have their say, but saying it.

It was also the only military action expressly agreed in advance by the House of Commons. The Opposition leaders were briefed throughout and the intelligence and military chiefs made available to them.

Both Opposition leaders behaved honourably and decently. Charles Kennedy was going to be anti-war, that was clear, but he conducted himself in a sensible and friendly fashion and I think understood that I was also in a difficult position.

Iain Duncan Smith had long been an advocate of taking on Saddam. His view was that Saddam was a threat, he would never change and he had to be confronted. He had written a very powerful pamphlet on the issue in early 2002. Like the Thatcherite ex-ministers and followers, he was Eurosceptic but pa.s.sionately in favour of the American alliance. He gave solid backing and I was really grateful for it. What's more, unlike many of his colleagues, he wasn't a fair-weather friend, but remained of the same view even when the going got tough.

It was reasonably clear fairly early on that I would need Tory votes to be sure of winning in the House of Commons, and we were already committed to a vote before the action. So I knew I would win the vote itself. But and it was a big 'but' the Tories were, perfectly justifiably, making it clear that if there was a 'no-confidence' motion following the vote on the conflict, then they would side with the rebels. In that case, I would be out. Therefore I had to win well, and in a way that deterred any on my own side taking their opposition as far as agreeing they would vote against the government on a 'no-confidence' motion.

On Wednesday 5 March, as France, Germany and Russia issued a joint statement separating themselves from the US, Jack came over after PMQs. He was genuinely alarmed and worried about the political fallout. 'If you go next Wednesday with Bush and without a second resolution, the only regime change that will be happening is in this room.' He said it as a friend and colleague; and he meant it.

I discovered that Andrew Turnbull, who had succeeded Richard Wilson as Cabinet Secretary in September 2002, was quietly looking into the Labour Party rules and what they meant for government in the event of my falling. It would have had to be led by John Prescott and there were a series of bureaucratic consequences that Andrew was trying to work through. He wasn't, by the way, doing it sneakily; he was quite within his rights to investigate all possibilities, and this was certainly one. But when I heard, I laughed a little uneasily and I thought: These really could be the last days in office.

I was going flat out to see if there was any juice left in the diplomatic tank. On 7 March, things got more complex still when Putin made it clear he would veto any second resolution. I knew I had about ten days in which to try to buy some time for the inspectors. I still thought it possible though the odds were lengthening that we could get a Saddam capitulation; or, another idea floating around, that we could agree a special blue beret (i.e. UN-backed) inspections force that would effectively take over the disarmament process. Meanwhile, I had come up with my own idea, on which I had been working with Hans Blix and some of the non-aligned countries on the UNSC.

There are five permanent members of the UNSC. Then there are another ten non-permanent members who rotate between the nations. These are drawn mainly from South American or African