Port Arthur, where the bulk of the Russian Pacific squadron lay, is somewhat difficult of ingress and egress. On January 31, 1904, the operation of extracting the ships and parading them outside was commenced, being brought to a conclusion on February 3rd, whereafter the squadron steamed out to sea, and, having made a short cruise off the coast of the Shantung promontory, returned to its position on the following day. The fleet taking part in this manoeuvre consisted of twenty-six ships, and the whole Russian naval force then in eastern Asia comprised seven battle-ships, four armoured cruisers, seven protected cruisers, four gunboats, six sloops, twenty-five destroyers, two mining transports, and fourteen first-cla.s.s torpedo-boats.

The j.a.panese, on their side, had six battle-ships, eight armoured cruisers, thirteen protected cruisers, fourteen small cruisers, nineteen destroyers, and eighty-five torpedo-boats. This enumeration shows a numerical superiority on the j.a.panese side, but in fighting capacity the two fleets were nearly equal. For, though the Russians possessed seven battle-ships to six j.a.panese, the latter had better gun-protection and greater weight of broadside fire than the former; and though j.a.pan could muster eight armoured cruisers against Russia's four, the latter were supplemented by five protected cruisers which ranked far above anything of the same cla.s.s on the j.a.panese side.

THE FIRST NAVAL OPERATION

When the Russian ships returned on the 4th of February from their cruise off the Shantung promontory, they took up their stations outside Port Arthur, all the harbour lights and beacons being left in position, and no special precaution being taken except that a patrol of three torpedo-boats was sent out. Yet the Russians should have appreciated the presence of danger. For, on the 6th of February, j.a.pan had broken off the negotiations in St. Petersburg, and had given official information of her intention to take measures for protecting her menaced interests. That signified war and nothing but war, and the "Official Messenger" of the same evening published the intimation, which was immediately communicated to Admiral Alexieff at Port Arthur.

The Russian fleet was then divided into three squadrons. The largest body lay off Port Arthur, and two very much smaller squadrons were posted, one at Chemulpo on the west coast of Korea, and another at Vladivostok. It is obvious that such division of the fleet on the eve of hostilities should have been carefully avoided. The ships should all have been held together with an extensive network of scouts so as to enable them swiftly and strongly to fall upon any j.a.panese transports carrying troops to the mainland, or to meet effectually and crush any attempt of the j.a.panese squadrons to obtain command of the sea.

On the night of February 8th-9th, three j.a.panese squadrons of destroyers, aggregating ten vessels, steamed across a calm, moonlit sea and delivered a torpedo attack on the Russian squadron at Port Arthur, the result being that the battle-ships Retvisan and Tsarevitch together with the cruiser Pallada were holed. These battle-ships were the most powerful vessels in the Russian squadron, and the Pallada was a first-cla.s.s protected cruiser of 6630 tons'

displacement. The j.a.panese destroyers had left Sasebo on the 6th of February and they returned thither uninjured, having materially weakened the Russian fleet. On the day following this surprise, Admiral Togo, the j.a.panese commander-in-chief, engaged the remains of the Russian squadron with the heavy guns of his battle-ships at a range of eight thousand yards, and succeeded in inflicting some injury on the battle-ship Poltava, the protected cruisers Diana and Askold, and a second-cla.s.s cruiser Novik. The Russians ultimately retreated towards the harbour with the intention of drawing the j.a.panese under closer fire of the land batteries, but the j.a.panese fleet declined to follow after them, and, instead, steamed away.

Three days later (February 11th) another disaster overtook the Russians. The Yenisei, one of the two mining-transports included in their fleet, struck a mine and sank so rapidly in Talien Bay that ninety-six of her crew perished. The j.a.panese had no part at all in this catastrophe. It was purely accidental.

THE CHEMULPO AFFAIR

While these things were happening at Port Arthur, a squadron of the j.a.panese navy, under Admiral Uryu, escorted a number of transports to Chemulpo, the port of the Korean capital, Seoul. There the Russian protected cruiser Variag (6500 tons) together with the gunboat Korietz and the transport Sungari were lying. It does not appear that Admiral Uryu's prime object was to engage these Russian ships. But Chemulpo having been chosen as the princ.i.p.al landing-place of the j.a.panese army corps which was to operate in Korea, it was, of course, imperative that the harbour should be cleared of Russian war-vessels.

On February 8th, the Russians at Chemulpo were surprised by a summons from Admiral Uryu to leave the port or undergo bombardment at their anchorage. The vessels stood out bravely to sea, and after an engagement lasting thirty-five minutes at ranges varying from five to ten thousand yards, they were so badly injured that they returned to the port and were sunk by their own crews, together with the transport Sungari. The moral effect of the destruction of these vessels was incalculable.

DECLARATION OF WAR

On the 10th of February, the Czar and the Mikado respectively issued declarations of war. The former laid stress upon Russia's pacific intentions in proposing revision of the agreements already existing between the two empires with regard to Korean affairs, and accused the j.a.panese of making a sudden attack on the Russian squadron at Port Arthur "without previously notifying that the rupture of diplomatic relations implied the beginning of warlike action." The j.a.panese declaration insisted that the integrity of Korea was a matter of the gravest concern to j.a.pan, inasmuch as the separate existence of the former was essential to the safety of the latter, and charged that "Russia, in disrespect of her solemn treaty pledges to China and of her repeated a.s.surances to other powers, was still in occupation of Manchuria, had consolidated and strengthened her hold upon those provinces, and was bent upon their final annexation." With regard to Russia's accusation against j.a.pan of drawing the sword without due notice, a distinguished British publicist made the following comment in the columns of The Times (London):

"Far from thinking the j.a.panese attack on the night of February 8th, two full days after the announcement of the intention to take action, was an exception to, or a deviation from, tradition and precedent, we should rather count ourselves fortunate if our enemy, in the next naval war we have to wage, does not strike two days before blazoning forth his intention, instead of two days after. The tremendous and decisive results of success for the national cause are enough to break down all the restraining influences of the code of international law and Christian morality."

THE FIRST MILITARY OPERATIONS

From the moment when war became inevitable, the problem of absorbing interest was to determine Russia's strategy, and it was ultimately seen that the two main groups of her forces were to be posted at Port Arthur and on the Yalu; the latter to resist an advance from Korea, and the former to defend the Liaotung peninsula, which const.i.tuted the key of the Russian position. Between the mouth of the Yalu and the Liaotung peninsula, a distance of 120 miles, there were many points where raiding parties might have been landed to cut the Russian railway. Against this danger, flying squadrons of Cossacks were employed. After the destruction of the three Russian vessels in Chemulpo and the crippling of the Port Arthur squadron, j.a.panese transports entered the former port and quietly landed some three thousand troops, which advanced immediately upon Seoul and took possession of it.

From that time there could be no doubt that the intention of the j.a.panese was to make their first attack upon the enemy by marching up the Korean peninsula, and that the capital of Korea was chosen for a base of operations because of climatic considerations. Chemulpo, however, was not the only landing-place. Fusan also served for that purpose, as subsequently did also Chinnampo, an inlet on the west coast of the peninsula. The distance from the port of Fusan to the Yalu River is four hundred miles, in round numbers, and the roads are very bad throughout the whole country. Hence the advance of the j.a.panese, which was made in a leisurely manner with the utmost circ.u.mspection and attention to detail, involved so much time that April had drawn to its close before the troops deployed on the banks of the Yalu. They consisted of three divisions const.i.tuting an army corps, and each division had a ration-strength of 19,000 men with a combatant strength of 14,000 sabres and rifles and thirty-six field-guns. It may be a.s.sumed, therefore, that when the j.a.panese First Army under General (afterwards Count) Kuroki reached the Yalu, it had a fighting-strength of between forty and fifty thousand men.

There had practically been no collision during the interval of the advance from the southern extremity of the peninsula to its northern boundary. It is true that, on March 28th, a squadron of Cossacks attempted to surprise the j.a.panese cavalry at Chong-ju, but the essay proved a failure, and the Cossacks were driven back upon Wiju, which they evacuated without any further struggle.

The Russian plan of operations did not originally contemplate a serious stand at the Yalu. The idea was to retire gradually, drawing the j.a.panese into Manchuria towards the railway, and engaging them in the exceedingly difficult country crowned by the Motien Mountains.

But at the last moment General Kuropatkin, Russian commander-in-chief in Manchuria, issued orders to General Sa.s.sulitch, commander of the Second Siberian Army Corps, to hold the line of the Yalu with all his strength. Sa.s.sulitch could muster for this purpose only five regiments and one battalion of infantry; forty field-guns; eight machine-guns, and some Cossacks--twenty thousand combatants, approximately. Kuroki disposed his troops so that their front extended some twenty miles along the Yalu, the centre being at Kiuliencheng, a walled town standing about 180 feet above the river.

From this point southward, the right, or Manchurian, bank has a considerable command over the left, and at Kiuliencheng a tributary stream, called the Ai, joins the main river, "which thenceforth widens from 4000 to 7000 yards and runs in three channels between the islands and the mainland. The central channel is navigable by small craft, and the other channels are fordable waist-deep. The Ai River is also fordable in many places during the spring." On the right bank of the Yalu, at the point of its junction with the Ai, the ground rises so as to command the position taken by the Russians.

The plan of the j.a.panese commander was to threaten an attack on the lower radius of the river; to throw two divisions against Kiuliencheng, and to use the remaining division in a wide flanking movement, crossing the river higher up. The battle took place on Sunday, the 1st of May. During the preceding nights, the j.a.panese placed a strong force of artillery in cleverly masked batteries, and under cover of these guns, threw seven bridges across the river, the highest upstream being thirteen miles above Kiuliencheng and the lower two being directed to the centre of the Russian position.

General Kuroki then telegraphed to Tokyo that he proposed to attack at dawn on Sunday, his plan being to march one division across the fords of the Ai River, and to employ the other two, one in crumpling up the Russian left, the other in attacking Antung, where a large Russian force was in position. This programme was accurately carried out. The j.a.panese infantry forded the Ai breast-deep, and, swarming up the heights, drove the Russians from these strong positions.

Meanwhile, the j.a.panese guards' division had crossed on the left and directed its march upon Antung, while the remaining division had completely turned the Russian left flank. The fiercest struggle occurred at Homutang, where a Russian regiment and a battery of artillery made a splendid stand to save their comrades at Antung from being cut off.

The casualties on the j.a.panese side were 318 killed, including five officers, and 783 wounded, including thirty-three officers. The Russian casualties numbered 1363 killed and 613 prisoners, but the detail of wounded was not published. The j.a.panese captured twenty-one quick-firing field-guns, eight machine-guns, 1021 rifles and a quant.i.ty of ammunition, etc. The moral result of this battle can hardly be overestimated. It had never been seriously believed in Europe that a Russian army could be conquered by a j.a.panese in a fair fight, and probably that incredulity influenced Kuropatkin when he ordered Sa.s.sulitch to defy strategical principles by attempting to hold a radically defective position against a greatly superior force.

In a moment, the j.a.panese were crowned with military laurels and placed on a pedestal for the world to admire. But the j.a.panese themselves were not deceived. They saw clearly that the contest had been between six battalions of Russians and two divisions of j.a.panese, a disparity of strength amply sufficient to account for the result in any circ.u.mstances.

NAVAL OPERATIONS

During the period of eleven weeks immediately subsequent to the battle of the Yalu, there were no military operations of a striking character. j.a.pan was preparing to despatch a second army to Manchuria, and pending its shipment the chief duty to be discharged devolved upon the fleet, namely, the further crippling of the Port Arthur squadron in order to secure the transports against its enterprises. The object was promoted on the 13th of April by the loss of the Russian battle-ship Petropavlovsk. She struck one of the mines laid by the j.a.panese and sank in a few minutes, carrying the Russian admiral, Makaroff, together with about six hundred sailors, to the bottom.

This event, although it materially weakened the Port Arthur squadron, had nothing to do with the fixed programme of Admiral Togo, which programme was to block the narrow channel forming the entrance of Port Arthur by sinking merchant vessels in the fairway. Three attempts to accomplish this were made. The first was on February 24th; the second, on March 2nd-3rd. In the first essay, five steamers were employed, their crews consisting of seventy-seven volunteers.

They failed. On the second occasion four steamers of at least two thousand tons each were sent in under the orders of Commander Hirose.

On this occasion, again, the steamers failed to reach vital points in the channel, and their experience alone remained to compensate the loss of many lives. These two attempts were watched by the public with keen interest and high admiration. The courage and coolness displayed by officers and men alike elicited universal applause. But it was generally believed that the successful prosecution of such a design was impossible and that no further essay would be made. The j.a.panese, however, are not easily deterred. On the night of May 2nd, eight steamers, aggregating some 17,000 tons, were driven into the channel in the face of mines, batteries, and torpedoes, and five of them reached their allotted positions, so that the blocking of the harbour for the pa.s.sage of large vessels was accomplished. The list of casualties proved very heavy. Out of 159 persons only eight officers and thirty-six men returned unhurt. The whole of the remainder, including twenty officers, were killed, wounded, or missing.

LANDING OF THE SECOND ARMY

On the very night after the accomplishment of this third blocking operation, a second j.a.panese army commenced to land at Pitszewo, eastward of the Liaotung peninsula. This was precisely the point chosen for a similar purpose by the j.a.panese in the war with China, ten years previously, and such close adherence to the former programme was condemned by some critics, especially as transports cannot get close to the sh.o.r.e at Pitszewo, but have to lie four miles distant, the intervening s.p.a.ce consisting, for the most part, of mud flats. But the j.a.panese were perfectly familiar with every inch of the coast from the mouth of the Yalu to Port Arthur, and had the Russian commanders possessed equally accurate knowledge, they would have recognized that Pitszewo was designated by natural features as the best available landing-place, and knowing that, they might have made effective dispositions to oppose the j.a.panese there, whereas ten thousand men had been put on sh.o.r.e before any suspicion seems to have been roused in the Russian camp.

BATTLE OF KINCHOU

After its landing at Pitszewo, on May 5th and the following days, the Second j.a.panese Army, consisting of three divisions under General (afterwards Count) Oku, pushed westward, driving away the Russian detachments in the vicinity and securing the control of the Port Arthur railway. Then, at Kinchou, on the 26th of May, a great battle was fought. A little south of Kinchou lies a narrow neck of land connecting the Kw.a.n.gtung promontory with the mainland. It is a neck only a mile and three-quarters broad, having Kinchou Bay on the northwest and Hand Bay on the southeast. On each side the ground near the sea is low, but along the centre of the neck a ridge rises, which culminates in a point about 350 feet above the sea. This point is known as Nanshan, and its commanding position is such that an army holding it blocks all access to the Kw.a.n.gtung peninsula.

The problem for the j.a.panese was to obtain possession of this neck as the sole road of access to Port Arthur; while General Stossel, who commanded the Russian troops, knew that if the neck fell into j.a.panese hands, Port Arthur would become unapproachable by land. "The Nanshan position offered unusual advantages for defence, and had been diligently prepared for permanent occupation during many weeks. Ten forts of semi-permanent character had been built, and their armament showed that, on this occasion, the Russian artillery was vastly superior, both in calibre and in range, to the j.a.panese guns. Forts, trenches, and rifle-pits, covered by mines and wire entanglements, were constructed on every point of vantage and in separate tiers.

Searchlights were also employed, and every advantage was taken of the proximity of a great fortress and its ample plant."*

*The War in the Far East, by the Military Correspondent of "The Times."

It will occur to the reader that war-vessels might have been advantageously used for the attack and defence of such a position, and, as a matter of fact, Russian gunboats manoeuvred in Hand Bay on the southeastern sh.o.r.e of the neck. But, on the western side, the shoal waters of Kinchou Bay prevented access by j.a.panese vessels in the face of the heavy batteries erected by the Russians on dominating sites. This splendid position was held by a Russian army mustering ten thousand strong with fifty siege-guns and sixteen quick-firers. A frontal attack seemed suicidal but was deliberately chosen. At daybreak the battle commenced, and, after sixteen hours of incessant fighting, a j.a.panese infantry force turned the left flank of the Russian line and the day was won. Over seven hundred Russian dead were buried by the j.a.panese, and into the latter's hands fell sixty-eight cannon of all calibres with ten machine-guns. The j.a.panese casualties totalled 4912.

This battle finally solved the problem as to whether j.a.panese infantry could hold its own against Russian. "With almost everything in its favour, a strong, fresh, and confident Russian army, solidly entrenched behind almost inaccessible fortifications and supported by a formidable and superior artillery, was, in a single day, fairly swept out of its trenches."* The victorious j.a.panese pressed forward rapidly, and on the 30th of May obtained possession of Dalny, a base presenting incalculable advantages for the prosecution of an attack upon Port Arthur, which fortress it was now evident that the j.a.panese had determined to capture.

*The War in the Far East, by the Military Correspondent of "The Times."

THE BATTLE OF TELISSU

To have left the j.a.panese in undisturbed possession of the neck of the Liaotung peninsula would have been to abandon Port Arthur to its fate. On the other hand, the Russians ought not to have entertained any hope of their own ability to carry such a position by a.s.sault after they had signally failed to hold it in the face of attack.

Nevertheless, finding it intolerable, alike to their prestige and to their sense of camaraderie, to take no measure in behalf of the great fortress and its thirty thousand defenders, they determined to march at once to its a.s.sistance. To that end celerity was all important, and on June 14th, that is to say, only eighteen days after the battle of Kinchou, a Russian army of some thirty-five thousand combatants, under the command of General Baron Stackelberg, moving down the railway to recover Kinchou and Nanshan, came into collision with the j.a.panese and fought the battle of Telissu. The Russian general, clinging always to the railway, advanced with such a restricted front that the j.a.panese, under General Oku, outflanked him, and he was driven back with a loss of about ten thousand, killed and wounded, fourteen guns, and four hundred prisoners.

NAVAL INCIDENTS

On June 15th, the very day after the Telissu victory, the j.a.panese met their only naval catastrophe. While their fleet was watching the enemy off Port Arthur, the battleships Hatsuse and Yashima struck mines and sank immediately. Moreover, on the same day, the cruisers Kasuga and Yoshino collided in a dense fog, and the latter vessel was sent to the bottom. As the j.a.panese possessed only six battle-ships, the loss of two was a serious blow, and might have emboldened the Russians to despatch a squadron from the Baltic to take the earliest possible advantage of this incident. Foreseeing this, the j.a.panese took care to conceal the loss of the Hatsuse and Yashima, and the fact did not become known until after the battle of Tsushima, a year later, when the Russian fleet had been practically annihilated.

Meanwhile, the Russian squadron at Vladivostok had accomplished little. This squadron consisted originally of three armoured cruisers, Gromovoi, Rossia, and Rurik, with one protected cruiser, Bogatyr. But the last-named ship ran on a rock near Vladivostok and became a total wreck in the middle of May, a month marked by many heavy losses. These cruisers made several excursions into the Sea of j.a.pan, sinking or capturing a few j.a.panese merchantmen, and cleverly evading a j.a.panese squadron under Admiral Kamimura, detailed to watch them. But their only achievement of practical importance was the destruction of two large j.a.panese transports, the Hitachi Maru and the Sado Maru. In achieving this feat the Russians appeared off Tsushima in the Straits of Korea, on June 15th, and the transports which they sunk or disabled carried heavy guns for the bombardment of Port Arthur.

Of course, nothing was publicly known about the cargo of the Hitachi and her consort, but there could be no question that, in timing their attack with such remarkable accuracy, the Russians must have obtained secret information as to the movements of the transports and the nature of their cargo. Considerable criticism was uttered against Admiral Kamimura for failure to get into touch with the Vladivostok vessels during such a long interval. But much of the censure was superficial. Kamimura redeemed his reputation on the 14th of August when, in a running fight between Fusan and Vladivostok, the Rurik was sunk and the Gromovoi and Rossia were so seriously damaged as to be unable to take any further part in the war. On this occasion six hundred Russians were rescued by the j.a.panese from the sinking Rurik, and it was noted at the time that the Russians had made no attempt to save j.a.panese life at the sinking of the Hitachi Maru.

THE j.a.pANESE FORCES

Immediately after the landing of the army corps under General Oku and the capture of Dalny in the sequel of the battle of Kinchou, the j.a.panese began to pour troops into Dalny, and soon they had there three divisions under the command of General (afterwards Count) Nogi.

This force was henceforth known as the Third Army, that of General Kuroki being the First, and that under General Oku, the Second. The next operation was to land another army at Takushan, which lies on the south coast of Manchuria, between Pitszewo and the estuary of the Yalu. This army was under the command of General (afterwards Count) Nozu, and its purpose was to fill the gap between the First Army and the Second. Nozu's corps thus became the Fourth Army. In fact, the j.a.panese repeated, in every respect, the plan of campaign pursued by them ten years previously in the war with China.

There was one ultimate difference, however. In the latter war, the force which captured Port Arthur was subsequently carried oversea to the Shantung province, where it a.s.saulted and took the great Chinese naval port at Weihaiwei. But the army sent against Port Arthur, in 1904, was intended to march up the Liaotung peninsula after the capture of the fortress, so, as to fall into line with the other three armies and to manoeuvre on their left flank during the general advance northward. Thus considered, the plan of campaign suggests that General Nogi and his three divisions were expected to capture Port Arthur without much delay, and indeed their early operations against the fortress were conducted on that hypothesis. But, as a matter of fact, in spite of heroic efforts and unlimited bravery on the j.a.panese side, Port Arthur, with its garrison of thirty thousand men, its splendid fortifications, and its powerful artillery, backed by the indomitable resolution and stubborn resistance of Russian soldiers, did not fall until the last day of 1904, and Nogi's army was unable to take part in the great field-battles which marked the advance of the three other j.a.panese armies from the seacoast to the capital of Manchuria.

Step by step, however, though at heavy sacrifice of life, the j.a.panese fought their way through the outer lines of the Russian defences, and the end of July saw the besiegers in such a position that they were able to mount guns partly commanding the anchorage within the port. An intolerable situation being thus created for the Russian squadron, it determined to put to sea, and on August 10th this was attempted. Without entering into details of the fight that ensued, it will suffice to state briefly that the result of the sortie was to deprive the Russian squadron of the services of one battle-ship, three cruisers, and five torpedo craft, leaving to Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtonsky, who commanded the vessels in Port Arthur, only five battle-ships, two cruisers (of which one was injured), and three destroyers. On August 18th, a gunboat; on August 23d, another battle-ship, and on August 24th another destroyer were sunk or disabled by striking j.a.panese mines, and it may be said briefly that the Russian squadron thenceforth ceased to be a menace to the j.a.panese, and that only the land forces had to be counted with.

FIELD OPERATIONS PRIOR TO BATTLE OF LIAOYANG

By the close of June the three j.a.panese armies under Generals Kuroki, Nozu, and Oku were fully deployed and ready to advance in unison. The task before them was to clear the Russians from the littoral of the Korean Sea and force them through the mountains of Manchuria into the valley of the Liao River. In these operations the j.a.panese acted uniformly on the offensive, whereas the Russians occupied positions carefully chosen and strictly fortified, where they stood always on the defensive. Five heavy engagements, beginning with Fenshuiling on the 26th of June and ending with Yangtzuling on July 31st, were fought in these circ.u.mstances, and in every instance the j.a.panese emerged victorious. From the commencement of the land campaign until the end of July the invading army's casualties were 12,000, while the Russian losses, exclusive of those at Port Arthur, aggregated 28,000 killed and wounded, and 113 light siege-and field-guns, together with eighteen machine-guns, captured.

THE BATTLE OF LIAOYANG

The first great phase of the field-operations may be said to have terminated with the battle of Liaoyang, which commenced on August 25th and continued almost without interruption for nine days, terminating on the 3rd of September. In this historic contest the Russians had 220,000 men engaged. They were deployed over a front of about forty miles, every part of which had been entrenched and fortified with the utmost care and ingenuity. In fact, the position seemed impregnable, and as the j.a.panese could muster only some 200,000 men for the attack, their chances of success appeared very small. Desperate fighting ensued, but no sensible impression could be made on the Russian lines, and finally, as a last resource, a strong force of Kuroki's army was sent across the Taitsz River to turn the enemy's left flank. The Russian general, Kuropatkin, rightly estimated that the troops detached by General Kuroki for this purpose were not commensurate with the task a.s.signed to them, whereas the Russians could meet this flanking movement with overwhelming strength. Therefore, Kuropatkin sent three army corps across the river, and by September 1st, the j.a.panese flanking forces were confronted by a powerful body.