(6) Sasaki Takayori 16,872

(7) Hatakeyama Yoshmari 16,801

(8) Sasaki Mochikiyo 16,725

If we examine the list still more minutely, we find no less than twenty-two families, each of whose estates was equal to, or larger than, one-half of the Muromachi manors. Some families consisted of several branches whose aggregate properties represented an immense area. This was notably the case of the Yamana; their five branches held lands totalling 45,788 cho. The owners of such estates must not be confounded with the high constables (shugo). Thus Yamana Sozen, as the high constable of Harima province, held administrative authority in fourteen districts covering an area of 10,414 cho, and if to this be added the expanse of his fief, namely, 8016 cho, we get a total nearly equal to the manors of Hosokawa Katsumoto. Again, Shiba Yos.h.i.toshi, in addition to owning 10,816 cho, officiated as tandai of Kyushu, which gave him jurisdiction over another extent of 106,553 cho, though it is true that his authority was defied in the provinces of Satsuma and Osumi. The military owner of one of these great estates levied a revenue on a scale which will be presently discussed, but the high constable was nominally empowered to collect and transmit only such taxes as were payable to the Bakufu, namely, the "military dues" (buke-yaku) and the "farmers' dues"

(hyakusho-yaku), whereof the former were originally a.s.sessed at two per cent., and subsequently raised to five per cent., of a family income; and the latter varied from one to two per cent, of a homestead's earnings. So long as a high constable or a tandai was loyal to the Bakufu, the latter received the appointed quota of imposts; but in times of insurrection, the shugo or tandai appropriated to his own purposes the proceeds alike of the buke-yaku and the hyakusho-yaku.

Not merely inequalities of wealth operated to produce political unrest. It has also to be noted that each great military family supported a body of armed retainers whose services were at all times available; further, we must remember that the long War of the Dynasties had educated a wide-spread spirit of fighting, which the debility of the Ashikaga Bakufu encouraged to action. The Onin disturbance had its origin in disputes about inheritance. It has been recorded that the high post of kwanryo (governor-general) in the Muromachi polity was filled by a member of one of three families, the Hosokawa, the Hatakeyama, and the Shiba. The Hosokawa were the most powerful, and had for representative in the middle of the fifteenth century an administrator, Katsumoto, who to extensive erudition and a profound knowledge of medicine added very exceptional gifts of statecraft and organizing ability. The Hatakeyama had for head Mochikuni, called also Tokuhon, a man of parts; and it happened that the rival family of Yamana was led by Mochitoyo, or Sozen, who, on account of his powerful physique, shaved head, and peculiar complexion, sometimes received the name of the "Red Monk"

(Aka-nyudo).

Tokuhon being without a legitimate son, adopted his nephew, Masanaga, but subsequently desired to secure the succession to Yoshinari, a son borne to him by a concubine. This change was not viewed with equanimity by all the va.s.sals of Tokuhon, and to solve the problem the latter appealed to the shogun, Yoshimasa, who authorized the death of Masanaga. Tokuhon, in his capacity of kwanryo, naturally had much weight with the shogun, but Yoshimasa's conduct on that occasion must be attributed mainly to a laisser-aller mood which he had then developed, and which impelled him to follow the example set by the Imperial Court in earlier times by leaving the military families in the provinces to fight their own battles. Masanaga sought succour from Hosokawa Katsumoto, and that magnate, welcoming the opportunity of avenging an old injury at the hands of the Hatakeyama, laid siege to the mansion of Tokuhon, who barely escaped with his life, his son, Yoshinari, fleeing to the fortress of Wakae, in Kawachi, whence he was presently driven by the forces of Katsumoto and Sozen, then acting in conjunction but destined afterwards to become bitter enemies.

The shogun, true to his complacent policy, now recognized Masanaga as head of the house of Hatakeyama, Tokuhon having just died (1455). But Yoshinari did not acquiesce. In 1456, he marched with a Kawachi army against Masanaga, and a deadly struggle was barely prevented by the intervention of the shogun. Thenceforth, the Hatakeyama became divided into two families, Masanaga's branch being the more powerful, but Yoshinari obtaining favour at Muromachi and being nominated kwanryo. Owing, however, to some petty causes, the shogun's good-will was subsequently estranged, and Yoshinari had to flee from Kyoto, pursued by Masanaga, who now held a commission from Muromachi to kill him. A seven-years' fight (1460-1467) ensued in Kawachi and Yamato.

Yoshinari displayed greatly superior skill as a strategist, and finally Yamana Sozen, who had always entertained a good opinion of him even while opposing his succession at the outset, openly espoused Yoshinari's cause. The immediate result was that Masanaga, who had been named kwanryo in 1464, had to give way to SOzen's nominee, Shiba Yoshikado, and found himself in deadly peril.

It is necessary here to recall the murder of the shogun Yoshinori, in 1441. That crime had resulted in the fall of the Akamatsu family, the direct agent of its overthrow being the united forces of Hosokawa, Takeda, and Yamana. There were no bonds of genuine friendship between the Hosokawa chief, Katsumoto, and Yamana Sozen. Their union was primarily due to Katsumoto's ambition. He desired to break the power of Hatakeyama Tokuhon, and with that ultimate object he courted the alliance of Sozen, giving his own daughter to the latter in marriage and himself adopting Sozen's son, Koretoyo. Thus, the two chiefs were subsequently found acting together against Tokuhon's attempt to subst.i.tute his son, albeit illegitimate, for his nephew, as heir to the Hatakeyama estates. Neither Katsumoto nor Sozen cared anything about the succession itself. Their object was simply to crush the Hatakeyama; and Sozen, who never relied on argument where force was applicable, lost no time in attacking Tokuhon and driving him from his burning mansion, as has been already stated. From the legal consequences of that violence, Sozen was saved by Katsumoto's intercession at Muromachi, and the alliance (1454) between the Hosokawa and the Yamana seemed stronger than ever. But Sozen did not greatly trust his crafty ally, with whose gifts of political strategy he was well acquainted. He suspected Katsumoto of a design to restore the fortunes of the once powerful Akamatsu family, and he began to muster forces for the great struggle which he antic.i.p.ated. Therefore it was that, in 1467, as shown above, he not only espoused the cause of Hatakeyama Yoshinari, in whom he recognized an able captain, but also championed Shiba Yoshikado.

With regard to this latter, it is necessary to recognize that he also figured in a succession dispute. The great family of Shiba being without a direct heir, a relative was appointed to the headship in 1452. This successor, Yos.h.i.toshi, attempting to enforce the acquiescence of one of his va.s.sals, was defeated and became a fugitive, a successor, Yoshikado, being nominated by the Shiba va.s.sals. But a sister of the fugitive subsequently married the shogun's favourite, Ise Sadachika, and through her influence the shogun was induced (1466) to recall Yos.h.i.toshi and to declare him rightful head of the Shiba family. Yamana Sozen, who had given his daughter in marriage to Yos.h.i.toshi's rival, Yoshikado, immediately set a powerful army in motion for Kyoto, and the alarmed shogun (Yoshimasa) not only recognized Yoshikado and drove out Yos.h.i.toshi, but also nominated the former to be kwanryo.

From this grievously complicated story the facts which emerge essentially and conspicuously are: first, that Yamana Sozen now occupied the position of champion to representatives of the two great families of Hatakeyama and Shiba; secondly, that the rival successors of these families looked to Hosokawa Katsumoto for aid; thirdly, that the relations between Sozen and Katsumoto had become very strained, and fourthly, that the issue at stake in every case was never more lofty than personal ambition.. The succession to the shogunate also was in dispute. Yoshimasa, being childless, desired to adopt as his heir his younger brother who had entered religion under the name of Gijin. The latter declined the honour until Yoshimasa swore that were a son subsequently born to him, it should be made a priest but never a shogun. Gijin then took the name of Yoshimi, and was for a time recognized as heir-apparent, Hosokawa Katsumoto being appointed manager (s.h.i.tsuji). Presently, however, the shogun's consort, Tomi, gave birth to a boy, Yoshihisa, and the mother persuaded Yoshimasa to contrive that her son should supplant the sometime priest. Of necessity, the aid of Sozen was sought to accomplish this scheme, Katsumoto being already officially attached to Yoshimi. The Yamana chief readily a.s.sented, and thus the situation received its final element, a claimant whose right rested on a deliberately violated oath.

THE ONIN WAR

By the close of 1466, the two great protagonists, Katsumoto and Sozen, had quietly collected in Kyoto armies estimated at 160,000 and 110,000 men, respectively. The shogun attempted to limit the area of disturbance by ordering that the various rival inheritors should be left to fight their own battles, and by announcing that whoever struck the first blow in their behalf would be proclaimed a rebel.

Such injunctions were powerless, however, to restrain men like Sozen.

In February, 1467, his followers attacked the former kwanryo, Hatakeyama Masanaga, and drove him from the capital. Katsumoto made no move, however; he remained on the watch, confident that thus the legitimacy of his cause would obtain recognition. In fact, the shogun was actually under guard of the Hosokawa troops, who, being encamped on the east and north of Muromachi, received the name of the Eastern Army; the Yamana forces, which were ma.s.sed on the west and south, being distinguished as the Western Army.

It was evident that if either side retreated, the other would perforce be acknowledged by the Bakufu, and both were reluctant to put their fortunes to the final test. At length, early in July, 1467, a petty skirmish precipitated a general engagement. It was inconclusive, and the att.i.tude of mutual observation was resumed. Two months later re-enforcements reached the Western Army, and thereafter, for nearly two years, victory rested with the Yamana. But Katsumoto clung desperately to his position. Kyoto was reduced almost completely to ruins, the Imperial palace, Buddhist temples, and other mansions being laid in ashes, countless rare works of art being destroyed, and the Court n.o.bles and other civil officials being compelled to flee to the provinces for shelter. A celebrated poet of the time said that the evening lark soared over moors where formerly there had been palaces, and in the Onin Records it is stated that the metropolis became a den for foxes and wolves, and that Imperial mandates and religious doctrines were alike unheeded.

At one time things looked as though the ultimate triumph must be with Sozen. But what Katsumoto lacked in military ability he more than compensated in statecraft. From the outset he took care to legalize his cause by inducing the Emperor and the ex-Emperor to remove to Muromachi, where they were guarded by the Hosokawa troops, and the defections to which this must ultimately expose Sozen's ranks were supplemented by fomenting in the domains of the Yamana and their allies intrigues which necessitated a diversion of strength from the Kyoto campaign. Curious and intricate was the att.i.tude of the Hosokawa towards the rival aspirants to the shogunate. Sozen's aid, as related above, had originally been invoked and exercised in behalf of Yoshimasa, the shogun's son by the lady Tomi.

Hence, it is not surprising to find the Yamana leader turning his back upon the sometime bonze, Yoshimi, in October, 1469. But it is surprising to see him openly espouse this same Yoshimi's cause two months later. The fact was that Sozen might not choose. He had been outmanoeuvered by his astute opponent, who now held complete control of the shogun, and who not only obtained an Imperial decree depriving Yoshimi of his offices, but also contrived that, early in 1469, the lady Tomi's four-year-old son, Yoshihisa, should be officially declared heir to the shogunate. In this matter, Katsumoto's volte-face had been nearly as signal as Sozen's, for the former was Yoshimi's champion at the beginning. Henceforth the war a.s.sumed the character of a struggle for the succession to the shogunate. The crude diplomacy of the Yamana leader was unable to devise any effective reply to the spectacular pageant of two sovereigns, a shogun, and a duly-elected heir to the shogunate all marshalled on the Hosokawa side. Nothing better was conceived than a revival of the Southern dynasty, which had ceased to be an active factor seventy-eight years previously. But this farce did little service to the cause of the Yamana. By degrees the hostile forces withdrew from the capital, of which the western half (called Saikyo) alone remained intact, and the strategy of the hostile leaders became concerned chiefly about preserving their own commissariat or depriving the enemy of his.

In 1472, a new feature was introduced: Hatakeyama joined the Eastern Army by order of the shogun, Yoshimasa. This was not merely a great accession of numerical strength, it also opened the road to the north where the Hatakeyama estates lay, and thus the Eastern Army found a solution of the problem which dominated the situation at Kyoto--the problem of provisions. The scale of success now swung in the direction of Hosokawa and his allies. But still no crushing victory was won, and meanwhile the war had continued seven years, with immense loss of life and treasure. There is evidence that alike Katsumoto and Sozen were fain to sheathe the sword in 1472, but during the long struggle conditions had developed which rendered peace difficult. In May, 1473, Sozen died and was followed to the grave in less than a month by Katsumoto. Still the struggle went on in a desultory way until December, 1477, when the Yamana forces burned their cantonments and withdrew, Yoshimi coming to terms with Muromachi and retiring to Mino. Peace at length dawned for Kyoto. But not yet for the provinces. There the sword was not immediately sheathed. In Echizen, Owari, and Totomi the great Shiba family was subjected to weakening onsets by the Asakura, the Oda, and the Imagawa. In Kaga, the Togashi house was divided against itself. In Kyushu there were bitter struggles between the Shimazu and the Ito, the Sagara and the Nawa, and the Otomo, the Shoni, and the Ouchi.

Finally, Shinano, Suruga, and Mikawa were all more or less convulsed.

YOSHIHISA

In 1474, Yoshimasa retired from office and, at the close of the year, his nine-year-old son, Yoshihisa, succeeded him as shogun, the kwanryo being that Hatakeyama Yoshinari whose appearance in the field practically terminated the Onin War. The shogun Yoshimasa was in his thirty-ninth year at the time of this abdication, and he survived for sixteen years, not the least dissipated of his life, in which he inst.i.tuted costly art reunions and carried self-indulgence to its extreme. During these years Tomi and her younger brother, Ise Sadachika, acquired such influence as to interfere in the administration, and under the pretext of procuring funds to rebuild the palace destroyed during the Onin War, they restored the toll-gates which had previously stood at the seven chief entrances to Kyoto, appropriating all the proceeds.

The young Yoshihisa could scarcely fail to be tainted by such an environment. Much to his credit, however, he showed sagacity and diligence, eschewing his father's luxurious habits, studying literature and military art, and taking lessons in statecraft from the ex-regent, Ichijo Kaneyoshi. Very early he became familiar with scenes of violence, for, goaded to madness by the taxes exacted at the seven toll-gates, a mob of the metropolitan citizens rose in arms, beat off the troops sent to quell them and threatened to sack the city, when, they were appeased by the issue of a tokusei ordinance, which, as already explained, meant the remission of all debts and the cancellation of all financial obligations. Socialism in such a genial form appealed not only to the ma.s.ses but also to bushi who had pledged their property as security for loans to meet warlike outlays or the demands of luxurious extravagance.

Alike in the home provinces and in distant Kaga, Noto, Etchu, and the south, tokusei riots took place. Notably incompatible with any efficient exercise of Muromachi authority was the independence which the provincial magnates had now learned to display. They levied what taxes they pleased; employed the proceeds as seemed good to them; enacted and administered their own laws; made war or peace as they wished, and granted estates or revenues to their va.s.sals at will. In short, the bushi had gradually constructed for themselves a full suit of feudal garments, and to bring them once again under the effective control of the sovereign or the shogun was almost a hopeless task.

Yoshihisa might perhaps have refrained from attempting it had the empire been at peace. But, in truth, the empire was on the threshold of a century-long struggle compared with which the Onin War proved a bagatelle. The mutterings of the coming storm made themselves very audible during the years of Yoshihisa's early manhood. The Uesugi septs, and the Hojo and the Satomi, were fighting in the Kwanto; the western provinces, the central provinces, and Kyushu were the scenes of constant conflicts, and no prospect of tranquillity presented itself. Yoshihisa determined to undertake the work of subjugating the whole country as Yoritomo had done effectually and as Takauji had done partially. But he died in his twenty-fifth year when engaged in conducting a campaign against the Rokkaku branch of the Sasaki family, in Omi province; a campaign which but for his death would certainly have been successful.

YOs.h.i.tANE

Yoshihisa, whose death took place in 1489, left no son, and his father, the ex-shogun Yoshimasa, made tardy atonement to his brother, Yoshimi, the sometime priest, by obtaining the high office of shogun for the latter's son, Yos.h.i.tane, a youth of twenty-five. In the following year Yoshimasa died, and, two years later (1492), Yos.h.i.tane placed himself at the head of an army to resume the Omi campaign which Yoshihisa's death had interrupted. His opponent was of Minamoto lineage, head of the Rokkaku branch of the Sasaki family, whose representative in the days of the Kamakura Bakufu had been high constable of four provinces, Omi, Izumo, Aki, and Iwami.

That the shogun, Yoshihisa, and his successor, Yos.h.i.tane, turned their weapons so resolutely against this magnate was due to a cause ill.u.s.trative of the abuses of the era. From the outset the Ashikaga sway over the provinces had been a vanishing quant.i.ty, and had disappeared almost entirely during the Onin War. Not alone did the writ of the sovereign or the shogun cease to run in regions outside Kyoto and its immediate vicinity, but also the taxes, though duly collected, did not find their way to the coffers of either Muromachi or the Court. Shugo there still existed, and jito and kokushi; but neither high constable nor land-steward nor civil governor acted as practical representative of any Central Government: each functioned for his own hand, swallowing up for his own use, or for inclusion in some local fief, the manors which had once been the property of the State or of the Court n.o.bility.

It was evidently of prime necessity from the Muromachi point of view that a state of affairs which crippled the shogun by impoverishing him should be remedied. Sasaki Takayori, head of the Rokkaku house, was a conspicuous product of his time. He had seized the manors of nearly fifty landowners in the province of Omi, and to punish his aggressions signally would furnish a useful object lesson. That was done effectually by Yos.h.i.tane's generals, and Sasaki had to flee from Omi. But the young shogun's triumph was short lived. He allowed himself to be drawn by Hatakeyama Masanaga into a private feud. We have already seen this Masanaga engaged with Yoshinari in a struggle for the Hatakeyama succession on the eve of the Onin War. Yoshinari was no longer alive, but he had bequeathed to his son, Yos.h.i.toyo, a heritage of resentment against Masanaga, and the latter, who now held the post of kwanryo for the fourth time, induced the shogun to order an attack upon Yos.h.i.toyo in the provinces of Kii and Kawachi. But Yos.h.i.toyo managed to enlist the aid of the recently discomfited Sasaki, of the soldier-monks of Kof.u.ku-ji, and, above all, of Hosokawa Masamoto, son of Hatakeyama Masanaga's old opponent, Hosokawa Katsumoto. With these co-operated the Yamana, the Isshiki, and other septs, so that Yos.h.i.tane found himself between two powerful armies, one in Kyoto, the other in Kii. In the sequel, Masanaga committed suicide, and the shogun, Yos.h.i.tane, escaped to Suwo.

YOSHIZUMI AND YOSHIHARU

Hosokawa Masamoto was now master of the situation in Kyoto. It was for him to nominate a new shogun in lieu of the fugitive Yos.h.i.tane.

He went to the Kwanto for a candidate. In 1461, Masatomo, brother of Yoshimasa, had been nominated governor-general (kwanryo) of the eight eastern provinces. His son, Yoshizumi, was chosen by Hosokawa to rule at Muromachi, and Hosokawa himself became kwanryo. The new shogun held office in name only; all administrative power was usurped by the kwanryo and his nominees. Now, as Hosokawa Masamoto practised asceticism for the better pursuit of necromancy, in which he was a believer, he had no offspring. Therefore he adopted three sons: the first, Sumiyuki, being the child of the regent, Fujiwara Masamoto; the second and third, Sumimoto and Takakuni, being kinsmen of his own. The first of these three was entrusted to Kasai Motochika; the last two were placed in the care of Miyoshi Nagateru. These guardians were Hosokawa's princ.i.p.al va.s.sals in Shikoku, where they presently became deadly rivals. Motochika, believing that Hosokawa's ultimate intention was to elevate Sumimoto to the shogunate, in which event the latter's guardian, Nagateru, would obtain a large access of power, compa.s.sed the murder of Hosokawa, the kwanryo, and proclaimed Sumiyuki head of the Hosokawa house. Thereupon Miyoshi Nagateru moved up from Shikoku at the head of a strong army, and, after a fierce conflict, Motochika and Sumiyuki were killed, and Sumimoto, then in his eleventh year, became chief of the Hosokawa family, receiving also the office of kwanryo.

The Motochika faction, however, though defeated, were not destroyed.

They conceived the plan of reinstating the shogun, Yos.h.i.tane, then a fugitive in the province of Suwo, and of securing the office of kwanryo for Takakuni, third son (by adoption) of the late Hosokawa Masamoto. The powerful Ouchi sept, which had its manors in Suwo, espoused the conspiracy, and escorted Yos.h.i.tane to Kyoto with a great army, the result being that the shogun, Yoshizumi, had to flee to Omi; that Yos.h.i.tane took his place, and that Ouchi Yoshioki became deputy kwanryo.

These things happened in 1508. Thenceforth, the great protagonists in the Kyoto arena were the two factions of the Hosokawa house, led by Sumimoto and Takakuni, respectively; the former championing the cause of the shogun, Yoshizumi, and in alliance with the Miyoshi; the latter supporting the shogun, Yos.h.i.tane, and aided by the Ouchi. One reverse befell the Yos.h.i.tane-Ouchi combination, but they quickly recovered from it, and from 1508 until 1518 a gleam of peace and prosperity shone once more in Kyoto under the administration of Ouchi Yoshioki, who governed with skill and impartiality, and whose influence seemed likely to restore the best days of the Bakufu. But, in 1518, he was recalled to his province by an attack from the shugo of Izumo, and by financial embarra.s.sment resulting from his own generosity in supplying funds to the Crown and the shogun.

Hosokawa Takakuni now became kwanryo, exercising his authority with a high hand. Then the Sumimoto branch of the Hosokawa, taking advantage of Ouchi's absence, mustered a force in Shikoku and moved against Kyoto. Takakuni found himself in a difficult position. In the capital his overbearing conduct had alienated the shogun, Yos.h.i.tane, and from the south a hostile army was approaching. He chose Hyogo for battle-field, and, after a stout fight, was discomfited and fled to Omi, the position of kwanryo being bestowed on his rival, Sumimoto, by the shogun. In a few months, however, Takakuni, in alliance with the Rokkaku branch of the Sasaki family under Sadayori, marched into Kyoto in overwhelming force. Miyoshi Nagateru retired to Chion-in, where he committed suicide; Sumimoto fled to Awa, dying there a few months later, and Yos.h.i.tane, after brief refuge in the island of Awaji, died in Awa, in 1523. Thus, Hosokawa Takakuni found himself supreme in Kyoto, and he proceeded to appoint a shogun, without awaiting the demise of Yos.h.i.tane. Yoshizumi, the eleventh shogun, who, as related above, fled from Kyoto in 1508, dying three years later in exile, left two sons: Yoshiharu, whom he committed to the charge of Akamatsu Yoshimura, and Yoshikore, whom he entrusted to Hosokawa Sumimoto. In 1521, Takakuni invited Yoshiharu, then eleven years old, to the capital and procured his nomination to the shogunate.

ANARCHY

From this time forward the confusion grows worse confounded. The Miyoshi of Awa are found in co-operation with Yanamoto Kataharu espousing the cause of the shogun's younger brother, Yoshikore, and of Harumoto, a son of Hosokawa Sumimoto. We see this combination expelling Yoshiharu and Takakuni from Kyoto, and we see the fugitives vainly essaying to reverse the situation. Thereafter, during several years, there is practically no government in the capital. Riot and insurrection are daily features, and brigandage prevails unchecked.

Kataharu, though not holding the office of kwanryo, usurps its functions so ostentatiously that the a.s.sa.s.sin's dagger is turned against him. Again the two Hosokawa chiefs, Takakuni and Harumoto, fight for power, and, in 1531, Takakuni is killed, Harumoto becoming supreme. Soon the Miyoshi brothers, Motonaga and Masanaga, engage in a fierce quarrel about their inheritance, and the former, with Yoshikore as candidate for the shogunate and Hatakeyama as auxiliary, raises the standard against Harumoto, who, aided by the soldier-priests of Hongwan-ji, kills both Yos.h.i.taka and Motonaga and takes Yoshikore prisoner. Thereafter, Harumoto quarrels with the Hongwan-ji bonzes, and being attacked by them, obtains the aid of Rokkaku Sadayori and the Nichiren priests, with the result that the splendid fane of Hongwan-ji is reduced to ashes. A reconciliation is then effected between Harumoto and the shogun, Yoshiharu, while Miyoshi Masanaga is appointed to high office. Yet once more the untiring Takakuni, aided by Miyoshi Norinaga, Motonaga's son, called also Chokei, drives Yoshiharu and Harumoto from the metropolis, and presently a reconciliation is effected by the good offices of Rokkaku Sadayori, the real power of the kwanryo being thenceforth exercised by the Miyoshi family. j.a.panese historians have well called it an age of anarchy.

YOs.h.i.tERU

In 1545, the shogun, Yoshiharu, resigned in favour of his son, Yos.h.i.teru. Two years of quiet ensued in Kyoto, and then the old feud broke out once more. The Hosokawa, represented by Harumoto, and the Miyoshi, by Chokei, fought for supremacy. Victory rested with the Miyoshi. The Hosokawa's power was shattered, and Chokei ruled in Kyoto through his va.s.sal, Matsunaga Hisahide. The era is memorable for the a.s.sa.s.sination of a shogun. Yos.h.i.teru had become reconciled with Chokei and was suffered to live quietly at Muromachi. But after Chokei's death (he was poisoned by Hisahide), Yos.h.i.teru's cousin, Yoshihide, a son of Yoshikore, sought to be nominated successor to the shogunate through the aid of Masanaga and Hisahide. In 1565, this plot matured. Hisahide suddenly sent a force which attacked Yos.h.i.teru's palace and killed the shogun. Yoshihide replaced the murdered potentate, and the Matsunaga family succeeded to the power previously wielded by the Miyoshi. Yos.h.i.teru's younger brother, Yoshiaki, fled to Omi, but afterwards made his way to Owari, where Oda n.o.bunaga took him by the hand and ultimately placed him in the shogun's seat at Kyoto.

REVIEW OF THE ASHIKAGA

Among the fifteen representatives of the Ashikaga, two were slain by their own va.s.sals, five died in exile, and one had to commit suicide.

From the accession of Takauji, in 1338, to the death of Yoshiaki, in 1597, a period of 259 years, there was not so much as one decade of signal success and efficient government. With justice the story of the time has been summed up in the epithet "ge-koku-jo," or the overthrow of the upper by the lower. The appreciation of the eminent historian, Rai Sanyo, is most faithful. Every great conflict throughout the era was marked by similar features. It is a weary record of broken promises, violated allegiances, and family feuds. If the Hatakeyama, the Hosokawa, and the Miyoshi set their own interests above those of the shogun, the Ashikaga, in turn, sacrificed the interests of the Throne on the altar of their own ambition. A river cannot be purer than its source. If the Miyoshi va.s.sals plotted against their chiefs, so did the latter against the Hosokawa; so did the Hosokawa against the Ashikaga; so did the Ashikaga against the Imperial family, and so did one branch of the Imperial family against another. Everywhere there was lack of loyalty.

The loyalty wanting among masters was equally deficient among servants. There is no more treacherous episode in the Middle Ages than Matsunaga Hisahide's poisoning of his liege lord to compa.s.s the downfall of the Miyoshi family and slaying the shogun, Yos.h.i.teru, to overthrow the Ashikaga, though he enjoyed the confidence of both. The Dai Nihon-rekishi (History of Great j.a.pan) observes that the ethical primers, with which a literary education had formerly familiarized the nation, lost their influence in this military era. There was no inordinate desire for landed property until the Gen-Hei epoch, when a manor became the princ.i.p.al reward of a successful soldier.

Thereafter, greed for domains acquired strength every year. Again, when Yoritomo became so-tsuihoshi (commander-in-chief) and so-jito (general steward) of the whole country, and his meritorious va.s.sals were appointed shugo and jito in each province, local authority pa.s.sed from the Throne to the military families, and when, after the Shokyu struggle, the shugo and the jito came into actual possession of the estates they had previously administered, military feudalism was practically established. The Hojo, by their just administration and astute measures, brought this system into esteem, but under the Ashikaga regime the reality of landed possession grew to be the unique aim of existence, and, to achieve it, sons forgot their paternal relation and va.s.sals lost sight of fealty. The nation engaged in an armed scramble; individualism became paramount, and social obligations were ignored. This is the more noteworthy because loyalty is so typical a j.a.panese virtue.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ASHIKAGA

The common saying that the Kamakura Bakufu brought the entire country under one administrative control requires modification. It was not until Tokugawa days in the seventeenth century that the whole sixty provinces pa.s.sed under one feudal ruler. Still as between the Kamakura Bakufu and the Muromachi, the latter, though its military supremacy was less complete, may be said to have extended its influence theoretically over the whole of the lands throughout the empire except the Chokodo estates.

In another respect, also, the advantage lay with the Muromachi shogunate. During the Kamakura era, the Court magnates continued to despise the Bakufu adherents, and the distance between the capital and Kamakura imparted to the latter an element of rusticity. But with the establishment of the Muromachi shogunate a change took place. The Bakufu, the visible repository of power, stood side by side with the Court, and opportunities for close relations existed constantly.

Moreover, the Court n.o.bles, notably antagonistic to the military regime, followed the fortunes of the Southern dynasty, those alone remaining in the capital who were on more or less intimate terms with the military. Such were the Nijo, the Saionji, the Hino, and so forth. These observed the behests of the Bakufu, sought to acquire the latter's confidence, and always paid respect to the Hana no Gosho, as the shogun was called. So close were the relations that for ceremonial purposes at the Bakufu, it was customary to employ Court officials, and witty writers of the time discourse amusingly on the often clumsy efforts made by the courtiers to ape the customs and acquire the dialects of the provincial soldiers.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL BAKUFU

The administrative power having been transferred from the Court to the Bakufu, it may be said that the sei-i tai-shogun exercised supreme authority throughout the empire. But the shogun himself did not actually discharge administrative duties. That was done by the kwanryo with the shogun's consent. Originally this official was called s.h.i.tsuji (manager), and his functions were to look after the affairs of a provincial magnate's establishment. During the Kamakura era, the Ashikaga family occupied a high place. Of Minamoto origin, it was connected with the Hojo by marriage, and for generations its s.h.i.tsuji had been a member of the Ko family. Ashikaga Takauji made Ko no Moronao his s.h.i.tsuji, and a highly competent captain he proved himself. Subsequently, in 1362, Shiba Yoshimasa was appointed s.h.i.tsuji, but soon his t.i.tle was changed to kwanryo (governor-general), and it thenceforth became customary for the latter position to be occupied by a member of one of the three families, Shiba, Hosokawa, and Hatakeyama, in succession.

Speaking broadly, the kwanryo corresponded to the skikken (regent) of Kamakura days. But whereas, the Kamakura shikken exercised virtually autocratic authority, the shogun being a minor, the Muromachi kwanryo, nominally, at all events, was under the control of an adult shogun. In fact, the kwanryo in the Muromachi polity resembled the betto of the Man-dokoro in Yoritomo's time. For the rest, the Muromachi Bakufu was organized on practically the same lines as its Kamakura prototype. There was a Man-dokoro, a Monju-dokoro, and a Samurai-dokoro, and the staff of these offices was taken originally, as far as possible, from the families of men who had distinguished themselves as legislators and administrators at Kamakura. There were also officials called bugyo (commissioners) who directed the enforcement of laws and ordinances. These commissioners numbered thirty-six, and each had his own sphere of duties: as the shonin bugyo, who controlled judicial affairs; the tosen bugyo, who dealt with affairs of foreign trade; the jisha bugyo, who superintended temples and shrines; the ons...o...b..gyo, who had to do with official rewards, etc.

ORGANIZATION OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS