A History of Spain - Part 33
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Part 33

CHAPTER x.x.xIX

THE GROWTH OF LIBERALISM, 1808-1898

[Sidenote: The Spanish American wars of independence and the virtual completion of Spain's gift to the Americas.]

With the outbreak of the Spanish "War of Independence" against Napoleon the interest of Spain proper as affecting the Americas almost if not wholly ceased. Her gift to the new world was by this time complete except as regards the island dependencies of the West Indies and the Philippines in the Far East. She was still to have important relations with the Americas, such as her vain endeavor to suppress the revolutions of her colonies and her relations with the United States concerning Florida and Cuba, but those matters belong to the field of Hispanic American history rather than to that of Spain as conceived in the present work. In 1808 the news of the accession of Joseph Bonaparte to the throne of Spain, after Napoleon had wrested the abdication of their rights from Charles IV and Ferdinand VII, was received in the colonies with hostile demonstrations, for the majority of Spanish Americans were loyal to Ferdinand. When in 1809 all the peninsula seemed lost, many began to hold to the view that relations with Spain, which had always been rather with the king than with the nation, were severed, and in the next year certain regions set up governments of their own, thus starting the movement for independence which ended only with the battle of Ayacucho in 1824.[67] Circ.u.mstances, skilfully directed by separatist leaders, had led the Americas to proceed out of what was at first a feeling of patriotism to the royal government to what eventually resulted in embittered wars against it. The wars were fought largely, though not wholly, by the colonists themselves, one faction supporting the newly const.i.tuted governmental machinery in the Americas, and the other following the lead of the changing national regimes in Spain,--just as if the war of the American Revolution had been a conflict of Whigs and Tories. It becomes pertinent, then, to enquire why Spain did not make a more strenuous effort to overcome the rebellions in her colonies, which she had always regarded as vital to her, and why she did not seriously attempt to reconquer them in the course of the nineteenth century. The answer lies in a statement of the internal affairs of Spain, who went through one of the most trying periods in the annals of the peninsula, characterized by an incessant recurrence of disturbances and even civil war. For Spain herself, however, it was a period of advance along Liberal lines. Spain gained, though it cost her an empire.

[Sidenote: Patriotic Spanish uprising against Napoleon.]

The years 1808 to 1814 are almost the only time in the century to which Spaniards may look back with satisfaction and pride, but the glory of their war against Napoleon may well be regarded by them as compensation for their losses and degradation in other respects. It took several weeks for the news of the treachery of Bayonne, followed by the events of the _Dos de Mayo_, to circulate throughout Spain. When at last the people comprehended what had happened, a wild outburst of rage against the French swept the peninsula. Between May 24 and June 10 every region in the country rose in arms against the invaders, each district acting independently, but all actuated by the same motives. As an English writer (Oman) has expressed it: "The movement was spontaneous, unselfish, and reckless; in its wounded pride, the nation challenged Napoleon to combat, without any thought of the consequences, without counting up its own resources or those of the enemy." _Juntas_, or governing groups, for the various provinces hastily const.i.tuted themselves and prepared for the conflict. There were some 100,000 widely scattered Spanish troops, between men of the regular army and the militia, but they were almost wholly unfit to take the field, and as events proved were badly officered. Against them were about 117,000 French soldiers in the peninsula (including 28,000 in Portugal), and though these were far from equalling Napoleon's best military units they were vastly superior in every technical respect to the Spaniards. If it had been a mere question of armies in the field there could have been no doubt as to the outcome in the shape of a decisive French victory, but something was going on in Spain which Napoleon had never dreamed of and seemed unable to understand; in a land stirred by the furor of patriotism such as had permeated all Spain the ordinary rules of military science had to be left in abeyance. Napoleon thought that all was over, when things were just about to begin; flying patrols here and there, a species of mounted police, would be enough, he believed, in addition to the existing garrisons, to keep the peninsula under control.

It was of a piece with this estimate that he should send General Dupont with a column of 13,000 men, later reinforced up to 22,000, to effect the conquest of Andalusia. Dupont found, what other French commanders were to learn after him, that the only land he could conquer was that actually occupied at a given time by his soldiers; the country in his rear rose behind him as surely as the armies before him stood ready at the first opportunity to oppose his advance. Getting into a difficult position at Baylen, he surrendered to the Spanish general, Castanos, on June 23, with 18,000 men. In less than two months the disorganized Spanish forces had been able to strike a blow such as French arms had not received for nine years. Meanwhile, Joseph Bonaparte, who had been designated by Napoleon for the crown of Spain as early as in the month of March, had been offered the throne on May 13 by the French-dominated _Junta_ of the Regency, of Madrid, and on June 15 at Bayonne by a deputation of Spanish n.o.bles who had been ordered to go there for precisely that purpose. Joseph had entered Madrid in July, but the capitulation of Baylen caused him to leave that city and retire with most of his forces behind the Ebro. Thus had the patriots won in their first trial of arms, and the moral effect of the victory made it certain, henceforth, that the Spaniards would fight to the end.

[Sidenote: The Spanish War of Independence.]

It is not necessary to go into the details of the six year conflict, which ended only with the fall of Napoleon in 1814, although the French had been expelled from Spain by the close of the preceding year. English historians, with a pardonable pride, have been wont to make it appear that this achievement was primarily a British feat of arms under the leadership of Sir Arthur Wellesley, the later Duke of Wellington, and, to be sure, English history does not record a more brilliant series of campaigns than that of the so-called Peninsula War. It is unlikely that the Spaniards, unaided, could have driven the French from Spain, for their armies almost invariably proved unable to defeat the enemy in the open field, even though they displayed fanatical courage in the defence of their homes,--as witness the two sieges of Saragossa, desperately resisted by General Palafox, and the stubborn opposition of General alvarez in Gerona to the French, who had to waste 20,000 men to take that post. On the other hand Wellington's victories would have been impossible but for the indirect aid of the Spanish soldiery. Speaking of the situation at the close of the year 1810 Oman says: "Enormous as was the force--over 300,000 men--which the Emperor had thrown into Spain, it was still not strong enough to hold down the conquered provinces and at the same time to attack Portugal [where the British army was stationed].

For this fact the Spaniards must receive due credit; it was their indomitable spirit of resistance which enabled Wellington, with his small Anglo-Portuguese army, to keep the field against such largely superior numbers. No sooner had the French concentrated, and abandoned a district, than there sprang up in it a local Junta and a ragged apology for an army. Even where the invaders lay thickest, along the route from Bayonne to Madrid, guerilla bands maintained themselves in the mountains, cut off couriers and escorts, and often isolated one French army from another for weeks at a time. The great partisan chiefs, such as Mina in Navarre, Julian Sanchez in Leon, and Porlier in the Cantabrian hills, kept whole brigades of the French in constant employment. Often beaten, they were never destroyed, and always reappeared to strike some daring blow at the point where they were least expected. Half the French army was always employed in the fruitless task of guerilla-hunting. This was the secret which explains the fact that, with 300,000 men under arms, the invaders could never concentrate more than 70,000 to deal with Wellington." This is a fair statement of the general situation throughout the war. It would seem that the Spaniards accounted for rather more than half of the French troops, even when practically every province of the kingdom was theoretically occupied by the enemy. In so doing they rendered a service not only to themselves but also to Europe, for they detached enough troops from the main body of Napoleon's armies to enable the allies to swing the balance against the emperor in his northern European campaigns. Incidentally it was quite evident that Spain could give scant attention to her American colonies while fighting for her very existence as an independent nation; indeed, it was not until 1815 that Spain turned to a consideration of the American wars.

[Sidenote: Spanish government in the early years of the war and the calling of the Cortes.]

Meanwhile, events of a political nature had been going on in Spain which were to determine the whole course of Spanish history in the nineteenth century. It was several months after the original outbreak before the various local _juntas_ were able to agree upon a supreme authority during the enforced absence of Ferdinand VII, who was regarded as the legitimate king. Late in September the somewhat unwieldy _Junta Central_ of at first twenty-four, afterward thirty-five, members was created, sitting at Aranjuez. Two months later when Napoleon himself advanced upon the capital the _Junta_ fled to Seville, and joining with the _junta_ of that city remained in session there for over a year. It was there that the _Junta_ declared, in January, 1809, that the overseas possessions of Spain were an integral part of the kingdom, refuting the colonial claim of a connection merely through the crown. Driven out again by the French the _Junta_ took refuge in Cadiz, where, in January, 1810, it appointed a Regency of five men to arrange for the calling of a _Cortes_ representative of Spain and the Americas. The _Junta_ thereupon resigned. Fearful of the radical tone that a _Cortes_ might adopt, the Regency postponed its summons as long as it could, but at last issued the call, and the _Cortes_ met in September, 1810. Very little was known at the time as to the exact status and powers of the various _Cortes_ of earlier centuries, but nothing was more certain than that the _Cortes_ of 1810 was like no other which had ever met in the peninsula. It was a single chamber body, designed to consist of elected deputies from the towns with a traditional right of representation, from the provincial _juntas_, from groups of 50,000 population, and from the Americas. Since the American deputies could not arrive in time, and since a still greater number of Spanish deputies could not be chosen by the complicated elective machinery provided, with the land mostly in the possession of the French, their places were supplied by persons from those regions happening to be resident in Cadiz. Thus the _Cortes_ came to be made up of men who did not in fact reflect the conservative temperament of the interior districts, but, rather, stood for the radical views of the people of the coast. Most of them dreamed of founding a representative body which should combine the supposed virtues of the French Revolutionary a.s.sembly with those of the British House of Commons and the earlier _Cortes_ of the peninsula kingdoms.

[Sidenote: The Liberal _Cortes_ of 1810 and the const.i.tution of 1812.]

One of the earliest acts of the _Cortes_ was to accept the resignation of the conservative Regency and to appoint a new body of three of that name responsible and subservient to the _Cortes_. Soon the _Cortes_ declared itself to be the legislative power, and turned over the executive and judicial authority to the Regency, following this up by declaring itself to have sovereign power in the absence of the king.

When it became clear that these measures, which were bitterly opposed by the church and the other conservative elements, were also distasteful to Ferdinand, the _Cortes_ decided that all acts or agreements of the king during his captivity were to be regarded as invalid. The greatest innovation of all, however, was the famous const.i.tution of 1812. Under a belief that they were returning to the system of the past the members of the _Cortes_ broke sharply from all the precedents of Spanish history, enthroning the people through their representatives, and relegating the crown and the church to a secondary place in the state. Among the several hundred items of this ultra-democratic doc.u.ment were the following: sovereignty was declared to rest with the people, to whom, therefore, was reserved the right of legislation; the laws were to be made through the popularly elected _Cortes_; the king was to be the executive, but was prevented from doing much on his own initiative by the requirement that his decrees should be countersigned by the ministers of state, who were responsible to the _Cortes_; all Spaniards in both hemispheres were declared a part of the Spanish nation; all Spanish men over twenty-five years of age were ent.i.tled to vote for members of the _Cortes_, of whom there was to be one for each group of 60,000 people; various paragraphs included a Bill of Rights, a complicated elective machinery, and the abolition of exemptions from taxation. In only one respect did a conservative tone appear in the doc.u.ment,--the Catholic faith was declared to be the religion of Spain, and the exercise of any other was forbidden. Nevertheless, both before and after the adoption of the const.i.tution, the _Cortes_ had shown itself to be distinctly anti-clerical, as witness its overthrow of the Inquisition, its restriction of the number of religious communities, and the expulsion of the papal nuncio when he protested against some of these laws. It was not by their workings in practice, however, that the const.i.tution and the laws of the _Cortes_ became important; rather it was that they const.i.tuted a program which became the war-cry of the democratic faction in Spain for years to come. The const.i.tution of 1812 eventually got to be regarded as if it would be the panacea for all the ills of mankind, and was fervently proclaimed by glib orators, who could not have stated the exact nature of its provisions.

[Sidenote: Despotic rule of Ferdinand VII and the revolution of 1820.]

Early in 1814 Ferdinand VII was freed by Napoleon, and allowed to return to Spain. It was inevitable that he should adopt a reactionary policy, toward which his own inclinations, the att.i.tude of other continental monarchs, and the overwhelming majority of the clergy, n.o.bles, and the people themselves of Spain impelled him. He had hardly reached the peninsula when he declared the const.i.tution of 1812 and the decrees of the _Cortes_ of no effect. This was followed by the arrest of the Liberal deputies and by the beginning of a series of persecutions. All might have been well, but the personal character of the rancorous, cruel, disloyal, ungrateful, and unscrupulous king and the blindness of the absolutists drove the reaction to extremes. Ferdinand not only restored absolutism, but also attempted to undo the enlightened work of Charles III for the economic and intellectual betterment of the people.

Liberalism in every form was crushed, and in accomplishing it such ferocious severity was displayed that the government of Ferdinand was discredited both at home and abroad, even in countries where the reactionary spirit was strongest. Back of the established forms of the restored absolutism stood the unofficial _camarilla_ (small room), or "kitchen cabinet," of the king's intimate friends, but back of all was the king. So suspicious was Ferdinand that more than thirty royal secretaries, or ministers, were dismissed from office between 1814 and 1820, and dismissal was usually accompanied by a sentence of exile or imprisonment. Periodical literature of a political character was suppressed, although the bars began to be let down for magazines of a scientific or literary type. Despite the rigors of the administration--in a measure because of them--there were insurrections each year from 1814 to 1817, all led by military chieftains of Liberal ideas. They were put down, for in no case was there a popular uprising; the people were as yet little affected by the new doctrines. Meanwhile, secret plots against the government were fostered, in part as the result of Spanish American influences which desired to prevent the sending of troops to suppress the revolutions of the new world, but more largely related to the Liberal ideal in Spain. This activity seems mainly to have been the work of societies of Freemasons, in which military men were strongly represented. Many other elements had also become pro-Liberal by this time, including prominent representatives of the middle cla.s.s, almost all of the patriots who had organized the resistance to the French in 1808, and the young men of education. The storm broke when orders were given in 1819 for the a.s.sembling of an army at Cadiz for the extremely unpopular service of the wars in the Americas. Colonel Riego raised the standard of revolt on January 1, 1820, proclaiming the const.i.tution of 1812. The government seemed paralyzed by the outbreak. Uncertain what to do it waited. Then late in February the example set by Riego was followed in the larger cities of northern Spain. The king at once yielded, and caused an announcement to be made that he would summon a _Cortes_ immediately and would swear his adhesion to the const.i.tution of 1812. Thus, without a battle, it seemed as if the revolution had triumphed.

[Sidenote: The Liberal _Cortes_ of 1820 and the triumph of the reaction.]

In July, 1820, the _Cortes_ met. Its earliest measures aimed to restore the legislation of the _Cortes_ of 1810, together with other laws of a similar character. The _Cortes_ of 1820 has been charged with being anti-clerical, as indeed it was, for the church was the most serious opponent of Liberalism, still able to dominate the opinions of the ma.s.ses. Notwithstanding all it accomplished, the _Cortes_ of 1820 satisfied n.o.body. Like most new-born democracies Spain found herself splitting on the rock of divergent opinions. The Liberals broke up into various well-defined groups: the Radicals felt that the _Cortes_ had been too moderate and cautious; the Moderates found the new laws dangerously radical; still others wished for a reform of the const.i.tution in the direction of yet greater moderation than most of the Moderates desired. These were only a few of the groups to spring up.

Meanwhile, the king and the absolutists, who had never intended to abide by the revolution, began to turn these divisions to account. Armed bands favorable to the king were formed, while others representing other factions also came into existence, and a state of anarchy ensued. The crisis was settled from abroad, however. From the first, Ferdinand had sent appeals to the reactionary kings of Europe, representing himself to be a prisoner, much as Louis XVI had been at the outbreak of the French Revolution. At length his appeals were listened to, and France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia joined together to restore matters to the situation they were in prior to 1820. It was as a result of this decision that a French army invaded the peninsula in the spring of 1823. No effective resistance was offered; indeed, the country seemed rather to second the French efforts and to facilitate their advance. No better proof could be furnished that the revolution of 1820 did not represent the sentiment of the people; the ma.s.ses were yet steeped in ignorance and weighed down by traditional influences, so that they rejected a system intended for their benefit in favor of one which had lost even the benevolent disposition of the eighteenth-century Bourbons; the intellectual elements which had promoted the revolution had shown an incapacity to face realities or to compromise with the full meed of their ideals. Thus had the revolution of 1810 been re-enacted. The example was to be many times repeated in the course of the next two generations. The const.i.tution and the laws of the _Cortes_ were abolished, and savage persecution of Liberalism began. From 1823 to 1829 the political history of Spain was a series of alternations between terrorism and a relaxation of coercive measures, according as one group or another prevailed with the king, but the dominant note was at all times that of absolutism. It is to be noted that Spain had scarcely had a moment's respite from domestic difficulties since the invasion of Napoleon in 1808. In the meantime, between 1810 and 1824, the American colonies of the mainland had seized their opportunity to separate from the mother country forever.

[Sidenote: Maria Cristina and the Carlist wars.]

[Sidenote: Progress of Liberalism.]

[Sidenote: Rule of Espartero.]

Reactionary as Ferdinand had shown himself to be, he did not go far enough to suit the extremists in the absolutist faction headed by the king's brother Don Carlos (Charles). This group soon formed a party, which believed that its principles could be secured only through the accession of Don Carlos to the throne, wherefore its members came to be known as Carlists. The king was childless and in feeble health, but the hopes of the Carlists received a setback when in 1829 he married again.

The new queen, Maria Cristina of Naples, was reactionary by instinct, but was forced by Carlist opposition to lean toward the Liberal faction in order to find some element on which she could depend for support. As it soon became clear that she was about to give birth to a child, the chances of Don Carlos' succession were gone in case the infant should prove to be a boy, but the Carlists relied upon the so-called Spanish Salic Law of Philip V to exclude the enthronement of a girl. The exigencies of the political situation in 1713 had led Philip V to declare that the male line should always succeed to the Spanish throne.

In 1789 Charles IV in agreement with the _Cortes_ abrogated the law, but the decision seems not to have been published. To meet every contingency Cristina persuaded Ferdinand in 1830 to publish the law of 1789.

Henceforth the struggle turned on the question of the validity of the law of 1789. In October, 1830, Cristina gave birth to a daughter, Maria Isabel, who was crowned as Queen Isabel, or Isabella II, with her mother as regent, on the death of the king in 1833. This was the signal for the outbreak of the Carlist wars, fought princ.i.p.ally in the north and east of Spain, where the party of Don Carlos had a strong following.

Meanwhile, a Liberal policy had been inaugurated, but in the main it was of a half-hearted type, for Cristina was both illiberal by temperament and unreliable in government; she would promise reforms, only to withdraw them, and would perhaps re-enact them in the very next breath.

Nevertheless, the period of her regency was one of distinct gain for the principle of limited monarchy. A wider and wider circle of the people came to believe in that ideal, the _Cortes_ met frequently, Liberal legislation was pa.s.sed which was not to be so lightly tossed aside as formerly, and the const.i.tutional principle was definitely established.

To be sure, the same divisions as before tore the Liberal element asunder, and even led to insurrections at the very time that the Carlist wars were in their most dangerous stage; Spain still had a long road to travel to achieve democracy. The most important piece of legislation was the const.i.tution of 1837, overthrowing the impossible instrument of 1812, though agreeing with it in many respects, including its recognition of the sovereignty of the people, and establishing a _Cortes_ of two houses, with an absolute veto by the crown, and a restricted suffrage,--a compromise between the position of the Moderates, or conservative element of the Liberals, and that of the Progressives, or radicals. Neither party was satisfied, and as a working instrument the const.i.tution was not long-lived, but henceforth this, and not the idolized 1812 doc.u.ment, was to serve as a basis in const.i.tution making. The year 1837 marked the first appearance in power of Espartero, who had distinguished himself as a general in the war against the Carlists, thus beginning an era in which successful military men were to be the virtual rulers of Spain, more or less under const.i.tutional forms, but in reality depending upon the army as the only force which all elements would recognize. Espartero's credit reached still higher when he was able to bring the Carlist war to a close in 1840, following his negotiations with the leading enemy generals. In the same year, Cristina, who had long maintained a precarious hold on the regency as a result of her insincerity and her affiliations with the Moderates, was at length compelled to abdicate. Espartero stepped into the breach, becoming regent in 1841, and for another two years maintained himself as a veritable dictator, but proclaiming Liberal principles, fighting the Moderates, defending himself against the intrigues of Cristina, and resisting the Progressives, who were dissatisfied with his policy or jealous of his preponderance. In 1843 the storm broke, and Espartero fled to England.

[Sidenote: Isabella II and the rule of the generals.]

[Sidenote: Narvaez and O'Donnell.]

[Sidenote: Rise of General Prim.]

[Sidenote: Character of the queen.]

The overthrow of Espartero had been accomplished by a combination of the extreme conservative and the radical elements, which aimed to prevent the recurrence of a regency by illegally proclaiming the thirteen-year-old Isabella II to be of age. Such widely divergent groups could not long remain harmonious, and the conservatives were soon in the saddle. The twenty-five year period of Isabella's active reign, from 1843 to 1868, was one in which reactionary forces were almost constantly in control under const.i.tutional forms. Except for the discredited Carlists, who engaged in several minor outbreaks during these years, no party stood frankly for absolutism, although that form of government was in fact the wish of many and the virtual type of rule employed. The real master was, not the queen, but the army through its generals. The saving factor in the situation was that the latter were not united; while certain of them were ultra-reactionary, others were Liberal, though none of those who attained to power went the lengths of the radicals. In the numerous ministries of the era an occasional non-military individual was at the head of the state,--such as the reactionary Gonzalez Bravo, or the clerically backed Bravo Murillo, but the terms of these and other civilian ministers were brief. The two princ.i.p.al rulers of the times were General Narvaez and General O'Donnell. Narvaez, who had won notoriety for his severity against the Carlists, was six times in office (1844-1846, 1846 again, 1847-1851, 1856-1857, 1864-1865, and 1866-1868).

It became the habit of the queen to send for him whenever the monarchy was in danger, not only because he could control the army, but also because he invariably struck hard and successfully against Liberalism at the same time that he upheld const.i.tutional government, though disregarding its mandates as suited his pleasure. Execution or exile followed swiftly where Narvaez was displeased with an individual.

Meanwhile, he made meritorious reforms which tended to restore good order and check anarchy, such as his success in stamping out brigandage and revolution. The ability of this despotic veteran was well displayed when he saved Spain from the storm which shook other European thrones in 1848. O'Donnell, who came into prominence in the temporarily successful Liberal revolution of 1854, was three times in office (1856, 1858-1863, 1865-1866), once holding power for five years. While far more liberal than Narvaez he was a staunch supporter of the Bourbons. He sought to divert public attention from domestic affairs by laying stress upon foreign policy, as witness his well-advertised refusal to sell Cuba to the United States, his plans to join France in the latter's intervention in Mexico, and especially his engaging in a war with Morocco (1859-1860). The chief political result of the war was to make a popular hero of General Prim, a man of Liberal tendencies and of less resolute devotion than O'Donnell to the Bourbons. Prim was the third of the great military figures who, together, explain this era. Beside them must be considered the queen. The former regent, Maria Cristina, had not been free from charges of immorality, but her daughter Isabella was notorious for her bad conduct. Furthermore, she was perfidious, selfish, superst.i.tious, and lacking in principle. Withal she was devoutly religious. The result was that her opinions were swayed by her numerous transitory lovers or by her confessors, and ministries rose and fell according to the dictates of the _camarilla_. Even O'Donnell declared it was impossible to govern under her, for no dependence could be placed upon her word.

[Sidenote: Const.i.tutional changes in the reign of Isabella II.]

The character of the period was reflected in the new const.i.tutions which were drawn up. The const.i.tution of 1845 included the following provisions: the introduction of a property qualification, narrowing the franchise of those electing deputies to the _Cortes_; the nomination of senators by the crown; life tenure of senators; the packing of the senate with grandees, ecclesiastics, successful soldiers, and financial magnates,--reactionary elements; emphasis on the recognition of the Catholic Church as the established religion; an a.s.sent to the theory of the sovereignty of the people, but in such an attenuated form as to deprive the right of its vitality; restrictions on the freedom of the press; and the reduction of the national militia--the hope of Liberalism--to an innocuous state by making it subject to the central executive. The church was strengthened still further upon the fall of Narvaez in 1851, for, reactionary though he was, he did not go far enough in ecclesiastical matters to suit the clergy. The brief term in office of their candidate, Bravo Murillo, resulted in the restoration of part of their former endowment as a result of the concordat of 1851, but their acceptance of this doc.u.ment was denounced by the Carlists and absolutists in general, including the pseudo-const.i.tutional reactionaries, as a betrayal of the cause for which the churchmen had stood. Bravo Murillo proposed a const.i.tution in 1852 which amounted to a virtual abrogation of parliamentary government, granting the crown the right to enact the budget by royal decree and to propose legislation which must be accepted or rejected by the _Cortes_ without amendment, together with other provisions of a like character. It was Narvaez who pointed out to the queen that the Bravo const.i.tution would result in disaster to the government, and the instrument was only productive of its proposer's fall. During the period of Liberal control, from 1854 to 1856, at which time Espartero returned to head the ministry, a fresh const.i.tution was presented to the _Cortes_ in 1855. The former provision for life senators was abolished; financial control was vested in the _Cortes_, which was to meet at least once a year; liberty of the press was granted; and it was decided that n.o.body should be persecuted for his religious views contrary to the Catholic faith, provided he should not manifest them publicly. The const.i.tution of 1855 remained an ideal only, for the _Cortes_ separated without promulgating it. In the next year O'Donnell brought about a restoration of the const.i.tution of 1845, with added enactments providing for the control of national finances by the _Cortes_ and for an elected senate. When Narvaez returned to power late in the same year, he caused such reform measures of the Liberals as had not already been done away with to be rescinded, and reinforced the const.i.tution of 1845.

[Sidenote: Revolution of General Prim and dethronement of Isabella II.]

Nevertheless, very important gains were made for democracy in this period, in addition to the recognition of the const.i.tutional principle.

Most vital of all was that a large proportion of the people had now joined with the intellectual cla.s.s among the civilian element in a desire for a more liberal government. The reaction had at first been welcomed as a.s.suring the country of peace, but the promise was not fulfilled. Insurrections soon began to occur on behalf of Liberalism, and people got to believe that there would be no security from anarchy until the policies of that party triumphed. The Liberal opposition more and more directed its attacks against the queen, whose instability of character seemed to preclude the attainment, or at least the continued practice, of any political ideal. Prim at length became convinced that the dynasty must be swept away, and headed an unsuccessful revolution in 1866. The queen's position was steadily weakened, however. Radical newspapers had been founded which exposed her immorality, and the government was unable to suppress these publications. The deaths of O'Donnell in 1867 and of Narvaez in 1868 were also fatal to her. The last-named was succeeded by Gonzalez Bravo, who had held the leadership of the ministry from 1843 to 1844, only to lose it because he was not a soldier, and could not control the army. This time he proposed to defeat the generals, and sought to do so by banishing all of them known to hold Liberal views. But the generals returned with Prim at their head, though Serrano was the nominal leader. At last the blow had fallen, and as the year 1868 drew toward a close the long, corrupt reign of Isabella II came to an end with the dethronement of the queen. The first question now to resolve was that of the type of government to be established.

This was left to the _Cortes_, which voted for a continuance of monarchy; it is significant of the advance of democratic ideas that 71 votes in a total of 285 favored the establishment of a republic. The next problem was to find a monarch. Prince after prince was approached, but it seemed as if n.o.body cared to be king of Spain. Leopold of Hohenzollern consented to become king, but later withdrew his candidacy, and it was this trifling incident which served as the occasion, hardly the cause, for the outbreak of war in 1870 between France and Prussia.

Finally, after a search which had lasted two years, the Duke of Aosta, Amadeo of Savoy, gave a reluctant consent. On the very day when Amadeo touched Spanish soil, December 30, 1870, General Prim died of wounds received a few days before from a band of a.s.sa.s.sins. It meant that the new king (who was crowned a few days later, in January, 1871) was to lack the support of the only individual who might have saved him from the difficulties of his position.

[Sidenote: Troubled reign of Amadeo of Savoy.]

Amadeo found himself king in a country where he had no party. At his accession there were three well-defined groups, the Alfonsists, the Republicans, and the Carlists. The first-named favored the principle of limited monarchy, under Alfonso of Bourbon, son of Isabella II. This party as yet had a meagre following, owing to the hatred of her family which Isabella had inspired among Spaniards. Republicanism was loudly proclaimed, but was untried and not trusted. The Carlist faction, standing for absolutism as well as for the accession of the heir of the earlier Don Carlos, was by all odds the strongest group of the day. Its backbone was the clergy, who were especially influential in the country districts of the north and east. They were deeply offended by the choice of a monarch from the House of Savoy, which had just occupied the last remnant of the Papal States and made the pope a "prisoner of the Vatican." They also feared that the new government might withdraw its financial support of the church, leaving them to the uncertain contributions of the faithful. Carlism was aided by the disintegration of the regular army, growing out of Prim's promise to abolish compulsory service, a policy which the Republicans included in their program, although no definite enactment to this effect was made. The morale of the army was thus destroyed, depriving the state of its only sure resort, disgusting the officers, and leading to a renewal of brigandage, anarchy, and an aggressive type of socialism. Altogether there was a recrudescence of grave disorder. There were six changes in ministry and three general elections in two years. At last Amadeo was told that he must suspend the const.i.tution and rule with an iron hand. This he refused to do, seizing the first opportunity which offered to resign his crown, leaving the country once more without a king, in February, 1873.

[Sidenote: The Spanish republic.]

The Republicans now had their innings, but the time could hardly have been worse for the trial of their ideas. The Carlists had under arms a force of 45,000 men in 1873, which swelled to 75,000 by the close of 1875. The south received the proclamation of the republic with a resort to self-governing, jealous particularism, as if the day of democratic _taifa_ states had dawned, for they were able to agree on one thing alone,--that of refusing to pay taxes to the central government. One Figueras had been proclaimed _ad interim_ president until a _Cortes_ could be elected, but he became terrified by the republic when he saw it, and fled before the _Cortes_ could meet. There were three more presidents in 1873. Pi y Margall was a federalist who believed that the newly won freedom would provide a remedy for the prevailing disorder,--but it did not. He was therefore put aside, and Salmeron, a unitary Republican, took the helm. Salmeron initiated vigorous measures to crush the forces of disintegration, but, as he was about to succeed, drew back before the fear of militarism. Castelar was put in his place, and he revived the army. This measure strengthened the central authority, but it killed Republicanism, which had made the abolition of enforced military service one of the cardinal tenets of its creed. It was now only a question of time before the Alfonsists would take control. Carlists of const.i.tutional leanings went over to that side as did many Republicans, since it now seemed clear that the accession of Alfonso was the only alternative to the enthronement of the Carlist representative. In December, 1874, Alfonso issued a proclamation, promising an amnesty and const.i.tutional government. With hardly a struggle the republic fell.

[Sidenote: Alfonso XII and the establishment of a conservative monarchy.]

The reign of Alfonso XII (1874-1885) marked the beginning of a new era, based upon the acceptance of pseudo-democracy under const.i.tutional forms, and accompanied by a growing tendency toward internal peace.

Minor outbreaks in Spain, now of Carlists, now of Republicans, continued to require military attention down to 1886, but no such disorder as had so long been the rule again prevailed. A new const.i.tution was promulgated in 1876 which had the effect of conciliating the clergy, since it provided for state support of the church, although that inst.i.tution did not receive all it had been promised; indeed, it protested bitterly against the grant of toleration to other faiths. The const.i.tution of 1876, which with some modifications is still operative, was patterned after that of 1845, with the addition of certain of the more recent reforms. Some of its provisions were the following: the _Cortes_ was to be composed of two houses, respectively the senate and the congress; the senate was to contain eighty members in their own right, such as princes of the royal family, grandees, presidents of the great councils, archbishops, and captain-generals, one hundred more by royal appointment, and one hundred and eighty elected for a term of five years by munic.i.p.al and provincial a.s.semblies, universities, and taxpayers of the highest cla.s.s; congress was to be made up of 431 deputies, representing districts of 50,000 people each, chosen by an electorate which was limited by the imposition of a property qualification,--changed in 1889 by the restoration of universal manhood suffrage; legislative power was vested in the _Cortes_ with the king; the king was made irresponsible, but his decrees had to be countersigned by a responsible minister; and the jury system was abolished,--although it was restored early in the next reign. The net result was a centralized monarchy in the control of the conservative elements. Many principles of the Liberal program, taken especially from the const.i.tution of 1869 when Prim was in power, have since been added. The death of the king, who had ruined his health as the result of excesses which recalled the scandals of his mother's reign, seemed likely to raise fresh difficulties at the close of the year 1885. The queen was then pregnant, and it was not until 1886 that her son, the present Alfonso XIII, was born. The ex-queen, Isabella II, attempted to intervene, but only succeeded in strengthening the position of the queen-mother, Maria Cristina of Austria, who ruled henceforth as regent until Alfonso attained his majority in 1902.

[Sidenote: The war of 1898 and disappearance of Spain as a colonial power.]

It was primarily in Spain's colonial policy that the evils of the old era continued. The lesson of the Spanish American wars of independence had not taught Spain how to govern her few remaining colonies. Indeed, corrupt methods were if anything worse than before, as the opportunities for engaging in them became fewer. Spanish civilians in Cuba preyed upon the island, and political office there was reserved for those seeking reward for party service at home. A revolution broke out in 1868 which lasted ten years. The government then made promises which were not fulfilled, and a second uprising occurred, but it was severely put down.

Once again there was a revolution, in 1895. This time the United States intervened, and in the brief war of 1898 Cuba became independent, and Porto Rico and the Philippines pa.s.sed over to the United States. Thus was the last vestige of Spain's trans-Atlantic dominion swept away. This was the final stroke in a century of disasters. And yet the total result was one of internal progress for Spain. She had paid a heavy price in her gropings for liberty, but she had reached a stage which, while not yet satisfactory, was incomparably ahead of that with which she had begun the century.

CHAPTER XL