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[Footnote 1: The doctrine of negation, its function and value with reference to diverse logical problems, have many diverse aspects, and it is impossible to do them justice in a small section like this.]

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where the reason repeats the thesis to be proved in another form (e.g. sound is non-eternal because it has not the quality of eternality); sadhyasama is that where the reason itself requires to be proved (e.g. shadow is a substance because it has motion, but it remains to be proved whether shadows have motion or not); kalat.i.ta is a false a.n.a.logy where the reason fails because it does not tally with the example in point of time. Thus one may argue that sound is eternal because it is the result of contact (stick and the drum) like colour which is also a result of contact of light and the object and is eternal. Here the fallacy lies in this, that colour is simultaneous with the contact of light which shows what was already there and only manifested by the light, whereas in the case of sound it is produced immediately after the contact of the stick and drum and is hence a product and hence non-eternal.

The later Nyaya works divide savyabhicara into three cla.s.ses, (1) [email protected] or common (e.g. the mountain is fiery because it is an object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fire is also an object of knowledge), (2) [email protected] or too restricted (e.g. sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound; this cannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in the sound and nowhere else), and (3) [email protected] or unsubsuming (e.g. everything is non-eternal, because they are all objects of knowledge; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can be found which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite conclusion may also be drawn). The fallacy [email protected]_ is that in which there is a contrary reason which may prove the opposite conclusion (e.g. sound is eternal because it is audible, sound is non-eternal because it is an effect). The fallacy _asiddha_ (unreal) is of three kinds (i) _as'rayasiddha_ (the lotus of the sky is fragrant because it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus in the sky), (2) _svarupasiddha_ (sound is a quality because it is visible; but sound has no visibility), (3) _vyapyatvasiddha_ is that where the concomitance between the middle and the consequence is not invariable and inevitable; there is smoke in the hill because there is fire; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a red hot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably a.s.sociated with smoke. The fallacy _badhita_ is that which pretends to prove a thesis which is against direct experience, e.g. fire is not hot because it is a substance. We have already enumerated the fallacies counted by [email protected] Contrary to Nyaya practice

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Pras'astapada counts the fallacies of the example. [email protected] also counted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms; but atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmakirtti counted also the fallacies of the [email protected] (minor); but Nyaya rightly considers that the fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguard inference and that these are mere repet.i.tions. Chala means the intentional misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for the purpose of defeating him. Jati consists in the drawing of contradictory conclusions, the raising of false issues or the like with the deliberate intention of defeating an opponent. Nigrahasthana means the exposure of the opponent's argument as involving self-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat is conclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious opponent. As to the utility of the description of so many debating tricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical work, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to emanc.i.p.ation, it is said by Jayanta in his _Nyayamanjari_ that these had to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant disputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before his pupils.

If the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of the pupils in him would be shaken and great disorder would follow, and it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was plodding onward for the attainment of [email protected] should acquire these devices for the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A knowledge of these has therefore been enjoined in the Nyaya sutra as being necessary for the attainment of salvation [Footnote ref l].

The doctrine of Soul.

Dhurtta Carvakas denied the existence of soul and regarded consciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there were other Carvakas called [email protected] Carvakas who admitted the existence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death.

The Buddhists also denied the existence of any permanent self.

The naiyayikas ascertained all the categories of metaphysics mainly by such inference as was corroborated by experience.

They argued that since consciousness, pleasures, pains, willing, etc. could not belong to our body or the senses, there must be

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 586-659, and [email protected]_ of Varadaraja and [email protected]@taka_ of Mallinatha, pp. 185 ff.]

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some ent.i.ty to which they belonged; the existence of the self is not proved according to Nyaya merely by the notion of our self-consciousness, as in the case of [email protected], for Nyaya holds that we cannot depend upon such a perception, for it may be erroneous. It often happens that I say that I am white or I am black, but it is evident that such a perception cannot be relied upon, for the self cannot have any colour. So we cannot safely depend on our self-consciousness as upon the inference that the self has to be admitted as that ent.i.ty to which consciousness, emotion, etc. adhere when they are produced as a result of collocations. Never has the production of atman been experienced, nor has it been found to suffer any destruction like the body, so the soul must be eternal. It is not located in any part of the body, but is all-pervading, i.e. exists at the same time in all places (_vibhu_), and does not travel with the body but exists everywhere at the same time. But though atman is thus disconnected from the body, yet its actions are seen in the body because it is with the help of the collocation of bodily limbs, etc. that action in the self can be manifested or produced. It is unconscious in itself and acquires consciousness as a result of suitable collocations [Footnote ref l].

Even at birth children show signs of pleasure by their different facial features, and this could not be due to anything else than the memory of the past experiences in past lives of pleasures and pains. Moreover the inequalities in the distribution of pleasures and pains and of successes and failures prove that these must be due to the different kinds of good and bad action that men performed in their past lives. Since the inequality of the world must have some reasons behind it, it is better to admit karma as the determining factor than to leave it to irresponsible chance.

is'vara and Salvation.

Nyaya seeks to establish the existence of is'vara on the basis of inference. We know that the Jains, the [email protected] and the Buddhists did not believe in the existence of is'vara and offered many ant.i.theistic arguments. Nyaya wanted to refute these and prove the existence of Is'vara by an inference of the [email protected]@[email protected] type.

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[Footnote 1:[email protected]_, &c. See _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 432 ff.]

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The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to this view the Nyaya holds that the world as a whole is also an effect like any other effect. Many geological changes and landslips occur, and from these destructive operations proceeding in nature it may be a.s.sumed that this world is not eternal but a result of production. But even if this is not admitted by the atheists they can in no way deny the arrangement and order of the universe. But they would argue that there was certainly a difference between the order and arrangement of human productions (e.g. a jug) and the order and arrangement of the universe; and therefore from the order and arrangement([email protected]@tata_) of the universe it could not be argued that the universe was produced by a creator; for, it is from the sort of order and arrangement that is found in human productions that a creator or producer could be inferred. To this, Nyaya answers that the concomitance is to be taken between the "order and arrangement"

in a general sense and "the existence of a creator" and not with specific cases of "order and arrangement," for each specific case may have some such peculiarity in which it differs from similar other specific cases; thus the fire in the kitchen is not the same kind of fire as we find in a forest fire, but yet we are to disregard the specific individual peculiarities of fire in each case and consider the concomitance of fire in general with smoke in general.

So here, we have to consider the concomitance of "order and arrangement" in general with "the existence of a creator," and thus though the order and arrangement of the world may be different from the order and arrangement of things produced by man, yet an inference from it for the existence of a creator would not be inadmissible. The objection that even now we see many effects (e.g. trees) which are daily shooting forth from the ground without any creator being found to produce them, does not hold, for it can never be proved that the plants are not actually created by a creator. The inference therefore stands that the world has a creator, since it is an effect and has order and arrangement in its construction. Everything that is an effect and has an order and arrangement has a creator, like the jug. The world is an effect and has order and arrangement and has therefore a creator.

Just as the potter knows all the purposes of the jug that he makes,

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so is'vara knows all the purposes of this wide universe and is thus omniscient. He knows all things always and therefore does not require memory; all things are perceived by him directly without any intervention of any internal sense such as manas, etc. He is always happy. His will is eternal, and in accordance with the karma of men the same will produces dissolution, creates, or protects the world, in the order by which each man reaps the results of his own deeds. As our self which is in itself bodiless can by its will produce changes in our body and through it in the external world, so is'vara also can by his will create the universe though he has no body. Some, however, say that if any a.s.sociation of body with is'vara is indispensable for our conception of him, the atoms may as well be regarded as his body, so that just as by the will of our self changes and movement of our body take place, so also by his will changes and movements are produced in the atoms [Footnote ref l].

The naiyayikas in common with most other systems of Indian philosophy believed that the world was full of sorrow and that the small bits of pleasure only served to intensify the force of sorrow. To a wise person therefore everything is sorrow ([email protected] [email protected]@m [email protected]_); the wise therefore is never attached to the so-called pleasures of life which only lead us to further sorrows.

The bondage of the world is due to false knowledge (_mithyajnana_) which consists in thinking as my own self that which is not my self, namely body, senses, manas, feelings and knowledge; when once the true knowledge of the six padarthas and as Nyaya says, of the proofs ([email protected]_), the objects of knowledge (_prameya_), and of the other logical categories of inference is attained, false knowledge is destroyed. False knowledge can be removed by constant thinking of its opposite ([email protected]_), namely the true estimates of things. Thus when any pleasure attracts us, we are to think that this is in reality but pain, and thus the right knowledge about it will dawn and it will never attract us again. Thus it is that with the destruction of false knowledge our attachment or antipathy to things and ignorance about them (collectively called [email protected], cf. the kles'a of Patanjali) are also destroyed.

With the destruction of attachment actions ([email protected]_) for the

[Footnote:1: See _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 190-204,_ is'varanumana_ of Raghunatha [email protected]@ni and Udayana's _Kusumanjali_.]

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fulfilment of desires cease and with it rebirth ceases and with it sorrow ceases. Without false knowledge and attachment, actions cannot produce the bondage of karma that leads to the production of body and its experiences. With the cessation of sorrow there is emanc.i.p.ation in which the self is divested of all its qualities (consciousness, feeling, willing, etc.) and remains in its own inert state. The state of mukti according to [email protected] is neither a state of pure knowledge nor of bliss but a state of perfect qualitilessness, in which the self remains in itself in its own purity. It is the negative state of absolute painlessness in mukti that is sometimes spoken of as being a state of absolute happiness (_ananda_), though really speaking the state of mukti can never be a state of happiness. It is a pa.s.sive state of self in its original and natural purity una.s.sociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc. [Footnote ref 1].

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[Footnote 1: _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 499-533.]

CHAPTER IX

[email protected] PHILOSOPHY [Footnote ref 1]

A Comparative Review.

The [email protected] philosophy looked at experience from a purely common sense point of view and did not work with any such monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our common sense experience should be considered as coming out of an original universal (e.g. [email protected] of the [email protected]). s.p.a.ce, time, the four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are substantive ent.i.ties or substances. What is perceived of the material things as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many ent.i.ties which have distinct and separate existence but which manifest themselves in connection with the substances. So also karma or action is supposed to be a separate ent.i.ty, and even the cla.s.s notions are perceived as separate ent.i.ties inhering in substances. Knowledge (_jnana_) which illuminates all things is regarded only as a quality belonging to soul, just as there are other qualities of material objects. Causation is viewed merely as the collocation of conditions. The genesis of knowledge is also viewed as similar in nature to the production of any other physical event. Thus just as by the collocation of certain physical circ.u.mstances a jug and its qualities are produced, so by the combination and respective contacts of the soul, mind, sense, and the objects of sense, knowledge (_jnana_) is produced. Soul with Nyaya is an inert unconscious ent.i.ty in which knowledge, etc.

inhere. The relation between a substance and its quality, action, cla.s.s notion, etc. has also to be admitted as a separate ent.i.ty, as without it the different ent.i.ties being without any principle of relation would naturally fail to give us a philosophic construction.

[email protected] had conceived of a principle which consisted of an infinite number of reals of three different types, which by their combination were conceived to be able to produce all substances, qualities, actions, etc. No difference was acknowledged to exist between substances, qualities and actions, and it was conceived

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[Footnote 1: On the meanirg of the word [email protected] see Chapter IV.]

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that these were but so many aspects of a combination of the three types of reals in different proportions. The reals contained within them the rudiments of all developments of matter, knowledge, willing, feelings, etc. As combinations of reals changed incessantly and new phenomena of matter and mind were manifested, collocations did not bring about any new thing but brought about a phenomenon which was already there in its causes in another form. What we call knowledge or thought ordinarily, is with them merely a form of subtle illuminating matter stuff. [email protected] holds however that there is a transcendent ent.i.ty as pure consciousness and that by some kind of transcendent reflection or contact this pure consciousness transforms the bare translucent thought-matter into conscious thought or experience of a person.

But this hypothesis of a pure self, as essentially distinct and separate from knowledge as ordinarily understood, can hardly be demonstrated in our common sense experience; and this has been pointed out by the Nyaya school in a very strong and emphatic manner. Even [email protected] did not try to prove that the existence of its transcendent [email protected] could be demonstrated in experience, and it had to attempt to support its hypothesis of the existence of a transcendent self on the ground of the need of a permanent ent.i.ty as a fixed object, to which the pa.s.sing states of knowledge could cling, and on grounds of moral struggle towards virtue and emanc.i.p.ation. [email protected] had first supposed knowledge to be merely a combination of changing reals, and then had as a matter of necessity to admit a fixed principle as [email protected] (pure transcendent consciousness). The self is thus here in some sense an object of inference to fill up the gap left by the inadequate a.n.a.lysis of consciousness (_buddhi_) as being non-intelligent and incessantly changing.

Nyaya fared no better, for it also had to demonstrate self on the ground that since knowledge existed it was a quality, and therefore must inhere in some substance. This hypothesis is again based upon another uncritical a.s.sumption that substances and attributes were entirely separate, and that it was the nature of the latter to inhere in the former, and also that knowledge was a quality requiring (similarly with other attributes) a substance in which to inhere. None of them could take their stand upon the self-conscious nature of our ordinary thought and draw their conclusions on the strength of the direct evidence of this self-conscious