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of the measure of the latter. This explains [email protected]@na, hrasva [email protected], mahat [email protected], and dirgha [email protected] The [email protected] of akas'a, kala, dik and atman which are regarded as all-pervasive, is said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The [email protected] of the atoms, akas'a, kala, dik, manas, and atman are regarded as eternal (nitya). All other kinds of [email protected] as belonging to non-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal.

The eighth is [email protected]_ (mutual difference or separateness of things), that ent.i.ty or quality in things by virtue of which things appear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is perceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation such as this jug is not this pot.

The ninth is [email protected]_ (connection), that ent.i.ty of [email protected] by virtue of which things appear to us as connected.

The tenth is _vibhaga_ (separation), that ent.i.ty of [email protected] which destroys the connection or contact of things.

The eleventh and twelfth [email protected], _paratva_ and _aparatva_, give rise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote and near.

The other [email protected] such as _buddhi_(knowledge),_sukha_ (happiness), [email protected]_ (sorrow), _iccha_ (will), [email protected]_ (antipathy or hatred) and _yatna_ (effort) can occur only with reference to soul.

The characteristic of _gurutva_ (heaviness) is that by virtue of which things fall to the ground. The [email protected] of _sneha_ (oiliness) belongs to water. The [email protected] of [email protected]_ is of three kinds, (i) _vega_ (velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions, (2) _sthiti-sthapaka_ (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing tries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) _bhavana_ is that quality of atman by which things are constantly practised or by which things experienced are remembered and recognized [Footnote ref l].

_Dharma_ is the quality the presence of which enables the soul to enjoy happiness or to attain salvation [Footnote ref 2]. _Adharma_ is

[Footnote 1: Pras'astapada says that bhavana is a special characteristic of the soul, contrary to intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which things seen, heard and felt are remembered and recognized. Through unexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of South India), repet.i.tion (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the [email protected] becomes particularly strong. See _Nyayakandali_, p. 167.

[email protected] however is silent on these points. He only says that by a special kind of contact of the mind with soul and also by the [email protected], memory ([email protected]) is produced (ix. 2. 6).]

[Footnote 2: Pras'astapada speaks of _dharma_ (merit) as being a quality of the soul. Thereupon S'ridhara points out that this view does not admit that dharma is a power of karma (_nakarmasamarthyam_). Sacrifice etc.

cannot be dharma for these actions being momentary they cannot generate the effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the action is destroyed its power (_samarthya_) cannot last. So dharma is to be admitted as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conduct which produce happiness for him when helped by certain other conditions of time, place, etc. Faith (_s'raddha_), non-injury, doing good to all beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, s.e.x-control, sincerity, control of anger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular G.o.ds, fasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance of duties a.s.signed to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated by Pras'astapada as producing dharma. The person who strictly adheres to these duties and the _yamas_ and _niyamas_ (cf. Patanjali's Yoga) and attains Yoga by a meditation on the six padarthas attains a dharma which brings liberation ([email protected]_). S'ridhara refers to the [email protected] account of the method of attaining salvation (_Nyayakandali_, pp. 272-280).

See also Vallabha's _Nyayalilavati_, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915.)]

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the opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads a man to suffer. [email protected]@[email protected]_ or destiny is that unknown quality of things and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, and arranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance with their merits or demerits.

_Karma_ means movement; it is the third thing which must be held to be as irreducible a reality as dravya or [email protected] There are five kinds of movement, (1) upward, (2) downward, (3) contraction, (4) expansion, (5) movement in general. All kinds of karmas rest on substances just, as the [email protected] do, and cause the things to which they belong to move.

_Samanya_ is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spite of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows.

In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all perceived as _sat_ or existing. This sat or existence is thus a sameness, which is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, [email protected], and karma. This sameness is called _samanya_ or _jati_, and it is regarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, [email protected], or karma. This highest genus _satta_ (being) is called _parajati_ (highest universal), the other intermediate jatis are called aparajati (lower universals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of [email protected], or still more intermediate jatis such as _gotvajati_ (the genus cow), _nilatvajati_ (the genus blue). The intermediate jatis or genera sometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as _pas'utva_ (animal jati) and _gotva_ (the cow jati); here however gotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a jati.

The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is jati which from one aspect appears as genus and from another as species.

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This jati or _samanya_ thus must be regarded as having a separate independent reality though it is existent in dravya, [email protected] and karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any independent reality of samanya, but said that the sameness as cow was really but the negation of all non-cows (_apoha_). The perception of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns on his own head [Footnote ref 1]. The [email protected] said that negation of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness perceived as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained by the aforesaid negation theory of the Buddhists. Samanya has thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that object [Footnote ref l]. This jati is eternal or non-destructible, for even with the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jati, the latter is not destroyed [Footnote ref 2].

Through [email protected]_ things are perceived as diverse. No single sensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees with any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves.

The, specific difference existing in the atoms, emanc.i.p.ated souls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it

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[Footnote 1: The Buddhist Panditas'oka says that there is no single thing running through different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the samanya could be established, for if it did exist then we could have known it simply by seeing any cook without any reference to his action of cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is formed. If there is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish jati in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the action of the cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should require one common factor to hold them together, then these should require another and that another, and we have a regressus ad infinitum.

Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent (_yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptam sannopalabhyate tattadasat_). Samanya is such, therefore samanya is non existent. No samanya can be admitted to exist as an ent.i.ty. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past experiences of existence and non existence that this notion is formed and transferred erroneously to external objects. Apart from this no samanya can be pointed out as being externally perceptible --_Samanyadusanadikprasarita_--in _Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts_. The Vedanta also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know jati as a separate substance. So it discards jati. See _Vedantaparibhasa_, _Sikhamani_ and _Mamprabha_, pp. 69-71. See also Sriharsa's [email protected], pp 1079-1086.]

[Footnote 2: Similarity (sadrs'ya_) is not regarded as a separate category, for it is defined as ident.i.ty in difference (_tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhuyodharmavattvam_).]

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is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the yogins who can perceive them.

_Samavaya_, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation by virtue of which two different things such as substance and attribute, substance and karma, substance and samanya, karana (cause) and karya (effect), atoms and [email protected], appear so unified that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality.

This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jati in substance and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they are one and the same thing Samyoga or contact may take place between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected and may later on be connected (_yutasiddha_), such as when I put my pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances and were disconnected, the samynga relation is the [email protected] by virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samavaya however makes absolutely difficient things such as dravya and [email protected] and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear as one inseparable whole (_ayutasiddha_). This relation is thus a separate and independent category. This is not regarded as many like [email protected] (contact) but as one and eternal because it has no cause. This or that object (eg. jug) may be destroyed but the samavaya relation which was never brought into being by anybody always remains [Footnote ref 1].

These six things are called the six padarthas or independent realities experienced in perception and expressed in language.

The Theory of Causation.

The [email protected] in most of its speculations took that view of things which finds expression in our language, and which we tacitly a.s.sume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus

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[Footnote 1: The Vedanta does not admit the existence of the relation of samavaya as subsisting between two different ent.i.ties (e.g. substance and qualities). Thus [email protected] says ([email protected] II. ii. 13_) that if a samavaya relation is to be admitted to connect two different things, then another samavaya would be necessary to connect it with either of the two ent.i.ties that it intended to connect, and that another, and so there will be a vicious infinite (_anavastha_).

Nyaya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all. It is well to remember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of [email protected]_ (valid infinite, as in case of the question of the seed and the tree, or of the avidya and the pa.s.sions), and another [email protected] anavastha_ (vicious infinite) as when the admission of anything invokes an infinite chain before it can be completed.]

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they admitted dravya, [email protected], karma and samanya, [email protected] they had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did not admit that things were continually changing their qualities, and that everything could be produced out of everything by a change of the collocation or arrangement of the const.i.tuting atoms.

In the production of the effect too they did not admit that the effect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that the material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the accessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the wheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two destroyed the cause, and produced the effect which was not existent before but was newly produced. This is what is called the doctrine of _asatkaryavada_. This is just the opposite of the [email protected] axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed _nabhavo vidyate [email protected]_) and that the non-existent could never be produced (_nasato vidyate bhavah_). The objection to this view is that if what is non-existent is produced, then even such impossible things as the hare's horn could also be produced. The [email protected] answer is that the view is not that anything that is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced was non-existent [Footnote ref 1].

It is held by [email protected] that an unseen power resides in the cause which produces the effect. To this Nyaya objects that this is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for there is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendental operation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily explained by molecular movement (_parispanda_). There is nothing except the invariable time relation (antecedence and sequence) between the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness of an antecedent does not suffice to make it the cause of what succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well (_anyathasiddhis'unyasya niyatapurvavartt.i.ta_). Unconditionality and invariability are indispensable for [email protected]_ or cause and effect relation. For example, the non-essential or advent.i.tious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, only collateral or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditional upon something else (_na [email protected]_). The potter's stick is an unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour

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[Footnote 1: _Nyayamunjari_, p. 494.]

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of a stick or its texture or size, or any other accompaniment or accident which does not contribute to the work done, is not an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore be regarded as a cause. Similarly the co-effects of the invariable antecedents or what enters into the production of their co-effects may themselves be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by those of the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, the sound produced by the stick or by the potter's wheel invariably precedes the jar but it is a co-effect; and akas'a (ether) as the substrate and vayu (air) as the vehicle of the sound enter into the production of this co-effect, but these are no unconditional antecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumeration of conditions or causes of the jar. The conditions of the conditions should also be rejected; the invariable antecedent of the potter (who is an invariable antecedent of the jar), the potter's father, does not stand in a causal relation to the potter's handiwork. In fact the antecedence must not only be unconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate. Finally all seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed with or left out are not unconditional and cannot therefore be regarded as causal conditions. Thus Dr. Seal in describing it rightly remarks, "In the end, the discrimination of what is necessary to complete the sum of causes from what is dependent, collateral, secondary, superfluous, or inert (i.e. of the relevant from the irrelevant factors), must depend on the test of expenditure of energy. This test the Nyaya would accept only in the sense of an operation a.n.a.lysable into molar or molecular motion (_parispanda eva bhautiko [email protected] [email protected] atindriyastu vyaparo nasti._ Jayanta's Manjari ahnika I), but would emphatically reject, if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysterious causal power or efficiency (_s'akti_) [Footnote ref 1]." With Nyaya all energy is necessarily kinetic. This is a peculiarity of Nyaya--its insisting that the effect is only the sum or resultant of the operations of the different causal conditions--that these operations are of the nature of motion or kinetic, in other words it firmly holds to the view that causation is a case of expenditure of energy, i.e. a redistribution of motion, but at the same time absolutely repudiates the [email protected] conception of power or productive

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[Footnote 1: Dr P.C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, 1909, pp. 249-250.]

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efficiency as metaphysical or transcendental (_atindriya_) and finds nothing in the cause other than unconditional invariable complements of operative conditions ([email protected]_), and nothing in the effect other than the consequent phenomenon which results from the joint operations of the antecedent conditions [Footnote ref 1].

Certain general conditions such as relative s.p.a.ce (_dik_), time (_kala_), the will of is'vara, destiny ([email protected]@[email protected]_) are regarded as the common cause of all effects (_karyatva-prayojaka_). Those are called [email protected]@na_ (common cause) as distinguished from the specific causes which determine the specific effects which are called [email protected] [email protected]_. It may not be out of place here to notice that Nyaya while repudiating transcendental power (_s'akti_) in the mechanism of nature and natural causation, does not deny the existence of metaphysical conditions like merit (_dharma_), which const.i.tutes a system of moral ends that fulfil themselves through the mechanical systems and order of nature.

The causal relation then like the relation of genus to species, is a natural relation of concomitance, which can be ascertained only by the uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in presence and agreement in absence, and not by a deduction from a certain _a priori_ principle like that of causality or ident.i.ty of essence [Footnote ref 2].

The material cause such as the clay is technically called the [email protected]_ of the jug. _Samavaya_ means as we have seen an intimate, inseparable relation of inherence. A [email protected] is called _samavayi_ when its materials are found inseparably connected with the materials of the effect. [email protected] is that which produces its characteristics in the effect through the medium of the samavayi or material cause, e.g. the clay is not the cause of the colour of the jug but the colour of the clay is the cause of the colour of the jug. The colour of the clay which exists in the clay in inseparable relation is the cause of the colour of the jug. This colour of the clay is thus called the asamavayi cause of the jug.

Any quality ([email protected]_) or movement which existing in the samavaya cause in the samavaya relation determines the characteristics of the effect is called the [email protected] The instrumental

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