Theory of Perception.

The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the theory of perception lies, as we have already seen, in this, that the Jains think that perception ([email protected]_) reveals to us the external objects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics of colour, form, etc., and also in this, that knowledge arises in the soul

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[Footnote 1: Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or other kinds of relations to the objects of our judgment as do not actually exist, but the objects themselves actually exist in other relations. When I mistake the rope for the snake, the snake actually exists though its relationing with the "this" as "this is a snake" does not exist, for the snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus called _satkhyati_ or misrelationing of existents (_sat_)].

[Footnote 2: See _Jaina-tarka-varttika_ of Siddhasena, ch. I., and [email protected] by S'antyacarya, [email protected]@mkara, ch. I., [email protected],_ ch. I.]

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from within it as if by removing a veil which had been covering it before. Objects are also not mere forms of knowledge (as the Vijnanavadin Buddhist thinks) but are actually existing. Knowledge of external objects by perception is gained through the senses.

The exterior physical sense such as the eye must be distinguished from the invisible faculty or power of vision of the soul, which alone deserves the name of sense. We have five such cognitive senses. But the Jains think that since by our experience we are only aware of five kinds of sense knowledge corresponding to the five senses, it is better to say that it is the "self" which gains of itself those different kinds of sense-knowledge in a.s.sociation with those exterior senses as if by removal of a covering, on account of the existence of which the knowledge could not reveal itself before. The process of external perception does not thus involve the exercise of any separate and distinct sense, though the rise of the sense-knowledge in the soul takes place in a.s.sociation with the particular sense-organ such as eye, etc. The soul is in touch with all parts of the body, and visual knowledge is that knowledge which is generated in the soul through that part of it which is a.s.sociated with, or is in touch with the eye. To take an example, I look before me and see a rose. Before looking at it the knowledge of rose was in me, but only in a covered condition, and hence could not get itself manifested. The act of looking at the rose means that such a fitness has come into the rose and into myself that the rose is made visible, and the veil over my knowledge of rose is removed. When visual knowledge arises, this happens in a.s.sociation with the eye; I say that I see through the visual sense, whereas in reality experience shows that I have only a knowledge of the visual type (a.s.sociated with eye). As experience does not reveal the separate senses, it is unwarrantable to a.s.sert that they have an existence apart from the self. Proceeding in a similar way the Jains discard the separate existence of manas (mind-organ) also, for manas also is not given in experience, and the hypothesis of its existence is unnecessary, as self alone can serve its purpose [Footnote ref 1]. Perception of an object means

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[Footnote 1: _Tanna indriyam bhautikam kim tu atma ca indriyam...[email protected][email protected] eva [email protected] [email protected][email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected],_ II. p. 98. In many places, however, the five senses, such as eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as senses, and living beings are often cla.s.sified according to the number of senses they possess. (See [email protected]@msa._ See also _Tattvartha-dhigamasutra_, ch. II. etc.) But this is with reference to the sense organs. The denial of separate senses is with reference to admitting them as ent.i.ties or capacities having a distinct and separate category of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the sense-knowledge which rises in the soul by inward determination; for it is already existent in it; the perceptual process only means that the veil which as observing it is removed.]

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that the veil of ignorance upon the "self" regarding the object has been removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by the karma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the presence of the object of perception, light, the capacity of the sense organs, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhists and many other Indian systems, the Jains denied the existence of any nirvikalpa (indeterminate) stage preceding the final savikalpa (determinate) stage of perception. There was a direct revelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sense-materials were necessary for the development of determinate perceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists who regarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation of indeterminate sense materials was the only valid part of perception.

The determinate stage with them is the result of the application of mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc., and hence does not truly represent the presentative part [Footnote ref 1].

Non-Perceptual Knowledge.

Non-perceptual knowledge ([email protected]_) differs from [email protected] in this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as the latter. Since the Jains do not admit that the senses had any function in determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction they could draw between perception and other forms of knowledge was that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us clearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter.

[email protected] thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory, etc.; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception.

Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to have five propositions, such as: (1) "the hill is fiery," (2) "because of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called respectively _pratijna, hetu, [email protected], upanaya_ and _nigamana_, except for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two propositions which actually enter into the inferential process ([email protected]@da,_ pp. 108, 109). When we make an

[Footnote 1 [email protected]@da,_ pp. 8-11.]

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inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected with the probandum either as coexistence (_sahabhava_) or as invariable antecedence (_kramabhava_) will from the mere statement of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an inference [Footnote ref 1].

As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and right knowledge have conquered all pa.s.sions and removed all ignorance [Footnote ref 2].

Knowledge as Revelation.

The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us.

That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that

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[Footnote 1: As regards concomitance (_vyapti_) some of the Jaina logicians like the Buddhists prefer _antarvyapti_ (between smoke and fire) to bahirvyapti (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire).

They also divide inference into two cla.s.ses, svarthanumana for one's own self and _pararthanumana_ for convincing others. It may not be out of place to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabahu in his Das'avaikalikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for making an inference; (1) _Pratijna_ (e.g. non-injury to life is the greatest virtue), (2) _Pratijnavibhakti_ (non-injury to life is the greatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) _Hetu_ (because those who adhere to non-injury are loved by G.o.ds and it is meritorious to do them honour), (4) _Hetu vibhakti_ (those who do so are the only persons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) [email protected]_ (but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling Jaina scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins), (6) [email protected] [email protected]_ (it is not so, it is impossible that those who despise Jaina scriptures should be loved by G.o.ds or should deserve honour), (7) [email protected]@[email protected]_ (the Arhats take food from householders as they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects), (8) [email protected] (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats, for they cook for them), (9) [email protected]@sedha_ (this cannot be, for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not be said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) _Naigamana_ (non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) ([email protected]@na's _Indian Logic_). These are persuasive statements which are often actually adopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of these are irrelevant. When Vatsyayana in his [email protected]_, I. 1. 32, says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he probably had this Jaina view in his mind.]

[Footnote 2: See _Jainatarkavarttika_, and [email protected]@rtti_, and [email protected]@ddars'anasamuccaya_ with [email protected] on Jainism.]

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which could not non-existent. In fact production of effect was with them the only definition of existence (being). Theoretically each unit of effect being different from any other unit of effect they supposed that there was a succession of different units of effect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession of new substances every moment. All things were thus momentary.

The Jains urged that the reason why the production of effect may be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can a.s.sert only that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corresponding experience. When we have a unit of experience we suppose the existence of the object as its ground. This being so, the theoretical a.n.a.lysis of the Buddhists that each unit of effect produced in us is not exactly the same at each new point of time, and that therefore all things are momentary, is fallacious; for experience shows that not all of an object is found to be changing every moment; some part of it (e.g. gold in a gold ornament) is found to remain permanent while other parts (e.g. its form as earrings or bangles) are seen to undergo change. How in the face of such an experience can we a.s.sert that the whole thing vanishes every moment and that new things are being renewed at each succeeding moment? Hence leaving aside mere abstract and unfounded speculations, if we look to experience we find that the conception of being or existence involves a notion of permanence a.s.sociated with change--_paryaya_ (acquirement of new qualities and the loss of old ones). The Jains hold that the defects of other systems lie in this, that they interpret experience only from one particular standpoint (_naya_) whereas they alone carefully weigh experience from all points of view and acquiesce in the truths indicated by it, not absolutely but under proper reservations and limitations. The Jains hold that in formulating the doctrine of _arthakriyakaritva_ the Buddhists at first showed signs of starting on their enquiry on the evidence of experience, but soon they became one-sided in their a.n.a.lysis and indulged in unwarrantable abstract speculations which went directly against experience.

Thus if we go by experience we can neither reject the self nor the external world as some Buddhists did. Knowledge which reveals to us the clear-cut features of the external world certifies at the same time that such knowledge is part and parcel of myself as the subject. Knowledge is thus felt to be an expression of my own self. We do not perceive in experience that knowledge

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in us is generated by the external world, but there is in us the rise of knowledge and of certain objects made known to us by it.

The rise of knowledge is thus only parallel to certain objective collocations of things which somehow have the special fitness that they and they alone are perceived at that particular moment.

Looked at from this point of view all our experiences are centred in ourselves, for determined somehow, our experiences come to us as modifications of our own self. Knowledge being a character of the self, it shows itself as manifestations of the self independent of the senses. No distinction should be made between a conscious and an unconscious element in knowledge as [email protected] does. Nor should knowledge be regarded as a copy of the objects which it reveals, as the Sautrantikas think, for then by copying the materiality of the object, knowledge would itself become material.

Knowledge should thus be regarded as a formless quality of the self revealing all objects by itself. But the [email protected] view that the validity ([email protected]_) of all knowledge is proved by knowledge itself [email protected]@nya_) is wrong. Both logically and psychologically the validity of knowledge depends upon outward correspondence ([email protected]) with facts. But in those cases where by previous knowledge of correspondence a right belief has been produced there may be a psychological ascertainment of validity without reference to objective facts ([email protected] parata eva jnaptau svakarye ca [email protected] paratas'ca. [email protected]_) [Footnote ref 1]. The objective world exists as it is certified by experience. But that it generates knowledge in us is an unwarrantable hypothesis, for knowledge appears as a revelation of our own self. This brings us to a consideration of Jaina metaphysics.

The Jivas.

The Jains say that experience shows that all things may be divided into the living (_jiva_) and the non-living (_ajiva_). The principle of life is entirely distinct from the body, and it is most erroneous to think that life is either the product or the property of the body [Footnote ref 2] It is on account of this life-principle that the body appears to be living This principle is the soul. The soul is directly perceived (by introspection) just as the external things are. It is not a mere symbolical object indicated by a phrase or

[Footnote 1: [email protected]@da,_ pp. 38-43.]

[Footnote 2: See _Jaina Varttika,_ p. 60.]

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a description. This is directly against the view of the great [email protected] authority Prabhakara [Footnote ref 1]. The soul in its pure state is possessed of infinite perception (_ananta-dars'ana_), infinite knowledge (_ananta-jnana_), infinite bliss (_ananta-sukha_) and infinite power (_ananta-virya_) [Footnote ref 2]. It is all perfect. Ordinarily however, with the exception of a few released pure souls (_mukta-jiva_) all the other jivas ([email protected]_) have all their purity and power covered with a thin veil of karma matter which has been acc.u.mulating in them from beginningless time. These souls are infinite in number.

They are substances and are eternal. They in reality occupy innumerable s.p.a.ce-points in our mundane world (_lokakas'a_), have a limited size ([email protected]_) and are neither all-pervasive (_vibhu_) nor atomic (_anu_); it is on account of this that _jiva_ is called _Jivastikaya_. The word _astikaya_ means anything that occupies s.p.a.ce or has some pervasiveness; but these souls expand and contract themselves according to the dimensions of the body which they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant and smaller in the ant life). It is well to remember that according to the Jains the soul occupies the whole of the body in which it lives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the foot, wherever there may be any cause of sensation, it can at once feel it. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often explained as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines the whole room though remaining in one corner of the room. The Jains divide the jivas according to the number of sense-organs they possess. The lowest cla.s.s consists of plants, which possess only the sense-organ of touch. The next higher cla.s.s is that of worms, which possess two sense-organs of touch and taste.

Next come the ants, etc., which possess touch, taste, and smell.

The next higher one that of bees, etc., possessing vision in addition to touch, taste, and smell. The vertebrates possess all the five sense-organs. The higher animals among these, namely men, denizens of h.e.l.l, and the G.o.ds possess in addition to these an inner sense-organ namely _manas_ by virtue of which they are

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[Footnote 1: See [email protected],_ p. 33.]

[Footnote 2: The Jains distinguish between _dars'ana_ and _jnana_.

Dars'ana is the knowledge of things without their details, e.g. I see a cloth. Jnana means the knowledge of details, e.g. I not only see the cloth, but know to whom it belongs, of what quality it is, where it was prepared, etc. In all cognition we have first dars'ana and then jnana. The pure souls possess infinite general perception of all things as well as infinite knowledge of all things in all their details.]

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called rational ([email protected]_) while the lower animals have no reason and are called _asamjnin_.

Proceeding towards the lowest animal we find that the Jains regard all the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) as being animated by souls. Thus particles of earth, etc., are the bodies of souls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives; they live and die and are born again in another elementary body.

These elementary lives are either gross or subtle; in the latter case they are invisible. The last cla.s.s of one-organ lives are plants.

Of some plants each is the body of one soul only; but of other plants, each is an aggregation of embodied souls, which have all the functions of life such as respiration and nutrition in common.