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[Footnote 1: [email protected]'s _Tarkarahasyadipika_, pp. 46-47.]

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view is only a veiled [email protected] doctrine; that of [email protected] is a confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the coexistence of all the aspects of an ent.i.ty at the same time, and that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would suppose that all the three times were found together and included in one of them. The [email protected] finds himself in agreement with Vasumitra's view and holds that the difference in time depends upon the difference of the function of an ent.i.ty; at the time when an ent.i.ty does not actually produce its function it is future; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having produced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existence of the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinks that if the past did not exist and a.s.sert some efficiency it could not have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in past times could not have produced its effects in the present time. The Sautrantika however thought that the [email protected]'s doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence, for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-difference appeared in it. The true view according to him was, that there was no difference between the efficiency of an ent.i.ty, the ent.i.ty and the time of its appearance. Ent.i.ties appeared from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to exist. He objected to the [email protected] view that the past is to be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing about the present on the ground that in that case there should be no difference between the past and the present, since both exerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. We can know non-existent ent.i.ties as much as we can know existent ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply that the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction is made between an efficiency and an ent.i.ty, then the reason why efficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another would be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no difference between efficiency and the ent.i.ty, you at once find that there is no time at all and the efficiency, the ent.i.ty and the moment are all one and the same. When we remember a thing of the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the same way in which we knew it when it was present. We are

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never attracted to past pa.s.sions as the [email protected] suggests, but past pa.s.sions leave residues which become the causes of new pa.s.sions of the present moment [Footnote ref.1].

Again we can have a glimpse of the respective positions of the Vatsiputtriyas and the Sarvastivadins as represented by Vasubandhu if we attend to the discussion on the subject of the existence of soul in _Abhidharmakos'a_. The argument of Vasubandhu against the existence of soul is this, that though it is true that the sense organs may be regarded as a determining cause of perception, no such cause can be found which may render the inference of the existence of soul necessary.

If soul actually exists, it must have an essence of its own and must be something different from the elements or ent.i.ties of a personal life. Moreover, such an eternal, uncaused and unchanging being would be without any practical efficiency (_arthakriyakaritva_) which alone determines or proves existence. The soul can thus be said to have a mere nominal existence as a mere object of current usage. There is no soul, but there are only the elements of a personal life. But the Vatsiputtriya school held that just as fire could not be said to be either the same as the burning wood or as different from it, and yet it is separate from it, so the soul is an individual (_pudgala_) which has a separate existence, though we could not say that it was altogether different from the elements of a personal life or the same as these. It exists as being conditioned by the elements of personal life, but it cannot further be defined. But its existence cannot be denied, for wherever there is an activity, there must be an agent (e.g. Devadatta walks). To be conscious is likewise an action, hence the agent who is conscious must also exist.

To this Vasubandhu replies that Devadatta (the name of a person) does not represent an unity. "It is only an unbroken continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which simple people believe to be a unity and to which they give the name Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned, and is based on an a.n.a.logy with their own experience, but their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving from one place to another. This movement, though regarded as

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[Footnote 1: I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished translation from Tibetan of a small portion of _Abhidharmakoia_ by my esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky of Petrograd. I am grateful to him that he allowed me to utilize it.]

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belonging to a permanent ent.i.ty, is but a series of new productions in different places, just as the expressions 'fire moves,'

'sound spreads' have the meaning of continuities (of new productions in new places). They likewise use the words 'Devadatta cognises' in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments, these former moments coming in close succession being called Devadatta)."

The problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty, for the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it produces its recollections when connected with a previous knowledge of the remembered object under certain conditions of attention, etc., and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains or violent emotions. No agent is required in the phenomena of memory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mind and nothing else. When the Buddha told his birth stories saying that he was such and such in such and such a life, he only meant that his past and his present belonged to one and the same lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say "this same fire which had been consuming that has reached this object," we know that the fire is not identical at any two moments, but yet we overlook the difference and say that it is the same fire. Again, what we call an individual can only be known by descriptions such as "this venerable man, having this name, of such a caste, of such a family, of such an age, eating such food, finding pleasure or displeasure in such things, of such an age, the man who after a life of such length, will pa.s.s away having reached an age." Only so much description can be understood, but we have never a direct acquaintance with the individual; all that is perceived are the momentary elements of sensations, images, feelings, etc., and these happening at the former moments exert a pressure on the later ones. The individual is thus only a fiction, a mere nominal existence, a mere thing of description and not of acquaintance; it cannot be grasped either by the senses or by the action of pure intellect.

This becomes evident when we judge it by a.n.a.logies from other fields. Thus whenever we use any common noun, e.g. milk, we sometimes falsely think that there is such an ent.i.ty as milk, but what really exists is only certain momentary colours, tastes, etc., fict.i.tiously unified as milk; and "just as milk and water are

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conventional names (for a set of independent elements) for some colour, smell (taste and touch) taken together, so is the designation 'individual' but a common name for the different elements of which it is composed."

The reason why the Buddha declined to decide the question whether the "living being is identical with the body or not" is just because there did not exist any living being as "individual,"

as is generally supposed. He did not declare that the living being did not exist, because in that case the questioner would have thought that the continuity of the elements of a life was also denied. In truth the "living being" is only a conventional name for a set of constantly changing elements [Footnote ref 1].

The only book of the Sammitiyas known to us and that by name only is the _Sammitiyas'astra_ translated into Chinese between 350 A.D. to 431 A.D.; the original Sanskrit works are however probably lost [Footnote ref 2].

The [email protected] are identified with the Sarvastivadins who according to [email protected]_ V. 47, as pointed out by Takakusu, branched off from the Mahis'asakas, who in their turn had separated from the Theravada school.

From the _Kathavatthu_ we know (1) that the Sabbatthivadins believed that everything existed, (2) that the dawn of right attainment was not a momentary flash of insight but by a gradual process, (3) that consciousness or even samadhi was nothing but

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[Footnote 1: This account is based on the translation of [email protected]@[email protected] [email protected]_, a special appendix to the eighth chapter of Abhidharmakos'a, by Prof Th. Stcherbatsky, _Bulletin de l' Academie des Sciences de Russie_, 1919.]

[Footnote 2: Professor De la Vallee Poussin has collected some of the points of this doctrine in an article on the Sammitiyas in the _E. R.E._ He there says that in the _Abhidharmakos'avyakhya_ the Sammitiyas have been identified with the Vatsiputtriyas and that many of its texts were admitted by the [email protected] of a later age. Some of their views are as follows: (1) An arhat in possession of nirvana can fall away; (2) there is an intermediate state between death and rebirth called _antarabhava_; (3) merit accrues not only by gift (_tyaganvaya_) but also by the fact of the actual use and advantage reaped by the man to whom the thing was given (_paribhoganvaya [email protected]_); (4) not only abstention from evil deeds but a declaration of intention to that end produces merit by itself alone; (5) they believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas from which it can be said to be either different or non-different. "The pudgala cannot be said to be transitory (_anitye_) like the skandhas since it transmigrates laying down the burden (_skandhas_) shouldering a new burden; it cannot be said to be permanent, since it is made of transitory const.i.tuents." This pudgala doctrine of the Sammitiyas as sketched by Professor De la Vallee Poussin is not in full agreement with the pudgala doctrine of the Sammitiyas as sketched by [email protected] which we have noticed above.]

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a flux and (4) that an arhat (saint) may fall away [Footnote ref 1].

The Sabbatthivadins or Sarvastivadins have a vast Abhidharma literature still existing in Chinese translations which is different from the Abhidharma of the Theravada school which we have already mentioned [Footnote ref 2]. These are 1. _Jnanaprasthana S'astra_ of Katyayaniputtra which pa.s.sed by the name of _Maha [email protected]_ from which the Sabbatthivadins who followed it are called [email protected] [Footnote ref 3]. This work is said to have been given a literary form by [email protected]

2. _Dharmaskandha_ by S'ariputtra. 3. _Dhatukaya_ by [email protected]

4. _Prajnaptis'astra_ by Maudgalyayana. 5. _Vijnanakaya_ by [email protected]

6. [email protected]_ by Sariputtra and [email protected]_ by Vasumitra.

Vasubandhu (420 A.D.-500 A.D.) wrote a work on the [email protected] [Footnote ref 4] system in verses (_karika_) known as the _Abhidharmakos'a_, to which he appended a commentary of his own which pa.s.ses by the name _Abhidharma [email protected]_ in which he pointed out some of the defects of the [email protected] school from the Sautrantika point of view [Footnote ref 5]. This work was commented upon by Vasumitra and [email protected] and later on by Yas'omitra who was himself a Sautrantika and called his work _Abhidharmakos'a vyakhya_; [email protected] a contemporary of Vasubandhu wrote _Samayapradipa_ and _Nyaya.n.u.sara_ (Chinese translations of which are available) on strict [email protected] lines. We hear also of other [email protected] writers such as Dharmatrata, [email protected], Vasumitra and Bhadanta, the writer of [email protected]'astra_ and [email protected]_.

[email protected](480 A.D.), the celebrated logician, a [email protected] or a Sautrantika and reputed to be a pupil of Vasubandhu, wrote his famous work [email protected]_ in which he established Buddhist logic and refuted many of the views of Vatsyayana the celebrated commentator of the _Nyaya sutras_; but we regret

[Footnote 1: See Mrs Rhys Davids's translation _Kathavatthu_, p. xix, and Sections I.6,7; II. 9 and XI. 6.]

[Footnote 2: _Mahavyutpatti_ gives two names for Sarvastivada, viz.

Mulasarvastivada and aryyasarvastivada. Itsing (671-695 A.D.) speaks of aryyamulasarvastivada and Mulasarvastivada. In his time he found it prevailing in Magadha, Guzrat, Sind, S. India, E. India. Takakusu says (_P.T.S._ 1904-1905) that Paramartha, in his life of Vasubandhu, says that it was propagated from Kashmere to Middle India by Vasubhadra, who studied it there.]

[Footnote 3: Takakusu says (_P.T.S._ 1904-1905) that Katyayaniputtra's work was probably a compilation from other [email protected] which existed before the Chinese translations and [email protected] texts dated 383 A.D.]

[Footnote 4: See Takakusu's article _J.R.A.S._ 1905.]

[Footnote 5: The Sautrantikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of the [email protected] as authentic and laid stress on the suttanta doctrines as given in the [email protected]]

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to say that none of the above works are available in Sanskrit, nor have they been retranslated from Chinese or Tibetan into any of the modern European or Indian languages.

The j.a.panese scholar Mr Yamakami Sogen, late lecturer at Calcutta University, describes the doctrine of the Sabbatthivadins from the Chinese versions of the _Abhidharmakos'a, [email protected]'astra_, etc., rather elaborately [Footnote ref 1]. The following is a short sketch, which is borrowed mainly from the accounts given by Mr Sogen.

The Sabbatthivadins admitted the five skandhas, twelve ayatanas, eighteen dhatus, the three [email protected]@rta dharmas of [email protected] [email protected] and akas'a, and the [email protected]@rta dharmas (things composite and interdependent) of rupa (matter), citta (mind), caitta (mental) and cittaviprayukta (non-mental) [Footnote ref 2]. All effects are produced by the coming together ([email protected]@rta) of a number of causes. The five skandhas, and the rupa, citta, etc., are thus called [email protected]@rta dharmas (composite things or collocations--_sambhuyakari_). The rupa dharmas are eleven in number, one citta dharma, 46 caitta dharmas and 14 cittaviprayukta [email protected] dharmas (non-mental composite things); adding to these the three [email protected]@rta dharmas we have the seventy-five dharmas. Rupa is that which has the capacity to obstruct the sense organs. Matter is regarded as the collective organism or collocation, consisting of the fourfold substratum of colour, smell, taste and contact. The unit possessing this fourfold substratum is known as [email protected], which is the minutest form of rupa. It cannot be pierced through or picked up or thrown away. It is indivisible, una.n.a.lysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable and intangible.

But yet it is not permanent, but is like a momentary flash into being. The simple atoms are called [email protected]_ and the compound ones [email protected]@nu_. In the words of Prof. Stcherbatsky "the universal elements of matter are manifested in their actions or functions. They are consequently more energies than substances." The organs of sense are also regarded as modifications of atomic matter. Seven such [email protected] combine together to form an [email protected], and it is in this combined form only that they become perceptible. The combination takes place in the form of a cl.u.s.ter having one atom at the centre and

[Footnote 1: _Systems of Buddhistic Thought_, published by the Calcutta University.]

[Footnote 2: [email protected] in his meagre sketch of the doctrine of the Sarvastivadins in his [email protected] on the _Brahma-sutras_ II. 2 notices some of the categories mentioned by Sogen.]

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others around it. The point which must be remembered in connection with the conception of matter is this, that the qualities of all the mahabhutas are inherent in the [email protected] The special characteristics of roughness (which naturally belongs to earth), viscousness (which naturally belongs to water), heat (belonging to fire), movableness (belonging to wind), combine together to form each of the elements; the difference between the different elements consists only in this, that in each of them its own special characteristics were predominant and active, and other characteristics though present remained only in a potential form. The mutual resistance of material things is due to the quality of earth or the solidness inherent in them; the mutual attraction of things is due to moisture or the quality of water, and so forth.

The four elements are to be observed from three aspects, namely, (1) as things, (2) from the point of view of their natures (such as activity, moisture, etc.), and (3) function (such as [email protected]_ or attraction, [email protected]_ or cohesion, _pakti_ or chemical heat, and _vyuhana_ or cl.u.s.tering and collecting). These combine together naturally by other conditions or causes. The main point of distinction between the [email protected] Sarvastivadins and other forms of Buddhism is this, that here the five skandhas and matter are regarded as permanent and eternal; they are said to be momentary only in the sense that they are changing their phases constantly, owing to their constant change of combination. Avidya is not regarded here as a link in the chain of the causal series of prat.i.tyasamutpada; nor is it ignorance of any particular individual, but is rather identical with "moha" or delusion and represents the ultimate state of immaterial dharmas. Avidya, which through [email protected], etc., produces namarupa in the case of a particular individual, is not his avidya in the present existence but the avidya of his past existence bearing fruit in the present life.

"The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when it becomes an effect, having changed its state." For example, clay becomes jar, having changed its state; and in this case the name clay is lost and the name jar arises [Footnote ref 1]. The Sarvastivadins allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only in the case of composite things ([email protected] hetu_) and in the case of

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[Footnote 1: Sogen's quotation from k.u.marajiva's Chinese version of aryyadeva's commentary on the _Madhyamika s'astra_ (chapter XX. Karika 9).]

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the interaction of mental and material things. The substratum of "vijnana" or "consciousness" is regarded as permanent and the aggregate of the five senses (_indriyas_) is called the perceiver.

It must be remembered that the indriyas being material had a permanent substratum, and their aggregate had therefore also a substratum formed of them.