A Commonplace Book of Thoughts, Memories, and Fancies.

by Anna Jameson.

PREFACE.

I must be allowed to say a few words in explanation of the contents of this little volume, which is truly what its name sets forth-a book of common-places, and nothing more. If I have never, in any work I have ventured to place before the public, aspired to _teach_, (being myself a _learner_ in all things,) at least I have hitherto done my best to deserve the indulgence I have met with; and it would pain me if it could be supposed that such indulgence had rendered me presumptuous or careless.

For many years I have been accustomed to make a memorandum of any thought which might come across me-(if pen and paper were at hand), and to mark (and _remark_) any pa.s.sage in a book which excited either a sympathetic or an antagonistic feeling. This collection of notes acc.u.mulated insensibly from day to day. The volumes on Shakspeare's Women, on Sacred and Legendary Art, and various other productions, sprung from seed thus lightly and casually sown, which, I hardly know how, grew up and expanded into a regular, readable form, with a beginning, a middle, and an end. But what was to be done with the fragments which remained-without beginning, and without end-links of a hidden or a broken chain? Whether to preserve them or destroy them became a question, and one I could not answer for myself. In allowing a portion of them to go forth to the world in their original form, as unconnected fragments, I have been guided by the wishes of others, who deemed it not wholly uninteresting or profitless to trace the path, sometimes devious enough, of an "inquiring spirit," even by the little pebbles dropped as vestiges by the way side.

A book so supremely egotistical and subjective can do good only in one way. It may, like conversation with a friend, open up sources of sympathy and reflection; excite to argument, agreement, or disagreement; and, like every spontaneous utterance of thought out of an earnest mind, suggest far higher and better thoughts than any to be found here to higher and more productive minds. If I had not the humble hope of such a possible result, instead of sending these memoranda to the printer, I should have thrown them into the fire; for I lack that creative faculty which can work up the teachings of heart-sorrow and world-experience into attractive forms of fiction or of art; and having no intention of leaving any such memorials to be published after my death, they must have gone into the fire as the only alternative left.

The pa.s.sages from books are not, strictly speaking, _selected_; they are not given here on any principle of choice, but simply because that by some process of a.s.similation they became a part of the individual mind.

They "found _me_,"-to borrow Coleridge's expression,-"found me in some depth of my being;" I did not "find _them_."

For the rest, all those pa.s.sages which are marked by inverted commas must be regarded as borrowed, though I have not always been able to give my authority. All pa.s.sages not so marked are, I dare not say, original or new, but at least the unstudied expression of a free discursive mind.

Fruits, not advisedly plucked, but which the variable winds have shaken from the tree: some ripe, some "harsh and crude."

Wordsworth's famous poem of "The Happy Warrior" (of which a new application will be found at page 87.), is supposed by Mr. De Quincey to have been first suggested by the character of Nelson. It has since been applied to Sir Charles Napier (the Indian General), as well as to the Duke of Wellington; all which serves to ill.u.s.trate my position, that the lines in question are equally applicable to any man or any woman whose moral standard is irrespective of selfishness and expediency.

With regard to the fragment on Sculpture, it may be necessary to state that it was written in 1848. The first three paragraphs were inserted in the Art Journal for April, 1849. It was intended to enlarge the whole into a comprehensive essay on "Subjects fitted for Artistic Treatment;"

but this being now impossible, the fragment is given as originally written; others may think it out, and apply it better than I shall live to do.

August, 1854.

PART I.

Ethics and Character.

Ethical Fragments.

1.

Bacon says, how wisely! that "there is often as great vanity in withdrawing and retiring men's conceits from the world, as in obtruding them." Extreme vanity sometimes hides under the garb of ultra modesty.

When I see people haunted by the idea of self,-spreading their hands before their faces lest they meet the reflection of it in every other face, as if the world were to them like a French drawing-room, panelled with looking gla.s.s,-always fussily putting their obtrusive self behind them, or dragging over it a scanty drapery of consciousness, miscalled modesty,-always on their defence against compliments, or mistaking sympathy for compliment, which is as great an error, and a more vulgar one than mistaking flattery for sympathy,-when I see all this, as I have seen it, I am inclined to attribute it to the immaturity of the character, or to what is worse, a total want of simplicity. To some characters fame is like an intoxicating cup placed to the lips,-they do well to turn away from it, who fear it will turn their heads. But to others, fame is "love disguised," the love that answers to love, in its widest most exalted sense. It seems to me, that we should all bring the best that is in us (according to the diversity of gifts which G.o.d has given us), and lay it a reverend offering on the altar of humanity,-if not to burn and enlighten, at least to rise in incense to heaven. So will the pure in heart, and the unselfish do; and they will not heed if those who _can_ bring nothing or _will_ bring nothing, unless they can blaze like a beacon, call out "VANITY!"

[Ill.u.s.tration]

2.

There are truths which, by perpetual repet.i.tion, have subsided into pa.s.sive truisms, till, in some moment of feeling or experience, they kindle into conviction, start to life and light, and the truism becomes again a vital truth.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

3.

It is well that we obtain what we require at the cheapest possible rate; yet those who cheapen goods, or beat down the price of a good article, or buy in preference to what is good and genuine of its kind an inferior article at an inferior price, sometimes do much mischief. Not only do they discourage the production of a better article, but if they be anxious about the education of the lower cla.s.ses they undo with one hand what they do with the other; they encourage the mere mechanic and the production of what may be produced without effort of mind and without education, and they discourage and wrong the skilled workman for whom education has done much more and whose education has cost much more.

Every work so merely and basely mechanical, that a man can throw into it no part of his own life and soul, does, in the long run, degrade the human being. It is only by giving him some kind of mental and moral interest in the labour of his hands, making it an exercise of his understanding, and an object of his sympathy, that we can really elevate the workman; and this is not the case with very cheap production of any kind. (Southampton, Dec. 1849.)

Since this was written the same idea has been carried out, with far more eloquent reasoning, in a n.o.ble pa.s.sage which I have just found in Mr.

Ruskin's last volume of "The Stones of Venice" (the Sea Stories). As I do not _always_ subscribe to his theories of Art, I am the more delighted with this antic.i.p.ation of a moral agreement between us.

"We have much studied and much perfected of late, the great civilised invention of the division of labour, only we give it a false name. It is not, truly speaking, the labour that is divided, but the men:-divided into mere segments of men,-broken into small fragments and crumbs of life; so that all the little piece of intelligence that is left in a man is not enough to make a pin or a nail, but exhausts itself in making the point of a pin or the head of a nail. Now, it is a good and desirable thing truly to make many pins in a day, but if we could only see with what crystal sand their points are polished-sand of human soul, much to be magnified before it can be discerned for what it is,-we should think there might be some loss in it also; and the great cry that rises from all our manufacturing cities, louder than their furnace-blast, is all in very deed for this,-that we manufacture everything there except men,-we blanch cotton, and strengthen steel, and refine sugar, and shape pottery; but to brighten, to strengthen, to refine, or to form a single living spirit, never enters into our estimate of advantages; and all the evil to which that cry is urging our myriads, can be met only in one way,-not by teaching nor preaching; for to teach them is but to show them their misery; and to preach to them-if we do nothing more than preach,-is to mock at it. It can be met only by a right understanding on the part of all cla.s.ses, of what kinds of labour are good for men, raising them and making them happy; by a determined sacrifice of such convenience, or beauty or cheapness, as is to be got only by the degradation of the workman, and by equally determined demand for the products and results of a healthy and enn.o.bling labour." ....

"We are always in these days trying to separate the two (intellect and work). We want one man to be always thinking, and another to be always working; and we call one a gentleman and the other an operative; whereas, the workman ought to be often thinking, and the thinker often working, and both should be gentlemen in the best sense. It is only by labour that thought can be made healthy, and only by thought that labour can be made happy; and the two cannot be separated with impunity."

Wordsworth, however, had said the same thing before either of us:

"Our life is turn'd Out of her course wherever man is made An offering or a sacrifice,-a tool Or implement,-a pa.s.sive thing employed As a brute mean, without acknowledgment Of common right or interest in the end, Used or abused as selfishness may prompt.

Say what can follow for a rational soul Perverted thus, but weakness in all good And strength in evil?"

[Ill.u.s.tration]

And this leads us to the consideration of another mistake, a.n.a.logous with the above, but referable in its results chiefly to the higher, or what Mr. Ruskin calls the _thinking_, cla.s.ses of the community.

It is not good for us to have all that we value of worldly material things in the form of money. It is the most vulgar form in which value can be invested. Not only books, pictures, and all beautiful things are better; but even jewels and trinkets are sometimes to be preferred to mere hard money. Lands and tenements are good, as involving duties; but still what is valuable in the market sense should sometimes take the ideal and the beautiful form, and be dear and lovely and valuable for its own sake as well as for its convertible worth in hard gold. I think the character would be apt to deteriorate when all its material possessions take the form of money, and when money becomes valuable for its own sake, or as the mere instrument or representative of power.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

4.

We are told in a late account of Laura Bridgeman, the blind, deaf, and dumb girl, that her instructor once endeavoured to explain the difference between the material and the immaterial, and used the word "soul." She interrupted to ask, "What is soul?"

"That which thinks, feels, hopes, loves,--"

"And _aches_?" she added eagerly.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

5.

I was reading to-day in the Notes to Boswell's Life of Johnson that "it is a theory which every one knows to be _false in fact_, that virtue in real life is always productive of happiness, and vice of misery." I should say that all my experience teaches me that the position is not false but true: that virtue _does_ produce happiness, and vice _does_ produce misery. But let us settle the meaning of the words. By _happiness_, we do not necessarily mean a state of worldly prosperity.

By _virtue_, we do not mean a series of good actions which may or may not be rewarded, and, if done for reward, lose the essence of virtue.

Virtue, according to my idea, is the habitual sense of right, and the habitual courage to act up to that sense of right, combined with benevolent sympathies, the charity which thinketh no evil. This union of the highest conscience and the highest sympathy fulfils my notion of virtue. Strength is essential to it; weakness incompatible with it.