_Direct._ XXIV. Ask yourselves seriously, how you would wish at death and judgment that you had used all your wits, and time, and wealth; and resolve accordingly to use them now.--This is an excellent direction and motive to you for doing good, and preventing the condemnation which will pa.s.s upon unprofitable servants. Ask yourselves, Will it comfort me more at death or judgment, to think, or hear, that I spent this hour in plays or idleness, or in doing good to myself or others? How shall I wish then I had laid out my estate, and every part of it? Reason itself condemneth him that will not now choose the course which then he shall wish that he had chosen, when we foresee the consequence of that day.

_Direct._ XXV. Understand how much you are beholden to G.o.d, (and not he to you,) in that he will employ you in doing any good; and how it is the way of your own receiving; and know the excellency of your work and end, that you may do it all with love and pleasure.--Unacquaintedness with our Master, and with the nature and tendency of our work, is it that maketh it seem tedious and unpleasant to us: and we shall never do it well, when we do it with an ill will, as merely forced. G.o.d loveth a cheerful servant, that loveth his Master and his work. It is the main policy of the devil to make our duty seem grievous, unprofitable, undesirable, and wearisome to us: for a little thing will stop him that goeth unwillingly and in continual pain.

_Direct._ XXVI. Expect your reward from G.o.d alone, and look for unthankfulness and abuse from men, or wonder not if it befall you.--If you are not the servants of men, but of G.o.d, expect your recompence from him you serve. You serve not G.o.d indeed, if his reward alone will not content you, unless you have also man's reward. "Verily you have your reward," if, with the hypocrite, you work for man's approbation, Matt. vi. 2, 5. Expect, especially if you are ministers or others that labour directly for the good of souls, that many prove your enemies for your telling them the truth; and that if you were as good as Paul, and as unwearied in seeking men's salvation, yet the more you love, the less you will (by many) be loved: and those that he could have wished himself accursed from Christ to save, did hate him, and persecute him, as if he had been the most accursed wretch: a pestilent fellow, and a mover of sedition among the people, and one that turned the world upside down, were the names they gave him; and wherever he came, "bonds and imprisonment did attend him;" and slandering, and reviling, and whipping, and stocks, and vowing his death, are the thanks and requital which he hath from those, for whose salvation he spared no pains, but did spend and was spent. If you cannot do good upon such terms as these, and for those that will thus requite you, and be contented to expect a reward in heaven, you are not fit to follow Christ, who was worse used than all this, by those to whom he showed more love than any of his servants have to show. "Take up your cross, and do good to the unthankful, and bless them that curse you, and love them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you, if you will be the children of G.o.d," Matt. v.

_Direct._ XXVII. Make not your own judgments or consciences your law, or the maker of your duty; which is but the discerner of the law of G.o.d, and of the duty which he maketh you, and of your own obedience or disobedience to him.--There is a dangerous error grown too common in the world, that a man is bound to do every thing which his conscience telleth him is the will of G.o.d; and that every man must obey his conscience, as if it were the lawgiver of the world; whereas, indeed, it is not ourselves, but G.o.d, that is our lawgiver. And conscience is not appointed or authorized to make us any duty, which G.o.d hath not made us; but only to discern the law of G.o.d, and call upon us to observe it: and an erring conscience is not to be obeyed, but to be better informed, and brought to a righter performance of its office.

In prosecution of this direction, I shall here answer several cases about doubting.

_Quest._ I. What if I doubt whether a thing be a duty and good work or not? must I do it while I doubt? Nay, what if I am uncertain whether it be duty or sin?

_Answ._ I. In all these cases about an erring or doubting conscience, forget not to distinguish between the being of a duty and the knowledge of a duty: and remember, that the first question is, Whether this be my duty? and the next, How I may discern it to be my duty? And that G.o.d giveth it the being by his law, and conscience is but to know and use it: and that G.o.d changeth not his law, and our duty, as oft as our opinions change about it. The obligation of the law is still the same, though our consciences err in apprehending it otherwise. Therefore, if G.o.d command you a duty, and your opinion be that he doth not command it, or that he forbids it, and so that it is no duty, or that it is a sin, it doth not follow that indeed G.o.d commands it not because you think so: else it were no error in you; nor could it be possible to err, if the thing become true, because you think it to be true. G.o.d commandeth you to love him, and to worship him, and to nourish your children, and to obey the higher powers, &c. And do you think you shall be discharged from all these duties, and allowed to be profane, or sensual, or to resist authority, or to famish your children, if you can but be blind enough to think that G.o.d would have it so? 2. Your error is a sin itself: and do you think that one sin must warrant another? or that sin can discharge you from your duty, and disannul the law? 3. You are a subject to G.o.d, and not a king to yourself; and therefore, you must obey his laws, and not make new ones.

_Quest._ II. But is it not every man's duty to obey his conscience?

_Answ._ No: it is no man's duty to obey his conscience in an error, when it contradicteth the command of G.o.d. Conscience is but a discerner of G.o.d's command, and not at all to be obeyed strictly as a commander; but it is to be obeyed in a larger sense, that is, to be followed wherever it truly discerneth the command of G.o.d. It is our duty to lay by our error, and seek the cure of it, till we attain it, and not to obey it.

_Quest._ III. But is it not a sin for a man to go against his conscience?

_Answ._ Yes: not because conscience hath any authority to make laws for you; but because interpretatively you go against G.o.d. For you are bound to obey G.o.d in all things; and when you think that G.o.d commandeth you a thing, and yet you will not do it, you disobey formally, though not materially. The matter of obedience is the thing commanded: the form of obedience is our doing the thing, because it is commanded; when the authority of the commander causeth us to do it.

Now you reject the authority of G.o.d, when you reject that which you think he commandeth, though he did not.

_Quest._ IV. Seeing the form of obedience is the being of it, and denominateth, which the matter doth not without the form, and there can be no sin which is not against the authority of G.o.d, which is the formal cause of obedience, is it not then my duty to follow my conscience?

_Answ._ 1. There must be an integrity of causes, or concurrence of all necessaries to make up obedience, though the want of any one will make a sin. If you will be called obedient, you must have the matter and form, because the true form is found in no other matter; you must do the thing commanded, because of his authority that commandeth it. If it may be called really and formally obedience, when you err, yet it is not that obedience which is acceptable; for it is not any kind of obedience, but obedience in the thing commanded, that G.o.d requireth.

2. But indeed as long as you err sinfully, you are also wanting in the form as well as the matter of your obedience, though you intend obedience in the particular act. It is not only a wilful opposing, and positive rejecting the authority of the commander, which is formal disobedience; but it is any privation of due subjection to it; when his authority is not so regarded as it ought to be; and doth not so powerfully and effectually move us to our duty as it ought. Now this formal disobedience is found in your erroneous conscience; for if G.o.d's authority had moved you as it should have done, to diligent inquiry and use of all appointed means, and to the avoiding of all the causes of error, you had never erred about your duty. For if the error had been perfectly involuntary and blameless, the thing could not have been your particular duty, which you could not possibly come to know.

_Quest._ V. But if it be a sin to go against my conscience, must I not avoid that sin by obeying it? Would you have me sin?

_Answ._ You must avoid the sin, by changing your judgment, and not by obeying it; for that is but to avoid one sin by committing another. An erring judgment is neither obeyed nor disobeyed without sin; it can make you sin, though it cannot make you duty; it doth insnare, though not oblige. If you follow it, you break the law of G.o.d in doing that which he forbids you. If you forsake it and go against it, you reject the authority of G.o.d, in doing that which you think he forbids you. So that there is no attaining to innocence any other way, but by coming first to know your duty, and then to do it. If you command your servant to weed your corn, and he mistake you, and verily think, that you bid him pull up the corn, and not the weeds; what now should he do? Shall he follow his judgment, or go against it? Neither, but change it, and then follow it; and to that end inquire further of your mind, till he be better informed: and no way else will serve the turn.

_Quest._ VI. Seeing no man that erreth doth know or think that he erreth, (for that is a contradiction,) how can I lay by that opinion, or strive against it, which I take to be the truth?

_Answ._ It is your sin, that you take a falsehood to be a truth. G.o.d hath appointed means for the cure of blindness and error, as well as other sins; or else the world were in a miserable case. Come into the light, with due self-suspicion, and impartiality, and diligently use all G.o.d's means, and avoid the causes of deceit and error, and the light of truth will at once show you the truth, and show you that before you erred. In the mean time sin will be sin, though you take it to be duty, or no sin.

_Quest._ VII. But seeing he that knoweth his master's will and doth it not, shall be beaten with many stripes; and he that knoweth it not, with few; is it not my duty chiefly to avoid the many stripes, by avoiding sinning against my conscience or knowledge?

_Answ._ 1. Your duty is to avoid both; and if both were not sinful, they would not both be punished with stripes. 2. Your conscience is not your knowledge when you err, but your ignorance. Conscience, as it signifieth the faculty of knowing, may be said to be conscience when it erreth; as reason is reason, in the faculty, when we err. And conscience, as to an erring act, may be called conscience, so far as there is any true knowledge in the act: as a man is said to see, when he misjudgeth of colours, or to reason, when he argueth amiss. But, so far as it erreth, it is no conscience in act at all; for conscience is science, and not nescience. You sin against your knowledge when you sin against a well-informed conscience, but you sin in ignorance when you sin against an erring conscience. 3. And if the question be not, what is your duty, but, which is the smaller sin, then it is true, that, _caeteris paribus_, it is a greater sin to go against your judgment, than to follow it. But yet, other imparities in matter and circ.u.mstances may be an exception against this rule.

_Quest._ VIII. But it is not possible for every man presently to know all his duty, and to avoid all error about his duty. Knowledge must be got in time. All men are ignorant in many things: should I not then in the mean time follow my conscience?

_Answ._ 1. Your ignorance is culpable, or not culpable. If it be not culpable, the thing which you are ignorant of is not your duty. If culpable, (which is the case supposed,) as you brought yourself to that difficulty of knowing, so it will remain your sin till it be cured; and one sin will not warrant another. And all that time you are under a double command; the one is, to know, and use the means of knowledge; and the other is, to do the thing commanded. So that how long soever you remain in error you remain in sin, and are not under an obligation to follow your error, but first to know, and then to do the contrary duty. 2. And as long as you keep yourselves in a necessity, or way of sinning, you must call it sin as it is, and not call it duty. It is not your duty to choose a lesser sin before a greater; but to refuse and avoid both the lesser and the greater. And if you say you cannot, yet, remember, that it is only your sin that is your impotency, or your impotency is sinful. But it is true, that you are most obliged to avoid the greatest sin: therefore, all that remaineth in the resolving of all such cases, is but to know, of two sins, which is the greatest.

_Quest._ IX. What if there be a great duty, which I cannot perform without committing a little sin? or, a very great good, which I cannot do but by an unlawful means; as, to save the lives of many by a lie?

_Answ._ 1. It is no duty to you, when you cannot do it without wilful sin, be it never so little. Deliberately to choose a sin, that I may perform some service to G.o.d, or do some good to others, is to run before we are called, and to make work for ourselves which G.o.d never made for us; and to offer sin for a sacrifice to G.o.d; and to do evil that good may come of it; and abuse G.o.d, and reject his government, under pretence of serving him. "The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination to the Lord: how much more, when he bringeth it with a wicked mind?" Prov. xxi.

27; xv. 8. "He that turneth away his ear from hearing the law, even his prayer shall be abomination," Prov. xxviii. 9. "Be more ready to hear, than to offer the sacrifice of fools: for they consider not that they do evil," Eccles. v. 1. 2. If you will do good by sinning, you must do good in opposition to G.o.d: and how easily can he disappoint you, and turn it into evil! It is not good indeed, which must be accomplished by sin. The final good is never promoted by it; and all other good is to be estimated by its tendency to the end. You think that good which is not so, because you judge by the present feeling of your flesh, and do not foresee how it stands related to the everlasting good.

_Quest._ X. Seeing then that I am sure beforehand that I cannot preach, or hear, or pray, or do any good action without sin, must I not, by this rule, forbear them all?

_Answ._ No; because your infirmities in the performance of your duty, which you would avoid and cannot, are not made the condition of your action, but are the diseases of it. They are not chosen and approved of. The duty is your duty notwithstanding your infirmities, and may be accepted of; for you cannot serve G.o.d in perfection till you are perfect; and to cast away his service is a far greater sin, than to do it imperfectly. But you may serve him without such wilful, chosen sin, if not in one way, yet in another. The imperfection of your service is repented of while it is committed; but so is not your approved, chosen sin. For a man to make a bargain against G.o.d, that he will commit a sin against him, though the action be the same which he hath often done before in pardonable weakness; this is to turn it to a presumptuous, heinous sin. If he do it for worldly gain or safety, he selleth his obedience to G.o.d for trifles. If he do it to serve G.o.d by, he blasphemeth G.o.d; declaring him to be evil, and a lover of sin, or so impotent as not to be able to do good, or attain his ends by lawful means. It is most dangerous to give it under our hands to the devil, that we will sin, on what pretence soever.

_Quest._ XI. What if I am certain that the duty is great, and uncertain whether the thing annexed to it be a sin or not? Must I forbear a certain duty for an uncertain sin? or forbear doing a great and certain good, for fear of a small, uncertain evil?

_Answ._ 1. The question _de esse_ must go before the question _de apparere_. Either that which you say you are uncertain of is indeed a sin, or it is none. If it be no sin, then you are bound both to search till you know that it is no sin, and not to forbear your duty for it.

But if really it be a sin, then your uncertainty of it is another sin; and that which G.o.d bindeth you to, is to forsake them both. 2. Your question containeth a contradiction: you cannot be certain that it is a duty at all to you, any further than you are certain whether the condition or means be lawful or a sin. What if an auditor in Spain or Italy say, I am certain that it is a duty to obey my teachers; but I am uncertain whether their doctrines of the ma.s.s, purgatory, and the rest, have any untruth or sin in them; therefore, I must not forbear certain obedience for uncertain sin. Or if a priest among them say, I am certain that it is a duty to preach G.o.d's word, but I am not certain that the Trent Articles, which I must swear or subscribe, are sinful or false; therefore I must not leave a great and certain duty for an uncertain sin. The answer to them both is easy. 1. It is your sin that you are uncertain of the sinfulness of those things, which G.o.d hath forbidden: and G.o.d biddeth you first to search the Scriptures, and cure that error. He made his law before your doubts arose, and will not change it because you doubt. 2. You contradict yourselves by a mistake. You have no more certainty that you should obey your teachers in these particulars, than you have that the things which they teach or command you are not against that law of G.o.d. You are certain that you must obey them in all things not forbidden by G.o.d, and within the reach of their office to require. And you are as certain that it is unlawful to obey them against the law of G.o.d, and that G.o.d must be obeyed before man. But whether you must obey them in this particular case, you cannot be certain, while you are uncertain whether it be forbidden of G.o.d. And the priest must be as uncertain whether it be any duty of his at all, to preach G.o.d's word, as he is uncertain of the lawfulness of the Trent oath or subscription, unless he can do it without. If a subject say, I am certain, that to govern the kingdom well is a great, good work and duty, but I am uncertain whether to depose the king if he govern not well, and set up myself, be a sin; therefore, the certain good must overrule the uncertain evil. I give him the same answer: 1. It is your sin to be uncertain whether rebellion be a sin; and G.o.d bindeth you to lay by the sin of your judgment, and not to make it a shoeing-horn to more. 2. You are sure that governing well is a good work; but you should be as sure, that it is no duty of yours, nor good work for you to do, as you are sure that you are but a private man and a subject, and never called to do the good of another's office. A private man may say, I am sure preaching is a good work; but I am not sure that a private, unordained man may not statedly separate himself to do it. But he can be no surer that it is a duty to him, than he is that he is called to it.

_Quest._ XII. Well, suppose my ignorance be my sin, and suppose that I am equally uncertain of the duty and of the sin annexed, yet if I have done all that I am able, and remain still unresolved, and after my most diligent inquiry am as much in doubt as ever, what should I then do?

_Answ._ 1. If you had by any former sin so forfeited G.o.d's a.s.sistance, as that he will leave you to your blindness, this altereth not his law and your obligations, which are still the same (to learn, understand, and practise). 2. But if you are truly willing to understand, and practise, and use his means, you have no cause to imagine that he will thus forsake you; undoubtedly he appointeth you no means in vain. If you attain not sufficient resolution to guide you in your duty, it is either because your hearts are false in the inquiry, and bia.s.sed, or unwilling to know the truth, or do it; or because you use not the true appointed means for resolution, but in partiality or laziness neglect it.

_Quest._ XIII. Suppose still my ignorance be my sin; which is the greater sin, to neglect the good work, or to venture on the feared evil that is annexed? I am not conscious of any unfaithfulness, but human frailty, that keepeth me from certainty. And no man is so perfect as to have no culpable ignorance, and to be certain in every point of duty. Therefore I must with greatest caution avoid the greatest sin, when I am out of hope of avoiding all. On one side, it is a common rule that I must do nothing against conscience, (no, not a doubting conscience,) though I must not always do what it biddeth me.

"For he that doubteth is condemned if he eat: for whatsoever is not of faith is sin," Rom. xiv. 23. On the other side, if all duty be omitted which conscience doubteth of, I may be kept from almost every duty.

_Answ._ The heart is so deceitful that you have great cause to watch, lest human frailty be pretended, for that error, which a corrupted, bia.s.sed, partial mind, or wilful laziness, is the cause of. Diligent study, and inquiry, and prayer, with a sincere desire to know the truth, may succeed, at least, to so much satisfaction, as may keep your minds in quietness and peace, and give you comfort in your way, and preserve you from all such sin as is inconsistent with this your safety and acceptance with G.o.d. But yet it is true that human frailty will occasion in the best uncertainties in some particular cases; and though G.o.d make it not our duty of two sins to choose the less, but to refuse both, yet he maketh it our duty more diligently to avoid the greater than the less. And ofttimes the case is so sudden that no inquiry can be made: and therefore I confess a christian should know which sins are greatest and to be most avoided. At present I shall lay down these following rules, premising this, that where accidents and circ.u.mstances which make sins great or small are to be compared, they are ofttimes so numerous and various, that no rules can be laid down beforehand, that will serve all turns, no more than in law and physic, any law books or physic books will serve all cases without a present experienced judicious counsellor: present prudence and sincerity must do most.

_Rule_ I. In things altogether indifferent, nothing must be done that conscience doubteth of, because there is a possibility or fear of sinning on the one side, but none on the other; and in that case it is a certain sin to venture on a feared sin. But then it is supposed that the thing be indifferent as clothed with all its circ.u.mstances, and that there be no accident that taketh away its indifferency.

_Rule_ II. In case the thing be really unlawful, and I think it to be lawful, but with some doubting, but am clear that the forbearing it is no sin; there the sin is only in the doing it; because all is clear and safe on the other side.

_Rule_ III. There are many sins which are always and to all persons in all cases sins, and not doubted of by any without gross unfaithfulness or negligence; and here there is no room for any doubting whether we must do that good which cannot be done without that sin, it being certain that no such good can be a duty. As, to commit idolatry, to blaspheme G.o.d, to deny Christ, to deny the Scriptures, to hate, or reproach, or oppose a holy life, to be perjured, to approve or justify the sin of others, &c. It can be no duty which cannot be done without the wilful yielding to or committing these or any known sin.

_Rule_ IV. There are some duties so great, and clear, and constant to all, that none but a profligate or graceless conscience (or one that is fearfully poisoned with sin) can make a doubt of it deliberately: these therefore come not within the case before us.

_Rule_ V. If moral evil be compared only with natural good, or moral good with natural evil, there is no doubt to be made of the case: the least sin having more evil in it than the prosperity or lives of millions of men have good (considered in themselves as natural good); and the least duty to G.o.d having more good in it than the death of millions of men (as such) hath evil. For the good of duty and the evil of sin are greatened by their respect to G.o.d, and the other lessened as being good or evil only unto men, and with respect to them.

_Rule_ VI. Where I am in an equal degree uncertain of the duty to be omitted, and of the sin to be committed, it is a greater sin to venture doubtfully upon the committing of a positive sin that is great, (in case it prove a sin,) than upon the omitting a duty which (in case it prove a duty) is less; and on the contrary, it is worse to venture on the omitting of a great duty, than on the committing of a small, positive sin. As, suppose my own or my neighbour's house be on fire, and I am in doubt whether I may take another man's water to quench it against his will; or if my own, or my child's, or neighbour's life be in danger by famine, and I doubt whether I may take another man's apples, or pears, or ears of corn, or his bread, against his will, to save my own life or another's. Really, the thing is already made lawful or unlawful (which I now determine not) by the law of G.o.d; but in my unavoidable uncertainty, (if I be equally doubtful on both sides,) it is a far greater sin (if it prove a sin) to omit the saving of the house or life, than to take another man's water, or fruit, or bread, that hath plenty (if this prove the sin).

So if king and n.o.bles were in a ship, which would be taken and all destroyed by pirates, unless I told a lie, and said, they are other persons; if I were equally in doubt which course to take, to lie or not, (though sin have more evil than all our lives have good,) yet a sinful omitting to save all their lives is a greater sin than a sinful telling of such a lie. Suppose I am in doubt, whether I may lawfully save an ox, or a.s.s, or a man's life, by labour on the sabbath day? or David had doubted, whether he might eat the consecrated shew-bread in his necessity? it is clear, that the sinful neglect of a man's life is worse than the sinful violation of a sabbath, or the sinful use of the consecrated bread. If I equally doubt, whether I may use a ceremony, or disorderly, defective form of prayer, and whether I should preach the gospel to save men's souls, where there are not others enough to do it; it is clear, that sinfully to use a ceremony, or disorderly form of prayer, is, _caeteris paribus_, a lesser sin than sinfully to neglect to preach the gospel and to save men's souls. On the other side, suppose I dwelt in Italy, and could not have leave to preach the gospel there, unless I would subscribe to the Trent Confession, or the canon 3d of Concil. Lateran sub Innocent III.; one of which requireth men to swear for transubstantiation, and to interpret the Scriptures only according to the unanimous consent of the fathers (who never unanimously consented in any exposition of the greatest part of the Scriptures at all); the other decreeth the pope's deposing temporal lords, and disobliging their subjects from their allegiance. On the one side, I doubt, whether by subscribing I become not guilty of justifying idolatry, perjury, and rebellion, and making myself guilty of the perjury of many thousand others: on the other side, I doubt, whether I may disobey my superiors who command me this subscription, and may forbear preaching the gospel, when yet I apprehend that there are others to preach it, and that my worth is not so considerable as that there should be any great loss in putting me out and putting in another; and G.o.d needeth not me to do him service, but hath instruments at command; and that I know not how soon he may restore my liberty, or that I may serve him in another country, or else in sufferings at home; in such a case the sinful justifying of perjury or rebellion in whole countries is a far greater sin than the sinful omission of my preaching: for he that justifieth perjury destroyeth the bonds of all societies, and turneth loose the subjects against their sovereigns. Or if I, being a minister, were forbidden to preach the gospel where there is necessity, unless I will commit some sin; if I doubt on one side whether I should disobey my superiors, and on the other whether I should forbear my calling, and neglect the souls of sinners; it is a lesser sin, _caeteris paribus_, to disobey a man sinfully, than to disobey G.o.d, and to be cruel to the souls of men to their perdition sinfully. Or if I have made a vow, and sworn that I will cast away a penny or a shilling, and I am in doubt on one side whether I be not bound to keep it as a vow, and on the other whether it be not a sin to keep it, because to cast away any of my talents is a sin; in this case, the sinful casting away of a penny or a shilling is not so great a sin as sinful perjury. If Daniel and the three witnesses had been in equal doubt, whether they should obey the king or pray to G.o.d, (as Dan. vi.) and renounce the bowing to his idol, (Dan. iii.) the sinful forbearance of prayer as then commanded, and the sinful bowing to the idol had been a greater sin than a sinful disobeying the king's command in such a case, if they had mistaken.

_Rule_ VII. If I cannot discern whether the duty to be omitted, or the sin to be committed, be materially and in other respects the greater, then that will be to me the greater of the sins which my doubting conscience doth most strongly suspect to be sin, in its most impartial deliberation. For if other things be equal, certainly the sinning against more or less conviction or doubting must make an inequality.

As, if I could not discern whether my subscription to the Trent Confession, or my forbearing to preach, or my preaching though prohibited, were the greater sin, in case they were all sinful; but yet I am most strongly suspicious of sinfulness in the subscription, and less suspicious of sinfulness in my forbearing in such a case to preach, and least of all suspicious of sinfulness in my preaching though prohibited: in this case to subscribe sinfully is the greatest sin, and to forbear sinfully to exercise my office is the next, and to preach unwarrantably is the least.

_Rule_ VIII. If I could perceive no difference in the degrees of evil in the omission and the commission, nor yet in the degrees of my suspicion or doubting, then that is the greater sin which I had greater helps and evidence to have known, and did not.

_Rule_ IX. If both greater material evil be on one side than on the other, and greater suspicion or evidence of the sinfulness also, then that must needs be the greater sin.

_Rule_ X. If the greatness of the material evil be on one side, and the greatness of the suspicion and evidence be on the other, then the former (if sin) will be materially and in itself considered the worst; but the latter will be formally the greater disobedience to G.o.d. But the comparison will be very difficult. As, suppose that I swear to G.o.d that I will cast away a shilling, or that I will forbear to pray for a week together; here I take perjury to be a greater sin than my casting away a shilling, or forbearing to pray a week: but when I question whether the oath should be kept or not, I have greater suspicion that it should not than that it should, because no oath must be the bond of the least iniquity. Here, if the not keeping it prove a sin, I shall do that which is the greater sin in itself if I keep it not; but I shall show more disobedience in keeping it, if it be not to be kept.

_Rule_ XI. If it be a double sin that I suspect on one side, and but a single one on the other, it maketh an inequality in the case. As, suppose that in my father's family there are heretics and drunkards, and I swear that in my place and calling I will endeavour to cast them out. My mother approveth my vow; my father is against it, and dischargeth me of it because I did it not by his advice. On one side, I doubt whether I am bound, or may act against my father's will: on the other side, I as much doubt whether I am not perjured, and disobedient to my mother, if I do it not, and whether I disobey not G.o.d, that made it my duty to endeavour the thing in my place and calling before I vowed it.

_Rule_ XII. There is a great deal of difference between omitting the substance of a duty for ever, and the delaying it, or altering the time, and place, and manner. For instance, that which will justify or excuse me for shortening my prayer, or for praying but once a day, or at noon rather than in the morning, or for defect in method, or fervency, or expressions, may not justify or excuse me for denying, renouncing, or long forbearing prayer. And that which may excuse an apostle for not preaching in the temple or synagogues, or not having the emperor's or the high priest's allowance or consent, or for not continuing in one city or country; would not excuse them if they had renounced their callings, or totally, as to all times, and places, and manner of performance, have ceased their work for fear of men.

_Rule_ XIII. If the duty to be omitted and the sin to be committed seem equal in greatness, and our doubt be equal as to both, it is commonly held safer to avoid the commission more studiously than the omission. For which there are many reasons given.

_Rule_ XIV. There is usually much more matter for fear and suspicion, _caeteris paribus_, of sins to be committed, than of duties to be omitted, when the commission is made necessary to the doing of the duty. Both because it is there that the fear beginneth: for I am certain that the good work is no duty to me, if the act be a sin which is its necessary condition. Therefore, so far as I suspect the act to be sinful, I must needs suspect the duty to be no duty to me at that time: it is not possible I should be rationally more persuaded that the duty is my duty, than that the condition is no sin. If it were the saving of the lives of all men in the country, I could no further take it to be my duty, than I take that to be no sin by which it must be done, it being a thing past controversy, that we must not sin for the accomplishment of any good whatsoever. And also because the sin is supposed to be always sin, but few duties are at all times duties: and the sin is a sin to every man, but the duty may be another man's duty, and not mine. For instance: Charles V. imposeth the Interim upon Germany: some pastors yielded to it; others refused it, and were cast out. Those that yielded pleaded the good of the churches, and the prevention of their utter desolation, but yet confessed that if the thing imposed were sinful, it was not their duty to do it for any good whatsoever, but to seek the good of the church as well as they could without it. The other that were cast out argued, that so far as they were confident the Interim was sinful, they must be confident that nothing was their duty that could not be done without it, and that G.o.d knew best what is good for his church, and there is no accomplishing its good by sin and G.o.d's displeasure; and that they did not therefore forsake their ministry, but only lose the ruler's licence; for they resolved to preach in one place or other till they were imprisoned, and G.o.d can serve himself by their imprisonment or death, as well as by their preaching. And while others took their places that thought the Interim lawful, the churches were not wholly dest.i.tute; and if G.o.d saw it meet, he could restore their fuller liberties again: in the mean time, to serve him, as all pastors did for three hundred years after Christ, without the licence of the civil magistrate, was not to cast away their office. Another instance: the zealous papists in the reign of Henry III. in France, thought that there was a necessity of entering the League, and warring against the king, because religion was in danger, the preservation whereof is an unquestionable duty. The learned and moderate lawyers that were against them said, that there being no question but the king had the total sovereignty over them, they were sure it was a sin to resist the higher powers, and therefore no preservation of religion could be a duty or lawful to them which must be done by such a certain sin: sin is not the means to save religion or the commonwealth.

_Rule_ XV. When a thing is not prohibited and sinful simply in itself, but because of some accidental or consequential evil that it tendeth to, there a greater accidental or consequential good may preponderate the evil, and make the thing become no sin, but a duty. It is a matter of exceeding difficulty to discern ofttimes whether a thing be simply and absolutely forbidden, or only by accident and alterably, and to discern which accident doth preponderate. There are so many observations that should here be taken in, and so much of a man's life and peace is concerned in it, that it deserveth a treatise by itself. And therefore I shall not meddle with it any further here, lest an insufficient tractate be worse than none, in a case where error is so easy and perilous.