General Beyers was elected Chairman with 19 votes, while the others obtained 13, 11, 10, and 6 votes respectively.

After a short address, the Chairman adjourned the meeting till the afternoon.

In the afternoon the meeting was opened with prayer by the Rev. J. D.

Kestell.

Acting State President S. W. Burger then addressed the meeting as follows:--We are here under peculiar circ.u.mstances. Many who commenced this struggle with us are no longer with us. The war has claimed its victims, and many who were highly esteemed by us have fallen or have been captured, or, alas, have become unfaithful. We have only reached the foot of the mountain, and everything now depends upon you as representatives of the people. Here we shall have to decide whether, under the circ.u.mstances, we can or must continue the war. We may not deny that our position is very critical and gloomy. Let us conduct ourselves as behoves comrades who have a common cause at heart. We shall have to say much about the future. Opinions will be widely divergent, and therefore it is important that we bear with one another and be not afraid to express our opinions in a manly way. You know what gave occasion for this meeting. A copy of the correspondence between the Netherlands and British Governments was sent to us by Lord Kitchener under instructions from his Government. When the Government of the South African Republic received this correspondence they thought it should be considered as an invitation to negotiate. They also considered that the opportunity should be availed of to discuss matters with the Orange Free State, and requested Lord Kitchener to enable them to meet the Government of that Republic to consider the advisability of making peace proposals to Britain. We met and discussed the matter at Klerksdorp. Then we negotiated with Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner, and the outcome of it all was the doc.u.ment (with the correspondence between the two Governments and the British Government attached), which was submitted to all the commandos. We felt that we had no power to decide with reference to the question of independence, and that it was only in our power to conclude a peace by which the independence would be maintained. As to the independence, only the people could decide. And for that purpose you are here. We, the members of the Governments, are here to give you advice and explanation. As you know, the enemy will not hear of letting us retain our independence, but they are willing to negotiate for terms on the basis of the relinquishment of our independence. If we consider all we have sacrificed and suffered, and for what we have sacrificed and suffered, it is very hard for us to think of giving up our independence, but we are not here to consult our hearts but our heads.

You must now give an account of the condition of our country and of our women and children. You must determine whether, after all the sacrifices that we have made, we are prepared to make further sacrifices. If we have no prospects, we cannot proceed and allow our people to be further exterminated. It will be hard after all that we have done to surrender our independence, but we must consult our heads. The Governments will do nothing without the people, and it is for you now to consider all the circ.u.mstances and decide, and if you, for instance, arrive at the conclusion that we have resorted to our last expedient, will it be right to continue? Let each one frankly express his opinion. As far as I am concerned, I do not flinch yet.

But I wish to know what the people say. A year ago the Governments decided never to give up the independence, but to continue the struggle until we could do so no longer, and then to surrender unconditionally; but if we become convinced that our strength and resources are exhausted we should consider whether we should not still try to do something for our people. Or shall we continue until all the leaders and many burghers are banished or killed? By a frank expression of opinion we shall be enabled to decide what course to pursue.

Here I must draw your attention to a difficulty that has arisen. Some of you have received definite instructions from the people from which it appears you consider you cannot deviate. Others have received authority to act according to circ.u.mstances. Now I believe that this need not cause a difference; in any case let it not cause a split among us. We must be unanimous here, and if we are, then the people will also be unanimous. If we are divided here, what will the people be?

At this juncture a letter was read, written five months before by the Deputation in Europe, and safely brought out by a person whose name was not mentioned. The letter contained much, and maintained, among other things, that in Europe the Boer cause was then more favourable than ever before.

The Chairman now gave the Generals and Delegates an opportunity of laying before the meeting the general condition in their respective divisions.

Commandant General Botha said: In the Utrecht district there are not sufficient mealies to support the commandos long, and then there could be no question of supplying the horses with mealies. There was still a considerable number of slaughter cattle. In Swazieland there was no grain, nor was there any in Wakkerstroom, so that the commandos could not exist there for another month. In Ermelo and Carolina there was still sufficient corn to exist on for some little time, say two or three months, and sufficient slaughter-cattle for the winter, if the cattle and sheep belonging to the burghers were indiscriminately taken. Most of the grain belonged to the Kaffirs. What had been sown was too near the enemy, otherwise they would have provisions for a considerable time still. In Bethal, Standerton, and Middelburg there was no corn whatever, and they could still hold out for one month at the utmost. The Heidelberg and Pretoria commandos have no corn to live on. In the neighbourhood of Boksburg and Springs there was a considerable quant.i.ty of mealies--the old mealie-cobs of last year--but the commandos have been squeezed out from those parts by the blockhouses. They had absolutely no slaughter-cattle. In a great area there was no living animal except horses, and when he was with the men a few days ago, three days had pa.s.sed since they had had meat. All that Middelburg (south-east of the railway) possessed of slaughter-cattle was 36 goats. Wakkerstroom also was entirely without slaughter-cattle. The condition on the High Veld as regards horses was very bad. The burghers were hard pressed by the enemy, and many were unmounted. The horses were now so weak that the commandos could not undertake a long journey. The Kaffir question became daily more serious. Shortly before his departure for Vereeniging 56 burghers were murdered in Vryheid by Kaffirs who came from the English lines. All the Kaffirs in the South-eastern portion of the Republic were more or less under arms, and this had an unfavourable influence on the spirit of the burghers. Furthermore they had a considerable number of families who were in a most lamentable condition. The entire High Veld was divided up by the lines of blockhouses, and the commandos were so cornered that they had continually to cross these lines of the railway, and then a fortnight often pa.s.sed before the husbands could return to attend to their families. It had happened that women had to flee to Kaffirs to be helped by them. Many were attacked and raped by the Kaffirs. Truly the condition of these women was the saddest thing with which he had had to do in this war.

Coming to the numerical strength of the burghers, they had in the field in the South African Republic 10,816 men, of which 3,296 were unmounted, leaving thus only 7,520 men who were available for use.

Since last June their numbers had been diminished by 6,084 men. The most of these had been captured, but the number included the surrenders and killed. They still had about 2,540 families. What their condition was he had already described, and what the difficulties were to support them, the delegates could imagine themselves. Summoning up all in one word the Commandant General concluded by saying that the greatest difficulties lay in the questions concerning horses and food, and the maintenance of the families.

Chief Commandant de Wet said that he would leave it to the delegates who were officers to give an account of the conditions obtaining in their respective districts. They came from far and near, and knew what the condition of matters was. He could, however, inform the meeting that the number of burghers in the Orange Free State was 6,100, of which about 400 were not serviceable. The Basutos were as well disposed towards the Boers as ever before.

General de la Rey said that he did not know exactly what was expected of him, and that it was the duty of the delegates to give an account of the condition of affairs. He could say this, however, that food was scarce in his division a year ago, and that was so still, but no one had suffered hunger yet. If a burgher had no food he had to fetch it from the enemy. He also thought it would be better to leave it to the delegates to give an account of the conditions in their respective divisions.

General Beyers said, I shall be brief. As regards food, we obtain supplies from the hostile Kaffirs, who are all, with the exception of one tribe, in rebellion against us. In Waterberg all the Kaffirs are sitting on the fence, and are in a way still well disposed, so that we cannot take anything from them, but must purchase what we want. What we require in Zoutpansberg we take. The Kaffirs fire on us, but then we shoot back. It is our good fortune that there is no co-operation between the Kaffirs in Zoutpansberg, otherwise they could make matters difficult for us. When the British forces are operating against us the Kaffirs are very troublesome, because the English use the Kaffirs. The greatest difficulties with which we have to cope are: fever, horse-sickness, and the Kaffirs. Food we have in abundance. I think there is sufficient food in the Zoutpansberg district to support the burghers of the South African Republic and of the Orange Free State for a year. The British, however, are buying up much grain there now at 10s. a bag and removing it.

General Muller remarked that everything was scarce with him, but that the burghers had never suffered hunger yet. He had cattle for two months still, if he slaughtered everything. His great difficulty was in connection with the families when the Kaffirs were rebellious. If provisions became scarce he intended to obtain these from the Kaffirs.

In his opinion he could still hold out to the end of the winter.

General Froneman (Winburg and Ladybrand) had no reason to complain.

They had sufficient food still. There were many women and children in his division, altogether about 80 families, who had to be supported.

The Kaffirs were particularly peaceable, and always prepared to a.s.sist in supplying them with clothing out of Basutoland. When he ran short of cattle he took some again from the enemy. He saw his way clear to continue the struggle for another year.

Commandant Hattingh (Kroonstad) informed the meeting that he still had much cattle, sheep and grain, sufficient for a year. The district of Heilbron had been entirely depleted of provisions, but he had supplied them again from the Bethlehem district.

Commandant Badenhorst (portion Bloemfontein, Boshof and Kroonstad) stated that in his districts there were still thousands of cattle and sheep, and therefore he could hold out for another year. The farmers had cattle on their farms, and then there was always a chance of capturing from the enemy. On one occasion he captured 1,500 cattle from the enemy, and he also saw a chance of obtaining cattle by this means for other parts. Hundreds of cattle and thousands of sheep could still be spared in his district for other districts. Grain was not so plentiful as it had been the previous year, but they could still raise so much that they could even supply others.

General Nieuwoudt (S.W. and S. portions of O.F.S.) said that during the last seven months the enemy had destroyed everything in his districts. The Fauresmith district had been totally devastated. No cattle had been left there. There were only about 70 bags of grain left, but they still managed to live well. He had found out that even when they had nothing they managed to get along. His horses were now in excellent condition. If they could sow he saw a chance of raising food for another year. In his division there were only about three women.

General Prinsloo (Ficksburg and Bethlehem) stated that he would not be speaking the truth if he said that there was no food, in his division.

He had no cause for complaint yet on that score. Latterly many forces of the enemy had operated against him, and all the cattle had been removed from the Southern Ward, but in the other Wards there was still much cattle. They could help other districts from there.

Unfortunately, however, cattle could not be moved from those Wards on account of the blockhouses. Further, he thought that the Lord would provide for them. Recently one of his Commandants had discovered what he might call a gold mine, in which there were 150 bags of mealies.

General Brand (Rouxville, &c.) said that the enemy had overrun his districts very much, built blockhouses, removed cattle, and destroyed grain. Portions of his division had been totally ruined. Everything had been removed, and not even a sheep was left. It frequently happened that for two or three days they were without food, but then they fortunately captured some food again. There were only nine women in his division. He had the means to continue for another year.

General Wessels (Vrede, Harrismith, and Frankfort) informed the meeting that the Khakis had latterly dealt fearfully with him. They moved up and down in his division, and he thought that nothing would be left, but he always found food still. It was a marvel to him that sheep, cattle and grain were still to be found there. Even if the enemy removed all the cattle he saw a chance of maintaining the struggle on the grain that would be left, and he knew for certain that he would be able to capture much cattle from the enemy. Only recently he had brought 300 head of cattle from Natal, and they had also discovered a cave containing 300 bags of mealies. As regards slaughter-cattle, he thought he had enough to last them for another three months.

Commandant van Niekerk (Vredefort) had to admit that his district had been entirely devastated, and that he had been forced out of it, so that they could neither plough nor sow. However, in Hoopstad and Kroonstad they had sown 35 bags of grain. The enemy had built blockhouses right through the middle of his division. There was no cattle, but he had captured 1,000 sheep and 52 head of cattle, and thought that in some way or other he would still manage to obtain food for another year.

Commandant van der Merwe said that matters with him were much the same as in the districts of Commandant van Niekerk. Everything was scarce, but they had not yet suffered hunger.

General J. C. s.m.u.ts related how his expedition to the Cape Colony had originated, and how it had been carried out. Last year, he said, it was the opinion of President Kruger and of their Deputation in Europe that there was good hope for their cause from the Cape Colony. On that ground and also on the reports that they received from there, it was decided to send General de la Rey thither to a.s.sume the supreme command as soon as the Cape was strong enough to be considered a third party in the struggle. Later, however, they came to the conclusion that it would be best to act more cautiously, that General de la Rey could hardly be missed in the Western Transvaal, that he (General s.m.u.ts) should go with a small commando to ascertain what the possibilities in the Cape Colony were. "I went," he continued, "with 300 men, while 100 men followed me, but 100 men I had to leave behind with General Kritzinger because their horses were too poor. We had a very difficult journey, certainly the most difficult that I and my people ever experienced. I went through the whole of the Cape Colony.

I proceeded to Grahamstown, then to Graaff Reinet, and down to the coast again. With a few exceptions I met all the commandos in the Cape Colony. I questioned the leaders and thus came to be well informed on everything. Commandant Kritzinger did not follow me according to agreement, and as I saw that there was a danger of disorder arising I took everything under my command. I found that there were about 1,400 or 1,500 men under arms, and not 3,000 as had been reported. To obtain the exact numbers, however, was almost impossible. Commandant Lotter was captured with his whole commando of 100 men. I have now been in the Cape Colony for about a year, and the number that joined us in that time was about 1,400. The number of men under arms had thus been doubled, and but for the losses there would now have been 3,000 men.

There are now about 2,600 men under my command, but then there is another division sent in by General de la Rey under General de Villiers in Griqualand West, about 700 strong, and another in Bechua.n.a.land under Commandant van der Merwe. There are thus about 3,300 men operating in the Cape Colony, and this does not include the men under Myburgh, Wessels, and van Reenen, of whom I know nothing.

The question now is: What help can be expected from the Cape Colony for our cause? There will be no general rising in the Cape. We had very good expectations, and thought that it would not be difficult to cause a general rising there. The people are very enthusiastic--more so than with us; but they have peculiar difficulties. The first is with reference to horses. The British have taken all the horses that could be used, and shot the useless ones. There is, therefore, a great scarcity of horses in the Cape Colony. And, further, it is extraordinarily difficult for the Colonist to rise if he has to fight on foot with the knowledge that if he is captured he will have to undergo heavy punishment. Unmounted men cannot fight in the Cape Colony. You can operate only with mounted commandos, and as we have no horses we cannot accept a tenth of those who are willing to join us.

On account of this deficiency of horses, we cannot expect a general rising. Another great difficulty is the absence of gra.s.s. The veld over the entire Cape Colony is overgrown with bushes (scrub). There is no gra.s.s as in the Republics. Where you have no forage, therefore, the horses cannot exist. Where I have been latterly there is wheat, and I fed my horses on that, but now the wheat is becoming scarce, and there is no prospect of obtaining any more on account of the proclamations of the British, which prohibit all sowing. We have, indeed, issued a counter proclamation, but that has not helped. The question of horses and forage is thus a great stumbling-block for our cause in the Cape.

In my opinion, the small commandos in the Cape Colony have done their best. Three British camps were lately taken by them.

The question now arose whether commandos from the Republics could proceed to the Cape Colony, and whether there was an opening for them there.--Yes, there was an opening, but the difficulty was how to get there. More of our commandos from the Republics would be able to exist in the Cape Colony if food became too scarce here, but the great trouble was how to get there. The British have now about 50,000 English and Dutch Africanders under arms.--These conditions have led me to the conclusion that there will be no general rising in the Cape Colony, and that the continuance of the war will depend more on the Republics than upon the Cape Colony."

The meeting was then adjourned till the evening.

On re-a.s.sembling, the first speaker was Commandant P. L. Uys (district Pretoria), who said that in his commando there were only 153 mounted men; the other 128 burghers were unmounted. There were still about 2,000 head of cattle, and grain enough to last them for a month.

All the Kaffirs in his district were hostile, with the exception of the captain Matello. In the portion of Middelburg under him there were 26 mounted men and 38 burghers on foot.

Commandant H. S. Grobler (Bethal) stated that during all the summer he had had no rest. He still had a commando of 150 men, but no food, and he could trek nowhere, because his horses were too poor. Only recently he had to break through a cordon (kraal), and managed to get through with only 153 men, while 63 were captured. The Bethal district had been devastated from the one end to the other. There was no food left for his commandos, nor for the 300 women and children, who were in a pitiable condition. They were not only without the necessaries of life, but also exposed to danger from the Kaffirs, who had already raped some of the women, which drove some of them to take refuge in the blockhouses.

General Chris. Botha remarked that he represented Swazieland. With regard to provisions, the supply of mealies was almost exhausted. They lived on what they could get from the Kaffirs as a favour. There were no more women with them. His commando of 113 men was still in the Piet Retief district. They had no grain, and had to proceed from one Kaffir-kraal to another to purchase food, which required money.

However, they still managed to live. In this way he had helped the Transvaal for two and a half years, and now that he heard that there was food in the Orange Free State he would proceed thither and help them for two and a half years. In the Piet Retief district they had grain for about two months, but no cattle, and they had to live on what they could capture from the enemy. There were 65 families still there, and it was hard to provide for them. Their position was very critical.

Mr. Birkenstock (Vryheid) said that he would go more fully into a few points relating to his district than the Commandant General had been able to do in his general review. In Vryheid during the last six or eight months they had been much hara.s.sed by large forces, and the district had been completely devastated. The presence of the families caused the greatest difficulties. Latterly the British refused to receive any more families. They were also continually in danger from Kaffirs, who were decidedly hostile to them. Horses and corn were scarce. But yet, as far as grain was concerned, they would manage, if the enemy did not again make incursions into that district. Recently in the early morning, before daybreak, a Kaffir commando had attacked a Boer commando consisting of 70 men, of whom they had killed 56. The families in that district had said to him: "You must make peace in any case," and he felt it his duty to inform the meeting of this.

General Alberts (Heidelberg) said that for the last twelve months they had had no rest in his district. During the past year they had not been able to plough and sow at all, and a commando could no longer exist there. Three times had they been enclosed in a cordon (kraal), but had fortunately always managed to get out. They had no slaughter-cattle themselves, but had received some from Commandant Roos, of the Orange Free State. His horses were in a most deplorable condition.

Landrost Bosman (Wakkerstroom) informed the meeting how matters stood in the Wakkerstroom district. They were dependent upon the Kaffirs for grain; in fact, for everything except meat. They bartered meat from the Kaffirs for mealies. But this year there were scarcely any mealies, and what there were had been badly spoilt by the enemy. With the supply they had, they would be able to manage for another two months, and out of this the families with them would also have to be supported. The supply of slaughter-cattle was also running short, and the horses were in such a poor condition that they could not be used against the enemy for a fortnight. It would perhaps become necessary for the commando to leave the district, and then the great question arose: What would become of the families there?

Mr. de Clercq (Middelburg) regretted that he had not the privilege of several members of the meeting of being able to present a rosy report.

The portion of Middelburg which he represented was entirely exhausted.

They had indeed some grain left, but that would last them for only a short time. They had no slaughter-cattle whatever. With the horses they still had, they could not operate. They were in too poor condition to enable the commando to escape if it became necessary to get out of the way of the enemy. The condition of the burghers was disheartening. If they should have to leave their district it was very doubtful whether they would reach their destination, on account of the condition their horses were in. There were only about 100 burghers left out of 500. They also had about 50 families with them, and these were in a miserable plight. The district would have to be abandoned, and then came the question: What would become of these families? Even now they were very badly provided for. Some women wished to proceed on foot to the British, but he had advised them not to do so until the result of these negotiations were known.

Commandant D. J. Schoeman (Lydenburg) said that until recently they had about 800 head of cattle, but these had all been removed now by the enemy. There was no grain at all. As they had no more food for the men, what would become of the families if the struggle was to be continued?

Commandant D. J. Opperman (Pretoria, South of the railway) gave an account of how matters were situated in that part of the district represented by him. His remarks were to the same effect as those of Commandant Alberts (see above).

General Liebenberg (Potchefstroom) spoke about the commandos of Potchefstroom under his command. During the past eight or nine months blockhouses had been established in his division, and he had only a narrow s.p.a.ce of about twelve miles wide where he could exist. A considerable amount of corn had been sown, but their fields had recently fallen into the hands of the enemy, and now everything had been destroyed, burnt, and trampled down by the horses. They had still 93 families. Some women from the Orange Free State had been placed on the boundary between the districts of Lichtenburg and Potchefstroom by the British. These were in a most deplorable condition, and were almost dying from misery. These women had informed him that unless matters improved they would proceed to Klerksdorp on foot. He had advised them to wait until after the completion of the negotiations.

His commando consisted of 400 mounted men and about 100 dismounted. He would be able to continue the struggle for some little time yet, and then he would have to seek salvation elsewhere.

General du Toit (Wolmaransstad) informed the meeting that provisions were very scarce with him, and that they had 500 families to support.

The horses were in a very poor condition, but by making _detours_ he could always manage to get out of tight corners. His commando was not large--it consisted of only about 450 mounted men--and the cattle they had were in good condition, but grain was scarce.

Commandant de Beer (Bloemhof) stated that he had 444 mounted men and about 165 unmounted burghers. Grain was not plentiful in his district, nor cattle, but Bloemhof had never had much cattle. The families with them were not yet suffering very much from scarcity of provisions, and he thought he would be able to continue the struggle for another year.

General Kemp said that he had under his command portions of the commandos of Krugersdorp and Rustenburg, and portions of the commandos of Pretoria and Johannesburg. In the Krugersdorp district they could not sow any more, and the majority of the cattle had been taken from them. And yet they were not suffering from want. Indeed, he thought they should never be in want if they had such a large commissariat upon which they could draw, namely, the Zoutpansberg district, where General Beyers was in command. He took from the Kaffirs what he required, but what he took was not the property of the natives, but what they had stolen from the burghers. He could hold out for two years longer.

Chief Commandant de Wet asked why those commandos in the eastern portions of the Transvaal could not do the same as those under command of General Kemp, and re-take their property from the Kaffirs?