General Botha replied that the native tribes with which General Kemp had to do could not even remotely be compared with the tribes with which they had to deal in the south-east. There the natives were in contact with the British. Whatever they looted from the Boers they handed over to the British, who sold the loot. If cattle were therefore taken from the Kaffirs in the south-eastern districts, they would be taking cattle the lawful property of the natives. Besides this, he had to point out that the Zulu was an entirely different kind of native from the Kaffir with whom General Kemp had to do. The Zulus were much stronger, and, further, the Republic had an agreement with the Swazies that they (the Boers) would not trek into their country with a commando to fight against them. They had to govern themselves as long as the war lasted. Most of the cattle of the Swazies also had been moved to behind the Lebombo mountains and to Zambaansland, and were therefore beyond the reach of the commandos.

General Chris. Botha also declared that no cattle belonging to the burghers in the eastern parts of the Transvaal were in possession of the natives.

Mr. J. L. Grobler (Carolina) next related how matters stood in his district. They had always had cattle and grain, but the British had cut off the best part of their fields by means of blockhouses. What they had now sown would stand them in good stead if nothing happened to prevent them reaping. The Kaffirs were not well disposed. He thought they could still hold out for seven or eight months, if nothing unforeseen occurred. They still had 300 horses for the burghers, but they were weak, and there were a good many burghers for whom they had no mounts.

Mr. Naude said that he was delegated by a portion of the Pretoria commando and by the detached commando under General Kemp. They sowed and reaped as usual. Fortunately he had no women and children to deal with. His commandos had no large supply of cattle, but yet there was no want.

After this the meeting was closed with prayer, and adjourned to the following morning.

FRIDAY, MAY 16TH, 1902.

The delegates met again shortly after nine o'clock.

The meeting was opened with prayer by the Rev. J. D. Kestell.

General Chris. Botha asked whether it was not desirable to attempt to get into communication with the Deputation in Europe.

After some discussion on this matter, the following two proposals were made:--

I. a.s.sistant Chief Commandant Froneman, seconded by Commandant Flemming:--

"That the Republican Governments be instructed to thank the Governments of His Majesty the King of England and of Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, through Lord Kitchener, for interesting themselves in connection with the opening up of peace negotiations, as appears from the correspondence between the said Governments, and to express their regret that His Majesty's Government did not accept the proposal of Her Majesty's Government to place their representatives in Europe, who still enjoy their full confidence, in a position to come to the Republics, and also that Lord Kitchener has refused a similar request made by our Governments."

II. Acting Landdrost H. J. Bosman, seconded by Commandant J. N.

Grobler:--

"The Representatives of the people here a.s.sembled resolve to record their regret that the request of their Governments to meet one or more of the members of their Deputation had been refused by Lord Kitchener, and instruct their Governments to try to send the Deputation a cablegram informing them that a meeting is now taking place to discuss the possibility of bringing about peace, and further to instruct their Governments to thank the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands for interceding in the interests of peace."

On being put to the vote, the first proposal was carried by 36 votes to 23.

The Chairman now laid before the meeting for discussion the doc.u.ment which had been drawn up by the Republican Governments relative to the negotiations in March and April last, and which had been read to all the commandos at the election of delegates.

Mr. P. R. Viljoen (Heidelberg) then addressed the meeting. He laid stress on the great seriousness of the matter before the delegates.

The ground whereon they stood, he said, was holy ground. And, indeed, it was so when they considered how it had been soaked with the tears and the blood of their fathers and of so many others in the present struggle. It was extremely hard for him even to think of relinquishing the independence after all the blood and tears that had been shed, and all the hardships that had already been endured, but from the information given them yesterday it was a matter they had to look in the face. It had been plainly shown that if they wished to continue the war they would be obliged to abandon some ten districts. By doing so they would be more concentrated, and that was exactly what the enemy wanted, for then they would be able to concentrate all their forces against the Republican commandos. According to what had been reported in this meeting, matters appeared to be going comparatively well in the Orange Free State. Here in the Transvaal, however, they were differently situated. The outlook was very dark, and it appeared to him that they should try to end the war. If there was a chance of retaining the independence then they could still continue, and they would be willing to undergo the bitterest suffering. But the question was whether there was any prospect of their retaining their independence. They knew nothing of how matters stood in Europe. The report from the Deputation that had been laid before the meeting was six months old. If there were any events in Europe in their favour it would have come to their knowledge by this time. It was plain that they should try to obtain peace in an honourable way. But how? They should still try to retain their independence, and for that purpose it would be as well if they instructed the Governments to ascertain once more what the British Government would give if they (the Boers) relinquished their independence, and that they should know this before they took a final decision. He did not see much chance to continue the war. Though it was bitter for him to have had to speak as he had done, he had felt that it was his duty to do so.

Mr. de Clercq (Middelburg) said he held the same opinion as the last speaker. They were confronted with great difficulties. The question was whether they should or should not continue the war. It was necessary to look into the future, and if they did so they must ask themselves what would be the consequences of a continuance of the war, and what the consequences would be if they terminated the struggle now. He drew the attention of the meeting to the fact that they had at present about 15,000 men against 250,000 of the enemy. They should also consider what had been said about the scarcity of food and horses and the other difficulties. All these matters made it difficult to prosecute the struggle, and before he could decide in favour thereof it would have to be shown him that the continuance of the war would mean the retention of their independence, and if that could be done, he was prepared to make still further sacrifices. But if there was no probability of retaining their independence, and if by the continuance of the struggle all would ultimately only be killed or captured, could there be a more lamentable termination? He considered that the most sensible course was to save what could still be saved. Their national existence should not be sacrificed. Who knew what was still to fall to the lot of their people in the future? But if everything was eradicated, they would cease to exist as a people. Was it a good thing that they should allow a people that had struggled as the Africander people had done to share such a fate?

Commandant Rheeder (Rouxville) said that though the circ.u.mstances were dark, yet there were some rays of light. If, however, they gave up their independence, where then could they look for a ray of light? He was prepared to give his last drop of blood for his country. It had been asked whether they should continue until they were eventually annihilated. But he would ask: Should they not continue until they were all delivered? There were three things possible: deliverance, annihilation, or surrender to the enemy. The retention of their independence must take the first place. They should fight on until they were dead, captured, or delivered.

General Kemp (Krugersdorp) remarked that the matter was most serious.

It was beyond doubt that to a certain extent their circ.u.mstances were dark. But when they commenced the war the chances were not on their side. They should continue. If they considered what the war had already cost them, how much blood had been shed, they could not give up the struggle. As far as he was concerned he wished to continue until he was dead or saved. They should not look at the dark side only. In some districts food was indeed scarce, but they could still find food everywhere. Those districts where they were threatened with famine they should give up. So many had been captured or killed, but that gave him so much the more courage. Because the struggle had cost them so much it could not be given up. If once they were vanquished, it was all over with the Africander people, and all chance of a revival would be gone for ever. Why should they not continue to place their trust in G.o.d? They had no right to distrust the G.o.d Who had helped them hitherto.

Mr. Breytenbach (Utrecht) thought that they should not brag. All this tall talk did not help them. They should consider each other's feelings. He also had received an instruction from the burghers whom he represented, and that instruction was that if he could adduce proofs after this meeting that they were able to continue the war, then Utrecht would continue to fight; but if he could not do that, Utrecht would fight no longer. And he could not. They should take a note of what had been said here yesterday. There were ten districts in the Transvaal that could not keep up the struggle any longer. Could they give up these districts? They should not consult their hearts only, but also their heads, and what did his head tell him? That they could not continue the war. If they decided that the struggle must go on, they should be able to carry out that decision as they had done from the beginning. But they could not. It had been said that they should trust the Lord, but they could not enter into the decrees of Providence. They could to some extent understand what G.o.d's answer to their prayers had been. With the Mauser and with Prayer they had commenced the war, and what had G.o.d's answer to those prayers been? He had led them on ways on which they had not expected to be led. If they continued now, they would, in his opinion, be dealing a death blow to the nation. They had seen that ten districts could not keep up the struggle any longer; should they now say: "We must continue and leave those districts to their lot?" Would it be right to let those districts, with the men, women and children who were still in them be lost? No; they should try to save what could still be saved.

General P. Liebenberg (Klerksdorp) concurred in the views of Mr.

Viljoen and Mr. de Clercq. If they could secure their independence he would gladly pay for it with his blood. The future appeared dark to him. They should keep their eyes on G.o.d, but also use their brains, and consider where their present course was leading them to. The commission he had received from those whom he represented was: "Secure our independence if it is in any way possible, but be careful and see to it that our national existence be not destroyed." If they could not do otherwise they should save what could still be saved, and obtain peace on the best terms.

Commandant P. L. Uys (Pretoria) spoke as follows: Comrades, we are faced with a most serious matter. If we continue the struggle I must leave my district, and hand over the families there a prey to the Kaffirs, because the British will not receive them. My mounted men I can always save, but if I did so what would become of the unmounted men, and what of the women and children? And under these circ.u.mstances it is a question whether all the mounted men would follow me. It now rests with the delegates and no longer with the Governments to decide this matter. Never yet have I experienced a day like this, on which I am called to such a great task. This is no time to criticise each other. We cannot blame one another, but must bear with one another.

The Bible has been quoted here, but if we do this we must not omit the text in which reference is made to the King who ought to consider whether he was competent to proceed with 10,000 men against him who was marching on him with 20,000 men. A further consideration is, what will become of the widows and orphans if we do not come to terms, and thus no longer remain their natural protectors? Oh, we must open our eyes and observe that G.o.d's hand is stretched forth against us, and not continue to add to the number of widows and orphans.

General J. N. H. Grobler (Ermelo) spoke in the same strain.

The meeting was then adjourned until the afternoon.

On resuming in the afternoon, a letter was read from General Malan, who was operating in the Cape Colony, and also one from General Kritzinger. General Malan reported on his operations, and General Kritzinger advised that the struggle be given up.

General S. P. du Toit was the next speaker, and said: The matter before us is so serious that I hardly know how to discuss it. We must bear with one another and remember that we stand here as responsible people. I have been delegated to this meeting by a portion of the people who have suffered heavily, and I have a definite instruction.

The people wish to retain their independence, but if that is impossible, then I am instructed to do the best I can. The state of matters in my division is, indeed, not so bad as to oblige us to give up the struggle, but the question is not only what must I do with a view to the condition in my district alone, but I must also take into consideration how other districts are situated. We must be specially on our guard against disunion. What will the future be if a portion of this meeting decides to make peace and another portion to continue the war? What will be the position of those who return to continue the war? Should we not rather all co-operate to obtain from the enemy what we can, and try to retain a portion of our independence? The eyes of the enemy are upon us, and what will be the effect if we are divided?

We must consider whether we should not approach the enemy with proposals, and in that way enter into negotiations with them. If we cannot prosecute the war we must see what terms we can get. Let us, above all, guard against internal disunion. If we as one man can decide to continue the war I shall support the resolution, but if we cannot be unanimous I am in favour of conceding more to the British than what our Governments have already offered. I mean we should do what we can to restore peace, and I would like to add that I am greatly disappointed in regard to the course matters have taken in the Cape Colony. It appears to me that the situation was not properly represented to us from there, but I am glad that we are now well informed.

Mr. F. W. Reitz, State Secretary of the South African Republic, said: The future of our country depends upon this opportunity. It is known what the Governments have already done, and the question I put myself now is whether there is still something that can be offered to the enemy consistent with the retention of our independence, and I think there is. Should we not offer the British the Wit.w.a.tersrand and Swazieland? We can also sacrifice our foreign policy and say "We desire to have no foreign policy, but only our internal independence."

We can then become a protectorate of England. What have we got in the Wit.w.a.tersrand? After the Franco-Prussian war France surrendered Alsace and Lorraine to Germany to retain her independence. What has the wealth from Johannesburg done for us? That money has only injured the n.o.ble character of our people. This is common knowledge. And the cause of this war originated in Johannesburg. I could adduce more arguments, but let me only say that the money obtained from there was to our detriment. It would now tend to our advantage to be rid of Johannesburg. We shall then have heard the last of Liquor-jews and other matters. I do not grudge England that inheritance. And then what have we in Swazieland? Our object was to get nearer the sea, but I do not believe that even from that point of view it has now any more value for us. We have had more loss than gain from Swazieland. As regards a protectorate, what does that mean? It means that England undertakes the obligation to defend the country against foreign attacks. And with reference to our foreign policy, only difficulties have originated out of that for us. Washington said that his country must have no foreign policy, and his country became strong enough to say that other Powers must not interfere with America.

General Muller (Boksburg) agreed with State Secretary Reitz. If they made a proposal in the terms suggested by Mr. Reitz they would also prove to the world that they were not fighting for gold or for honour, but only to be free. His burghers were prepared to surrender the Wit.w.a.tersrand and Swazieland, but nothing of their independence.

Rather than do that they would fight to the finish.

Field Cornet Roux (Marico) said: My instruction is that I can concede much, but we must retain our independence. I stand or fall by that.

Landrost s...o...b..rg (Zoutpansberg) said: Disunion must not even be mentioned with us. We must strive to be unanimous. I make this remark with reference to what General du Toit said. Zoutpansberg has said to me: "Our independence we will not surrender. We are prepared to concede much, but not that." If we can satisfy the British in some way or other and retain our independence, I will support such a course.

Some of the burghers are of opinion that the Gold Fields can be surrendered for a time, and others point out that gold was the cause of the war. The gold has indeed injured us all, and I agree that we can give up the Gold Fields. What has the gold done for us? You may say: "It has enriched us." Yes, but it has been much more of a stumbling block. If there had been no Johannesburg, there would also never have been a war. Is it not better for us to be a poor but independent people than rich and a subject nation? The gold is only a temptation, and has a pernicious moral influence on our national character. Let the Gold Fields be given up. We shall in any case retain the Johannesburg market.

Commandant Mentz (Heilbron) I must ask the indulgence of the meeting, as I regret that I am not able to present such a rosy report as my fellow delegates from the Free State. From ten to fifteen columns are trekking about in my district, devastating everything. There is but little grain, but my greatest trouble is the families who are still with us. We have 200 families, and how and on what must they live?

Some months ago I had 200 burghers. Now I have only 80. If we must continue the war I with my men can leave my district, but what must I then do with my 200 families? My instruction was: "Do not surrender the independence," but more than half the burghers who gave me this instruction have been captured, and subsequently others have asked me to try to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement, and to act according to circ.u.mstances. I am at one with the proposal of State Secretary Reitz. Let us even give up a portion of our country if we can thereby retain our independence. I recollect when I was still a child the late President Jan Brand saying: "Give up the Diamond Fields! You will profit more from them than England; you plough and sow and farm." This we can do now, too.

Commandant Fleming (Hoopstad) said that Hoopstad had been considerably devastated, and few cattle had been left, but there were still other cattle with which they had escaped. Matters in his district were not in such a state that they could not continue the war. There was also sufficient game for them to live on. The burghers had said to him: "We have sacrificed wives and children, fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, money and blood, and if we must now surrender our independence too, we give up everything, and rather than do that we will fight to the finish." However, he had to admit that the burghers were not acquainted with the conditions in other parts of the country and in the Transvaal, and now that he knew what these conditions were he could support the proposal of State Secretary Reitz to give up a portion of the country to save the independence. They should, if possible, make an end to the war out of sympathy with the poor families who suffered so grievously from the enemy and from the Kaffirs.

Acting State President Burger spoke as follows: The Governments must receive an instruction from the delegates after they have heard and considered everything. We should now make a fresh proposal to the British and see what will come of it. If our proposals are rejected then we stand exactly where we were before. If any one of you is attached to his independence, I am too, and I shall very seriously consider the matter before I surrender it. If any one of you has sacrificed everything and is prepared to sacrifice still more I am prepared to do so too. Some say: "We must retain our independence or continue to fight. We can continue the struggle for another six months or nine months or a year." But supposing we did that, what would we gain thereby? Only this, that the enemy would be stronger and we weaker. If I take everything into consideration I must say it appears to me impossible to prosecute the war any longer. We can, indeed, proceed and say: "Let come what will," but who of us can declare to-day with an upright and clear conscience that we can continue the struggle with any chance of success? G.o.d works miracles, but who can a.s.sure me that He will do so in our case? It is argued that European complications may arise, but that is a mere hope without foundation.

We must view the matter from all sides, and there is this other point to which I wish to draw your attention. In a wonderful way the Lord has. .h.i.therto preserved and spared us, and kept us standing, so that we are still acknowledged as a party, and can speak and negotiate for our people. Now we should ask ourselves whether this is not the last chance we shall have of being able to do so. If this opportunity is allowed to pa.s.s, I fear all chances will for ever be gone for us to negotiate as a party for the entire people. Commandant Rheeders said that we must fight till we are dead, captured, or saved. That would be manly and would redound to the honour of ourselves and of our descendants; but must we act from l.u.s.t of glory? Would that be sensible and right towards our people? Can we let the people be annihilated for the sake of honour and fame for ourselves? If I sacrifice my person for my people it would bring me true honour, but not otherwise. If after discussion and consideration we become convinced that we can only continue the war for a little while longer, it is our duty to make an end to it now. What would further unnecessary torture avail us? Have we not now arrived at that stage when we should pray: "Thy will be done"? and then when we feel what His will is, surrender ourselves to it? That is a prayer of faith, and one must be prepared to abide by His will. We have already effected supernatural things at which the world stands amazed. Shall we now allow a people, who have sacrificed even women and children, to be exterminated? If we do not arrive at a proper peace now, then when the last shot shall have been fired, and the war terminates in another way, what will become of our women and children and of our prisoners of war? We shall have rejected the proposals of the British Government, and what right will we have to intercede for these unfortunate people? We must think seriously over this. If we see that we have no ground for hope upon which we can continue the war, then we must now try to get for our people the best that can be got. We were proud and despised the enemy, and is it not perhaps G.o.d's will to humble us and cast down the pride in us by allowing us to be oppressed by the English people? The time will come when we shall again exist as a people. If you decide to proceed with the war, I shall stand or fall with your decision, although I would not approve of it. I think we should draft a proper peace proposal, in which we concede as much as possible, in order to retain our independence. If England refuses to accept our proposals we can consider further what course to pursue.

Reference has been made to the confiscation of farms, but there can be no confiscation, as long as we are in possession of the whole country.

However, if we have to abandon ten districts of the Transvaal, and some in the Orange Free State, then, according to legal advice, those confiscation Proclamations could be carried into effect, and where would we then stand? I say it would be criminal of us to continue the struggle till everything is destroyed and everyone dead if we are now convinced that it is a hopeless struggle. Our people do not deserve to be annihilated.

After this the following proposal was handed in by General Kemp, seconded by Mr. Naude, which was unanimously adopted:--

"In order to expedite the business this meeting resolves to appoint General J. C. s.m.u.ts and General Hertzog as a committee to draft a resolution in consultation with the two State Presidents, and submit same to the meeting to-morrow."

The meeting was then adjourned until the evening at 7.30 o'clock.

After a short service conducted during the adjournment by the Rev. J.

D. Kestell, the meeting re-a.s.sembled at 7.30 p.m.

General Celliers (Lichtenburg) reported as follows: Circ.u.mstances in my district are favourable. We have abundant provisions and our horses are good. The burghers are also well organised. But I wish to take into account the circ.u.mstances in which the other districts are situated. My burghers are just at present a little fiery, and say: "Stand firm for the independence." But when they said that, they were not acquainted with the circ.u.mstances elsewhere, and the question is: To what extent can the other districts who are worse off than we are, co-operate with us? Well, the other districts say that, if the war is continued they cannot join in maintaining the struggle. I wish to act on the lines that will be best for my people and for the future. Now, what would be best--to say we shall fight to the finish, or to approach the enemy with a proposal, the acceptance of which will preserve us as a people? A further question is: Are we as leaders of the people justified in making further sacrifices? Personally, I must reply: "Yes, certainly, because we commenced with our trust in G.o.d, Who has preserved us miraculously hitherto." It was painful to me to hear a comrade say to-day that G.o.d's hand was against us. As far as I am concerned I say we must proceed, but as it appears that all of us are not able to keep up the struggle, we must jointly try to pursue a course by which we can in some measure retain our independence. If we give that up, what can we offer instead to the women and children who have suffered so grievously?

General Froneman (Winburg and Ladybrand) spoke as follows: I have not much to say, but it appears to me that matters in my division are viewed too favourably. The condition is not so rosy there as might be deduced from what has been said here. I am, however, tied by an instruction. In a word, my burghers have said to me: "We wish to hear of nothing else but the retention of our independence, and that intact." They do not wish to trample on the blood that has already been shed, but to persevere until deliverance comes. I sympathise with the comrades from those divisions where matters are so serious, but our deliverance is from the Lord. It grieves me to observe a doubt amongst some of us whether G.o.d is indeed with us. I would only ask: Has there ever been a greater miracle than this, that we have been able hitherto to maintain the struggle against such overwhelming odds?

What has maintained us to this moment? It is the faith of those who in privacy prayed G.o.d to ward off the war, and who when they saw that such was not G.o.d's will, but that He ordained that there should be war, trusted in Him, and fought bravely. The Lord has indeed hitherto helped us. The enemy cut us off entirely from the outside world, and yet these two small Republics have been enabled to maintain the struggle. Is that not a marvel? I should like to hear what Generals Botha, de Wet, and de la Rey have to say, for they can throw much light on the subject for us.

Commandant General Botha said: I am glad to have this opportunity of expressing my views. It has been observed that we must not be divided, but when I consider the information that has been given us here, then there cannot but be a difference of opinion, because in those divisions where the circ.u.mstances are favourable the delegates cannot flinch at anything. They must declare that they will maintain the struggle for our independence. If the delegates from those divisions, where they cannot hold out any longer, differ from the others with reference to the possibility of continuing the war, we must not ascribe that to indifference or cowardice or slackness, but to facts which have wrought a sincere conviction in them. Where I differ from one or other of you, I do so simply on facts. If I should maintain silence as to the true state of affairs, and matters went wrong later on, I, as Head, could be accused of having suppressed facts.