I have made a diversion here this day in favour of your excellency, which, by all the rules of military tactics, must increase the relative strength of your army and facilitate its march. My time and attention must now be devoted to naval matters, and unless you advance this evening, I shall have deeply and bitterly to regret, for the sake of Greece, that I ever put faith in anything being accomplished by individuals to whom so many difficulties, which my experience has taught me to be imaginary, present themselves. I recall to your excellency's recollection your promises and a.s.surances, and I call upon you to make some effort to save your country from inevitable ruin. I solemnly declare that it is my opinion that a thousand men who would obey orders and do their duty are more than are necessary to perform the task at which your excellency hesitates. I shall be oppressed with grief if, after the scene of yesterday, I am compelled to return, first, to the seat of Government, and next to Europe, without having witnessed any deed that can tend to obliterate the stain thereby affixed on the Grecian people."

"I am making my last effort," wrote Lord Cochrane to Dr. Gosse, "to get Karaskakes to advance. The monastery is taken, its defenders are destroyed, and now the sheepfold on the other side of the Phalerum is the obstacle. We want mortars, sh.e.l.ls, and fuses, shoes for the seamen, and food for the mob denominated falsely the army of Greece."

The letter to Karaskakes had some effect. On the 30th of April, General Church wrote to say that he had persuaded the Greek captains to agree unanimously to an immediate movement against Athens. Two thousand men were to go, during the following night, by water to the neighbourhood of Cape Colias, and thence march stealthily to a hill about a mile south of Athens, which they hoped to seize and secure under cover of the darkness. During the next evening, a force about twice as large was to join them by the same route, and all were to do their best to drive the Turks from their encampments round the Acropolis. This was Lord Cochrane's plan; and there can be no doubt that it would have been successful had the Greeks acted upon it and done their duty.

Unfortunately they did neither. Having promised overnight, they found reasons in the morning for breaking their promises. Nothing was done on the 1st of May, and Lord Cochrane, tired of their excuses for procrastination, paid a brief visit to the authorities at Poros. The result was, that he thought of going without the Greek leaders. "I have seen the Government," he wrote to Sir Richard Church on the 2nd, "and prepared them for the worst, should things go on as they have hitherto done. They are incapable of applying any remedy. Therefore, the more credit will be due to you if you shall be enabled to save the garrison of the Acropolis; in which endeavour count on my utmost exertions and most unlimited co-operation. I hope now you will be able to act without Karaskakes. In addition to your own people, I can provide two thousand marines, seamen, and volunteers. With these, if you land at night to the eastward, you may be in the neighbourhood of Athens in two hours; and then there is the garrison of fifteen hundred in addition to co-operate, making in the whole a force of nearly five thousand, without taking a soldier from Karaskakes's tambourias. If, however, you judge well to have volunteers from Karaskakes's camp, I shall offer 200,000 piastres amongst all who will accompany you or meet you at Athens; by which means I have little doubt you will find Karaskakes deserted, and the whole mob at the gates of Athens. All the vessels are at your service."

Sir Richard Church feared to undertake the exploit without the co-operation of Karaskakes, and, on again consulting him, he was informed that a fresh supply of entrenching tools was necessary. Lord Cochrane immediately sent messengers to procure them, but was none the less annoyed at what seemed to him an unnecessary excuse, and again threatened to take his ships where they could do good work for Greece.

"You have done everything in your power," wrote Sir Richard to him on the 3rd of May, "and so have I. The soldiers will not embark without the entrenching tools. All we could collect do not amount to two hundred and fifty. I would have gone without one, but no one will follow me. I cannot say more; but to-morrow we may be more fortunate.

I cannot say to you stay or otherwise. If you go, I cannot deplore it more than yourself."

Lord Cochrane consented to wait till the morrow, and on the morrow an incident occurred which caused a little further delay. On the 4th of May a small body of Greeks, chiefly Hydriots, went on a skirmishing expedition. At first they were successful, and they had nearly won a redoubt, when a large force of Turks suddenly a.s.sailed them on the flank, and drove them back to Phalerum with a loss of nearly a hundred men. Karaskakes, hearing of this reverse, hurried to the rescue, and with the bravery which was never wanting to him when in actual battle, sought to rally the fugitives. He was on the point of leading them back, when a ball from a pistol struck him in the belly. He was conveyed, in a dying state, to General Church's schooner. Regret at his previous vacillations seems to have filled his mind. "Where is Cochrane? Bring Cochrane to me!" he exclaimed over and over again.

Lord Cochrane soon arrived. Karaskakes, on seeing him, murmured repeated thanks to him for his forbearance towards himself and his devotion to the cause of the Greeks. In his eagerness, he seized the interpreter, Mr. Ma.s.son, by the beard, and, pointing towards Cape Colias, said, with all the strength he could muster, "Tell them to be sure to land the division over there to-morrow." Then, not doubting that the expedition would be successful, he uttered solemn thanks to Heaven that he was dying in the moment of victory. Then he made his will--a soldier's will. "I leave my sword and my gun to my son. Tell him to remember they belonged to Karaskakes." He had little else to leave, having always been free from the avarice by which many of his countrymen were disgraced. He died in the night, and in him Greece lost the worthiest of her native warriors. His faults were the faults of his nation. Many of his virtues were his own. Had his followers been as brave and honest as he was in his best moments, he might have led them on to easy victory. But they wavered and procrastinated, and, in listening to their excuses, he lost his chance of triumph and subjected himself to blame, for which his brave death only half atoned.

On the evening of the 4th, Lord Cochrane a.s.sembled the Greek captains at Munychia, and telling them of their leader's dying message, asked whether they were ready to obey it. For some time they made no answer.

At length, on the question being repeated, they replied that they thought they had only been brought thither to hear from the Admiral words of consolation for the loss they had sustained in the death of the brave and wise Karaskakes. Being asked a third time whether they would obey the dying injunction of the leader for whom they now mourned so much, they answered that they were not ready, that the army was in disorder, that some of them were occupied in burying the slain, that some were tending the wounded, and that all desired to stay near their chief as long as the soul was in his body, and to have at any rate the opportunity of kissing his body before its burial.

With some bitterness, Lord Cochrane replied that such an excess of grief was inopportune, and that their love for Karaskakes would be best shown in obeying his last command. He added that, if they really refused to go to the rescue of the Acropolis, they would not need his presence on the coast and could not complain of his going to serve Greece elsewhere. Having said that, he returned to his ship.

He had not been long on board, however, when a messenger followed him with intelligence that the army would adopt his plan and be ready, without fail, to proceed to the Acropolis on the following evening.

There was no further procrastination, and throughout the next day preparations were being made for what one historian of the Greek Revolution calls "a whim,"[6] and another "an insane scheme."[7]

[6] Trikoupes, vol. iv., p. 152.

[7] Gordon, vol. ii., p. 392.

"The scheme," says one who was in close attendance on Lord Cochrane all through this time, Mr. Edward Ma.s.son, "was anything but insane. It was one of the most sober, safe, and practicable plans ever formed.

The first and fundamental condition on which Lord Cochrane consented to co-operate in any plan of landing troops at Cape Colias was, that the troops landed should not expose themselves to an attack of cavalry in the plains, but should, on being landed, proceed by a night march, in compact order, and without halting, to a specified rocky height beyond the temple of Jupiter Olympus, a position which, it was admitted by all, they could hold with perfect safety during the day.

From this position, the leaders were to try to communicate, by signals or otherwise, with the garrison, and in concert with it, act as circ.u.mstances might dictate. Should the garrison resolve to make a sortie, the main body of the Greek army advancing simultaneously from the Phalerum, it was confidently hoped that the combined attack on the enemy would prove victorious; or, at least, would be so far successful, as to enable the Greeks to save the garrison and bring away the families. The great characteristic of the plan was, that nothing should be risked in reference to the enemy's cavalry, and that if the detachment should find they could accomplish nothing, they should, on the following night, return as they went, in safety, and be embarked for the Phalerum."

Unfortunately, the two main points on which Lord Cochrane had insisted were neglected, and thereby what must otherwise have been a brilliant victory was turned into a miserable defeat. He had insisted upon the movement from Cape Colias being aided by the march of the main body of the army direct from the Piraeus to the hills, thus diverting the attention of many of the Turks while the advancing party and the garrison were uniting; but Zavella, to whom this part of the work had been entrusted, never moved at all. He had urged yet more strongly that the preparations for the advance should be so hastened as that all the ground should be travelled over during the night-time, while the Turks were in ignorance of it; but instead of that, the Greeks, though they were embarked at Phalerum by midnight, and landed at Cape Colias before two o'clock in the morning, loitered near the sh.o.r.e till daylight, so that their whole enterprise was exposed to the enemy. The critics who have laid the blame of the disaster on Lord Cochrane have neglected to show how these circ.u.mstances caused the failure of the enterprise.

The story of the disaster of the 6th of May will be best told in the words of an eye-witness. "About three thousand soldiers," said Dr.

Gosse, in a letter written to M. Eynard on the 23rd, "were embarked in the night between the 5th and the 6th of May, in a clear moonlight, and in the most perfect order, and promptly landed on the other sh.o.r.e.

Up to that time everything favoured our enterprise; but the treason and negligence of the chiefs, and the indolence of some of the soldiers, altogether destroyed it. Instead of marching directly to Athens during the night, they employed themselves in constructing redoubt after redoubt, as bad as they were useless, of the sort called by them tambourias. We counted a dozen. Only the Suliots, the Candiots, commanded by Demetrius Kalerdji, two hundred regular troops, under the orders of Inglesi and D'aujourd'hui, and twenty-two Philh.e.l.lenes, went in advance. Without any hindrance, they reached within cannon-shot of the Acropolis, towards Philippapus, so that, as I have heard, they could even speak with the besieged; but, having received no orders to enter, they waited until the day rendered their position hazardous. The enemy thus had time to ascertain their weakness and to send against them eight hundred hors.e.m.e.n. Thrice these troops were repulsed. Va.s.so and Notaras, however, who covered the right flank, abandoned their posts, as they had done in the affair of the unfortunate Bourbakes, and thereby they caused confusion among the troops in the centre. The latter defended themselves with renewed valour, but yielded at last to the sabres of the Dehli cavalry. Then was exhibited such a panic as cannot be described. The soldiers who occupied the redoubts in the rear, and near to the place of debarkation, began to flee almost at the same time as those of Va.s.so, and threw themselves into the sea at the risk of being drowned. I was at this time with Lord Cochrane, who did not wish to mix himself up with the affair, when the sudden flight forced us at once to rejoin our boat, and even this was not done without great difficulty. General Church was also on the sh.o.r.e, and he too was only saved by the sloop which was waiting for him. The Turkish cavalry, after having killed or captured all the advanced party, rushed into the plain and made terrible havoc among the Greeks. Seven hundred of them were killed; and two hundred and forty were taken prisoners. The rest, numbering about two thousand, rushed down towards the sea, and would soon have been all destroyed by the Turkish guns placed on the hills if the fire from the vessels off the coast had not kept the enemy at a respectful distance. They pa.s.sed the day in a terrible uncertainty, but were sustained by the courage of certain chiefs, especially of Nicolo Serva, a Suliot captain; and in the following night they were embarked and carried back to Phalerum. While this portion of the army was being thus troubled, the Greeks, under the orders of Kisso Zavella, remained inactive. That chief quietly smoked his pipe, and when implored to march, was content to answer coldly, 'When they pay me I will go.' The troops of Kolokotrones the younger, and of Sessinis, deserted in the direction of Livonia. The Turks, taking advantage of the disorganized condition of the Greeks, attacked the Phalerum on the night of the 6th, but were repulsed."

Lord Cochrane's account of the battle sent to the Government on the 7th of May, though more general, supplies some other details. "The plan concocted previous to the death of General Karaskakes," he said, "was carried into effect on the 6th, by his excellency General Church, with this difference in the execution of the service, that his excellency and myself were anxious that a rapid march should be made from the place of debarkation direct to Athens, by a body of four thousand men, in order to return with the women and children and the wounded, whereas the officers of the army insisted upon entrenchments being made in the line of their progress--an operation which required so much time as to preclude the possibility of effecting the object surprised and unopposed. The redoubts were in progress of construction, and the work continued with unremitting labour until about nine o'clock in the morning, when the enemy's cavalry, having collected from all quarters, broke in upon the unfinished redoubts and vigorously attacked those who had advanced the furthest, and who, from the number of subdivisions left, according to the custom of the country, in these redoubts during their progress, had become so weakened as to be incapable of making effectual resistance. The loss on our side has been very considerable. I had to lament this day that the Greeks still continue their aversion to that regularity of movement and honesty of action which const.i.tute the strength of armies, and I grieve to see great bravery rendered useless to their country and dangerous to themselves, and wasted in desultory and unsupported personal efforts. The use of the bayonet and very slight military instruction would have saved most of those who fell on this occasion, and would have rendered unnecessary those redoubts which delay the progress of your arms, and destroy more men in insignificant enterprises which tend to no result, than would be required for the deliverance of your country. The affairs of Greece require energy, and that remedy be at once applied to whatever impedes the progress of affairs."

Lord Cochrane testified to the excellent soldiership of the Turkish hors.e.m.e.n. With sabres and short muskets, they dashed in and out of the crowd of retreating Greeks, who, having no bayonets and no weapons adapted for close fighting, were utterly defenceless. He himself, having landed with Dr. Gosse to watch the operations from the sh.o.r.e, was so hard pressed by these formidable antagonists that he was only rescued by his own bravery and the daring of Dr. Gosse, who retained possession of the boat which was waiting for him on the sh.o.r.e until his chief had time to force his way back to it through the crowd of fighting Turks and Greeks and through the waves beating up to his neck. It was only when he was again on board the _h.e.l.las_, and able to direct the firing of the guns, that the Turks were driven back, and the remnant of the Greek force was allowed to collect and prepare for the return to Phalerum.

The fall of the Acropolis soon followed this terrible defeat. By it the Greeks were utterly disorganized. Lord Cochrane, finding it impossible to persuade them to another attempt, returned to Poros with the fleet on the 10th of May. Sir Richard Church remained at Munychia, his army being every hour reduced by desertions, till the 27th, when he and the two thousand starving men who were left to him abandoned their position. Fabvier and the garrison, through the intervention of the French Captain Le Blanc and Admiral De Rigny, capitulated on the 5th of June. It was then found that the Acropolis still contained stores of food and ammunition sufficient for four months' use, and that their reports of dest.i.tution had been deliberate falsehoods, intended only to force their friends outside to come speedily to their relief.

Those falsehoods had been particularly mischievous. By them, as has been shown, Lord Cochrane was induced to listen to the entreaties of Karaskakes and the Government, and take his ships to Phalerum, instead of carrying out his plan of stopping the Turkish supplies in the Negropont and at Oropos. Had that plan been adhered to, it seems as if a very different issue might easily have been brought about.

The work on which he had been engaged having terminated so unfortunately, Lord Cochrane was much blamed for it by critics who had private reasons for being jealous. We have shown, however, that he only entered upon that work at the request of men whose power and influence he could not gainsay; that, having undertaken it, he set himself shrewdly and earnestly to render it successful; and that the failure was occasioned, not by adoption of his plans, but by their perversion or rejection. If he erred, he erred only in expecting too much patriotism and valour from the people whom he was doing his utmost to serve.

If anything further need be said in explanation and defence of Lord Cochrane's position up to this time, it will be best done by quoting part of a letter addressed to M. Eynard on the 27th of May, in which he concisely repeated the whole story. "On my arrival in Greece," he wrote, "I found that the authority was claimed by two factions, that nothing like a navy existed, and that a number of individuals called an army were collected to raise the siege of Athens,--but wholly deficient in military talent on the part of the commanders, or in obedience and discipline on the part of the troops. As soon as I had accepted my commission, I commenced active exertions to save the Acropolis. I advised Karaskakes to embark and land to the southward and eastward of the Phalerum, and, marching direct to the Acropolis, bring out the women and children. But my counsel was in vain, as he had no idea of any combined naval and military movement, nor indeed of any military plan, except that of advancing by slow steps, after the manner of the Turks, who construct little fortifications, called tambourias, at every few hundred yards, which are again opposed by others of the adverse party; and, as neither army attacks these forts by active force, the whole, after a few hours, are brought to a stand, and the result of the contest depends on who can the longest continue to furnish pay and provisions. Such was the state of the military contest when General Church took the command. The battle at Phalerum, though brilliant, was accidental, and, not being followed up, was productive of no result. Karaskakes fell, and General Church embarked the troops in order to execute the movement that ought to have taken place a month before. The moment was more inauspicious than we were aware of; for the Turkish commander had that very night been joined by a large body of cavalry and a number of infantry from Negropont and elsewhere. This, however, would not have proved decisive, had not General Church, with a view to conciliate the officers under his command, and indeed in order to induce them to embark at all upon the expedition, conformed to their absurd views of military movement, and permitted them to carry entrenching tools to form their usual numerous positions on the line of their route, the construction of which wholly defeated the intention of surprise, and enabled the enemy to surround their advanced guard or van, weakened by the division of the troops into fourteen garrisons left in a line in their advance, whereas the whole body might, with perfect safety and in two hours, have reached the Acropolis. The slaughter which the Turks made in the advanced posts of the Greeks was horrible, and the panic which took possession of those who remained on the Phalerum, at three leagues' distance from the scene of action, was as disgraceful as the conduct of their chief, Zavella, who made no movement even to create a diversion, but sat coolly looking at the slaughter of his countrymen. With six thousand men under his command he remained totally inactive. This expedition to Athens cost upwards of twenty-five thousand dollars of the naval money and destroyed most of our provisions. At the same time, I believed it to be my duty to act as I did, and I have not since regretted any step that I took, because, if Fabvier and the garrison fall into the hands of the Turks and are destroyed, I shall at least have the consolation of knowing that my utmost efforts were made to avert their fate."

CHAPTER XIX.

LORD COCHRANE'S RETURN TO POROS.--HIS ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE AN EFFICIENT GREEK NAVY.--THE WANT OF FUNDS AND THE APATHY OF THE GREEKS.--HIS LETTER TO THE PSARIANS, AND HIS VISITS TO HYDRA AND SPETZAS.--HIS CRUISE ROUND THE MOREA.--HIS FIRST ENGAGEMENT WITH THE TURKS.--THE DISORGANIZATION OF HIS GREEK SAILORS.--HIS CAPTURE OF A VESSEL BEARING THE BRITISH FLAG, LADEN WITH GREEK PRISONERS.--SEIZURE OF PART OF RESHID PASHA'S HAREM.--IBRAHIM PASHA'S NARROW ESCAPE.--LORD COCHRANE'S FURTHER DIFFICULTIES.--HIS EXPEDITION TO ALEXANDRIA.--ITS FAILURE THROUGH THE COWARDICE OF HIS SEAMEN.--HIS TWO LETTERS TO THE PASHA OF EGYPT.--HIS RETURN TO POROS.--FURTHER EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE NAVY.--HIS VISIT TO SYRA.--THE TROUBLES OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT.--LORD COCHRANE'S VISIT TO NAVARINO.--HIS DEFEAT OF A TURKISH SQUADRON.

[1827.]

Before arriving in Greece, Lord Cochrane bad been informed by Captain Abney Hastings and other experienced Philh.e.l.lenes of the inefficiency of the navy, and a very short stay at Poros served to convince him of the truth of the information. On the 17th of April he obtained from the National a.s.sembly a decree authorizing the organization of a better national fleet, and, before proceeding to join in the efforts for the relief of the Acropolis, he did all that was possible towards the achievement of this object, making such arrangements as would prevent any hindrance thereto arising from his temporary absence on the most pressing work that devolved upon him. Having sent Captain Hastings with all the available ships on the expedition to the Negropont which has already been described, he established at Poros the centre of the administration of the fleet, entrusting its direction to Dr. Gosse, as Commissary-General. He then visited Hydra, Spetzas, and other islands, and left in each directions for the inspection of all the ships there stationed, in order that, according to the national decrees, the best of them might be bought up by the Government, on equitable terms, and converted into vessels of war at Poros. During his stay near the Piraeus he was in almost daily correspondence with Dr. Grosse and Emanuel Tombazes respecting the purchase of stores, the construction of gunboats, and every other essential to the fulfilment of his purpose. He sent Jakomaki Tombazes, the elder of the two brothers, to look out near Candia for a new corvette which had just been built at Leghorn for the Pasha of Egypt.

All other means in his power were adopted by him for augmenting the naval strength of Greece, and fitting it to oppose the force of her enemies so soon as he was able to devote himself exclusively to that work.

This he did promptly and zealously immediately after the failure of the expedition in favour of the garrison of the Acropolis. "Brave officers and soldiers and seamen of the military and naval services,"

he wrote in a proclamation issued on the 7th of May, "a defeat of the enemy's naval force will tenfold repay the check which was sustained in yesterday's attempt to relieve the Acropolis. Let every man maintain his post as duty to his country demands, and in a few days I trust you will find your affairs not only retrieved but secured on a permanent base."

That trust was not fulfilled. The Greeks proved themselves on sea as well as on land unable to fight worthily, and with enough real patriotism, for the liberty of their country. But honour must not on that account be withheld from the man who used all his large experience and larger philanthropy in trying to put them in the way of victory.

Lord Cochrane returned to Poros on the 10th of May, after an absence of just three weeks. He lost no time in rendering to the Government, then located in that island, a personal account of his recent proceedings, and in doing his utmost to persuade the Greeks to aid him in the new exploits on which he hoped to enter with better prospect of success. An address to the Psarians, dated the 11th of May, will serve as a specimen of many doc.u.ments of the same nature. "It was my intention yesterday," he said, "to have paid my respects to you, in order personally to have made known to you the circ.u.mstances in which the naval service is placed and the state and preparations of the enemy, and to have called on you to show an example to the other islanders, on whose exertions now depend the liberties and fate of their country. The abandonment of the schooner, in which I have hitherto been embarked by all her seamen, prevented me from fulfilling my intention, and the certain intelligence received this morning that the Turkish fleet from Constantinople pa.s.sed Syra the day before yesterday, to join the Egyptian fleet, compels me now to recommend you by writing, instead of by word of mouth, to save your country and yourselves by prompt and energetic exertions. The money I brought here with me, being the proceeds of subscriptions made throughout Europe for your cause, has unfortunately been nearly consumed in fruitless endeavours to save the capital of Greece by means of an irregular and unmanageable body of men, who will neither receive instruction nor listen to advice. I hope that the brave seamen who understand their duty will listen to my recommendation through you that they should at once step forward to save their families from oppression and slavery, and the name of their country from being struck out of the list of independent nations. By one glorious effort Greece may be free; but if she remain in her present state of apathy all hope must be abandoned.

I call upon you now to stand forward in defence of your religion and all that is valuable to man. I send you a thousand dollars, which is all that I can spare. Those who will equip their ships may depend on repayment out of the first money that shall be remitted to me for the public service of Greece."

As that letter implies, Lord Cochrane had to begin his reconstruction of the Greek navy--now the only remaining resource of the nation in its hope of working out and a.s.suring its independence by effort of its own--almost without funds. The small sum of 8000l. which he had brought with him, as well as the money collected by the European committees and transmitted to the Philh.e.l.lenic Committee in Greece, composed of Colonel Heydeck, Dr. Bailli, and Dr. Gosse, was nearly exhausted, and the bankrupt Government was unable to provide him with any adequate resources for carrying on his work. It had authorized him to buy ships and stores and to employ labourers and seamen, and expected him to do all without stint, but gave him no money for the purpose. In lieu it authorized him to borrow upon the security of all the future revenue to be derived from the islands; and every effort to utilize this mortgage was made by his agent Dr. Gosse, but with very poor success. The credit of the Greek Government was so low that the prospects of any considerable revenue in the depressed state of commerce--likely to be yet more depressed by the steady advances made by the Turks in regaining their dominion over the insurgents--deterred capitalists from staking their money thereupon. Lord Cochrane, as we shall see, had to apply half his energies in performing the work of a financier, never antic.i.p.ated by him, and certainly not proper to his functions as First Admiral; and, the result of all being feeble, his legitimate duties were grievously crippled.

Money being absolutely needed, however, he did his best to procure it, and with this view, as well as in order to make personal acquaintance with the princ.i.p.al ports, and the ships and sailors contained in them, he left Poros, three days after returning to it, on a tour among the other important islands.

Starting on Sunday, the 13th of May, he reached Hydra on the following morning. There, in the house of the brothers Konduriottes, its richest and most influential inhabitants, he met several other leading primates, and prevailed on them to take upon themselves the outfit of several brigs and brulottes, the cost of which he had at present no means of paying. Having, on the 15th, pa.s.sed on to Spetzas, Lord Cochrane had a similar interview with its chief residents. "I have been highly gratified," he wrote on the 16th to the elder Konduriottes, "by the spirit here manifested in following the n.o.ble example which you have set, and I have no doubt but a sufficient force will be immediately equipped to cut off all the resources by which the army of Reshid Pasha is maintained, and so destroy that army even more effectually than by the sword. The utmost prompt.i.tude, however, is necessary. One day's delay may permit several weeks' provisions and stores to enter the Negropont."

Prompt.i.tude was not easy, in spite of the favourable promises of the primates. "Strange as it may appear to you," said Lord Cochrane, in a letter to his friend, M. Eynard, "it is yet a fact that, out of the thousands of seamen idle and starving at Hydra, Spetzas, and Egina, not a man will enter the service of his country without being paid in advance; nor will they engage to prolong their service beyond a month, so that the labour of disciplining a crew is interminable. Were there funds to increase the pay for each month, the sailors would remain, and there might be some hope of getting a ship in order. At the present moment there are no individuals in Greece who are instructed in their duties as officers in ships of war." "I see no termination to the obstacles," he wrote to Dr. Gosse on the 17th, "which present themselves at every step I advance. Neither the Hydriots nor the Psarians, nor the Spetziots, nor the Poriots, will embark in this frigate, which is thus useless to Greece, if not prejudicial, because her maintenance is an expense without benefit. I wish I could do a thousand things which I am compelled to neglect, by reason of the difficulties and want of a.s.sistance of all kinds. You, my good friend, are my only aid."

At Spetzas, and in its neighbourhood, Lord Cochrane remained four days, directing the arrangements to be made in organizing a fleet strong enough to go against the enemy's shipping, and, while waiting for that, in appointing two minor expeditions upon services that were urgent. On the 18th of May, he sent Admiral Saktoures with ten brigs and four fireships to cruise about the Negropont and capture as much as he could of the stores sent through that channel from Constantinople for the use of the Turkish army in Attica. On the following day he went himself in the _h.e.l.las_, attended by the _Karteria_, under Captain Abney Hastings, in the direction of Cape Clarenza, the north-westernmost point of the Morea, opposite to Zante.[8]

[8] "The admiral," says Gordon, "weighed with the _h.e.l.las_ and _Karteria_ alone, leaving the rest of his squadron to draw pay and rations at Porto Kheli" (vol. ii., p. 415). The fact was that all the rest of his squadron that was fit for service was sent to the Negropont; and Lord Cochrane left directions that the other vessels, as soon as there were men to be rationed and funds for paying them, should follow him to Clarenza. But they only came to run away.

Castle Tornese, there situated, was being besieged by the Turks, and Lord Cochrane hoped to be in time to avert its capture. In this he failed. Arriving on the 22nd of May, he found that the castle had capitulated a few hours before. All he could do was to chase two Turkish frigates which he found on the coast. "We fired into them," he said, "but our guns were ill-directed, and the noise and confusion on board this ship was excessive, which prevented my choosing to attack them again, though they did us not the slightest injury, because I am desirous that the _h.e.l.las_ shall be in somewhat better order before I voluntarily attack an enemy who may take advantage of the impossibility of causing my orders to be obeyed, and so leave the fate of the ship to the conduct of a rabble."

One capture, however, the _h.e.l.las_ was able to make on the following day. She fell in with a vessel, manned by Turks and Ionian Islanders, bearing the British flag, loaded with captives, chiefly women and children, just taken in the Castle Tornese. Lord Cochrane seized her, and sent her, with a reasonably indignant letter, to the Lord High Commissioner at Corfu. "If I do not attempt to express my feelings in addressing you," he said, "it is because I am aware that the terms I should employ would fall far short of the sensations that will arise in the breast of every honourable man throughout the civilized world, and the degradation which every Englishman will experience, on learning that the flag of England, first prost.i.tuted by supplying the traffickers in Christian slaves with all the necessaries for their horrid purposes, is now further debased by a traffic in the slaves themselves. I send you an Ionian vessel, full of women violated in their persons, and who, with their children, had been reduced to slavery, in order that the British public and the world may ascertain whether these unfortunate people will be protected by the decision of an Ionian tribunal. If there were any hope that the people in the Ionian Islands would abandon their infamous dealings otherwise than by force, I should ask your excellency to issue an order upon the subject. I beg, however, to signify that I am ready to co-operate with the admiral and officers of the British naval service in the Mediterranean in enforcing obedience to the laws of justice and humanity, and putting down the Ionian trade in slaves, as well as the piracies which have originated chiefly in the total contempt shown by the Ionian people and others for the laws of nations and the principles of justice during the contest between Greeks and Turks. I also put at your disposal the Turks found on board the Ionian boat, not considering them as prisoners of war, but as men apprehended in violating the laws of civilized nations and insulting the feelings of Christendom." "Since writing the above," it was added in a postscript, "I have experienced considerable difficulty in restraining the fury of the Greeks from bursting forth upon the violators of their countrywomen. From what I foresee, I also feel it my duty to warn you that, should the transportation of Christian captives by neutrals be continued, I cannot answer for the safety of Ionians found so employed by the other vessels of the Greek squadron."

A formal acknowledgment of that letter was all the answer received by Lord Cochrane.

On the 24th of May, when near Missolonghi, he made another capture--a Turkish brig, with eight guns, bearing Austrian colours, which was proceeding from Previsa to Navarino. In her, besides a good store of flour and gunpowder, were found some Turkish officials and several members of Reshid Pasha's harem. The alarm of these prisoners was very great at first; but they were treated with courtesy, and landed, with all their personal properties, at the first convenient halting-place, the brig and its cargo being retained as prizes. Reshid Pasha, in return for the generous treatment shown to his attendants, afterwards released a hundred Greek prisoners without ransom.

Another curious incident occurred at this time. Several small Turkish merchant-vessels pa.s.sed Lord Cochrane's ship during his stay near Missolonghi, but he abstained from capturing them, deeming it unworthy to interfere with such small crafts, devoted, as it was supposed, only to trading purposes. He was afterwards informed that in one of them Ibrahim Pasha himself had been concealed. Had the Egyptian leader been thus made prisoner, the future course of the war might have been altogether changed.

Lord Cochrane had gone into the Gulf of Patras in hope of meeting with Captain Hastings, from whom he had parted soon after leaving Spetzas; but the _Karteria_ had been disabled by a squall, which took away both her masts, and so had to return to Poros; and with the ill-manned _h.e.l.las_ alone Lord Cochrane did not deem it prudent, as he had wished, to attack Navarino, whither the besiegers of the Castle Tornese had gone, and where twelve Egyptian frigates, twenty corvettes, and forty or fifty smaller vessels were for some time lying. Several of these came out to take on board the Ottoman troops who had done their work at Cape Clarenza, and Lord Cochrane, on the 1st of June, remained for several hours within sight of them, ready and hoping to be attacked. No fight being offered, however, he did not choose to run the risk of going single-handed into their midst. He accordingly contented himself with surveying the coast, and forming his own judgment as to the relative value of its ports and harbours, as he sailed back in the direction of Poros.

To Poros itself Lord Cochrane did not venture to proceed. "I have written for all the Greek vessels that are ready, including the fireships and explosion-vessels, to join me," he said in a letter to Dr. Gosse, written on the 7th of June, off Cerigo; "I remain at sea with this frigate, lest the whole of her crew should desert, according to custom, were I to pay a visit to Poros." The want of zeal which he thus perceived in his seamen was shared by nearly all their countrymen. All wished him to serve them, but very few made any patriotic effort to aid him in the service. His most active supporter was Captain Abney Hastings; and Captain Abney Hastings complained yet more loudly than did his superior of the indolence and bad conduct of the Greeks. "I had the honour to receive your order of the 7th, enjoining me to repair to your lordship without delay, if ready for sea," he wrote on the 9th, from Spetzas; "a variety of circ.u.mstances, unavoidable in a country deprived of even the shadow of organization, has prevented me from being yet ready to sail. The majority and best of my crew have left me, and I must look for others."

Hastings and all his other officers wrote over and over again to Lord Cochrane, asking for stores of all sorts, and for money with which to pay the wages of their crews. But Lord Cochrane was still almost without funds. Only from Konduriottes, and the other island primates, could he procure scanty supplies with which to carry on his work--or rather, to prevent that work from being altogether abandoned. "I have the honour," he wrote to the Government, "to represent to your excellencies that I find it impossible to realise the credit which you a.s.signed to me on the revenues of the islands, and that insurmountable obstacles prevent my acting as affairs require. The _h.e.l.las_ even is idle for want of supplies. Each day, each event, increases my conviction that, without strong and special efforts, without a prompt and disinterested co-operation of all its citizens, Greece must of necessity be overcome. Isolated as I am, I am useless to them.

Supported by their patriotism and zeal, I could fight for their independence. The islands of the Archipelago are willing to aid our efforts, but they claim from me in return a guarantee for the safety of their goods and for the regular administration of their imposts. I await your excellencies' instructions for promptly answering their demand; for the resources of the western nations are drained; European charity is wearied. The islands alone offer us the means of maintaining the naval forces, and of resisting, if it be possible--if it be not too late--the vigorous preparations of our enemy. We must act promptly or abandon everything." The Government only answered by urging its chief admiral to lose no time in securing the independence of Greece.

This, in spite of the difficulties thrown in his way, he set himself heartily to attempt. Two courses were now open to him. Reshid Pasha, having taken possession of the Acropolis, and thus completed the capture of Athens, had laid siege to Corinth; and Sir Richard Church, with a weak and vacillating body which went by the name of an army--the remnants of that which had proved so useless in the neighbourhood of the Piraeus--was vainly trying to raise the siege. By him and by the Government Lord Cochrane was urged to muster as large a fleet as possible in the Bay of Corinth, and to co-operate with the land forces by blockading the besiegers, after the method that had failed at Athens. Experience convinced him that such action would be useless; whereas from modification of the plan which he had in the former instance been induced to abandon he hoped much. He knew that a large Egyptian force was being prepared at Alexandria, to be employed first in aiding the siege of Corinth, and afterwards in completing the conquest of all Greece. If only he could train the Greeks to act under his bold leadership, as he had trained the Chilians and Brazilians, he trusted that, by one daring movement, he could seize Alexandria as he had seized Valdivia and Maranham. And to this project he zealously addressed himself, deeming it sufficient to send a small force to blockade the gulfs of Patras and Corinth, and leaving Dr. Gosse as his agent in command of naval affairs at home, with special orders to visit the various islands, and, in accordance with authority received from the Government, to collect the revenues of each, in order that the necessary expenses of the fleet might be met.