In my opinion, no government could live here at this time if peace was proposed upon terms that would have any chance of acceptance.

Those in civil authority that I have met are as reasonable and fairminded as their counterparts in England or America, but, for the moment, they are impotent.

I hear on every side the old story that all Germany wants is a permanent guaranty of peace, so that she may proceed upon her industrial career undisturbed.

I have talked of the second convention[110], and it has been cordially received, and there is a sentiment here, as well as elsewhere, to make settlement upon lines broad enough to prevent a recurrence of present conditions.

There is much to tell you verbally, which I prefer not to write.

Faithfully yours, E.M. HOUSE.

Colonel House's next letter is most important, for it records the birth of that new idea which afterward became a ruling thought with President Wilson and the cause of almost endless difficulties in his dealings with Great Britain. The "new phase of the situation" to which he refers is "the Freedom of the Seas" and this brief note to Page, dated March 27, 1915, contains the first reference to this idea on record. Indeed, it is evident from the letter itself that Colonel House made this notation the very day the plan occurred to him.

_From Edward M. House_ Emba.s.sy of the United States of America, Berlin, Germany.

March 27, 1915.

DEAR PAGE:

I have had a most satisfactory talk with the Chancellor. After conferring with Stovall[111], Page[112], and Willard[113], I shall return to Paris and then to London to discuss with Sir Edward a phase of the situation which promises results.

I did not think of it until to-day and have mentioned it to both the Chancellor and Zimmermann, who have received it cordially, and who join me in the belief that it may be the first thread to bridge the chasm.

I am writing hastily, for the pouch is waiting to be closed.

Faithfully yours, E.M. HOUSE.

The "freedom of the seas" was merely a proposal to make all merchant shipping, enemy and neutral, free from attack in time of war. It would automatically have ended all blockades and all interference with commerce. Germany would have been at liberty to send all her merchant ships to sea for undisturbed trade with all parts of the world in war time as in peace, and, in future, navies would be used simply for fighting. Offensively, their purpose would be to bombard enemy fortifications, to meet enemy ships in battle, and to convoy ships which were transporting troops for the invasion of enemy soil; defensively, their usefulness would consist in protecting the homeland from such attacks and such invasions. Perhaps an argument can be made for this new rule of warfare, but it is at once apparent that it is the most startling proposal brought forth in modern times in the direction of disarmament. It meant that Great Britain should abandon that agency of warfare with which she had destroyed Napoleon, and with which she expected to destroy Germany in the prevailing struggle--the blockade.

From a defensive standpoint, Colonel House's proposed reform would have been a great advantage to Britain, for an honourable observance of the rule would have insured the British people its food supply in wartime.

With Great Britain, however, the blockade has been historically an offensive measure: it is the way in which England has always made war.

Just what reception this idea would have had with official London, in April, 1915, had Colonel House been able to present it as his own proposal, is not clear, but the Germans, with characteristic stupidity, prevented the American from having a fair chance. The Berlin Foreign Office at once cabled to Count Bernstorff and Bernhard Dernburg--the latter a bovine publicity agent who was then promoting the German cause in the American press--with instructions to start a "propaganda" in behalf of the "freedom of the seas." By the time Colonel House reached London, therefore, these four words had been adorned with the Germanic label. British statesmen regarded the suggestion as coming from Germany and not from America, and the reception was worse than cold.

And another tragedy now roughly interrupted President Wilson's attempts at mediation. Page's letters have disclosed that he possessed almost a clairvoyant faculty of foreseeing approaching events. The letters of the latter part of April and of early May contain many forebodings of tragedy. "Peace? Lord knows when!" he writes to his son Arthur on May 2nd. "The blowing up of a liner with American pa.s.sengers may be the prelude. I almost expect such a thing." And again on the same date: "If a British liner full of American pa.s.sengers be blown up, what will Uncle Sam do? That's what's going to happen." "We all have the feeling here,"

the Amba.s.sador writes on May 6th, "that more and more frightful things are about to happen."

The ink on those words was scarcely dry when a message from Queenstown was handed to the American Amba.s.sador. A German submarine had torpedoed and sunk the _Lusitania_ off the Old head of Kinsale, and one hundred and twenty-four American men, women, and children had been drowned.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 100: On September 5, 1914, Great Britain, France, and Russia signed the Pact of London, an agreement which bound the three powers of the Entente to make war and peace as a unit. Each power specifically pledged itself not to make a separate peace.]

[Footnote 101: Published in Chapter XI, page 327.]

[Footnote 102: Colonel House's summer home in Ma.s.sachusetts.]

[Footnote 103: Amba.s.sador from Austria-Hungary to the United States.]

[Footnote 104: This, with certain modifications is Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.]

[Footnote 105: There is a suggestion of these provisions in Article 8 of the League Covenant.]

[Footnote 106: Article 11 of the League Covenant reflects the influence of this idea.]

[Footnote 107: From the President's second message to Congress, December 8, 1914: "It is our dearest present hope that this character and reputation may presently, in G.o.d's providence, bring us an opportunity, such as has seldom been vouchsafed any nation, to counsel and obtain peace in the world and reconciliation and a healing settlement of many a matter that has cooled and interrupted the friendship of nations."]

[Footnote 108: The opening of the Dardanelles would have given Russian agricultural products access to the markets of the world and thus have preserved the Russian economic structure. It would also have enabled the Entente to munition the Russian Army. With a completely equipped Russian Army in the East and the Entente Army in the West, Germany could not long have survived the pressure.]

[Footnote 109: German Under Foreign Secretary.]

[Footnote 110: It was the Wilson Administration's plan that there should be two peace gatherings, one of the belligerents to settle the war, and the other of belligerents and neutrals, to settle questions of general importance growing out of the war. This latter is what Colonel House means by "the second convention."]

[Footnote 111: Mr. Pleasant A. Stovall, American Minister to Switzerland.]

[Footnote 112: Mr. Thomas Nelson Page, American Amba.s.sador to Italy.]

[Footnote 113: Mr. Joseph E. Willard. American Amba.s.sador to Spain.]