[Ibid., 92; pb 79.]

The basic need of the creator is independence. The reasoning mind cannot work under any form of compulsion. It cannot be curbed, sacrificed or surbordinated to any consideration whatsoever. It demands total independence in function and in motive. To a creator, all relations with men are secondary.

[Ibid.]

Men have been taught that the highest virtue is not to achieve, but to give. Yet one cannot give that which has not been created. Creation comes before distribution-or there will be nothing to distribute. The need of the creator comes before the need of any possible beneficiary. Yet we are taught to admire the second-hander who dispenses gifts he has not produced above the man who made the gifts possible. We praise an act of charity. We shrug at an act of achievement.

[Ibid., 93; pb 80.]

Men have been taught that it is a virtue to agree with others. But the creator is the man who disagrees. Men have been taught that it is a virtue to swim with the current. But the creator is the man who goes against the current. Men have been taught that it is a virtue to stand together. But the creator is the man who stands alone.

Men have been taught that the ego is the synonym of evil, and selflessness the ideal of virtue. But the creator is the egoist in the absolute sense, and the selfless man is the one who does not think, feel, judge or act. These are functions of the self.

[Ibid., 94; pb 80.]

See also ALTRUISM; COOPERATION; INDEPENDENCE; INDIVIDUALISM; INTELLIGENCE; PRODUCTIVENESS; PYRAMID of ABILITY; SECOND-HANDERS; SELFISHNESS.

Credit. In all its countless variations and applications, "credit" means money, i.e., unconsumed goods, loaned by one productive person (or group) to another, to be repaid out of future production. Even the credit extended for a consumption purpose, such as the purchase of an automobile, is based on the productive record and prospects of the borrower. Credit is not... a magic piece of paper that reverses cause and effect, and transforms consumption into a source of production.

["Egalitarianism and Inflation," PWNI, 160; pb 132.]

All credit transactions are contractual agreements. A credit transaction is any exchange which involves a pa.s.sage of time between the payment and the receipt of goods or services. This includes the vast majority of economic transactions in a complex industrial society.

["Government Financing in a Free Society," VOS, 158; pb 117.]

See also CONSUMPTION; DEFICIT FINANCING; INTEREST (on LOANS); INVESTMENT; MONEY; PURCHASING POWER; SAVINGS.

Crime. A crime is a violation of the right(s) of other men by force (or fraud). It is only the initiation of physical force against others-i.e., the recourse to violence-that can be cla.s.sified as a crime in a free society (as distinguished from a civil wrong). Ideas, in a free society, are not a crime-and neither can they serve as the justification of a crime.

[" 'Political' Crimes," NL, 99.]

There can be no such thing as a political crime under the American system of law. Since an individual has the right to hold and to propagate any ideas he chooses (obviously including political ideas), the government may not infringe his right; it may neither penalize nor reward him for his ideas; it may not take any judicial cognizance whatever of his ideology.

By the same principle, the government may not give special leniency to the perpetrator of a crime, on the grounds of the nature of his ideas.

[Ibid.]

All actions defined as criminal in a free society are actions involving force-and only such actions are answered by force.

Do not be misled by sloppy expressions such as "A murderer commits a crime against society." It is not society that a murderer murders, but an individual man. It is not a social right that he breaks, but an individual right. He is not punished for hurting a collective-he has not hurt a whole collective-he has hurt one man. If a criminal robs ten men-it is still not "society" that he has robbed, but ten individuals. There are no "crimes against society"-all crimes are committed against specific men, against individuals. And it is precisely the duty of a proper social system and of a proper government to protect an individual against criminal attack-against force.

["Textbook of Americanism," pamphlet, 7.]

See also FRAUD; INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS; PHYSICAL FORCE; RETROACTIVE LAW; RIGHTS of the ACCUSED; SOCIETY.

"Crow Epistemology." See Unit-Economy.

Culture. Just as there is no such thing as a collective or racial mind, so there is no such thing as a collective or racial achievement. There are only individual minds and individual achievements-and a culture is not the anonymous product of undifferentiated ma.s.ses, but the sum of the intellectual achievements of individual men.

["Racism," VOS, 174; pb 127.]

A nation's culture is the sum of the intellectual achievements of individual men, which their fellow-citizens have accepted in whole or in part, and which have influenced the nation's way of life. Since a culture is a complex battleground of different ideas and influences, to speak of a "culture" is to speak only of the dominant ideas, always allowing for the existence of dissenters and exceptions.

["Don't Let It Go," PWNI, 250; pb 205.]

The acceptance of the achievements of an individual by other individuals does not represent "ethnicity": it represents a cultural division of labor in a free market; it represents a conscious, individual choice on the part of all the men involved; the achievements may be scientific or technological or industrial or intellectual or esthetic-and the sum of such accepted achievements const.i.tutes a free, civilized nation's culture. Tradition has nothing to do with it; tradition is being challenged and blasted daily in a free, civilized society: its citizens accept ideas and products because they are true and/or good-not because they are old nor because their ancestors accepted them. In such a society, concretes change, but what remains immutable-by individual conviction, not by tradition-are those philosophical principles which correspond to reality, i.e., which are true.

["Global Balkanization," pamphlet, 6.]

See also CIVILIZATION; COLLECTIVISM; "ETHNICITY"; INDIVIDUALISM; TRADITION.

Cynicism. There is nothing so naive as cynicism. A cynic is one who believes that men are innately depraved, that irrationality and cowardice are their basic characteristics, that fear is the most potent of human incentives-and. therefore, that the most practical method of dealing with men is to count on their stupidity, appeal to their knavery, and keep them in constant terror.

In private life, this belief creates a criminal; in politics, it creates a statist. But, contrary to the cynic's belief, crime and statism do not pay.

A criminal might thrive on human vices, but is reduced to impotence when he comes up against the fact that "you can't cheat an honest man." A statist might ride to power by dispensing promises, threats and handouts to the seekers of the unearned-but he finds himself impotent in a national emergency, because the language, methods and policies which were successful with parasites, do not work when the country needs producers.

["From My 'Future File,' " ARL, III, 26, 3.]

When one discards ideals, the fact that a given policy (such as government controls) is evil, does not const.i.tute a reason for rejecting it. On the contrary, such an estimate serves as an incentive to adopt and expand that policy: to a cynic's mind, that which is evil, is potent and practical.

["Ideas v. Goods," ARL, III. II. 4.]

See also AMORALISM; APPEAs.e.m.e.nT; BENEVOLENT UNIVERSE PREMISE; HONOR; MALEVOLENT UNIVERSE PREMISE; MORAL COWARDICE; MORAL-PRACTICAL DICHOTOMY; MORALITY; VALUES; VIRTUE.

D.

Dance. Among the performing arts, dancing requires a special discussion. Is there an abstract meaning in dancing? What does dancing express?

The dance is the silent partner of music and partic.i.p.ates in a division of labor: music presents a stylized version of man's consciousness in action-the dance presents a stylized version of man's body in action. "Stylized" means condensed to essential characteristics, which are chosen according to an artist's view of man.

Music presents an abstraction of man's emotions in the context of his cognitive processes-the dance presents an abstraction of man's emotions in the context of his physical movements. The task of the dance is not the projection of single, momentary emotions, not a pantomime version of joy or sorrow or fear, etc., but a more profound issue: the projection of metaphysical value-judgments, the stylization of man's movements by the continuous power of a fundamental emotional state -and thus the use of man's body to express his sense of life.

Every strong emotion has a kinesthetic element, experienced as an impulse to leap or cringe or stamp one's foot, etc. Just as a man's sense of life is part of all his emotions, so it is part of all his movements and determines his manner of using his body: his posture, his gestures, his way of walking, etc. We can observe a different sense of life in a man who characteristically stands straight, walks fast, gestures decisively-and in a man who characteristically slumps, shuffles heavily, gestures limply. This particular etement-the overall manner of moving-const.i.tutes the material, the special province of the dance. The dance stylizes it into a system of motion expressing a metaphysical view of man.

A system of motion is the essential element, the pre-condition of the dance as an art. An indulgence in random movements, such as those of children romping in a meadow, may be a pleasant game, but it is not art. The creation of a consistently stylized, metaphysically expressive system is so rare an achievement that there are very few distinctive forms of dancing to qualify as art. Most dance performances are conglomerations of elements from different systems and of random contortions, arbitrarily thrown together, signifying nothing. A male or a female skipping, jumping or rolling over a stage is no more artistic than the children in the meadow, only more pretentious.

["Art and Cognition." RM, pb 66.]

Within each system, specific emotions may be projected or faintly suggested, but only as the basic style permits. Strong pa.s.sions or negative emotions cannot be projected in ballet, regardless of its librettos; it cannot express tragedy or fear-or s.e.xuality; it is a perfect medium for the expression of spiritual love. The Hindu dance can project pa.s.sions, but not positive emotions; it cannot express joy or triumph, it is eloquent in expressing fear, doom-and a physicalistic kind of s.e.xuality.

[Ibid., 68.]

Music is an independent, primary art; the dance is not. In view of their division of labor, the dance is entirely dependent on music. With the emotional a.s.sistance of music, it expresses an abstract meaning; without music, it becomes meaningless gymnastics. It is music, the voice of man's consciousness, that integrates the dance to man and to art. Music sets the terms; the task of the dance is to follow, as closely, obediently and expressively as possible. The tighter the integration of a given dance to its music-in rhythm, in mood, in style, in theme-the greater its esthetic value.

A clash between dance and music is worse than a clash between actor and play: it is an obliteration of the entire performance. It permits neither the music nor the dance to be integrated into an esthetic ent.i.ty in the viewer's mind-and it becomes a series of jumbled motions superimposed on a series of jumbled sounds.

[Ibid., 69.]

See also ART; RALLET; Ch.o.r.eOGRAPHER; MUSIC; PERFORMING ARTS; STYLIZATION.

Dark Ages. The infamous times you call the Dark Ages were an era of intelligence on strike, when men of ability went underground and lived undiscovered, studying in secret, and died, destroying the works of their mind, when only a few of the bravest martyrs remained to keep the human race alive. Every period ruled by mystics was an era of stagnation and want, when most men were on strike against existence, working for less than their barest survival, leaving nothing but sc.r.a.ps for their rulers to loot, refusing to think, to venture, to produce, when the ultimate collector of their profits and the final authority on truth or error was the whim of some gilded degenerate sanctioned as superior to reason by divine right and by grace of a club.

[GS, FNI, 211; pb 169.]

In the history of Western civilization, the period known as the Dark Ages, after the fall of the Roman Empire, was a period when Western Europe existed without any social organization beyond chance local groupings cl.u.s.tered around small villages, large castles, and remnants of various traditions-swept periodically by ma.s.sive barbarian invasions, warring robber bands, and sundry local looters. It was as close to a state of pure anarchy as men could come.

["A Nation's Unity," ARL, II, 2, 2.]

See also HISTORY; MIDDLE AGES; MYSTICISM; PHILOSOPHY; REASON; RENAISSANCE.

Decorative Arts. The task of the decorative arts is to ornament utilitarian objects, such as rugs, textiles, lighting fixtures, etc. This is a valuable task, often performed by talented artists, but it is not an art in the esthetic-philosophical meaning of the term. The psycho-epistemological base of the decorative arts is not conceptual, but purely sensory: their standard of value is appeal to the senses of sight and/or touch. Their material is colors and shapes in nonrepresentational combinations conveying no meaning other than visual harmony; the meaning or purpose is concrete and lies in the specific object which they decorate.

As a re-creation of reality, a work of art has to be representational; its freedom of stylization is limited by the requirement of intelligibility; if it does not present an intelligible subject, it ceases to be art. On the other hand, a representational element is a detriment in the decorative arts: it is an irrelevant distraction, a clash of intentions. And although designs of little human figures or landscapes or flowers are often used to decorate textiles or wallpaper, they are artistically inferior to the nonrepresentational designs. When recognizable objects are subordinated to and treated as a mere pattern of colors and shapes, they become incongruous.

["Art and Cognition," RM, pb 74.]

See also: ART; BEAUTY; ESTHETICS; PSYCHO-EPISTEMOLOGY; VISUAL ARTS.

Deficit Financing. The government has no source of revenue, except the taxes paid by the producers. To free itself-for a while-from the limits set by reality, the government initiates a credit con game on a scale which the private manipulator could not dream of. It borrows money from you today, which is to be repaid with money it will borrow from you tomorrow, which is to be repaid with money it will borrow from you day after tomorrow, and so on. This is known as "deficit financing." It is made possible by the fact that the government cuts the connection between goods and money. It issues paper money, which is used as a claim check on actually existing goods-but that money is not backed by any goods, it is not backed by gold, it is backed by nothing. It is a promissory note issued to you in exchange for your goods, to be paid by you (in the form of taxes) out of your future production.

["Egalitarianism and Inflation," PWNI, 161; pb 133.]

See also CREDIT, GOLD STANDARD; GOVERNMENT; INFLATION; MONEY; TAXATION; WELFARE STATE.

Definitions. A definition is a statement that identifies the nature of the units subsumed under a concept.

It is often said that definitions state the meaning of words. This is true, but it is not exact. A word is merely a visual-auditory symbol used to represent a concept; a word has no meaning other than that of the concept it symbolizes, and the meaning of a concept consists of its units. It is not words, but concepts that man defines-by specifying their referents.

The purpose of a definition is to distinguish a concept from all other concepts and thus to keep its units differentiated from all other existents.

Since the definition of a concept is formulated in terms of other concepts, it enables man, not only to identify and retain a concept, but also to establish the relationships, the hierarchy, the integration of all his concepts and thus the integration of his knowledge. Definitions preserve, not the chronological order in which a given man may have learned concepts, but the logical order of their hierarchical interdependence.

With certain significant exceptions, every concept can be defined and communicated in terms of other concepts. The exceptions are concepts referring to sensations, and metaphysical axioms. [ITOE, 52.]

The rules of correct definition are derived from the process of concept-formation. The units of a concept were differentiated-by means of a distinguishing characteristic(s)-from other existents possessing a commensurable characteristic, a Conceptual Common Denominator. A definition follows the same principle: it specifies the distinguishing characteristic (s) of the units, and indicates the category of existents from which they were differentiated.

The distinguishing characteristic(s) of the units becomes the differentia of the concept's definition; the existents possessing a Conceptual Common Denominator become the genus.

Thus a definition complies with the two essential functions of consciousness: differentiation and integration. The differentia isolates the units of a concept from all other existents; the genus indicates their connection to a wider group of existents.

For instance, in the definition of table ("An item of furniture, consisting of a flat, level surface and supports, intended to support other, smaller objects"), the specified shape is the differentia, which distinguishes tables from the other ent.i.ties belonging to the same genus: furniture. In the definition of man ("A rational animal"), "rational" is the differentia, "animal" is the genus.

[Ibid., 53.]

A definition must identify the nature of the units, i.e., the essential characteristics without which the units would not be the kind of existents they are.

[Ibid., 55.]

It is the principle of unit-economy that necessitates the definition of concepts in terms of essential characteristics. If, when in doubt, a man recalls a concept's definition, the essential characteristic(s) will give him an instantaneous grasp of the concept's meaning, i.e., of the nature of its referents. For example, if he is considering some social theory and recalls that "man is a rational animal," he will evaluate the validity of the theory accordingly; but if, instead, he recalls that "man is an animal possessing a thumb," his evaluation and conclusion will be quite different.

[Ibid., 86.]

Now observe... the process of determining an essential characteristic: the rule of fundamentality. When a given group of existents has more than one characteristic distinguishing it from other existents, man must observe the relationships among these various characteristics and discover the one on which all the others (or the greatest number of others) depend, i.e., the fundamental characteristic without which the others would not be possible. This fundamental characteristic is the essential distinguishing characteristic of the existents involved. and the proper defining characteristic of the concept.

Metaphysically, a fundamental characteristic is that distinctive characteristic which makes the greatest number of others possible; epistemologically, it is the one that explains the greatest number of others.

[Ibid., 59.]

All definitions are contextual, and a primitive definition does not contradict a more advanced one: the latter merely expands the former.

[Ibid., 56.]

Since man is not omniscient, a definition cannot be changelessly absolute, because it cannot establish the relationship of a given group of existents to everything else in the universe, including the undiscovered and unknown. And for the very same reasons, a definition is false and worthless if it is not contextually absolute-if it does not specify the known relationships among existents (in terms of the known essential characteristics) or if it contradicts the known (by omission or evasion).

[Ibid., 62.]

An objective definition, valid for all men, is one that designates the essential distinguishing characteristic(s) and genus of the existents subsumed under a given concept-according to all the relevant knowledge available at that stage of mankind's development.

[Ibid., 61.]

Truth is the product of the recognition (i.e., identification) of the facts of reality. Man identifies and integrates the facts of reality by means of concepts. He retains concepts in his mind by means of definitions. He organizes concepts into propositions-and the truth or falsehood of his propositions rests, not only on their relation to the facts he a.s.serts, but also on the truth or falsehood of the definitions of the concepts he uses to a.s.sert them, which rests on the truth or falsehood of his designations of essential characteristics.

[Ibid., 63.]

The truth or falsehood of all of man's conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions.

[Ibid., 65.]

Definitions are the guardians of rationality, the first line of defense against the chaos of mental disintegration.

["Art and Cognition," RM, pb 77.]

To know the exact meaning of the concepts one is using, one must know their correct definitions, one must be able to retrace the specific (logical, not chronological) steps by which they were formed, and one must be able to demonstrate their connection to their base in perceptual reality.

When in doubt about the meaning or the definition of a concept, the best method of clarification is to look for its referents-i.e., to ask oneself : What fact or facts of reality gave rise to this concept? What distinguishes it from all other concepts?

[ITOE, 67.].

Let us note, at this point, the radical difference between Aristotle's view of concepts and the Objectivist view, particularly in regard to the issue of essential characteristics.

It is Aristotle who first formulated the principles of correct definition. It is Aristotle who identified the fact that only concretes exist. But Aristotle held that definitions refer to metaphysical essences, which exist in concretes as a special element or formative power, and he held that the process of concept-formation depends on a kind of direct intuition by which man's mind grasps these essences and forms concepts accordingly.

Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical; Objectivism regards it as epistemological.

Objectivism holds that the essence of a concept is that fundamental characteristic(s) of its units on which the greatest number of other characteristics depend, and which distinguishes these units from all other existents within the field of a man's knowledge. Thus the essence of a concept is determined contextually and may be altered with the growth of man's knowledge. The metaphysical referent of man's concepts is not a special, separate metaphysical essence, but the total of the facts of reality he has observed, and this total determines which characteristics of a given group of existents he designates as essential. An essential characteristic is factual, in the sense that it does exist, does determine other characteristics and does distinguish a group of existents from all others; it is epistemological in the sense that the cla.s.sification of "essential characteristic" is a device of man's method of cognition-a means of cla.s.sifying, condensing and integrating an ever-growing body of knowledge.

[Ibid., 68.]