CAUCASUS.

Field Troops PEACE.

Engineers. 1,548 Cavalry. 12,364 Infantry. 8,442 Artillery. 59,254 Total. 81,608 Horses. 15,927 Guns. 198 WAR.

Total. 150,313 Horses. 31,700 Guns. 366

Reserve Fortress Troops PEACE.

Engineers. - Cavalry. 5,480 Infantry. 2,860 Artillery. 2,270 Total. 10,610 Horses. 6,137 Guns. 8 WAR.

Total. 51,776 Horses. 36,862 Guns. 12

TURKESTAN.

PEACE.

Engineers. 496 Cavalry. 6,744 Infantry. 2,468 Artillery. 12,522 Total. 22,230 Horses. 8,246 Guns. 48 WAR.

Total. 34,125 Horses. 12,780 Guns. 76

SIBERIA.

PEACE.

Engineers. 244 Cavalry. 2,606 Infantry. 1,273 Artillery. 7,752 Total. 11,875 Horses. 3,412 Guns. 24 WAR.

Total. 29,779 Horses. 14,745 Guns. 58

_Grand Aggregate of the Empire_.

PEACE.

Engineers. 23,623 Cavalry. 90,600 Infantry. 83,328 Artillery. 460,494 Total. 663,045 Horses. 113,990 Guns. 1,610 WAR.

Total. 1,978,640 Horses. 367,089 Guns. 3,920

During 1884 the engineer corps was reorganized. Henceforward the peace establishment will consist of seventeen battalions of sappers; eight battalions of pontoniers; sixteen field-telegraph companies, each of which is mounted, so as to maintain telegraphic communication for forty miles, and have two stations; six engineering parks or trains, each ten sections, carrying each sufficient tools and material for an infantry division; four battalions of military railway engineers; four mine companies; two siege trains, and one telegraph instruction company. The whole is divided into six brigades, and provisions are taken for training recruits and supplying the losses during war. The fortress troops, for the defence of fortresses, consist of forty-three battalions of twelve hundred men each in time of war, and nine companies of three hundred men each. The depot troops, for garrison service, consist of thirteen battalions and three hundred detachments.

The reserve troops supply 204 battalions of infantry, 56 squadrons of cavalry, 57 batteries of artillery, and 34 companies of sappers.

If mobilized, they are intended to supply 544 battalions, 56 squadrons, 144 batteries, and 34 companies of engineers. The second reserve, or "Zapas," consists of "cadres" for instruction, organized in time of war.

The training of the Russian infantry comprises that of skirmishing as of most importance; the whistle is used to call attention; the touch is looser in the ranks than formerly; squares to resist cavalry are no longer used; [Footnote: A British officer, who has had good opportunities, says the infantry drill is second to none.]

the Berdan breech-loader is the infantry arm; sergeant-majors wear officers' swords, and together with musicians carry revolvers.

A great stimulus has been given to rifle practice in the Russian army, with fair results, but complaint is made of want of good instructors. The dress and equipment of the infantry is noted for an absence of ornament, and hooks are subst.i.tuted for b.u.t.tons. Every thing has been made subordinate to comfort and convenience. Woollen or linen bandages are worn instead of socks. The entire outfit of the soldier weighs about fifty pounds. The Guards, alone, are yet permitted to wear their old uniform with b.u.t.tons. The arms of the Turkestan troops are mixed Berdan and Bogdan rifles. The field clothing is generally linen blouse with cloth shoulder-straps, chamois-leather trousers, dyed red, and a white kepi. Officers wear the same trousers in the field. Cossacks wear gray shirts of camel's hair.

The artillery is divided into field artillery and horse artillery, of which the strength is given elsewhere. The horse batteries have the steel four-pound gun.

Col. Lumley, of the British army, says: "In Russia it is believed that the field artillery is equal to that of any other Power, and the horse artillery superior." Lieut. Grierson, R.A., from his personal observation, confirms this opinion.

It is not too much to say that, in any European conflict in the near future, the Russian cavalry will be conspicuous and extraordinarily effective. In a war with England, in Asia, the use of large bodies of cavalry, organized, instructed, and equipped after the American plan, must become the main feature.

From the wonderful reforms inst.i.tuted by Russia in her huge army of hors.e.m.e.n, which have put her before all other nations, not excepting Germany, we may expect to hear of wonderful mobility, stunning blows at the enemy's depots, and the appropriation of choice positions under his nose: of stubborn contests with the Anglo-Indian infantry, the only weapon a Berdan carbine; of communications destroyed by high explosives: especially, of the laying waste smiling Afghan valleys, inexpedient to occupy:--these are a few of the surprises to which we may be treated if Russia gets the chance. In this manner she is doubtless prepared to take the initiative in her next war.

[Footnote: The bold operations of General Gourko in the Russo-Turkish war of 1878, afford the best ill.u.s.tration of the versatile qualities of the progressive military horseman since the American war, 1861-5. An Austrian officer says: "The Russian cavalry reconnoitred boldly and continuously, and gave proof of an initiative very remarkable. Every one knows that Russian dragoons are merely foot soldiers mounted, and only half hors.e.m.e.n: however, that it should come to such a point as making dragoons charge with the bayonet, such as took place July 16th near Twardista, seems strange. Cossacks and Hussars dismounted on the 30th, formed skirmishing lines, coming and going under the fire of infantry, protecting their battery, and conducting alone an infantry fight against the enemy. At Eski Zagra, July 31st, the dragoons did not leave the field until all their cartridges were exhausted. On the other hand, the _offensive_ action, and the spirit of enterprise and dash, which are the proper qualifications of cavalry, were not wanting in the Russians."]

The whole of the regular cavalry of the line has been converted into dragoons armed with Berdan rifle and bayonet; the Guard regiments must adopt the same change when ordered into the field, and the Cossacks have been deprived of the lance (excepting for the front rank); new musketry regulations have been prescribed. Great stress is now laid upon the training of both horses and men in the direction of long marches, and the pa.s.sage of obstacles. Forced marches are also made to cover the greatest possible distances in the shortest possible time.

[Footnote: Among other experiments are noted that of 7 officers and 14 men of the Orenburg Cossacks who in November last in bad weather travelled 410 versts between Niji Novgorod and Moscow in 5 days--about 53 miles a day; then covering 685 versts from Moscow to St.

Petersburg in 8 days--56 miles a day; on arrival an inspector reported horses fresh and ready for service; the party was mentioned in orders, and presented to the Czar. A month before, in snow and intense cold, 7 officers and 7 men of the cavalry school covered 370 versts in 4 days--60 miles a day. It is a.s.serted that the best Russian cavalry can travel 70 miles a day, continuously, without injury. General Gourko recently inspected two sotnias of Don Cossacks who had cleared 340 versts in 3 days, or 74 miles a day.]

Swimming was practised in the Warsaw, Odessa, and Moscow districts, the horses being regularly taught with the aid of inflated bags tied under them. The Suprasl was crossed by the entire 4th Cavalry Division swimming. In order to acquire a thorough knowledge of pioneer duty, both the officers and non-commissioned officers of cavalry are attached to the engineer camp for a short course of instruction. In one division a regular pioneer squadron has been formed for telegraphic and heliographic duty. The mounted force, provided for in the Russian establishment, comprises twenty-one divisions of 3,503 sabres and 12 guns each, or an aggregate of 73,563 men and 252 field guns.

A feature of the Russian cavalry equipment is the pioneer outfit, consisting of tools for construction or destruction, as they desire to repair a bridge or destroy a railroad; this outfit for each squadron is carried on a pack-mule; dynamite is carried in a cart with the ammunition train.

The Cossack (except of the Caucasus) is armed with a long lance (front rank only), a sabre without guard, and a Berdan rifle. Those of the Caucasus have in addition pistol and dagger, besides a _nagaska_ or native whip. The uniform is blue, high boots, fur cap, cloak with cape. The snaffle-bit is universally used, even by the officers, although the average Russian troop-horse is noted for his hard mouth.

In the mounted drill of the Cossacks there is a charge as skirmishers (or "foragers") called the "lava," which is executed at a great pace and with wild yells of "Hourra!"

Lieut. Grierson, of the British army, writes that: "A big fine man mounted on a pony, with his body bent forward and looking very top-heavy, always at a gallop, and waving his enormous whip, the Cossack presents an almost ludicrous appearance to one accustomed to our stately troopers. But this feeling is dashed with regret that we possess no such soldiers."

_Transport and Supply_.--The Russian system of transport is in a very experimental and unsatisfactory state. It is the only army which provides regimentally for the _personnel_ and _materiel_ of this department. In each regiment is a non-combatant company, in which all men required for duty without arms are mustered.

All military vehicles required for the regiment are under charge of this company. The intention of the system now developing is to reduce the quant.i.ty of transportation required. [Footnote: In 1878 the head-quarters baggage of the Grand Duke Nicholas required five hundred vehicles and fifteen hundred horses to transport it.]

Besides the wagons and carts used for ordinary movements of troops, Russia will, in Afghanistan, depend upon the animals of the country for pack-trains and saddle purposes. After the _Camel_, of which large numbers exist in the region bordering Afghanistan on the north, the most important aid to Russian military mobility is the remarkable _Kirghiz Horse_. The accounts of the strength, speed, endurance, and agility of this little animal are almost incredible, [Footnote: In 1869 a Russian detachment of five hundred men, mounted on Kirghiz horses, with one gun and two rocket-stands, traversed in one month one thousand miles in the Orenburg Steppe, and only lost three horses; half of this march was in deep sand. In October, M.

Nogak (a Russian officer) left his detachment _en route_, and rode one horse into Irgiz, 166-2/3 miles in 34 hours.] but they are officially indorsed in many instances. He is found in Turkestan, and is more highly prized than any other breed. The Kirghiz horse is seldom more than fourteen hands, and, with the exception of its head, is fairly symmetrical; the legs are exceptionally fine, and the hoofs well formed and hard as iron. It is seldom shod, and with bare feet traverses the roughest country with the agility of a chamois, leaping across wide fissures on the rocks, climbing the steepest heights, or picking its way along mere sheep-tracks by the side of yawning precipices, or covering hundreds of versts through heavy sand, with a heavier rider, day after day. Its gaits are a rapid and graceful walk of five and one half to six miles an hour, and an amble [Footnote: Moving both feet on a side almost simultaneously.] at the maximum rate of a mile in two minutes. This animal crosses the most rapid streams not over three and one half feet deep, lined with slippery boulders, with ease. They are good weight carriers. [Footnote: The mounted messengers (pony express) over the steppes, use these horses, and carry with them, over stages of 350 miles in 8 days, an equipment and supplies for man and horse of nearly 300 pounds.] With a view of stimulating horse-breeding in Turkestan, the government in 1851 offered prizes for speed.

[Footnote: The greatest speed recorded (1853.) was 13-1/2 miles (on a measured course) in 27 minutes and 30 seconds.] Kirghiz horses have been thoroughly tested in the Russian army. For modern cavalry and horse-artillery purposes they are unsurpa.s.sed. The average price is L6, but an ambler will bring L12. Great Britain is said to possess 2,800,000 horses, while Russia, in the Kirghiz steppes alone, possesses 4,000,000 saddle or quick-draught horses.

The supply of the Russian army is carefully arranged under the central Intendance. The ration in the field was, in 1878, 14.3 ounces of meat, 14.9 black bread, preserved vegetables and tea, with an issue of brandy in the winter. Immense trains follow each division, at intervals, forming consecutive mobile magazines of food. A division provision train can carry ten days' supply for 230,000 men.

Forage is now supplied for transport in compressed cakes, of which 20,000,000 were used by Russia in her last war. [Footnote: A compressed ration of forage was extensively used by the Russians in 1878, weighing 3-1/2 pounds; 5 days' supply could be carried on the saddle with ease.]

Clothing is furnished by the supply bureau of certain regions in which there are large government factories; it is usual to keep on hand for an emergency 500,000 sets of uniform clothing.

_Routes_.--Having devoted a share of our limited s.p.a.ce to an account of the roads leading to Herat, from India, we may consider, briefly, certain approaches to Afghanistan or India from the northwest. This subject has been so clearly treated in a recent paper read before the Royal United Service Inst.i.tution by Captain Holdich, R.E., who surveyed the region referred to, in 1880, that we quote liberally as follows:

In improving our very imperfect acquaintance, both with the present military resources and position of Russia in Central Asia, and of the difficulties presented both geographically and by the national characteristics of the races that she would have to encounter in an advance south of the Oxus, a good deal has been already learned from the Afghans themselves. Among the turbulent tribes dwelling in and around Kabul, whose chief and keenest interest always lies in that which bears, more or less directly, on their chances of success in mere faction fights, which they seem to regard as the highest occupation in life, the Russian factor in the general game must be a matter of constant discussion. Thus it may possibly arise from their individual interest in their national position that there is no better natural geographer in the world than the Afghan of the Kabul district. There is often an exactness about his method of imparting information (sometimes a careful little map drawn out with a pointed stick on the ground) which would strike one as altogether extraordinary, but for the reflection that this one accomplishment is probably the practical outcome of the education of half a lifetime.

Russia's bases of military operations towards India are two: one on the Caspian Sea at Krasnovodsk, and Chikishliar, with outposts at Chat and Kizil Arvat; and the other on the line of Khiva, Bokhara, Samarcand, and Margillan, which may roughly be said to represent the frontier held (together with a large extent of boundary south of Kuldja) by the Army of Tashkend, under General Kaufmann. But between this latter line and the Oxus, Russia is undoubtedly already the dominant Power. The mere fact of Russia having already thoroughly explored all these regions, gives her the key to their future disposal. There is no doubt that in all matters relating to the acquirement of geographical knowledge, where it bears on possible military operations, Russian perceptions are of the keenest. Her surveying energies appear to be always concentrated on that which yet lies beyond her reach, rather than in the completion of good maps to aid in the right government of that which has already been acquired.

With what lies north of the Oxus we can have very little to say or to do; therefore it matters the less that in reality we know very little about it. The Oxus is not a fordable river. At Khoja Saleh, which is the furthest point supposed to have been reached by the Aral flotilla, it is about half a mile wide, with a slow current. At Charjui it is about the same width, only rapid and deep. At Karki it is said to be one thousand yards wide, and at Kilif perhaps a quarter of a mile. But at all these places there are ferries, and there would be ample means of crossing an army corps, if we take into account both the Aral flotilla and the native material, in the shape of large flat-bottomed boats, capable of containing one hundred men each, used for ferrying purposes, of which there are said to be three hundred between Kilif and Hazarasp. These boats are drawn across the river by horses swimming with ropes attached to their manes. But under any circ.u.mstances it seems about as unlikely that any British force would oppose the pa.s.sage of a Russian army across the Oxus as that it would interfere with the Russian occupation of the trans-Oxus districts; but once south of the Oxus, many new conditions of opposition would come into play, arising princ.i.p.ally from the very different national characteristics of the southern races to those farther north. It would no longer be a matter of pushing an advance through sandy and waterless deserts, or over wild and rugged mountains, difficulties which in themselves have never yet r.e.t.a.r.ded the advance of a determined general, but there would be the reception that any Christian foe would almost certainly meet at the hands of a warlike and powerful people, who can unite with all the cohesion of religious fanaticism, backed up by something like military organization and a perfect acquaintance with the strategical conditions of their country. Most probably there would be no serious local opposition to the occupation by Russia of a line extending from Balkh eastwards through Khulm and Kunduz to Faizabad and Sarhadd, all of which places can be reached without great difficulty from the Oxus, and are connected by excellent lateral road communications. But the occupation of such a line could have but one possible object, which would be to conceal the actual line of further advance. Each of these places may be said to dominate a pa.s.s to India over the Hindoo Kush. Opposite Sarhadd is the Baroghil, leading either to Kashmir or to Mastuj and the Kunar valley. Faizabad commands the Nuksa Pa.s.s. Khulm looks southwards to Ghozi and the Parwan Pa.s.s into Kohistan, while from Balkh two main routes diverge, one to Bamian and Kabul, the other to Maimana and Herat.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that this short list disposes of all the practicable pa.s.ses over the Hindoo Kush. The range is a singularly well-defined one throughout its vast length; but it is not by any means a range of startling peaks and magnificent alt.i.tudes. It is rather a chain of very elevated flattish-topped hills, spreading down in long spurs to the north and south, abounding in warm sheltered valleys and smiling corners, affording more or less pasture even in its highest parts, and traversed by countless paths. Many of these paths are followed by Kuchis in their annual migrations southward, with their families and household goods piled up in picturesque heaps on their hardy camels, or with large herds of sheep and goats, in search of fresh pasturage. South of the Hindoo Kush we find most of the eastern routes to our northwest frontier to converge in one point, very near to Jelalabad. There are certain routes existing between the Russian frontier and India which pa.s.s altogether east of this point. There is one which can be followed from Tashkend to Kashgar, and over the Karakoram range, and another which runs by the Terek Pa.s.s to Sarhadd, and thence over the Baroghil into Kashmir; but these routes have justly, and by almost universal consent, been set aside as involving difficulties of such obvious magnitude that it would be unreasonable to suppose that any army under competent leadership could be committed to them. The same might surely be said of the route by the Nuksan Pa.s.s into the valley of Chitral and the Kunar, which joins the Khyber route not far from Jelalabad. Its length and intricacy alone, independently of the intractable nature of the tribes which border it on either side, and of the fact that the Nuksan Pa.s.s is only open for half the year, would surely place it beyond the consideration of any general who aspired to invade India after accomplishing the feat of carrying an army through it. West of Kafirstan across the Hindoo Kush are, as we have said, pa.s.ses innumerable, but only three which need be regarded as practicable for an advancing force, all the others more or less converging into these three. These are the Khak, the Kaoshan (or Parwan, also called Sar Alang), and the Irak. The Khak leads from Kunduz _via_ Ghori and the valley of the Indarab to the head of the Panjshir valley. Its elevation is about thirteen thousand feet. It is described as an easy pa.s.s, probably practicable for wheeled artillery. The Panjshiris are Tajaks, and, like the Kohistanis generally, are most bigoted Suniu Mohammedans. The rich and highly cultivated valley which they inhabit forms a grand highway into Kohistan and Koh Dahman; but all this land of terraced vineyards and orchards, watered by snow-cold streams from the picturesque gorges and mountain pa.s.ses of the Hindoo Kush and Paghman mountains,--this very garden of Afghanistan, stretching away southwards to the gates of Kabul, is peopled by the same fierce and turbulent race who have ever given the best fighting men to the armies of the Amirs, and who have rendered the position of Kabul as the ruling capital of Afghanistan a matter of necessity; with their instincts of religious hostility, it will probably be found that the Kohistani, rather than the Hindoo Kush, is the real barrier between the north and the south. The Sar Alang or Parwan Pa.s.s leads directly from Kunduz and Ghori to Charikar and Kabul. It is the direct military route between Afghan Turkestan and the seat of the Afghan Government, but is not much used for trade.

It cannot be much over eleven thousand feet elevation, and it is known to be an easy pa.s.s, though somewhat dest.i.tute of fuel and forage. The next route of importance is that which leads from Balkh, _via_ Bamian, to the Irak Pa.s.s on the Hindoo Kush, and into the upper watercourse of the Helmund River, and thence by the Unai over the Paghman range to Kabul. This is the great trade route from the markets of Turkestan and Central Asia generally to Kabul and India. The Irak, like the Parwan, is not nearly so high as has been generally a.s.sumed, while the Unai is a notoriously easy pa.s.s. This route is at present very much better known to the Russians, who have lately frequently traversed it, than to ourselves. Like the Parwan and the Khak, it is liable to be closed for three or four months of the year by snow. During the winter of 1879-80 they were open till late in December, and appear to be again free from snow about the middle of April. Between these main pa.s.ses innumerable tracks follow the "durras," or lines of watercourse, over the ridges of the Hindoo Kush and Paghman, which afford easy pa.s.sage to men on foot and frequently also to "Kuchi" camels. These pa.s.ses (so far as we can learn) could, any of them, be readily made available for mountain artillery with a very small expenditure of constructive labor and engineering skill. In Koh Dahman nearly every village of importance lying at the foot of the eastern slopes of the Paghman (such as Beratse, Farza, Istalif, etc.) covers a practicable pa.s.s over the Paghman, which has its continuation across the Sh.o.r.eband valley and over the ridge of the Hindoo Kush beyond it. But between the Khak Pa.s.s and the Irak, the various routes across the Hindoo Kush, whether regarded as routes to India or to Kandahar, although they by no means converge on Kabul City, must necessarily pa.s.s within striking distance of an army occupying Kabul. Such a force would have, first of all, thoroughly to secure its communication with the Oxus, and a strong position at Kabul itself.

Having the official statement of a military engineer with reference to the Oxus-Hindu-Kush line, as a barrier or base or curtain, we may pa.s.s to the princ.i.p.al approach to Herat from the northwest.

There are four distinct lines by which Russia could move on Herat:

I. From the _Caspian_ base a trans-Caucasian army corps could move (only with the concurrence and alliance of Persia) by the Mashed route direct;

II. Or it could move outside Persian territory, from _Chikishliar_ by the Bendessen Pa.s.s to Asterabad, and would then have to pa.s.s through Persian territory to Sarakhs, or across the desert to Merv;

III. From the _Tashkend-Bokhara_ base a route exists _via_ Charjui, the Oxus, direct to Merv; and there is

IV. Also the well-known road by _Balkh_ and Mamiana, direct to Herat.

Routes III. and IV. having just been discussed, let us look at Routes I. and II.