Russia, the third of the three nations to which the war was most immediately due, is the most extensive consolidated empire in the world, its total area being estimated at 8,647,657 square miles, of which 1,852,524 are in Europe, the remainder in Asia. The population is given at about 160,000,000, of which 130,000,000 are in Europe.

Agriculture is the chief pursuit of this great population, though manufactures are largely developing. The forests, immense in extent, cover forty-two per cent of the area and contain timber in enormous quant.i.ties. While a large part of the area is level ground, there is much elevated territory, and the mineral wealth is very important. It includes gold, silver, platinum, iron, copper, coal and salt, all of large occurrence. Of the people, over 1,800,000 are employed in manufacture, and the annual value of the commerce amounts to $1,300,000,000. The length of railway is about 50,000 miles.

Russia is heavily in debt, Germany being its largest creditor.

The total debt is stated at $4,553,000,000, its revenue $1,674,000,000. The liability to military service covers all able-bodied men between the ages of twenty and forty-two years.

Five years must be pa.s.sed in active service, the remainder in the various reserves. On a peace footing the army is 1,290,000 strong; its war strength is 5,500,000. The territor8al service is capable of supplying about 3,000,000 more, making a possible total of 7,500,000. As regards the navy, it was greatly reduced in strength in the war with j.a.pan and has not yet fully recovered. The empire now possesses nine modern battleships, four cruiser battleships, and eight of old type. There are also cruisers and other vessels, including 23 torpedo boats, 105 destroyers, and 48 submarines.

RESOURCES OF FRANCE

France, the one large Power in Europe in which the people have created a republic and have got rid of the FACT of a king, as ill.u.s.trated in the other continental Powers, - and in addition to the mountain realm of Switzerland, in which the people govern themselves through their representatives, - has taken up the dogma of militarism in common with its neighbors and const.i.tutes the fourth of the Powers in which this system has been carried to its ultimate conclusion of a world-wide war.

France had a startling object lesson in 1870. It had, under Napoleon III, been imitating Prussia in its military establishment, and its government officials coincided with the emperor in the theory that its army was in a splendid state of preparation. Marshal Leboeuf lightly declared that "everything was ready, more than ready, and not a gaiter b.u.t.ton missing," and it was with a light-hearted confidence that the Emperor Napoleon declared war against Prussia, the insensate mult.i.tude filling Paris with their futile war cry of "On to Berlin."

This is not the place to deal with this subject, but it may be said that France quickly learned that nothing was ready and the nation went down in the most sudden and awful disaster of modern times. A lesson had been taught, one not easy to forget. The Republic succeeded the Empire, and has since been working on the theory that war with its old enemy might at any time become imminent and no negligence in the matter of preparation could be permitted. As a consequence, France went into the war of 1914 in a state of fitness greatly superior to that of 1870, and Germany found France waiting on its border line, alert and able, ready alike for offense or defense.

What are the natural conditions, the strength and resources, of this great republic? France has an area of 207,054 square miles, almost the same as that of the German Empire. If its numerous colonies be added, its total area is over 4,000,000 square miles.

But this vast colonial expanse is of no special advantage to it in a European war. Its population is 39,601,509; if Algeria, its most available colony, be added, it is about 45,000,000, a total 20,000,000 less than the population of Germany.

Its soil is highly fitted for agricultural use, about mine tenths of it being productive and more than half of it under the plow, the cereals forming the bulk of its products. Its wheat crop is large and oats, rye and barley are also of value, though the raising of the domestic animals is of less importance than in the surrounding countries. The growth of the vine is one of its most important branches of agriculture, and in good years France produces about half of the total wine yield of the world. In mineral wealth it stands at a somewhat low level, its yield of coal, iron, etc. being of minor importance.

France enjoys a large and valuable commerce and active manufacturing industries, products of a more or less artistic character being especially attended to. Of the textile fabrics, those of silk goods are much the most important, this industry employing about 2,000,000 persons and yielding more than a fourth in value of the whole manufactured products of France. Other products are carpets, tapestry, fine muslins, lace and cotton goods. Products of different character are numerous and their value large. The fisheries of France are also of much importance.

Its commerce, while large, is very considerably less than that of Great Britain and Germany, France being especially a self-centered country, largely using what it makes.

There is abundant provision for internal trade and travel, there being 30,000 miles of railway, 3,000 miles or ca.n.a.l, and 5,500 miles of navigable rivers. The annual revenue approaches $1,000,000,000, and the public debt in 1914 was at the large total of over $6,200,000,000. This is much the largest debt of any nation in the world, the debt of Russia, which comes next in amount, being about $l,l700,000,000 less. It is largely due to the cost of the war of 1870 and the subsequent large payment to Germany. Yet the French people carry it without feeling seriously overburdened.

Coming now to the French military system, it rivals that of Germany in efficiency. The law requires the compulsory military service of every French citizen who is not unfit for such service. They have to serve in the regular army for three years, in the regular reserves for six years, in the territorial army for six years, and finally in the reserves of this army for ten years. This gives France a peace strength of 720,000 and a total war strength of 4,000,000. The navy is manned partly by conscription, partly by voluntary enlistment, the naval forces comprising about 60,000 officers and men.

The naval strength of the republic embraces 17 modern battleships, 25 of older type, 18 first-cla.s.s, 13 second and third-cla.s.s cruisers, 173 torpedo boats, 87 destroyers, and 90 submarines. There is another element of modern military strength of growing importance and sure to be of large use in the war under review. This is that of the airship. In 1914 France stood at the head in this particular, its aeroplanes, built or under construction, numbering 550. Germany had 375, Russia 315, Italy 270, Austria 220, Britain 180 and Belgium 150. In dirigible balloons Germany stood first, with 50. France had 30, Russia 15, Austria 10 and Britain 7. These air-soaring implements of war came into play early in the conflict and Tennyson's vision of "battles in the blue" was realized in attacks of aeroplanes upon dirigibles, with death to the crews of each.

RESOURCES OF GREAT BRITAIN.

Great Britain, the remaining party to the five-fold war of great European Powers, is an island country of considerably smaller area than those so far named. Including Ireland it has an area of 121,391 square miles, about equal to that of the American State of New Mexico and not half the size of the Canadian province of Saskatchewan. Its population, however, surpa.s.ses that of France, amounting to 45,221,615. If the outlying dominions of Great Britain be added it becomes the greatest empire in the world's history, its colonial dominions being estimated at over 13,000,000 square miles, and the total population of kingdom and colonies at 435,000,000, the greatest population of any country in the world. And Britain differs from France in the fact that much of this outlying population is available for war purposes in case of peril to the liberties of the mother country. At the outbreak of the war of 1914 the loyal Dominion of Canada sprang at once into the field, mobilized its forces, and offered the mother land material aid in men and gifts of varied nature.

The same sense of loyalty was shown in Australia and South Africa and in others of the British oversea dominions, while India added an important contingent to the army and much other aid.

As for the immediate kingdom, it is not of high value in agricultural wealth, being at present divided up to a considerable extent into large unproductive estates, and it is quite unable to feed its teeming population, depending for this on its large commerce in food products. Its annual imports amount to about $3,000,000,000, its exports to $2,250,000,000.

Commercially and industrially alike Great Britain stands at the head of all European nations. Its abundant mineral wealth, especially in coal and iron, has stimulated manufactures to the highest degree, while its insular character and numerous seaports have had a similar stimulating effect upon commerce. Its revenue, aside from that of the colonies, amounts to about $920,000,000 annually, and its public debt reaches a total of $3,485,000,000.

The British government depends largely for safety from invasion upon its insular position and its enormously developed navy, and has not felt it necessary to enter upon the frenzy of military preparation which pervades the continental nations. No British citizen is obliged to bear arms except for the defense of his country, but all able-bodied men are liable to militia service, the militia being raised, when required, by ballot. Enlistment among the regulars is either for twelve years' army service, or for seven years' army service and five years' reserve service.

The peace strength of the army is estimated at about 255,000 men, the reserves at 475,000; making a total of 730,000.

It is in its navy that Great Britain's chief warlike strength exists, the naval force being much greater than that of any other nation. It possesses in all 29 modern battleships, many of them of the great dreadnaught and super-dreadnaught type. In addition it has 10 cruiser battleships, and 38 older battleships, most of the latter likely to be of little service for warlike duty. There are also 45 first-cla.s.s, and 70 second and third-cla.s.s cruisers, 58 torpedo boats, 212 destroyers and 85 submarines, the whole forming a total navel strength approaching that of any two of the other Powers.

SERVIA AND BELGIUM

As regards the remaining nations engaged in the war, Servia, in which the contest began, has an area of 18,782 square miles, a population of 4,000,000, and a standing army of 240,000, a number seemingly very inadequate to face the enormously greater power of Austria-Hungary. But the men had become practically all soldiers, very many of them tried veterans of the recent Balkan War; their country is mountainous and admirably fitted for defensive warfare, and their power of resistance to invasion was quickly shown to be great.

Belgium, the other early seat of the war, is still smaller in area, having but 11,366 square miles. But it is very densely populated, possessing 7,432,784 inhabitants. Its army proved brave and capable, its fortifications modern and well adapted to defense, and small as was its field force it held back the far more numerous German invaders until France and Great Britain had their troops in position for available defense. This small intermediate kingdom therefore played a very important part in the outset of the war.

If one judges by the figures given of the available military strength of the nations involved, the huge host said to have followed Xerxes to the invasion of Greece could easily be far surpa.s.sed in modern warfare. The fact is, however, that these huge figures greatly exceed the numbers that could, except in the most extreme exigency, be available for use in the field, and for real active service we should be obliged to greatly reduce these paper estimates. It must be taken into account that the fields and factories of the nations cannot be too greatly denuded of their trained workers. It was a shrewd saying of Napoleon Bonaparte that "An army marches on its stomach," and the important duty of keeping the stomach adequately filled can not be overlooked.

In actual war also there is an enormous exhaustion of military material, which must be constantly replaced, and this in turn demands the services of great numbers of trained artisans. The question of finance also cannot be overlooked. It needs vast sums of money to keep a modern army in the field, this increasing rapidly as the forces grow in numbers, and no national treasure chest is inexhaustible. Tax as they may, the war lords cannot squeeze out of their people more blood than flows in their veins, and exhaustion of the war-chest may prove even more disastrous than exhaustion of the regiments. For these reasons a limit to the size of armies is inevitable and in any great war this limitation must quickly make itself apparent.

Chapter IV. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR The Growth of German Importance - German Militarism - Great Britain's Peace Efforts - Germany's Naval Program - German Ambitions - Preparation for War - Effect on the Empire

The influence of the European War permeated everything from and through the nation to the individual, from trade and commerce and world-finance to the cost of food and the price of labor. The whole world, civilized and uncivilized, was drawn into this whirlpool of disaster - the majority of the population of the earth was actually at war. Was it possible that such a vast conflict - so far reaching in its racial and national elements, so bitter in its old and new animosities, so great in its territorial area, so tremendous in the numbers of men in arms - could come, as some commentators say, like a thief in the night or have fallen upon the world like a bolt from the blue! All available information of an exact character, all the preparation of the preceding few years, all the inner statecraft of the world as revealed in policy and action, prove the fallacy of this supposition.

THE GROWTH OF GERMAN IMPORTANCE

As a matter of fact one nation had been for nearly half a century the pivot upon which European hopes and fears have turned in the matter of peace and war, of military and naval preparation, of diplomatic interchange. During this period Germany rose to a foremost place amongst the nations of Europe, to the first place in strength of military power and organized fighting force, to the second place in naval strength and commercial progress. The growth itself was a legitimate one in the main; and, given the character of its people and their cultivated convictions as to inherent greatness, was inevitable. For other nations the vital question asked in diplomacy and answered in their military or naval preparations was equally inevitable: How would Germany use this power, against whom was it aimed, for what specific purpose was it being organized with such capable precision, such splendid skill?

GERMAN MILITARISM

Great Britain, meanwhile, had devoted her main attention to the trade and diplomacy and little wars a.s.sociated with the maintenance of a world-empire and, in self-defense, had cultivated friendships with Russia and France and the United States and j.a.pan as this German power began to come closer and touch the most vital British interests. France naturally strengthened itself as its historic enemy grew in power; Russia improved her military position after the j.a.panese was as she was bound to do; Germany appeared to set the pace upon sea and land with an aggressive diplomacy in Morocco and in China, at Paris and at St. Petersburg, which was bound to cause trouble and to promote what is commonly called militarism. The vast ambitions and persistent policy of the German ruler and his people, the unsatisfied characteristics of German diplomacy, the militant ideals and military preparations and naval expansion of Germany between 1900 and 1914 became the dominant consideration in the chancelleries of Europe. Armies and navies, wars in the Balkans or struggles for colonial spheres of influence, financial reserves and naval construction and volunteer forces - all came to be measured against current developments in this center of European gravity.

GREAT BRITAIN'S PEACE EFFORTS

Great Britain tried to hold aloof from this international rivalry, this preparation for a war which her people and leaders hoped against hope would be averted. Royal visits of a pacific character were exchanged, parties of Great Britain's business men visited Berlin, while leaders such as King Edward and Lord Haldane exercised all their ability in striving for some mutual ground of friendly action. Lovers of peace wrote many volumes and filled many newspapers with articles on the beneficence of that policy and the terrors of militarism - books and articles which were never seen in Germany except by those who regarded them as so many confessions of national weakness. Between 1904 and 1908 Grear Britain actually reduced her naval expenditures and limited her construction of battleships in the hope that Germany would follow the lead, pleaded at two Hague Conferences for international reduction of armaments, kept away from all increase in her own almost ridiculous military establishment, urged upon two occasions (in 1912-1913) a naval holiday in construction. The following figures from Bra.s.sey's authoritative NAVAL ANNUAL shows that her naval expenditure upon new ships in 1913 was actually less than in 1904, that Germany's was nearly three times greater, that France and Russia and Italy had doubled theirs: --------------------------------------------------------- Great Britain/Germany/France/Russia/Italy/Austro-Hungary ---------------------------------------------------------- 1904 (in British pounds) ---------------------------------------------------------- 13,508,176/4,275,489/4,370,102/4,480,188/1,121,753/1,329,590 ---------------------------------------------------------- 1908 ---------------------------------------------------------- 8,660,202/7,795,499/4,193,544/2,703,721/1,866,158/716,662 ---------------------------------------------------------- 1911 ---------------------------------------------------------- 17,566,877/11,710,859/5,876,659/3,240,394/2,677,302/3,125,000 ---------------------------------------------------------- 1912 ---------------------------------------------------------- 17,271,527/11,491,157/6,997,552/7,904,094/2,500,000/3,620,881 ---------------------------------------------------------- 1913 ---------------------------------------------------------- 13,276,400/11,176,407/7,595,010/10,953,616/2,800,000/3,280,473 -------------------------------------------------------------

GERMANY'S NAVAL PROBLEM

Between 1909 and 1914 British leaders became convinced, as France and Russia and other countries had long been certain, that Germany meant war as soon as she was ready; that her policy was to take the two border enemies, or rivals, first with a great war-machine which would give them no chance for preparation or success, to dictate a peace which would give her control of the sea-coasts and channel touching Britain, to make that country the seat of war preparations, naval uncertainty, perhaps financial difficulty and commercial injury, to prepare at leisure for the war which would conquer England and acquire her colonies. In the first-named year British statesmen of both parties told an amazed Parliament and country that German naval construction of big ships was approaching the British standard, that the cherished policy of a British navy equal to those of any two other nations was absolutely gone, that England would be lucky if, in a few years, she held a 60 per cent superiority over that of Germany alone, that the latter country's naval construction was clearly aimed at Britain and could be for no other than a hostile purpose. British ships had already been recalled from the Seven Seas to hold the North Sea against the growing naval power of a nation which had 5,000,000 soldiers behind its ships as compared with England's 250,000 men scattered over the world. From that date in 1909 all who shared in the statecraft of the British Empire understood the issue to be a real one - with France and Russia as allies or without them.

What was back of this situation? Germany was already dominant in Continental Europe. It had compelled Russia to submit when Austria in 1908 annexed the Slav states of Bosnia and Herzegovina and defied Servia to interfere or its proud patron at St.

Petersburg to prevent the humiliation; it had brought France to her knees over the Morocco incident and the Delca.s.se resignation, and would have done so again in 1911 if Great Britain had not ranged herself behind the French republic; it held the issues of peace and war between the great Powers during the Balkan struggles of 1912 and 1913 and prevented Servia from winning its legitimate fruits of victory or Montenegro from holding what it had won; it had watched with delight the defeat of unorganized Russia at the hands of j.a.pan and saw what its writers described as a decadent British Empire holding in feeble hands a quarter of the earth in fee, with revolt coming in Ireland, rebellion seething in India, dissatisfaction in South Africa, separation upon the horizon in Canada and Australia. Here lay the secret of German naval policy, of German hopes that Britain would remain out of the inevitable struggle with France and Russia, of German ambitions for a world-empire.

GERMAN AMBITIONS

The German nation had not up to the pa.s.sing of Bismarck been the enemy of the British people and until its belated entrance upon the field of world politics and expansion the people had not even been rivals. In the long series of European wars between 1688 and 1815, the German states were allies and friends of England. After that, Prussia, and then the German Empire, became gradually a great national force in the world and its spirit of unity, pride of power, energy in trade, skill and success in industry, vigor of development in tariffs, progress in military power and naval construction were, from the standpoint of its own people, altogether admirable. Following the Franco-Prussian War it had steadily attained a position of European supremacy. Then came the increase of population and trade, the desire for colonies, the restriction of emigration to foreign countries.

It was a natural though difficult ambition. The marriage of Queen Wilhelmina, and later the birth of a heir, averted any immediate probability of acquiring Holland and, with it, the Dutch colonial possessions, except by means of force. The a.s.sertion of the United States' Monroe Doctrine checked German efforts which had been directed to South America and concentrated in Brazil, where 100,000 Germans had settled and where trade relations had become very close. British diplomacy of a trade, as well as political character, in Persia, prevented certain railway schemes from being carried out, which would have given Germany a dominating influence in Asia Minor and on the Persian Gulf. Although the part.i.tion of Africa gave the German Empire nearly one million square miles and an obvious opening for colonization and power, the inexperience and inept.i.tude of German officials in Colonial government, the dislike, also, of Germans for emigration and the fact that the movement of settlers abroad steadily decreased in late years, tended to prevent, on the Continent, an expansion which would have been a.s.sured under British colonization and business effort.

At the same time the acquisition of these and other regions such as Samoa was significant. Prior to 1870 Germany was a geographical expression which meant a loose combination of States with sometimes clashing interests, and incoherent expression, and varied patriotism. German trade was then small, the industries too poor to compete with those of Britain, while its people possessed not an acre of soil beyond their European boundaries.

Since then it had become a closely-united people with an army of over five million men - admittedly the best-trained troops in the world; with a trade totalling $4,400,000,000 and competing in Britain's home market, taking away her contracts in India and some of the colonies, beating her in many foreign fields; with an industrial production which included great steel works such as Krupps, ship-building yards said to be of greater productive power than those of Britain, factories of well-kept character operating at high pressure with workmen trained in the best technical system of the world today; with other productive conditions aided by high protective duties and with exports totalling (1910) $2,020,000,000 and imports of $2,380,000,000; with Savings Bank deposits in 1911 totalling $4,500,000.0000 as against a British total of $1,135,000,000.

Couple these conditions with Colonial ambitions dwarfed, or unsuccessful in comparison with British success; continental power as supreme, by virtue of military strength, as Napoleon's was one hundred years before by the force of genius, but hampered, as was his, by the power of Britain on the seas; a productive force of industry increasing out of all proportion to home requirements, competing with British commerce in every corner of the world and threatened by a possible but finally postponed combination of British countries in a system of inter-Empire tariffs; a population of 64,000,000, increasing at the rate of one million a year and having no suitable opening for emigration or settlement within its own territories; and we have conditions which explained and emphasized German naval construction. Both German ambition and German naval construction were therefore easily comprehensible.

Nor was the ambition for sea-power concealed. The first large naval program was pa.s.sed by the Reichstag in 1898 and fixed the naval estimate up to 1903, when the total expenditure was to be $45,000,000 - in 1906 the naval expenditure was over $60,000,000.

The second Naval Bill was pa.s.sed in 1900 during the Boer War, and the preamble to this Act stated that its object was to give Germany "a fleet of such strength that even for the mightiest Naval Power, a war with her would involve such risks as to endanger its own supremacy." Other Acts were pa.s.sed in 1906 and 1908, and for the years 1908 to 1917 arrangements were made for a total expenditure of $1,035,000,000 - this including a portion of the "accelerated program" and the Special Dreadnought construction which caused the memorable debate in the British Commons in 1909.

The Law of 1912 - pa.s.sing the Reichstag on May 21st of that year - provided for an addition to the program of three battleships, three large cruisers and three small ones. During the years 1898 -1904 Grear Britain launched 26 battleships to Germany's 14, with 27 armored cruisers, 17 protected cruisers and 55 destroyers to Germany's 5, 16 and 35 respectively, or a total of 125 to 70. In 1905-11 Great Britain launched 20 battleships to Germany's 15, with 13 armored cruisers, 10 protected cruisers and 80 destroyers to Germany's 6, 16 and 70 respectively, or a total of 123 to 107.

Excluding destroyers Great Britain launched 70 sea-going warships in the first period to Germany's 25 and in the second period 43 to 37.

PREPARATION FOR WAR

Meanwhile German preparations for war went on apace in every direction. Following up the war teachings of Nietzsche and Treitschke and others, General Von Bernhardi issued book after book defining in clear language the alleged national beneficence, biological desirability and inevitability of war, which, when it came, would be "fought to conquer for Germany the rank of a world-power;" the universities and schools and press teemed with militarist ideals and practices; the army charges rose to $250,000,000 and the trained soldiers available at the beginning of 1910 were alleged to have 6,000 field-guns; Colonel Gaedke, the German naval expert, stated on February 24th of that year that the German government was building a fleet of 58 battleships and that "the time is gradually approaching when the German fleet will be superior to all the fleets of the world, with the single exception of the English fleet," and that in the past twelve years Germany had spent on new ships alone 63,200,000 pounds, or $316,000,000, while between then and 1914 she would spend 57,500,000 pounds more, or $287,500,000.