The campaign in Formosa proved a very tame affair. It amounted to the shooting-down of a few semi-savages. No attempt was made to penetrate into the ulterior of the island, where, as modern experience shows, many great difficulties would have had to be overcome. Peking took serious umbrage on account of j.a.pan's high-handed conduct--for such it seemed to Chinese eyes. In the first place, the statesmen of the Middle Kingdom contended that the Ryukyu Islands could not properly be regarded as an integral part of the j.a.panese empire; and in the second place, they claimed that, in attacking Formosa, j.a.pan had invaded Chinese territory. After a long interchange of despatches the Tokyo Government sent an amba.s.sador to Peking, and a peaceful solution was found in the payment by China of a small indemnity, and the recognition of Formosa as a part of the Middle Kingdom.*

*The indemnity amounted to 500,000 dollars (Mexican).

THE KOREAN QUESTION AGAIN

The Formosan expedition took place in 1874, and, in the fall of 1875, a Korean fort opened fire on a j.a.panese warship which was engaged in surveying the coast. Such an insult could not be tamely endured.

j.a.pan marshalled an imposing number of warships and transports, but, following the example set in her own case by Commodore Perry, she employed this flotilla to intimidate Korea into signing a treaty of amity and commerce and opening certain ports to foreign trade. Thus, Korea was drawn from her hereditary isolation, and to j.a.pan fell the credit of having become an instrument for extending the principle of universal intercourse which she had herself so stoutly opposed during two and a half centuries. It was a clever coup, but it earned little credit with the samurai. They regarded such a settlement as derogatory to their country.

ABOLITION OF THE SAMURAI

It was at this stage that the Tokyo Government felt itself strong enough to resort to conclusive measures in the cases of the samurai.

Three years had now pa.s.sed since the wearing of swords had been declared optional and since a scheme for the voluntary commutation of the samurai's pensions had been elaborated. The leaders of progress felt that the time had now come to make these measures compulsory, and, accordingly, two edicts were issued in that sense. The edicts, especially their financial provisions, imposed a heavy sacrifice. But it is very noticeable that the momentary question evoked no protests.

It was to the loss of their swords that a number of samurai objected strenuously. Some scores of them, wearing old-fashioned armour and equipped with hereditary weapons, attacked a castle, killed or wounded three hundred of the garrison, and then died by their own hands. Here and there throughout the empire a few equally vain protests were raised, and finally the Satsuma samurai took the field.

THE SATSUMA REBELLION

This insurrection in the south severely taxed the resources of the Central Government. The Satsuma samurai were led by Saigo Takamori, but it has always been claimed for him that he undertook the command, not for the purpose of overthrowing the Meiji Government, but in the hope of restraining his followers. Ultimately, however, he seems to have been swept away by the tide of their enthusiasm. The insurgents numbered some forty thousand; they all belonged to the samurai cla.s.s, were fully trained in Occidental tactics, and were equipped with rifles and field-guns. Their avowed purpose was to restore the military cla.s.s to its old position, and to insure to it all the posts in the army and the navy.

Fighting began on January 29, 1877, and ended on September 24th of the same year. All the rebel leaders fell in battle or died by their own hands. During these eight months of warfare, the Government put sixty-six thousand men into the field, and the casualties on both sides totalled thirty-five thousand, or thirty-three per cent, of the whole. Apart from the great issue directly at stake, namely, whether j.a.pan should have a permanent military cla.s.s, a secondary problem of much interest found a solution in the result. It was the problem whether an army of conscripts, supposed to be lacking in the fighting instinct and believed to be incapable of standing up to do battle with the samurai, could hold its own against the flower of the bushi, as the Satsuma men undoubtedly were. There really never was any substantial reason for doubt about such a subject. The samurai were not racially distinct from the bulk of the nation. They had originally been mere farmers, possessing no special military apt.i.tude. Nevertheless, among all the reforms introduced during the Meiji era, none was counted so hazardous as the subst.i.tution of a conscript army for the nation's traditional soldiers. The Satsuma rebellion disposed finally of the question.

ENGRAVING: SAIGO TAKAMORI

EDUCATION OF THE NATION

Meanwhile the Government had been strenuously seeking to equip the people with the products of Western civilization. It has been shown that the men who sat in the seats of power during the first decade of the Meiji era owed their exalted position to their own intellectual superiority and far-seeing statesmanship. That such men should become the nation's teachers would have been natural anywhere. But in j.a.pan there was a special reason for the people's need of official guidance. It had become a traditional habit of the j.a.panese to look to officialdom for example and direction in everything, and this habit naturally a.s.serted itself with special force when there was question of a.s.similating a foreign civilization which for nearly three centuries had been an object of national repugnance. The Government, in short, had to inspire the reform movement and, at the same time, to furnish models of its working.

The task was approached with wholesale energy by those in power. In general the direction of the work was divided among foreigners of different nations. Frenchmen were employed in revising the criminal code and in teaching strategy and tactics to the j.a.panese army. The building of railways, the installation of telegraphs and of lighthouses, and the new navy were turned over to English engineers and sailors. Americans were employed in the formation of a postal service, in agricultural reforms, and in planning colonization and an educational system. In an attempt to introduce Occidental ideas of art Italian sculptors and painters were brought to j.a.pan. And German experts were asked to develop a system of local government, to train j.a.panese physicians, and to educate army officers. Great misgivings were expressed by foreign onlookers at this juncture. They found it impossible to believe that such wholesale adoption of an alien civilization could not be attended with due eclecticism, and they constantly predicted a violent reaction. But all these pessimistic views were contradicted by results. There was no reaction, and the memory of the apprehensions then freely uttered finds nothing but ridicule to-day.

FINANCE

One of the chief difficulties with which the Meiji statesmen had to contend was finance. When they took over the treasury from the Bakufu there were absolutely no funds in hand, and for some years, as has been shown above, all the revenues of the former fiefs were locally expended, no part of them, except a doubtful surplus, finding its way to the Imperial treasury. The only resource was an issue of paper money. Such tokens of exchange had been freely employed since the middle of the seventeenth century, and at the time of the mediatization of the fiefs, 1694 kinds of notes were in circulation.

The first business of the Government should have been to replace these unsecured tokens with uniform and sound media of exchange. But instead of performing that duty the Meiji statesmen saw themselves compelled to follow the evil example set by the fiefs in past times.

Government notes were issued. They fell at the outset to a discount of fifty per cent, and various devices, more or less despotic, were employed to compel their circulation at par. By degrees, however, the Government's credit improved, and thus, though the issues of inconvertible notes aggregated sixty million yen at the close of the first five years of the Meiji era, they pa.s.sed freely from hand to hand without discount. But, of course, the need for funds in connexion with the wholesale reforms and numerous enterprises inaugurated officially became more and more pressing, so that in the fourteenth year (1881) after the Restoration, the face value of the notes in circulation aggregated 180 million yen, and they stood at a heavy discount.

The Government, after various tentative and futile efforts to correct this state of depreciation, set themselves to deal radically with the problem. Chiefly by buying exporters' bills and further by reducing administrative expenditures as well as by taxing alcohol, a substantial specie reserve was gradually acc.u.mulated, and, by 1885, the volume of fiduciary notes having been reduced to 119 millions, whereas the treasury vaults contained forty-five millions of precious metals, the resumption of specie payments was announced. As for the national debt, it had its origin in the commutation of the feudatories' incomes and the samurai's pensions. A small fraction of these outlays was defrayed with ready money, but the great part took the form of public loan-bonds. These bonds const.i.tuted the bulk of the State's liabilities during the first half-cycle of the Meiji era, and when we add the debts of the fiefs, which the Central Government took over; two small foreign loans; the cost of quelling the Satsuma rebellion, and various debts incurred on account of public works, naval construction, and minor purposes, we arrive at the broad fact that the entire national debt of j.a.pan did not exceed 305 million yen at the close of the twenty-eighth year of her new era.

A war with China in 1894-1895--to be presently spoken of--and a war with Russia in 1904-1905, together with the price paid for the nationalization of railways and for various undertakings, brought the whole debt of the nation to 2300 million yen in 1907, which is now being paid off at the rate of fifty million yen annually. It remains to be noted that, in 1897, j.a.pan took the momentous step of adopting gold monometallism. The indemnity which she obtained from China after the war of 1894-1895 brought to her treasury a stock of gold sufficient to form a substantial specie reserve. Moreover, gold had appreciated so that its value in terms of silver had exactly doubled during the first thirty years of the Meiji era. There was consequently no arithmetical complication connected with the adoption of the single gold standard. It was only necessary to double the denomination, leaving the silver subsidiary coins unchanged.

EDUCATION

In the field of education the Meiji statesmen effected speedy reforms. Comparatively little attention had been directed to this subject by the rulers of medieval j.a.pan, and the fact that the Meiji leaders appreciated the necessity of studying the arts and sciences of the new civilization simultaneously with the adoption of its products, bears strong testimony to the insight of these remarkable men. Very shortly after the abolition of feudalism, an extensive system of public schools was organized and education was made compulsory. There were schools, colleges, and universities, all modelled on foreign lines with such alterations as the special customs of the nation dictated. These inst.i.tutions grew steadily in public favour, and to-day over ninety per cent, of boys and girls who have attained the school age receive education in the common elementary schools, the average annual cost per child being about 8s.

6d. ($2.00), to which the parents contribute 1.75d. (3.5 cents) per month. Youths receiving education enjoy certain exemption from conscription, but as this is in strict accordance with the Western system, it need not be dwelt upon here.

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

For purposes of local administration the empire is divided into prefectures (ken), counties (gun), towns (shi), and districts (cho or son). The three metropolitan prefectures of Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto are called fu, and their districts are distinguished as "urban" (cho) and "rural" (son), according to the number of houses they contain.

The prefectures derive their names from their chief towns. The principle of popular representation is strictly adhered to, every prefecture, every county, every town, and every district having its own local a.s.sembly, wherein the number of members is fixed in proportion to the population. These bodies are all elected. The enjoyment of the franchise depends upon a property qualification which, in the case of prefectural and county a.s.semblies, is an annual payment of direct national taxes to the amount of three yen (6s., $1.50); in the case of town and district a.s.semblies two yen; and in the case of prefectural a.s.semblies, ten yen. There are other arrangements to secure the due representation of property, the electors being divided into cla.s.ses according to their aggregate payment to the national treasury. Three such cla.s.ses exist, and each elects one-third of an a.s.sembly's members. There is no payment for the members of an a.s.sembly, but all salaried officials, ministers of religion, and contractors for public works, as well as persons unable to write their own names and the names of the candidates for whom they vote, are denied the franchise.

A prefectural a.s.sembly holds one session of thirty days annually; and a county a.s.sembly, one session of not more than fourteen days; while the town and district a.s.semblies are summoned by the mayor or the headman whenever recourse to their deliberation appears expedient.

Each prefecture has a prefect (governor) and each county a.s.sembly has a headman. Both are appointed by the Central Administration, but an a.s.sembly has competence to appeal to the minister of Home Affairs from the prefect's decisions. In the districts, also, there are headmen, but their post is always elective and generally non-salaried. Other details of the local-government system are here omitted. It suffices to say that the system has been in operation for over thirty years and has been found satisfactory in practice.

Moreover, these a.s.semblies const.i.tute excellent schools for the political education of the people.

THE CONSt.i.tUTION

It has already been shown that the sovereign's so-called coronation oath did not contemplate a national a.s.sembly in the Western sense of the term. The first a.s.sembly convened in obedience to the oath consisted of n.o.bles and samurai only, and was found to be a virtually useless body. Not till 1873, when Itagaki Taisuke, seceding from the Cabinet on account of the Korean complication, became a warm advocate of appealing national questions to an elective a.s.sembly, did the people at large come to understand what was involved in such an inst.i.tution. Thenceforth Itagaki became the centre of a more or less enthusiastic group of men advocating a parliamentary system, some from sincere motives, and others from a conviction that their failure to obtain posts was in a manner due to the oligarchical form of their country's polity.

When the Satsuma rebellion broke out, four years later, this band of Tosa agitators memorialized the Government, charging it with administering affairs in despite of public opinion; with ignoring popular rights, and with levelling down instead of up, since the samurai had been reduced to the cla.s.s of commoners, whereas the latter should have been educated to the standard of the former. But the statesmen in power insisted that the nation was not yet ready to enjoy const.i.tutional privileges. They did not, indeed, labour under any delusion as to the ultimate direction in which their reforms tended, but they were determined to move gradually, not precipitately. They had already (1874) arranged for the convention of an annual a.s.sembly of prefects who should act as channels of communication between the central authorities and the people in the provinces. This was designed to be the embryo of representative inst.i.tutions, though obviously it bore that character in a very limited degree only.

In the following year (1875), the second step was taken by organizing a Senate (Genro-in), which consisted of official nominees and was charged with the duty of discussing and revising laws and ordinances prior to their promulgation. But it had no power of initiative, and its credit in the eyes of the nation was more or less injured by the fact that its members consisted for the most part of men for whom no posts could be found in the administration and who, without some steadying influence, might have been drawn into the current of discontent.

At this stage, an event occurred which probably moved the Government to greater expedition. In the spring of 1878, the great statesman, Okubo Toshimitsu, who had acted such a prominent part on the stage of the reformation drama, was a.s.sa.s.sinated. His slayers were avowedly sympathizers of Saigo, but in their statement of motives they a.s.signed as their princ.i.p.al incentive the Government's failure to establish representative inst.i.tutions. They belonged to a province far removed from Satsuma, and their explanation of the murder showed that they had little knowledge of Saigo's real sentiments. But the nation saw in them champions of a const.i.tutional form of government, and the authorities appreciated the necessity of greater expedition.

Thus, two months after Okubo's death, the establishment of elective a.s.semblies in the prefectures and cities was proclaimed.

ENGRAVING: OKUBO TOSHIMITSU

Reference has already been made to these and it will suffice here to note that their princ.i.p.al functions were to determine the amount and object of local taxes; to audit the accounts for the previous year; and to pet.i.tion the Central Government, should that seem expedient.

These a.s.semblies represented the foundations of genuinely representative inst.i.tutions, for although they lacked legislative power, they discharged parliamentary functions in other respects. In fact, they served as excellent training schools for the future Diet.

But this did not at all satisfy Itagaki and his followers. They had now persuaded themselves that without a national a.s.sembly it would be impossible to oust the clique of clansmen who monopolized the prizes of power. Accordingly, Itagaki organized an a.s.sociation called Jiyu-to (Liberals), the first political party in j.a.pan. Between the men in office and these visionary agitators a time of friction, more or less severe, ensued. The Government withheld from the people the privileges of free speech and public meeting, so that the press and the platform found themselves in frequent collision with the police.

Thus, little by little, the Liberals came to be regarded as victims of official tyranny, so that they constantly obtained fresh adherents.

Three years subsequently (1881), another political crisis occurred.

Ok.u.ma Shigen.o.bu resigned his portfolio, and was followed into private life by many able politicians and administrators. These organized themselves into a party ultimately called Progressists (Shimpo-to), who, although they professed the same doctrine as the Liberals, were careful to maintain an independent att.i.tude; thus showing that "j.a.pan's first political parties were grouped, not about principles, but about persons."*

*Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th edition); article "j.a.pan," by Brinkley.

It must not be supposed for a moment that the Progressists were conservative. There was no such thing as real conservatism in j.a.pan at that time. The whole nation exhaled the breath of progress.

Ok.u.ma's secession was followed quickly by an edict promising the convention of a national a.s.sembly in ten years. Confronted by this engagement, the political parties might have been expected to lay down their arms. But a great majority of them aimed at ousting the clan-statesmen rather than at setting up a national a.s.sembly. Thus, having obtained a promise of a parliament, they applied themselves to exciting anti-official sentiments in the future electorates; and as the Government made no attempt to controvert the prejudices thus excited, it was evident that when the promised parliament came into existence, it would become an arena for vehement attacks upon the Cabinet.

Of course, as might have been expected, the ten years of agitated waiting, between 1881 and 1891, were often disfigured by recourse to violence. Plots to a.s.sa.s.sinate ministers; attempts to employ dynamite; schemes to bring about an insurrection in Korea--such things were not infrequent. There were also repeated dispersions of political meetings by order of police inspectors, as well as suspensions or suppressions of newspapers by the fiat of the Home minister. Ultimately it became necessary to enact a law empowering the police to banish persons of doubtful character from Tokyo without legal trial, and even to arrest and detain such persons on suspicion.

In 1887, the Progressist leader, Ok.u.ma, rejoined the Cabinet for a time as minister of Foreign Affairs, but after a few months of office his leg was shattered by a bomb and he retired into private life and founded the Waseda University in Tokyo.

It may indeed be a.s.serted that during the decade immediately prior to the opening of the national a.s.sembly, "an anti-Government propaganda was incessantly preached from the platform and in the press." The Tokyo statesmen, however, were not at all discouraged. They proceeded with their reforms unflinchingly. In 1885, the ministry was recast, Ito Hirob.u.mi--the same Prince Ito who afterwards fell in Manchuria under the pistol of an a.s.sa.s.sin--being appointed premier and the departments of State being reorganized on European lines. Then a n.o.bility was created, with five orders, prince, marquis, count, viscount, and baron. The civil and penal laws were codified. The finances were placed on a sound footing. A national bank with a network of subordinate inst.i.tutions was established. Railway construction was pushed on steadily. Postal and telegraph services were extended. The foundations of a strong mercantile marine were laid. A system of postal savings-banks was inst.i.tuted. Extensive schemes of harbour improvement, roads, and riparian works were planned and put into operation. The portals of the civil service were made accessible solely by compet.i.tive examination. A legion of students was sent westward to complete their education, and the country's foreign affairs were managed with comparative skill.

PROMULGATION OF THE CONSt.i.tUTION

On the 11th of February, 1889, the Const.i.tution was promulgated amid signs of universal rejoicing. The day was signalized, however, by a terrible deed. Viscount Mori, one of j.a.pan's most enlightened statesmen, was stabbed to death by Nishino Buntaro, a mere stripling, the motive being to avenge what the murderer regarded as a sacrilegious act, namely, that the viscount, when visiting the shrine at Ise in the previous year, had partially raised one of the curtains with his cane. The explanation given of this extraordinary act by a modern historian is that "j.a.pan was suffering at the time from an attack of hysterical loyalty, and the shrine at Ise being dedicated to the progenitrix of the country's sovereigns, it seemed to Nishino Buntaro that when high officials began to touch the sacred paraphernalia with walking-sticks, the foundations of Imperialism were menaced." An interesting light is thrown upon the j.a.panese character in the sequel of this crime. During many subsequent years the tomb of Nishino received the homage of men and women who "worshipped achievement without regard to the nature of the thing achieved." There was a similar furore of enthusiasm over the would-be a.s.sa.s.sin of Ok.u.ma.

PROVISIONS OF THE CONSt.i.tUTION

The framers of the Const.i.tution, chief among whom was Prince Ito, naturally took care not to make its provisions too liberal. The minimum age for electors and elected was fixed at twenty-five and the property qualification at payment of direct taxes aggregating not less than fifteen yen (30s. $7.20) annually.

A bicameral system was adopted. The House of Peers was in part hereditary, in part elective (one representative of the highest tax-payers in each prefecture), and in part nominated by the sovereign (from among men of signal attainments), while the House of Representatives consisted of three hundred elected members. In the eyes of party politicians this property qualification was much too high; it restricted the number of franchise-holders to 460,000 in a nation of nearly fifty millions. A struggle for the extension of the franchise commenced immediately, and, after nearly ten years, the Government framed a bill lowering the qualification to ten yen for electors; dispensing with it altogether in the case of candidates; inaugurating secret ballots; extending the limits of the electorates so as to include the whole of a prefecture, and increasing the members of the lower house to 363. By this change of qualification the number of franchise holders was nearly doubled.

ENGRAVING: THE LATE PRINCE ITO

As for the provisions of the Const.i.tution, they differed in no respect from those of the most advanced Western standard. One exception to this statement must be noted, however. The wording of the doc.u.ment lent itself to the interpretation that a ministry's tenure of office depended solely on the sovereign's will. In other words, a Cabinet received its mandate from the Throne, not from the Diet. This reservation immediately became an object of attack by party politicians. They did not venture to protest against the arrangement as an Imperial prerogative. The people would not have endured such a protest. The only course open for the party politicians was to prove practically that a ministry not responsible to the legislature is virtually impotent for legislation.