A History of the Japanese People - Part 71
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Part 71

Historians differ as to the exact date of the establishment of the Yedo Bakufu, but the best authorities are agreed that the event should be reckoned from the battle of Sekigahara, since then, for the first time, the administrative power came into the hand of the Tokugawa baron, he having previously been simply the head of a board inst.i.tuted by the Taiko. There can be no doubt, that in choosing Yedo for his capital, Ieyasu was largely guided by the example of Yoritomo and by the experience of the Ashikaga. Kamakura had been a success as signal as Muromachi had been a failure. In the former, Ieyasu had much to imitate; in the latter, much to avoid. We have seen that he distributed the estates of the feudatories so as to create a system automatically unfavourable to disturbance, in which contrivance he borrowed and extended the ideas of n.o.bunaga and Hideyoshi. It remains to note that what Hojo Tokimasa and Oye Hiromoto were to Minamoto Yoritomo as advisers and organizers, and what Ashikaga Tadayoshi and Kono Moronao were to Ashikaga Takauji in the same roles, such, also, were Honda Masan.o.bu and Honda Masazumi to Tokugawa Ieyasu.

HIDEYORI AND IEYASU

In May, 1605, Hideyori was nominated u-daijin. At that time the nation was divided pretty evenly into two factors; one obedient to the Tokugawa, the other disposed to await Hideyori's coming of age, which event was expected to restore the authority of the Toyotomi family. f.u.kushima Masanori and Kato Kiyomasa were the most enthusiastic believers in the latter forecast. Up to that time Ieyasu had not given any definite indication of the att.i.tude he intended to a.s.sume towards the Taiko's heir. It was not till the year 1611 that he found an opportunity of forming a first-hand estimate of Hideyori's character. He then had a meeting with the latter at Nijo Castle, and is said to have been much struck with the bearing and intelligence of Hideyori. In fact, whereas common report had spoken in very disparaging terms of the young man's capacities--Hideyori was then seventeen years old--the Tokugawa chief found a dignified and alert lad whose aspect suggested that if he was suffered to remain in possession of Osaka a few years longer, Yedo would run the risk of being relegated to a secondary place.

Ieyasu after that interview is said to have felt like "a man who, having still a long distance to travel, finds himself enveloped in darkness." He saw that the time for considering justice and humanity had pa.s.sed, and he summoned Honda Masan.o.bu to whom he said: "I see that Hideyori is grown up to be a son worthy of his father. By and by it will be difficult for such a man to remain subservient to another." Masan.o.bu, whom history describes as the "Tokugawa's storehouse of wisdom," is recorded to have replied: "So I, too, think, but there is no cause for anxiety. I have an idea." What this idea was events soon disclosed. Summoning one of the officials in the service of Hideyori's wife--Hidetada's daughter--Masan.o.bu spoke as follows: "Hideyori is the only son of the late Taiko and it is the desire of the O-gosho" (the t.i.tle given to Ieyasu after his retirement from the shogunate) "that he, Hideyori, should have a numerous and thriving family. Therefore, if any woman takes his fancy, she must be enrolled among his attendants to whatever cla.s.s she may belong. Moreover, if there be among these ladies any who show jealousies or make disturbances, no complaint need be preferred to the O-gosho. I will undertake to settle the matter."

From that time Hideyori lived among women. A word may here be said about the marriage between Hideyori and the granddaughter of Ieyasu, the bride and the bridegroom alike being mere children. According to a recognized historical authority, writing in the Tokugawa Jidaishi, such marriages were inspired by one or more of the following motives: (1) that the bride or bridegroom should serve as a hostage; (2) that the wedding should contribute to cement an alliance between the families of the bride and the bridegroom; (3) that the wedding should become a means of spying into the affairs of one of the families; (4) that it should be an instrument for sowing seeds of enmity between the two families. The objects of Ieyasu in wedding his granddaughter at seven years of age to Hideyori at eleven were doubtless of the nature indicated in the third and fourth of the above definitions. On the one hand, he seemed to the Osaka party to be conforming to the will of the Taiko; on the other, he was able to introduce into the household of Hideyori an unlimited number of spies among the retinue of his granddaughter.

KATAGIRI KATSUMOTO

Just before his death, Hideyoshi specially conjured Koide Hidemasa and Katagiri Katsumoto to labour for the safety of the Toyotomi family. Hidemasa soon followed his patron to the grave, and the duty of managing the affairs of the family devolved entirely upon Katsumoto in his capacity of administrator (bugyo). He devoted himself to the task with the utmost sincerity and earnestness, and he made it the basic principle of his policy to preserve harmony between the Tokugawa and the Toyotomi. His belief was that Ieyasu had not many years more to live, and that on his demise the administrative power would revert wholly to Hideyori as a natural consequence. Hence the wisest course was to avoid any collision in the meanwhile.

THE OATH OF FEALTY

On the 14th of May, 1601, that is to say, shortly after the battle of Sekigahara, all the feudatories were invited to subscribe a written oath of loyalty to the Tokugawa. This oath consisted of three articles. The first was a promise to observe strictly all instructions issued by the Bakufu in Yedo. The second was an engagement not to harbour or protect any person who had either violated or opposed the will of the shogun. The third was a pledge not to give employment to any samurai reported to be a traitor or an a.s.sa.s.sin. By these stipulations the signatories swore to abide strictly, and declared that any violation of the provisions of the oath would render the violator liable to severe punishment. Among the signatories there were not found any members of the Osaka party.

These put forward the last will of the Taiko as a reason for refusing to sign, and from that time it became evident that the situation must terminate in an armed struggle.

ONO HARUNAGA

Among the Osaka partisans was one called Ono Harunaga, the son of the lady Yodo's nurse. This youth led a life of great profligacy, and although not wanting in any of the attributes of the samurai, he altogether lacked political insight. Thus, his relations with Katsumoto were strained, and Harunaga constantly essayed to undermine Katsumoto's influence. Hideyori himself did not want for ability, but acting by the advice of his mother, Yodo, and of his friend, Harunaga, he adopted a false policy of opposition to Ieyasu.

STATE OF OSAKA

The fact that the feudatories who called themselves friends of the Osaka party had refused to sign the oath of fealty, and the fact that the lady Yodo and Harunaga threw their influence into the anti-Tokugawa scale, had the effect of isolating Osaka so far as the laws of the Bakufu were concerned. Men who had broken those laws or otherwise offended against the shogun took refuge in Osaka. Such was the case with the son of Hosokawa Tadaoki; with Goto Matabei, chief va.s.sal of Kuroda Nagamasa, and with Nambu Saemon, princ.i.p.al retainer of Nambu n.o.bunao. These three and many others repaired to the castle of Osaka, and being there secure against any unarmed attempt of the Tokugawa to arrest them, they virtually defied Ieyasu's control. By degrees a constant stream of ronin, or free-lances, flowed into that city, and a conspicuous element among its inhabitants consisted of Christian feudatories, who, regardless of the edicts of the Bakufu, openly preached their faith and were in no wise checked by the Toyotomi rulers. Even the Buddhist and Shinto priests in Osaka and its territories were independent of the Bakufu authority, and there were cases of boundary disputes in which the Tokugawa officials declined to give judgment since they were not in a position to enforce it. It may well be supposed that this state of affairs grew steadily more obnoxious to the Tokugawa. Ieyasu only awaited a pretext to a.s.sert the supremacy of his authority.

INSCRIPTION ON THE BELL

It has already been stated that, in the year 1586, a colossal image of Buddha was erected by Hideyoshi at the Hoko-ji in Kyoto. This idol was made of wood, and the great earthquake of 1596 destroyed it.

Subsequently, Ieyasu advised Hideyori to replace the wooden idol with a bronze one. Ono Harunaga stood opposed to this idea, but Katagiri Katsumoto, constant to his policy of placating Ieyasu, threw his influence into the other scale. It is impossible to tell whether, in making this proposal, Ieyasu had already conceived the extraordinary scheme which he ultimately carried out. It would appear more probable, however, that his original policy was merely to impoverish the Toyotomi family by imposing upon it the heavy outlay necessary for constructing a huge bronze Buddha. Many thousands of ryo had to be spent, and the money was obtained by converting into coin a number of gold ingots in the form of horses, which Hideyoshi had stored in the treasury of the Osaka castle as a war fund. Five years later, that is to say, in 1614, the great image was completed and an imposing ceremony of dedication was organized. A thousand priests were to take part, and all the people in the capital, as well as many from the surrounding provinces, a.s.sembled to witness the magnificent fete. Suddenly an order was issued in the name of Ieyasu, interdicting the consummation of the ceremony on the ground that the inscription carried by the bell for the idol's temple was designedly treasonable to the Tokugawa. This inscription had been composed and written by a high Buddhist prelate, Seikan, reputed to be one of the greatest scholars and most skilful calligraphists of his time.

It was inconceivable that such a man should err flagrantly in the use of the ideographic script. Ieyasu, however, despatched to Kyoto two rival prelates, Soden and Tengai, with instructions to convoke a meeting of the priests of the Five Temples and invite them to express an opinion about the inscription. Soden held the post of administrator of temples. This placed him officially at the head of all the other priests, and thus the opinions he expressed at the instance of Ieyasu possessed special weight. It was in vain that Seikan repudiated all intention of disrespect and pointed out that the inscription did not for a moment lend itself to the interpretation read into it by the Tokugawa chief. Only one priest, Kaizan of Myoshin-ji, had sufficient courage to oppose Soden's view, and the cause of the Tokugawa chief triumphed.

Without a full knowledge of the Chinese ideographic script it is impossible to clearly understand either the charges preferred by the Tokugawa or the arguments employed in reb.u.t.tal. Western readers may, however, confidently accept the unanimous verdict of all modern scholars, that the interpretation a.s.signed to the inscription in the first place by the Tokugawa officials, and in the second by Hayashi Doshun, representing the Confucianists, and Soden and Tengai, representing the Buddhists, was grossly unreasonable. That many experts should be found to range themselves on the side of a ruler so powerful as Ieyasu was not wonderful, but it says little for the moral independence of the men of the time that only one Buddhist priest among many thousand had the courage to withhold his consent to a judgment which outraged truth and justice.

Naturally the news of the decision threw Osaka into a state of great excitement. Lady Yodo hastened to despatch to Sumpu her princ.i.p.al lady-in-waiting, Okura-no-Tsubone, accompanied by another dame of the chamber. These two were received by Acha-no-Tsubone at the court of Ieyasu, and through her they conveyed fervent apologies to the Tokugawa chief. Ieyasu treated the whole matter lightly. He granted an interview to the two ladies from Osaka and sent them on to Yedo to visit the wife of Hidetada, the lady Yodo's younger sister. The Osaka deputies naturally drew favourable inferences from this courteous mood, and taking an opportunity to refer to the affair of the inscription on the bell, elicited from Ieyasu an a.s.surance that the matter need not be regarded with concern.

Not for a moment suspecting any deception, Okura-no-Tsubone and her companion took their way to Osaka. On the other hand, Honda Masan.o.bu and the priest, Tengai, were instructed to inform Katsumoto that the umbrage of Ieyasu was deeply roused, and that some very strong measure would be necessary to restore the Bakufu's confidence in Hideyori. Katsumoto vainly sought some definite statement as to the nature of the reparation required. He was merely told to answer the question himself. He accordingly proposed one of three courses, namely, that the lady Yodo should be sent to Yedo as a hostage; that Hideyori should leave Osaka and settle at some other castle; or, finally, that he should acknowledge himself a va.s.sal of the Tokugawa.

To these proposals the only reply that could be elicited from Ieyasu was that Yodo and her son should choose whichever course they pleased, and, bearing that answer, the disquieting import of which he well understood, Katsumoto set out from Sumpu for Osaka. Travelling rapidly, he soon overtook Okwra-no-Tsubone and explained to her the events and their import. But the lady was incredulous. She was more ready to suspect Katsumoto's sincerity than to believe that Ieyasu had meant to deceive her.

Had Katsumoto been free to continue his journey to Osaka, reaching it in advance of Okura-no-Tsubone's party, the result might have been different. But Ieyasu did not contemplate any such sequence of events. He instructed Itakura Katsushige to invite Katsumoto to call at Kyoto on the way to Osaka with the object of discussing an important affair. Katsumoto had no choice but to delay his journey, and Katsushige took care that the delay should be long enough to afford time for Okura-no-Tsubone's party to reach Osaka, and to present their report, together with their suspicions of Katsumoto's disloyalty.

Lady Yodo was incensed when she learned the terms that Katsumoto had offered. "I am Hideyori's mother," she is reported to have cried. "I will never bend my knee to the Kwanto. Rather will I and my son make this castle our death-pillow." Then, with Ono Harunaga, she formed a plot to kill Katsumoto and to draw the sword against the Tokugawa.

Subsequently, when Katsumoto returned to Osaka and reported the result of his mission, he stated his conviction that the only exit from the dilemma was one of the three courses indicated above.

Yodogimi, on being informed of this opinion, intimated her desire to see Katsumoto. But when the day named for the meeting came and Katsumoto was on the point of leaving his residence for the purpose of repairing to the conference, he received information that the intention was to kill him en route. He therefore fled to his domain in the remote province of Ibaraki. It is recorded that Katsumoto's plan was to offer to send Yodo as a hostage to Yedo. Then the question would arise as to a place of residence for her in the eastern capital, and the processes of preparing a site and building a house were to be supplemented by accidental conflagrations, so that the septuagenarian, Ieyasu, might easily pa.s.s away before the actual transfer of the hostage took place. Such was Katsumoto's device, but he had to flee from Osaka before he could carry it into effect.

THE SIEGE OF OSAKA CASTLE

In the year 1614, Ieyasu issued orders for the attack of Osaka Castle, on the ground that Katsumoto's promise had not been fulfilled. The Tokugawa chief set out from Sumpu and his son, Hidetada, from Yedo. Their armies, combined with the forces of several of the feudatories, are said to have aggregated one hundred and fifty thousand men. In Osaka, also, a great host was a.s.sembled, and among its leaders were several renowned warriors, including Sanada Yukimura, Goto Matabei, Hanawa Naotsugu, and others, who, although not originally va.s.sals of the Toyotomi, supported Hideyori loyally. As for the castle, its enormous strength rendered it well-nigh impregnable, and after weeks of effort the Tokugawa forces had nothing to show for their repeated attacks except a long list of casualties.

Ieyasu now had recourse to intrigue. The mother of Kyogoku Takatsugu, daimyo of Obama, in Wakasa, was the younger sister of the lady Yodo.

Ieyasu induced her to open communications with Yodo, and to represent to the latter the advisability of concluding peace with the Tokugawa instead of remaining perpetually beleaguered in a fortress, thus merely postponing an end which could not be finally averted. A council was convened in the castle to consider this advice. Opinions were divided. Some held that Ieyasu could not be believed, and that if the struggle were maintained for a few years, the face of affairs might change radically. Others urged that the loyalty of the garrison was not above suspicion, and that if the fight went on much longer, treachery might be practised, to which risk a speedy peace, even at some cost, would be preferable. Ono Harunaga was among the advocates of surrender, but Hideyori himself showed that his character had not been mistaken by Ieyasu. He indignantly reminded Harunaga and the latter's fellow thinkers that arms had been taken up by their advice and in opposition to the loyal efforts of Katsumoto in the cause of peace.

Lady Yodo, however, threw her influence into the scale with Ono Harunaga, and finally peace was concluded on terms highly favourable to the Toyotomi. It was agreed that Hideyori should remain in the possession of the castle and of all his domains, and that the garrison, as well as the unattached samurai who formed part of it, should not be punished but should be provided for subsequently. It might have occurred to the leaders of the Osaka party that these lenient conditions covered some occult designs; nothing was less likely than that a statesman like Ieyasu would be content with so signal a failure. But a short-sighted sentiment of confidence seems to have obscured the judgment of the Osaka folks. They actually gave heed to Ieyasu's complaint that he, the o-gosho, and his son, the shogun, must not be allowed to have taken so much trouble for nothing; that it was customary to give hostages to an army which agreed to raise a siege, and that at least a portion of the castle's defences should be destroyed. As to the last point, the Tokugawa chief was kind enough to say that the work of demolition should not cost the garrison anything, since labour would be supplied gratis by the shoguni.

After considerable correspondence it was agreed that Harunaga's son should go to Yedo as a hostage, and that a portion of the outer moat of Osaka Castle should be filled up. Ieyasu did not lose a moment in giving effect to this latter provision. He ordered some of the fudai daimyo of the Kwanto to proceed to Osaka with several thousands of men, who should go to work forthwith to tear down the parapets and fill up the moats of the castle. These orders were implicitly obeyed, and as Ieyasu had omitted to indicate any limit for the work of destruction, it went on without check, and presently the second line of parapets began to follow the first. The Osaka leaders protested and essayed to stay the destruction. But the officers who were in command of the operation said that without a direct message from Honda Masazumi, who represented Ieyasu, they could not suspend their task. Efforts were then made to approach Honda, but he was conveniently absent "on account of his health," and the ensuing correspondence occupied several days, during which the pulling-down and filling-up went on by day and by night. More than one-half of the second moat had disappeared before Masazumi could be found. His answer was that he had been merely told to fill up the moat. Possibly he had mistaken the scope of his instructions and he would refer the matter to Ieyasu. This involved further delay and more filling, until, finally, Masazumi acknowledged that he had made a mistake, declared himself prepared to undergo punishment, and withdrew his men to Fushimi.

Ieyasu supplied the sequel of the farce. When complaint was made against Masazumi, the Tokugawa leader simulated astonishment, expressed much regret, and said that he would condemn Masazumi to commit suicide were it permissible to mar this happy occasion by any capital sentence. "Peace," declared the astute old statesman, "has now been fortunately concluded. Let us not talk any more about the castle's moats or parapets." Against such an att.i.tude the Osaka men could not enter any protest, and the farce ended there. Had the Osaka leaders possessed any measure of the wisdom that marked all the doings of Ieyasu, they would not have suffered matters to rest at such a stage. But they foolishly imagined that some retaliation might be effected by calling upon the Tokugawa to supplement that part of the peace provisions which related to allowances for the samurai who had fought on the side of the garrison. A demand in that sense was preferred to Ieyasu. But he had now laid aside his transient suavity.

The Osaka people were brusquely informed that they must look to the Toyotomi family for recompense, and that as for rewarding unattached samurai who had drawn the sword against the shogun, the Osaka people, were they obedient to the dictates of loyalty, would of their own account peremptorily reject such an unwarranted proposition, even though Ieyasu himself were disposed to consent to it.

Of course this answer profoundly enraged the Osaka party. They appreciated for the first time that they had been deceived throughout, and that by a series of adroit manoeuvres they had been removed from an almost impregnable position to a practically helpless plight. Not a few turned their backs on the castle, but a great majority determined to renew the conflict and to die at their posts.

The circ.u.mstances, however, had now undergone a radical change. The castle had been converted from the strongest fortress in j.a.pan into a mere semblance of strength, and no garrison, however brave and however resolute, could have defended it successfully against the forces that the Tokugawa were able to marshal.

As for Ieyasu, he knew that his task had been immensely lightened. On the 3rd of May, 1615, he started from Sumpu for Osaka at the head of an army numbering scarcely one-third of the force previously led against the castle. Nevertheless, one contingency presented itself in a dangerous light. It was always possible that Hideyori himself should make a sortie from the fortress, and, in that event, the prestige attaching to the memory of his father, Hideyoshi, might have demoralized a large section of the Tokugawa troops. To avert this danger, Ieyasu had recourse to his wonted methods of deception. It has been shown that he held Harunaga's son, as a hostage. This youth was required to write a letter to his father stating that collusion existed between parties within and without the fortress, and that the traitors had plotted to induce Hideyori to make a sortie, whereupon the castle would be given up and Hideyori would be delivered into the hands of his enemies. Harunaga does not appear to have entertained any doubt as to the trustworthiness of this letter. He carried it hastily to Hideyori, who was in the act of preparing to sally out of the castle and throw himself upon the beleaguering forces.

The receipt of the letter naturally led to a change of plan, and although desperate fighting subsequently took place, the castle was finally set on fire by traitors and its fate was seen to be hopeless.

Hideyori's wife, granddaughter of Ieyasu, repaired to the Tokugawa headquarters to plead for the life of her husband and his mother. But Ieyasu was inexorable. He granted asylum to his granddaughter, but replied to her prayer by ordering a renewal of the attack upon the castle. On June 4th, Hideyori committed suicide, and his mother, Yodo, was killed by one of his retainers. Some thirty men and women killed themselves at the same time.

Men spoke of the first fruitless a.s.sault upon the castle as the "Winter Campaign," and of the second and successful a.s.sault as the "Summer Campaign." But the two operations were radically different in their character. For, whereas in the first a.s.sault the garrison--numbering something like one hundred and eighty thousand men--stood strictly on the defensive, wisely relying on the immense strength of the fortress, on the second occasion most of the fighting took place outside the walls, the garrison preferring to rely upon strategy and courage rather than on ruined parapets and half-filled moats. Thus, the details of the second campaign occupy a large s.p.a.ce in j.a.panese histories, but these tedious features of strategy and tactics are abbreviated here. There can be no doubt that Ieyasu, so far from seeking to save Hideyori's life, deliberately planned his destruction. Moreover, when it became known that an illegitimate son of Hideyori, called Kunimatsu, had been carried from the castle by some common soldiers and secreted at a farmhouse in Fushimi, Ieyasu caused this child of six to be seized and beheaded by a common executioner at Sanjo-kawara in Kyoto. This episode reflects no credit whatever on the Tokugawa leader. That he should extirpate every scion of the Toyotomi family was not inconsistent with the canons of the tune or with the interests of his own security. But death at the hands of a common executioner ought never to have been decreed for the son of the u-daijin, and the cruelty of the order finds no excuse. No tenet of bushido can be reconciled with such inhumanity.

To this chapter of history belongs the att.i.tude of Ieyasu towards the memory of his old friend and benefactor, Hideyoshi. He caused to be levelled with the ground the temple of Toyokuni Daimyo-jin, where the spirit of Hideyoshi was worshipped, and he ordered the removal of the tomb of the Taiko from Amidagamine to a remote corner of the Daibutsu enclosure. Finally, he sought and obtained the Emperor's sanction to revoke the sacred t.i.tle conferred posthumously on Hideyoshi. One looks in vain for any fragment of magnanimity among such acts. Ieyasu is reported to have avowedly adopted for guidance the precept, "Before taking any step propound to your heart the query, how about justice?" He certainly did not put any such query to his own conscience in connexion with the castle of Osaka or its inmates.

THE GENNA YEAR-PERIOD (1615-1623)

The battle of Sekigahara is often spoken of as the last great internecine campaign in j.a.panese history, but this is hardly borne out by the facts. Indeed, from what has been said above, it will be seen that Sekigahara was merely a prelude to Osaka, and that the former stood to the latter almost in the relation of a preliminary skirmish. It is from August, 1615, that we must date the commencement of the long period of peace with which j.a.pan was blessed under Tokugawa rule. The year-name was then changed to Genna.

DEATH OF IEYASU

In February, 1616, Ieyasu fell sick, and in April the Emperor sent an envoy to confer on him the t.i.tle of dajo daijin. He expired a few days afterwards at the age of seventy-five and was apotheosized as Tosho Dai-Gongen (Light of the East and Great Incarnation). He was buried on the summit of Mount Kuno in Suruga, and ultimately his ashes were carried to Nikko for interment. It is recorded, though not on independent authority, that when his end was drawing near he spoke to those at his side in the folio whig terms: "My death is now in sight, but happily the country is at peace, and Hidetada has already discharged the duties of shogun for several years. I have, therefore, no cause for anxiety. If, after I am gone, Hidetada should make any failure in his administration of public affairs, or if he should lose control of the people, any one of you to whom the Imperial order may be addressed, should a.s.sume the functions of shogun, for, as you well know, that post is not the property of this or that person in particular, nor will my rest in the grave be disturbed though such an event occurs."

Another record, however, represents Ieyasu as following the example of the Taiko and conjuring his most trusted retainers to devote their strength to the support of the Tokugawa family. To Hidetada he is said to have suggested the advisability of compelling the daimyo to remain in Yedo for three full years after his (Ieyasu's) demise, in order to test thoroughly their att.i.tude. Hidetada replied that while most unwilling to reject his father's advice, his intention was to allow the feudatories to leave Yedo at once, and if any one of them evinced hostile feeling by shutting himself up in his castle, he, Hidetada, would follow him thither and level his parapets with the ground. Such an object lesson was, in his opinion, the best stepping-stone to supremacy. Ieyasu is reported to have received this answer with profound satisfaction, and to have declared that he was now a.s.sured of the permanence of peace. He then had all his sons called to his side and enjoined upon them the duty of serving the shogun faithfully. To his grandson, Iemitsu, he specially addressed himself, saying: "It will fall to your lot, some day, to govern the country. On that day remember that benevolence should be the first principle of a ruler."

CHARACTER OF IEYASU

Frugality is one of the virtues which Ieyasu certainly possessed.

Striking example of its display is connected with Yedo Castle. This fortress, as built originally by Ota Dokwan, was not of imposing dimensions even as a military stronghold, and the dwelling-house in the keep presented most homely features, having a thatched roof and a porch of rough boat-planks. Yet Ieyasu was content to make this edifice his palace, and while he devoted much care to strengthening the fortifications, he bestowed none on the enlargement and adornment of the dwelling. The system he adopted to populate the city may be said to have been colonial. He encouraged his va.s.sals to settle there, giving them lands to cultivate and breeding-grounds for horses, so that within a brief time the city obtained numerous inhabitants and developed a prosperous condition. It was in planning the details of all enterprises that he particularly excelled. To everything he brought an almost infinite capacity of patient study and minute examination; his principle being that to achieve success the first desideratum is to avoid mistakes. Doubtless he owed this faculty of profound painstaking to the vicissitudes of his early life. The years that he pa.s.sed under the control of the Imagawa and afterwards under that of Oda taught him patience and self-restraint, and made the study of literature obligatory for him, at the same time begetting in his mind a feeling of reverence for the Buddhist faith.

j.a.panese historians generally credit him with the virtues of humanity, magnanimity, justice, and affability. That he was always pleased to receive advice from others and that he set an example of courtesy and zeal, there can be no doubt. Neither will anyone deny that his resourcefulness amounted to genius. On the other hand, his record shows that he was unscrupulous in utilizing opportunities, whether created by himself or made accessible by fortune, and from the same record we are compelled to infer that he could be cruel and implacable on occasion. His favourite sayings afford perhaps the best index that we possess to his disposition:--

Man's life is like a long journey toiling under a heavy burden.

Never be in a hurry.

He that regards dest.i.tution as his habitual lot will never feel the pressure of want.

When the spirit of ambition arises in your bosom, recall the days of your distress.

To forbear is the source of harmlessness and the road to success.